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A new dialogue is beginning between students of international law and international relations scholars concerning compliance with international agreements. This article advances some basic propositions to frame that dialogue. First, it proposes that the level of compliance with international agreements in general is inherently unverifiable by empirical procedures. That nations generally comply with their international agreements, on the one hand, or that they violate them whenever it is in their interest to do so, on the other, are not statements of fact or even hypotheses to be tested. Instead, they are competing heuristic assumptions. Some reasons why the background assumption of a propensity to comply is plausible and useful are given. Second, compliance problems very often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of advantage. The article proposes a variety of other reasons why states may deviate from treaty obligations and why in many circumstances those reasons are properly accepted by others as justifying apparent departures from treaty norms. Third, the treaty regime as a whole need not and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance that is "acceptable" in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to safeguard. How the acceptable level is determined and adjusted is considered.

International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments

Hip protectors appear to be effective in reducing the incidence of hip fractures. However, compliance is often poor. Therefore, the objective of this study was to examine the compliance and determinants of compliance with external hip protectors. A prospective study was performed in residents from apartment houses for the elderly, homes for the elderly and nursing homes with a high risk for hip fracture (n = 276). The study was performed within the framework of the Amsterdam Hip Protector Study, a randomized controlled trial examining the effect of external hip protectors on the incidence of hip fractures. Compliance was assessed by unannounced visits at 1, 6 and 12 months after inclusion in the study. During the visits, a member of the research team checked whether the participant was wearing the hip protector and, if so, whether it was worn correctly. Furthermore, data on potential determinants of compliance were collected by interviewing the participants or their nurses. Compliance was 60.8% after 1 month (n = 217), 44.7% after 6 months (n = 246), and 37.0% after 12 months (n = 230). Of those wearing the hip protector, 86.7%, 91.7% and 96.5% of the participants were wearing the hip protector correctly after 1, 6 and 12 months respectively; and 14.8%, 16.1% and 8.8% respectively reported wearing the hip protector at night. Compliance after 12 months was predicted by the compliance after 1 month (RR = 2.04; 90% CI: 1.05-3.96). Furthermore, people who experienced one or more falls in the half year before baseline had a lower probability of being compliant at 6 months (RR = 0.72; 90% CI: 0.52-0.99). In conclusion, compliance is a very important issue in hip protector research and implementation. Although, the compliance percentages were moderately high during the unannounced visits in this study, not everyone was wearing the protector correctly and most participants did not wear the hip protector during the night. © International Osteoporosis Foundation and National Osteoporosis Foundation 2003.

A compliance model is developed and tested using a survey of corporate officials and the regulatory arena of equal employment opportunity. Findings support the economic model of compliance in its conclusion that probability of detection and probable level of sanctions influence compliance decisions. (Original abstract-amended)