Search results

Conflict prevention was high on the agendas of both the EU & the UN in 2001, resulting in the release of major reports & ensuing high-level debates. The reports document the efforts of the EU & the UN to practically implement their new commitment to conflict prevention. Both the EU & the UN have emphasized long-term preventive efforts focused on the root causes of armed conflicts. This calls for an integrated approach & improved coordination among actors. In practice, however, this is difficult as preventive efforts in West Africa & Zimbabwe illustrate. The annex lists figures for current multilateral peace operations in 2001. For the first time since 1996 no new UN peace operation was launched. The limited size & scope of the five new multilateral missions meanwhile illustrate the increasing caution of the international states & organizations toward new operations as the costs of such commitments are realized. 1 Figure, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.

Akashi, Y.: Actors, tools and mechanisms for conflict prevention at the global level. - S. 1-4 Yeo Lay Hwee; Zaur, Ian; Ekeroth, M.: Conflict map of Southeast Asia. - S. 5-20 Kreuzer, P.: The Mindanao conflict : ripe for resolution? - S. 21-32 Pasch, P.: The North Korean nuclear crisis : last exit Beijing. - S. 33-42 Lebédel, E.; Fort, B.: The conflict map of Europe : from Mars to Venus? - S. 43-56 Vetschera, H.: Early warning in the Yugoslav crisis and the development of instruments : a European perspective. - S. 57-70 Schettini, R.: Migration from Africa to Europe. - S. 71-78 Berger, B.; Ekerroth, M.; Iglesias, S.: Report on proceedings of the 4th Asia-Europe Roundtable. - S. 79-87

Mediation is a popular process to prevent conflicts over common resources, but there is little clean insight into its effectiveness and mechanisms. Our experimental approach allows for a comprehensive analysis of third-party intervention into potential conflicts and circumvents key problems linked to the analysis of field data. A mediator who credibly threatens punishment in the case of uncooperative behavior achieves the efficient solution in most cases. Similar results are obtained even if the mediator is biased toward one party or has no incentive to intervene. When cooperation fails, communication without credible punishment threats leads to particularly low payouts for the "losing" party. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]