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This item is part of the Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements (PRISM) digital collection, a collaborative initiative between Florida Atlantic University and University of Central Florida in the Publication of Archival, Library & Museum Materials (PALMM).

Url: http://josc.selcuk.edu.tr/article/view/1075000407 ; Bu makale, Türkiye'de toplumsal muhafazakarlıkla örtüşen siyasi muhafazakarlığı kültürel, ekonomik yönleriyle incelerken, medyatik olarak muhafazakarlığın tahrifini araştırmayı amaçlamıştır. Menderes ve Özal dönemlerinde görüldüğü gibi, literatürde "yaratıcı", "tepkisel" ve "liberal" özelliklerle adı konan ve toplumsal muhafazakarlıkla örtüşen Türk siyasi muhafazakar-lığının nasıl ve ne şekilde statükoculuğa ya da egemenlerin düzenine dönüştüğü belirlenmiştir. 1980'lerden sonra özellikle ticari televizyon kanallarının yayın hayatına girmesiyle, toplumsal muhafazakarlığın kendini temsil imkanı bulunmakla beraber, ilerleyen zaman içinde, tıpkı siyasi statükoculukta olduğu gibi, "halk böyle istiyor!" ya da "hükümetçe söylem"lerle medyatik muhafazakarlığın da statükoculuğa ya da egemenlerin düzenini temsil etmeye başladığı ve böylesi bir temsiliyetin kendini yeniden üretemeyecek bir biçimde kitleselleşme sürecine yapmış olduğu katkı vurgulanmıştır.

Executive summary Prior research shows that accounting conservatism exists in mature economies. However there is not too much research about accounting conservatism in transitional economies. This paper analyses the influence of institutional and political factors on accounting conservatism in Eastern European countries which have already joined the European Union. I researched the levels of unconditional and conditional conservatism in Eastern Europe and compared them with Western European results. I did not find evidence that there is conditional conservatism in Eastern Europe. My research shows that there was conditional conservatism only in Poland during the analyzed period. I found significant evidence proving my expectations regarding the influence of the quality of law, securities law and the risk of expropriation on conditional conservatism.

A review of Roger Scruton's Conservatism: An Invitation to the Great Tradition, arguing that while Scruton's historical discussion is illuminating, situating conservatism in dialogue with liberalism, his agenda for taking conservatism forward, involving a focus on political correctness and religious extremism, is very limited, not only ignoring a number of other very serious political issues, but also failing to speak to the concerns of non-conservatives.

The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism's problematic relationship with relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical conservatism's ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements – such as seeing irrational decisions or the demands of "life" as the basis of politics – to discredit notions of universal political morality and law, thereby underpinning their authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist. ; peerReviewed

According to the game-theoretic model of monetary policy, inflation is the consequence of time-inconsistent behavior of the monetary authority. The inflation bias can be eased by handing over the responsibility for monetary policy to an independent central bank and appointing a weight-conservative central banker. Countries around the world chose different combinations of central bank independence and conservatism. Most of the existing empirical studies concentrate on measuring legal or factual central bank independence thereby neglecting the degree of conservatism of the monetary authorities. In this paper we show how a joint empirical measure of central bank independence and conservatism can be derived from factual central bank behavior. Based on a panel logit approach we estimate measures of effective monetary policy conservatism for a sample of 11 OECD countries.

The consequences of Foucault's work for political theory have been subject to much reinterpretation. This article examines the reception of Foucault's work by the left of politics and argues that the use made of his work is overly negative and lacks a positive political dimension. Through a discussion of the work of Judith Butler and other interpreters of Foucault I argue that the problem facing the poststructuralist left is formulated in a confusing and unhelpful manner, what I will call the 'dilemma of the left libertarian'. Once we get around this formulation of the problem a more progressive political response becomes possible. I end by discussing the political possibilities of Foucault's work in terms of an account of autonomy derived from Foucault's later work on the Enlightenment. KEY WORDS: Foucault, Butler, Autonomy, Politics, Ethics, Critique, Left, Conservative, Rorty, Habermas

We study the information consequences of conservatism in accounting. Prior research shows that information asymmetries in capital markets lead to firm-level increases in conservatism. In this paper, we further argue that increases in conservatism improve the firm information environment and lead to subsequent decreases in information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. We predict and test if this decrease in information asymmetries manifests itself through: (a) a decrease in the bid-ask spread and in stock-returns volatility, and (b) an improved information environment for financial analysts, leading to more precise and less dispersed forecasts, and to more analysts following the firm. Using a large US sample for the period 1977-2007 and several proxies for conservatism we find robust evidence consistent with our expectations. Our results are in line with conservatism being useful not only for debt-holders, but also for equity-holders. ; We acknowledge financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (ECO2010–19314, ECO2008–06238/ECON and SEJ2007-67582/ECON), the ICJCE/AT1 UAM-Auditores Madrid Chair, IESE Research Division, the Government of Comunidad de Madrid (Grant CCG10-UC3M/HUM-4760) and the AECA Chair in Accounting and Auditing.

Conservatism in the United States can seem perplexing from a European perspective. It is also under-theorized in many branches of the humanities, including literary and cultural studies. The international conference "Cultures of US-American Conservatism" will address both of these problems by bringing together scholars from the social sciences and the humanities to explore US-American conservatism from a cultural perspective. Our approach is pluralistic. We will keep in mind that the conservative movement was never homogeneous. From its origins in anticommunism, it has grown into a loose coalition that includes evangelicals interested in traditional values, independents who become active on divisive issues such as abortion and affirmative action, libertarians, neoliberals, fiscal conservatives, foreign policy hawks, nativists, and opponents of federalism and taxation. What unites these groups is an anti-establishment and individualistic orientation defined in opposition to the allegedly "liberal" media and university system. The goal of the conference is to interrogate this orientation by placing the multiplicity of conservative politics in relation to conservative lifestyles, beliefs, attitudes, discourses, markers of taste, media outlets, and social and familial roles. ; https://conservatismconference2017.wordpress.com/

At the core of literary decadence is a conflicted relationship with modernity. For some decadent writers, the onset of rapid social and technological change could usher in possibilities for living and loving in hitherto unimagined ways, yet for others of a more conservative hue, modernization was to be rejected, tradition embraced. This essay argues that experience can be used as a framework for articulating these very different forms of decadence. The essay begins with an exploration of aesthetic modernity as an attempt to articulate the shock of the new, whereby the experience (present) or sensation becomes the ground for the erosion of collective tradition (experience past). Decadent and aestheticist writers such as Walter Pater, Arthur Symons, and Oscar Wilde embraced these new experiences, rejecting the "fruits of experience" as a ground for knowledge. In contradistinction to this valorization of sensation, I examine the "conservative" decadent aesthetic of Lionel Johnson and Michael Field. These writers' embrace of nostalgia and jingoistic nationalism, I argue, demands we expand our current critical frameworks to more fully encompass the politics of decadence. Edith Cooper (1862–1913), the younger half of the aunt and niece who published as Michael Field, wrote in Works and Days on New Year's Eve, 1893: "I do not yet realise where modernity is taking me."Footnote1 Among decadent writers, she was far from alone in expressing anxiety at the dramatic social and technological flux of the fin de siècle. Along with her aunt, Katharine Bradley (1846–1914), she would use a wide range of literary forms to capture, but also to critique, the experience of modernity. Yet there was little consistency either to that experience or to the literary forms that decadent writers deployed to capture it. Defining the nature of that experience and how decadent literature might respond to it is the task of this essay. Our understanding of decadence has largely glossed over the ways in which it emerges out of the "destruction of experience" that, for Giorgio Agamben, is the constituent feature of modernity. Decadent writers, I argue, responded in two very different ways (often simultaneously): either by reveling in the immediacy of sensation or by valorizing the transmission of knowledge from the past. Of these two, the former has dominated our understanding of decadence, but the latter is just as significant. This latter strain, which I will articulate as a conservative one, will be my primary focus here as I offer two examples of writers whose work emphasized the power of tradition for confronting the experience of modernity: Lionel Johnson and Michael Field.

This article investigates the major characteristics and principles of economic conservatism with an analysis of the ideas of medieval and later religious scholars in the Christian and the Muslim world, mercantilism as an economic currency of thought, and the advocacies and the campaigns of the conservative political movements and thinkers in the economic sphere to the early 20th century. It is argued in the article that these actors and phenomena have contributed to the formation of a conservative view to economy which cast itself in form of support for extensive state involvement in the economy, development of national economies, public welfare, social state, taxation of the wealth, favourable trade balance, distributive justice, agrarianism; and opposition to monopolization, black-marketing, speculation, interest, usury, luxury, indulgence, acquisition of wealth without moral concern. Particularly in the US example from 19th century onwards, reaction to capitalism was the most important second characteristic of economic conservatism after the support for an economically active state for capitalism was deemed to suffer from a substantial moral gap that threatened the social foundations of the country. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2016.v7n3p11

We study the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. Consistent with prior literature, we find that contracting induces only conditional conservatism and litigation induces both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We extend prior evidence by Qiang (2007) by showing that taxation and regulation induce not only unconditional conservatism, but conditional conservatism as well. We show that in certain scenarios taxation and regulation create incentives to shift income from periods with high taxation pressure and high public scrutiny to periods with lower taxation pressure and lower public scrutiny. These income shifting strategies are implemented by recognising current economic losses that, given managerial incentives to report aggressively, would not have been recognised otherwise, or by delaying the recognition of current economic gains that would have been recognised had circumstances been different ; We acknowledge financial assistance from IESE Research Division, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2008-06238-C02-01/ECON and SEJ2007-67582-C02-02ECON), and the European Commission INTACCT Research Training Network (MRTN-CT-2006-035850)

We study the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. Consistent with prior literature, we find that contracting induces only conditional conservatism and litigation induces both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We extend prior evidence by Qiang (2007) by showing that taxation and regulation induce not only unconditional conservatism, but conditional conservatism as well. We show that in certain scenarios taxation and regulation create incentives to shift income from periods with high taxation pressure and high public scrutiny to periods with lower taxation pressure and lower public scrutiny. These income shifting strategies are implemented by recognising current economic losses that, given managerial incentives to report aggressively, would not have been recognized otherwise, or by delaying the recognition of current economic gains that would have been recognized had circumstances been different. ; The authors would also like to thank John Graham, who kindly provided estimates for the marginal tax rate. They acknowledge financial assistance from IESE Research Division, the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2008-06238-C02-01/ECON and SEJ2007-67582-C02-02/ECON), and the European Commission INTACCT Research Training Network (MRTN-CT-2006-035850) ; Publicado

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment robustly generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. Exclusive focus on inflation by the central bank recoups large part - in some cases all - of the steady state welfare losses associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment. An inflation conservative central bank tends to improve also the conduct of stabilization policy.

This article argues that the Conservative Party finds itself in a period of ideological crisis. The last significant period of intellectual realignment in the party led to the dominance of Hayekian market theory as a structuring logic for government. Under Boris Johnson, this economic logic is challenged by the political logic of neoconservatism, which restores the political through appeals to authority, hierarchy and quite particular articulations of the nature of the (national) community. To demonstrate this tension, the article examines how Brexit and the 'levelling-up' agenda can be understood as structured by this division between the economic and the political. Both of these logics are incompatible with older, traditional forms of conservatism and whichever is ultimately successful, this signals a major shift in the character of British conservatism and potentially ushers in a new era of conservatism without tradition.