El presente trabajo busca examinar la manera como la educación en los años cincuenta del siglo XX, fundamentada a partir de la enseñanza de la historia patria, la educación cívica y la religión, en el municipio de Puebloviejo (hoy Aquitania, en Boyacá), incidió en la conformación de la sociedad, durante los años de la violencia, 1946-1965. Esto es, durante el periodo de los gobiernos conservadores de Ospina Pérez y Laureano Gómez, la dictadura de Rojas Pinilla y las dos primeras administraciones del Frente Nacional. Así, se considera al sistema educativo, a partir de la enseñanza de las tres disciplinas mencionadas, como fundamento de la conformación social, política y económica de un municipio de Boyacá (aun cuando el sistema educativo redundaría en el ámbito nacional), y que contribuiría a legitimar un orden social existente: la desigualdad social y económica, mediante los postulados de la historia, la educación cívica y la religión. Para ello, se parte del análisis de la sociedad del Puebloviejo de los años ochentas, caracterizada por un extremo individualismo, aun entre miembros de la sociedad anteriormente excluidos. Ese individualismo estaría dado por el auge económico del monocultivo de la cebolla larga, introducido a mediados de la década de los años sesenta, el cual contribuyó "liberar" a gran parte de la sociedad que permanecía sujeta a los patrones, sin remuneración salarial durante los años cincuenta. Esta distinción individualista conllevó una amplia diferenciación social y económica, cuyo origen se advertiría en la desigual distribución y tenencia de la tierra, donde una minoría ostentaba grandes propiedades, mientras la mayoría carecía de ésta o disponía de pequeñas propiedades. Aun más, la característica primaria en la tenencia de la tierra de una importante fracción de la sociedad se hizo patente en el minifundio, el cual, con el cambio en la producción agrícola en los años sesenta, se expresaría en el alto valor de la tierra, así como en los conflictos que surgirían por el corrimiento de linderos. En tal virtud, se parte de hacer un análisis del presente para indagar en el pasado sus orígenes, como parece desprenderse de la propuesta de investigación histórica de Josep Fontana. Al mismo tiempo, la pretensión del trabajo es la de partir del examen de una realidad nacional para llegar a una realidad local, pues se deduce que el sistema educativo imperante en la época de estudio cubría la totalidad del país, y que redundaría en la concepción de la realidad de un grupo social específico. Por tanto, el trabajo se inscribe en el ámbito de la historia de la educación, no ajena de la ideología política ni de los conflictos sociales y religiosos, los cuales influyen en la conformación social, económica y cultural de un pueblo. En este sentido, el trabajo recurre al método histórico, en investigación, a la vez que emplea algunas fuentes orales para corroborar y confrontar algunos datos bibliográficos. ; Abstract. The purpose of the current work is to examine how education in the fifties of the twentieth century, based on the teaching of homeland history, civic education and religion, in the municipality of Puebloviejo (today Aquitania, in Boyacá), affected the conformation of society, during the years of violence, 1946-1965. That is, during the period of Ospina Perez' and Laureano Gómez' conservative governments, Rojas Pinilla's dictatorship and the two first National Front administrations. Thus, the educational system, based on the teaching of the three disciplines mentioned above, is considered the foundation of the social, political and economic conformation of a municipality of Boyacá (even though the educational system would be national), and that would contribute to legitimize an existing social order: social and economic inequality, through the postulates of history, civic education and religion. To do this, we start with the analysis of the Puebloviejo society in the 1980s, characterized by extreme individualism, even among previously excluded members of society. This individualism would be due to the economic boom of the spring onion monoculture, introduced in the mid- 1960s, which contributed to "release" a large part of the society which remained subject to the bosses, without salary remuneration during the fifties. This individualistic distinction entailed a wide social and economic differentiation, whose origin would be noticed in the unequal distribution and possession of land, where a minority boasted great properties, while most of the people lacked of land or had small properties. Moreover, the primary characteristic of the land possession of an important fraction of society was evident in the minifundio (small plots), which would be expressed in the high value of the land, with the change of the agricultural production in the 1960s, as well as in the conflicts that would arise by the landslide. In this way, the starting point is the analysis of the present to investigate its origins in the past, as it can be deduced from Josep Fontana's historical research proposal. At the same time, the pretension of this work is to start from the examination of a national reality to reach a local one, since it is inferred that the educational system which prevailed in the time of the study covered the entire country, and would redound to the conception of the reality by a specific social group. Therefore, the work is part of education history, connected to political ideology and social and religious conflicts, which influence the social, economic and cultural conformation of a town. In this sense, the work uses the historical method in research, while using some oral sources to corroborate and confront some bibliographic data. Following these presuppositions, and taking into account that the education of the fifties influenced the conception of the world (and even the cultural conformation), of society, starting with the teaching of fatherland history, Civic education and religion, displacing the community values acquired during the Liberal governments of the 1930s, and generating gradually an intolerant society, is the manner to seek how this process was implemented. In this direction, the work is divided into four parts, which look for the answer to the question raised a a guide of this work: in the period of Violence (1946-1965) how political and religious ideology affected the school and its educational programs, contributing to the transformation and conformation of the present society of the municipality of Aquitaine, in the basin of the Lake of Tota, Boyacá? Thus, the three initial chapters attempt to warn and show the process of formation of an intolerant society, which would take place at the national level and reach the local one, which are in this case the towns of Boyacá. That process would begin in the full Liberal Republic, through the attack to the clergy, the intelligentsia and the conservative party, in Laureano Gómez' leading voice, to the constitutional reform of 1936. This process should also be reinforced through the educational system that became confessional based on the educational counter-reform of 1948 and 1950, which sought to increase the hours of homeland history, civic education and religion in education, and whose contents were imbued of exclusion and intolerance. The hard attack that the liberal government faced during the sixteen years of administration by conservatism and clergy, as well as the confessional educational Counter-reformation, led to the fragmentation and ideological polarization of society, whose differences would be expressed in violence, with a probable balance of more than three hundred thousand victims. To conclude it can be said that the four parts that make up this work have as a purpose to explain how the educational system of the 1950s helped to the formation of an intolerant society, while contributing to legitimize a social and economic inequality in the towns of Boyacá. In that sense, the school did not release, but subdued the society at the expense of interests which were diluted among political ideology, religious beliefs and economic interests of a minority. ; Maestría
A hurricane threat, a shortened schedule, some botched scheduling and an audience that couldn't get excited in unison were just a few of the challenges that confronted the Republican Party's Convention that concluded this past week in Tampa, Florida. The main purpose was to reintroduce Mitt Romney to the file and rank of his own party as well as to the wider national audience and to show that, besides business experience and his CEO approach to politics, the man is also human. With the help of Ann Romney, this was arguably accomplished. However, once humanized, the candidate had to convey a compelling message, a vision of the future that would sway the 8% undecided, and convert the anti-Obama into pro-Romney voters. In this, the Convention fell short. His strategic efforts as a candidate in the Primary Election were dedicated to convincing the right wing of the Republican party that his ideas and values had "evolved "from his times of governor of Massachusetts: he is now pro-life and not pro-choice, and his signature health care reform for that state, based on an individual mandate, had very little resemblance to Obamacare. He succeeded then, but these ultra conservative positions alienated two fundamental blocs of voters he will need for the general election, namely, women and Latinos. Indeed, the gender gap puts Obama ahead, with 51% of women voting for Obama and 41% for Romney. The Latino voter gap is at 63% for Obama to 28% for Romney. The campaign's political calculation was thus to use the Convention to appeal to the wider audience by showing the party's "diversity", by "humanizing" the candidate and by convincing the Evangelical right that being Mormon is not a monstrosity. Testimonials by members of his congregation, a convincing speech by Ann Romney and a black- and- white biographical video succeeded in meeting this goal. We learned that Mr. Romney is a wonderful husband and father, a patient man who tries to live by a set of values; that his years as head of a Mormon community were devoted to helping the needy, accompanying the lonely and counseling the troubled. It was also revealed that his tithing was uncommonly and consistently generous. The Convention was carefully staged to show younger, more diverse GOP "rising stars" in order to bring into the fold some of still persuadable minorities. Paul Ryan, the Catholic, strictly anti- abortion 42-year old that completes the ticket, gave an ideological speech that charmed the older generation, with references to "central-planners" and direct attacks on Obama's "socialist" policies, using what could be described at best as half-truths. A great admirer of atheist right-wing writer Ayn Rand, Ryan, a Representative from Wisconsin, rose to fame this past year by presenting a budget plan that would lower taxes for the upper-income bracket, privatize Medicare and harshly restrict social programs. Portraying himself as a compassionate conservative, he is supposed to bring in the Catholic vote. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Florida Senator Marco Rubio used their personal stories aptly and were able to get two of the few electrifying moments of the Convention. Rice's appearance was important after a period of what seemed to be her retirement from politics; she talked optimistically about America, its unbound freedoms, its role as an underwriter of world order, and unquestionably, the land of exceptional opportunity: channeling Obama, she offered her story as a testament of these possibilities. In spite of growing up in the Jim Crow South, she rose to Secretary of State and here she was today, the first "stateswoman" of the Republican Party. Rubio, a fresh-faced 41 year old and the son of working class Cuban immigrants, was the Latino version of the same idea. He had the difficult task of introducing Mitt Romney after the audience was still puzzled at Clint Eastwood's imaginary dialogue with President Obama (represented by an empty chair). After an awkward moment during which the seniors in the audience were still trying to process the meaning of Eastwood's sometimes off-color parody, Rubio managed the transition quite well and soon people were paying him undivided attention. One of the best-received portions was an anecdote about his father, who worked for years at a bar. "He stood behind a bar in the back of the room all those years, so one day I could stand behind a podium in the front of a room," Rubio said, bringing in a huge applause. There were many of these "rag-to-riches" stories aimed at reassuring the viewers that the candidate's wealth is not an obstacle to Romney and Ryan's newly found empathic conservatism. Mitt Romney's entrance along a cordoned red carpet, shaking hands and nodding to groups of supporters on each side, as well as the first few lines of his acceptance speech were shrewdly staged to evoke the State of the Union address. In line with the general theme, he devoted two thirds of his speech to his own biography and very little to the specifics of his economic agenda. While conventions are seldom memorable affairs, and while this one is most likely going to be remembered by the bizarre spectacle of actor Clint Eastwood talking, at times incoherently, to an empty chair, there were other minor headlines running parallel to it that deserve more attention for what they reveal of the long-term GOP plan to re-take government. Under the pretext that voter fraud is prevalent in presidential elections (a claim unsubstantiated by serious research), at least 14 Republican-dominated state legislatures, mostly (but not all) in the South, have been quietly passing new laws aimed at making the act of voting more difficult in those states. The intention is clear: to keep just enough demographic groups likely to vote for the Democrats (namely, young people and minorities) away from the polls. This voter suppression strategy takes different forms, the most prevalent of which is requiring the presentation of government- issued photo IDs, such as a driver's license or a US passport, at the polls It is a well-known fact that many elderly minorities and disabled citizens who don't drive lack these (Social Security cards in the US do not have photos, and there is not voting document such as a "credencial civica" in the US). These groups of people would have a hard time getting one, sometimes requiring them to travel miles away to get to the closest Public Safety office. In the case of young students, university-issued student identification cards for the most part are not accepted at the polls. Other bills and rules were aimed at shortening early voting time frames, repealing Election Day registration laws, and preventing non-profit, non-partisan groups such as the League of Women Voters from organizing voter registration campaigns. This week, however, a three-judge panel of the Federal District Court in Washington DC struck down a Texas voter ID law. Two days earlier, a different three-judge panel for the same court found that, in its redrawing of the electoral-district map (a practice that takes place every ten years following a national Census), the Texas legislature had intentionally discriminated against minority voters More important than any platform, more lasting than any emotional appeal to voters, voter suppression attempts constitute a politically divisive outrage that goes to the heart of our democracy. Indeed, it is unfathomable that over a century and a half after the Emancipation Proclamation and the Fifteenth Amendment, and half a century after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, minorities in the United States still have to rely on the court system to protect their right to vote. In a presidential election year and with a race as tight as the one we are about to witness in two months, voter turnout is fundamental. Laws aimed at discouraging citizens to vote are a surreptitiously shrewd, anti-democratic way to ensure victory.
Why "aporophobia"—rejection of the poor—is one of the most serious problems facing the world today, and how we can fight itIn this revelatory book, acclaimed political philosopher Adela Cortina makes an unprecedented assertion: the biggest problem facing the world today is the rejection of poor people. Because we can't recognize something we can't name, she proposes the term "aporophobia" for the pervasive exclusion, stigmatization, and humiliation of the poor, which cuts across xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, and other prejudices. Passionate and powerful, Aporophobia examines where this nearly invisible daily attack on poor people comes from, why it is so harmful, and how we can fight it.Aporophobia traces this universal prejudice's neurological and social origins and its wide-ranging, pernicious consequences, from unnoticed hate crimes to aporophobia's threat to democracy. It sheds new light on today's rampant anti-immigrant feeling, which Cortina argues is better understood as aporophobia than xenophobia. We reject migrants not because of their origin, race, or ethnicity but because they seem to bring problems while offering nothing of value. And this is unforgivable in societies that enshrine economic exchange as the supreme value while forgetting that we can't create communities worth living in without dignity, generosity, and compassion for all. Yet there is hope, and Cortina explains how we can overcome the moral, social, and political disaster of aporophobia through education and democratic institutions, and how poverty itself can be eradicated if we choose.In a world of migrant crises and economic inequality, Aporophobia is essential for understanding and confronting one of the most serious problems of the twenty-first century
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The New Political Economy1 is based on the postulate of homo politicus that Downs (1957) presents as the clone of homo oeconomicus, a rational agent mo- tivated by the maximisation of his material self-interest. Goodin and Roberts (1975) were the first to propose an alternative to the homo politicus postulate by introducing the notion of 'ethical voter' 2. The 'ethical voter' describes a rational agent who is not only motivated by the maximisation of his short term material self-interest but also by the promotion of what he considers as fair for the society as a whole. There have been so far only few attempts to model 'ethical voting'. Most of them liken 'ethical voting' to caring about the well-being of the worst-off when voting (see Snyder and Kramer (1988), Kranich (2001) and Galasso (2003)). Alesina and Angeletos (2005) constitute an exception. Following responsibility-based theories of justice, they assume that individuals share the conviction that one deserves the income on the basis of his skill and effort and that only luck creates unfair differences they are consequently willing to compensate. However, the 'responsibility cut' (Dworkin (1981)) used by Alesina and Angeletos (2005) lacks justification, should one consider the theoretical literature on fair redistribution or the empirical literature on individual opinions on distributive justice. I propose to analyze 'ethical voting' in a more comprehensive way. The thread of this work is a 'fair utility function'. More precisely, I specify in paper 1 a 'fair utility function' to model citizens' trade-off between their self-interest and some of their major concerns for fairness. Paper 2 and paper 3 rely on the 'fair utility function' to study voting behavior over the (re)distribution of economic surpluses in different contexts of democracy4. In paper 2, my coauthor and I compute the politico-economic equilibrium that emerges when citizens are endowed with the 'fair utility function'. We model the institutional setting of a typical Western democracy where political cleavages are mainly income-based. In paper 3, I estimate the 'fair utility function'. I base my estimation on survey data that I collected in an ethnically polarized democracy where political cleavages are mainly ethnic-based. Paper 1 investigates whether concerns for fairness influence the aggregate out- come in real life interactions so that economic analysis should complete the postulate of homo economicus with the postulate of homo ethicus. I conduct a three-step analysis addressing the following research questions: • Which are the main concerns for fairness that individuals are able to show? • Do these concerns for fairness influence the aggregate outcome in the eco- nomic field? • Do these concerns for fairness influence the aggregate outcome in the po- litical field? Based on experimental evidence, I identify three main concerns for fairness likely to influence individual behaviors besides self-interest: utilitarian altru- ism, 'Rawlsian' altruism and desert-sensitivity. Utilitarian altruism consists in maximizing the sum of all utilities. 'Rawlsian' altruism consists in maximizing the utility of the worst-off. Desert-sensitivity consists in weighting one's con- cerns for fairness towards others, should they be utilitarian altruistic concerns or 'Rawlsian' altruistic concerns, depending on these others' deservingness with respect to their responsibility characteristics. I find out that concerns for fairness have no impact on market aggregate out- comes, should I focus on markets involving complete contracts or on markets involving incomplete contracts. I provide evidence that concerns for fairness have a significant impact on po- litical aggregate outcomes. More particularly, concerns for fairness (utilitarian altruism, 'Rawlsian' altruism, and desert-sensitivity) seem to express through citizens' position on a liberalism/conservatism scale which ultimately impacts their voting behavior. However, evidence also shows that ethnic prejudice, an unambiguously unfair motivation, constitutes a serious challenger to individual concerns for fairness, even in the Western democratic context where political parties are officially divided along income-based, not ethnic-based, lines. My findings suggest that economic theory in general (and the New Political Economy in particular) should pay more attention to the modelling of ethical voting behaviors to improve its explanatory and predictive power. I propose a provisional 'fair utility function' to model citizens' trade-off between their self-interest and the three various concerns for fairness which are utilitarian altruism, 'Rawlsian' altruism and desert-sensitivity. • Which is the politico-economic equilibrium emerging in a society where individuals are endowed with the 'fair utility function'? We study a simple voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parame- ter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy where political cleavages are income-based. We allow for heterogeneities in productivities and preferences for consumption and leisure and incorporate the incentive effects of taxation. We show that in a society where altruistic preferences are desert-sensitive, (i) strictly lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium comparedto a society where altruistic preferences are not desert-sensitive and (ii) lower or equal levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium compared to a society where preferences for redistribution are purely egoistic. We then investigate the following research question: • Can our theoretical result help explain the differences between the Ameri- can and the European social contract? Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1992 dataset, we provide empirical evidence that: (i) preferences for redistribution are not purely egoistic, (ii) desert-sensitivity induces lower support for redistribution and (iii) differences in desert-sensitivity hold between both continents, inducing lower support for redistribution among Americans compared to Europeans. We see two apparent explanations helping to understand why preferences for re- distribution are more desert-sensitive among individuals in the US than among individuals in Europe (see Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for an extensive discussion). First, the myth of the US being the 'land of op- portunity' greatly entrenched its customs. Meanwhile, European perceptions are influenced by the historical (from medieval times till the nineteenth cen- tury) division of society into classes, where birth and nobility were the main determinants of wealth and success. Second, the American belief of undeserv- ingness of the poor may reflect racial prejudice against the black minority. Poor white voters might reduce their support for redistribution when they believe that poor black citizens also benefit from redistribution (see Luttmer (2001) for strong empirical evidence). Roemer et al. (2007) find out that marginal income taxes would have been much higher when racial prejudice would have been absent. They believe that racial prejudice is the major underlying factor explaining why in the US, while the past twenty years were characterized by a sharp rise in inequality, the effective marginal income taxes have fallen. • In an ethnically polarized country, does aversion towards inter-ethnic in- equity induce citizens to vote for a party promoting an equitable allocation of national resources among ethnic groups?5 or, in other words, Could ethical voting help reduce risks of conflict in ethnically polarized countries? Relying on data collected among students from Addis Ababa University, my answer is threefold. First, I show that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity significantly lowers university students' temptation to vote for their ethnic party. This finding is encouraging. Under my initial assumption that the degree of ethical concerns of university students constitute an upper bound of the degree of ethical concerns of the average citizen, this finding indeed suggests that ethical concerns could also influence his voting behavior. In other words, nationwide civic education programmes could be a promising conflict-reducing strategy in ethnically po- larized countries. Finkel (2002, 2003) provides evidence that civic education programs have a significant impact on participants' 'political tolerance', while his concept of 'political tolerance' is close to our notion of 'aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity'. Second, I find out that, though significant, the relative impact of ethical concerns is very small in comparison to the impact of ethnic group loyalty, an important determinant of ethnic voting. This finding is discouraging since it suggests that the relative impact of ethical concerns will be even lower across a more representative sample of the Ethiopian population. In other words, the 'return' on nationwide civic education programmes in terms of switch from ethnic voting to ethical voting is expected to be low. Third, I analyse the sociodemographic determinants of university students' aver- sion towards inter-ethnic inequity and ethnic group loyalty. I provide confirma- tion that some specific sociodemographic characteristics significantly (i) increase the degree of aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity and (ii) lower ethnic group loyalty. Those characteristics have in common that they reduce the 'psycholog- ical' distance between ethnic groups, like living in a cosmopolitan city and hav- ing parents belonging to different ethnic groups (see Atchade and Wantchekon (2006) for a first evidence). Besides, I find that ethnic group loyalty is par- ticularly strong among ethnic groups experiencing a severe level of grievance. Finally, evidence shows that aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity depends pos- itively on the income of the household in which the respondent grew up in. ; La politique de la Nouvelle Economy1 est basée sur le postulat de l'homo politicus qui Downs (1957) présente comme le clone de l'homo oeconomicus, un agent rationnel mo- tivé par la maximisation de son intérêt matériel. Goodin et Roberts (1975) ont été les premiers à proposer une alternative à l'homo politicus postulat en introduisant la notion de «électeur éthique» 2. Le «éthiques des électeurs »désigne un agent rationnel qui n'est pas seulement motivé par la maximisation de son matériel à court terme l'intérêt mais aussi par la promotion de ce qu'il considère comme équitable pour la société dans son ensemble. Il ya eu jusqu'ici que peu de tentatives pour le modèle «vote éthique». La plupart d'entre eux vote éthiques assimiler »pour veiller au bien-être des plus démunis au moment de voter (Voir Snyder et Kramer (1988), Kranich (2001) et Galasso (2003)). Alesina et Angeletos (2005) constituent une exception. À la suite de la responsabilité fondée sur théories de la justice, ils supposent que les individus partagent la conviction que l'on mérite le revenu, sur la base de ses compétences et de l'effort et que la chance ne crée différences injustes, ils sont donc prêts à compenser. Toutefois, le «Couper la responsabilité» (Dworkin (1981)) utilisé par Alesina et Angeletos (2005) n'a pas justification, doit-on considérer la littérature théorique sur la redistribution équitable ou la littérature empirique sur les opinions individuelles sur la justice distributive. Je me propose d'analyser «vote éthique» d'une manière plus globale. Le fil de ce travail est une «fonction d'utilité équitable». Plus précisément, je précise en papier 1 une «fonction d'utilité équitable» au modèle des citoyens compromis entre leur intérêt personnel et certaines de leurs préoccupations majeures pour l'équité. Livre 2 et document 3 compter sur la «fonction d'utilité équitable» pour étudier le comportement des électeurs au cours de la (re) distribution des excédents économiques dans différents contextes de democracy4. Dans le document 2, mon coauteur et je calculer l'équilibre politico-économique qui émerge quand les citoyens sont dotés de la «fonction d'utilité équitable». Nous modélisons les institutionnels création d'une démocratie occidentale typique où les clivages politiques sont principalement fondée sur le revenu. Dans le document 3, je estimer la «fonction d'utilité équitable». Je me base estimation des données d'enquête que j'ai pu recueillir dans une démocratie ethniquement polarisés où les clivages politiques sont principalement fondées sur l'ethnie. Document 1 cherche à savoir si les préoccupations d'équité pour l'influence sur l'ensemble- viennent dans les interactions réelles de sorte que l'analyse économique devrait compléter le postulat de l'homo economicus avec le postulat de l'homo ETHICUS. -Je effectuer une analyse en trois étapes l'étude des questions suivantes: • Quelles sont les principales préoccupations d'équité que les individus sont en mesure de spectacle? • Ne ces préoccupations pour l'équité influence le résultat global de l'éco- domaine économique? • Ne ces préoccupations pour l'équité influence le résultat global de la po- litical domaine? Sur la base de données expérimentales, je identifier trois principales préoccupations pour l'équité susceptibles d'influencer les comportements individuels en plus de l'intérêt: utilitaire ALTRU- ISM, «l'altruisme rawlsienne et désert sensibilité. l'altruisme utilitariste consiste à maximiser la somme de tous les services publics. «Altruisme rawlsienne» consiste à maximiser l'utilité des plus démunis. Desert sensibilité consiste en un coefficient de con- préoccupations d'équité envers les autres, devraient-ils être utilitaires préoccupations altruistes ou «préoccupations altruistes rawlsienne», selon le caractère méritoire de ces autres avec fonction de leurs caractéristiques responsabilité. Je trouve que les préoccupations d'équité n'ont pas d'impact sur le marché global hors vient, dois-je mettre l'accent sur les marchés portant sur des contrats complets ou sur les marchés impliquant des contrats incomplets. Je fournis des éléments de preuve que les préoccupations d'équité ont un impact significatif sur le Po- litical résultats globaux. Plus particulièrement, les préoccupations d'équité (utilitaires l'altruisme, «l'altruisme rawlsienne», et le désert de sensibilité) semblent exprimer à travers citoyens position sur une échelle de libéralisme conservatisme qui a un impact à terme leur comportement de vote. Toutefois, la preuve montre également que les préjugés ethniques, une ambiguïté déloyale motivation, constitue un concurrent sérieux aux préoccupations individuelles pour l'équité, même dans le contexte occidental de démocratie où les partis politiques sont officiellement répartis le long de revenus, pas à base ethnique, des lignes. Mes résultats suggèrent que la théorie économique en général (et les nouveaux enjeux politiques Économie en particulier) devrait accorder plus d'attention à la modélisation de l'éthique les comportements de vote pour améliorer sa capacité explicative et prédictive. Je propose à titre provisoire «fonction d'utilité équitable» au modèle des citoyens compromis entre leurs l'intérêt et les trois différentes préoccupations d'équité qui sont utilitaires l'altruisme, «l'altruisme rawlsienne et désert sensibilité. • Quel est l'équilibre politico-économique émergent dans une société où les individus sont dotés de la «fonction d'utilité équitable»? Nous étudions un modèle simple de vote où une redistribution unidimensionnelle para- ter est choisi par vote à la majorité dans une démocratie directe où les clivages politiques sont fondées sur le revenu. Nous tenons compte de l'hétérogénéité dans les préférences et les productivités à la consommation et de loisirs et d'intégrer les effets incitatifs de la fiscalité. Nous montrons que dans une société où les préférences altruistes sont désertiques sensibles, (i) strictement niveaux inférieurs de la redistribution émerger dans comparedto équilibre politique d'une société où les préférences ne sont pas altruistes désert sensibles et (ii) inférieur à ou des niveaux équivalents de redistribution émerger dans l'équilibre politique par rapport à un société où les préférences pour la redistribution sont purement égoïstes. Nous avons ensuite étudier la question de recherche suivante: • Peut notre résultat théorique aider à expliquer les différences entre les Améri- peut et du contrat social européen? En utilisant les données de l'International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1992 dataset, nous fournir des preuves empiriques que: (i) les préférences pour la redistribution ne sont pas purement égoïste, (ii) du désert sensibilité induit support inférieur pour la redistribution et (iii) les différences dans le désert sensibilité tenir entre les deux continents, induisant support inférieur pour la redistribution entre les Américains contre les Européens. Nous voir deux explications apparentes aide à comprendre pourquoi les préférences pour les re- de distribution sont plus sensibles du désert entre les individus aux États-Unis que chez personnes en Europe (voir Alesina et al. (2001) et Alesina et Glaeser (2004) pour une discussion approfondie). Tout d'abord, le mythe des Etats-Unis étant le "pays de l'op- portunity «fortement enracinées ses coutumes. Pendant ce temps, les perceptions européennes sont influencés par les historiques (de l'époque médiévale jusqu'à la dix-neuvième de la CEN- siècle), une division de la société en classes, où la naissance et la noblesse ont été les principaux déterminants de la richesse et de succès. Deuxièmement, la croyance américaine de undeserv- disponibilité manifestée des pauvres peuvent refléter les préjugés raciaux contre la minorité noire. Pauvres électeurs blancs pourraient réduire leur soutien à la redistribution quand ils croient que les pauvres citoyens noirs aussi profiter de la redistribution (voir Luttmer (2001) pour de solides preuves empiriques). Roemer et al. (2007) constatent que marginal impôt sur le revenu aurait été beaucoup plus élevé lorsque les préjugés raciaux aurait été absent. Ils croient que les préjugés raciaux est le principal facteur qui sous-tendent expliquant pourquoi les États-Unis, tandis que les vingt dernières années ont été caractérisées par une forte hausse des inégalités, les impôts en vigueur du revenu marginal ont chuté. • Dans un pays ethniquement polarisés, ne aversion envers inter-ethniques en l'équité amener les citoyens à voter pour un parti de promouvoir une répartition équitable des ressources nationales entre les groupes ethniques? 5 ou, en d'autres termes, Pourriez vote éthiques aider à réduire les risques de conflit dans des environnements ethniquement polarisés pays? S'appuyant sur des données recueillies auprès des étudiants de l'Université d'Addis-Abeba, mon réponse est triple. Tout d'abord, je montre que l'aversion envers l'inégalité inter-ethniques réduit considérablement la tentation des étudiants universitaires à voter pour leur parti ethnique. Cette constatation est encourageant. Sous mon hypothèse de départ que le degré de préoccupations éthiques des étudiants constituent une limite supérieure du degré de préoccupations d'ordre éthique du citoyen moyen, cette constatation suggère en effet que les préoccupations éthiques pourraient également influer sur son comportement de vote. En d'autres termes, l'éducation civique à l'échelle nationale programmes pourraient être une stratégie prometteuse de réduction des conflits dans des environnements ethniquement po- tif pays. Finkel (2002, 2003) fournit la preuve que l'éducation civique programmes ont un impact significatif sur la tolérance des participants «politique», tandis que son concept de «tolérance politique» est proche de notre notion de «aversion envers l'inégalité inter-ethnique ». Deuxièmement, je trouve que, bien que significative, l'impact relatif des préoccupations d'ordre éthique est très faible par rapport à l'impact de la loyauté envers le groupe ethnique, un important facteur déterminant du vote ethnique. Ce résultat est décourageant, car elle suggère que l'impact relatif des préoccupations d'ordre éthique sera encore plus faible sur une plus échantillon représentatif de la population éthiopienne. En d'autres termes, le «retour» sur les programmes d'éducation civique à l'échelle nationale en termes de passage du vote ethnique au vote à l'éthique devrait être faible. Troisièmement, je analyser les déterminants socio-démographiques des étudiants de l'Université moyenne- sion vers l'inégalité inter-ethnique et loyauté envers le groupe ethnique. Je fournis des confir- tion que certaines caractéristiques socio-démographiques spécifiques de façon significative (i) augmenter le degré d'aversion pour l'inégalité inter-ethnique et (ii) inférieur à un groupe ethnique fidélité. Ces caractéristiques ont en commun qu'elles réduisent la «psycholo- iCal «distance entre les groupes ethniques, comme vivre dans une ville cosmopolite et HAV- ING parents appartenant à différents groupes ethniques (voir Atchade et Wantchekon (2006) pour une première preuve). D'ailleurs, je trouve que la fidélité groupe ethnique est par- particulièrement forte parmi les groupes ethniques connaît un niveau sévère de grief. Enfin, il est prouvé que l'aversion envers l'inégalité inter-ethnique dépend pos- itively sur le revenu du ménage dans lequel le répondant a grandi po
An eye-opening portrait of the gun sellers who navigated the social turmoil leading up to the January 6 Capitol attackGun sellers sell more than just guns. They also sell politics. Merchants of the Right sheds light on the unparalleled surge in gun purchasing during one of the most dire moments in American history, revealing how conservative political culture was galvanized amid a once-in-a-century pandemic, racial unrest, and a U.S. presidential election that rocked the foundations of American democracy.Drawing on a wealth of in-depth interviews with gun sellers across the United States, Jennifer Carlson takes readers to the front lines of the culture war over gun rights. Even though the majority of gun owners are conservative, new gun buyers are more likely to be liberal than existing gun owners. This posed a dilemma to gun sellers in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election: embrace these liberal customers as part of a new, perhaps post-partisan chapter in the American gun saga or double down on gun politics as conservative terrain. Carlson describes how gun sellers mobilized mainstays of modern conservative culture—armed individualism, conspiracism, and partisanship—as they navigated the uncertainty and chaos unfolding around them, asserting gun politics as conservative politics and reworking and even rejecting liberal democracy in the process.Merchants of the Right offers crucial lessons about the dilemmas confronting us today, arguing that we must reckon with the everyday politics that divide us if we ever hope to restore American democracy to health
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Debates over foreign policy have played an unusually significant role in the intra-Republican party debate over the last year. Disagreements over aid for Ukraine were a driving force behind former Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy's ouster from his leadership position last October. When Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) endorsed Donald Trump's 2024 presidential campaign, he cited his foreign policy record as the primary reason, and Nikki Haley has made her aggressive brand of foreign policy central to her challenge to Trump.Now, the Republican Party will undergo another meaningful transition. Mitch McConnell, who has led the Senate Republican conference since 2007, announced last week that he will step down from his long-held perch following November's elections and retire from the Senate at the end of his current term. While McConnell's decision is not explicitly about foreign policy, it is a signal that the party's views on a number of major issues, including America's role in the world, are changing."It's a body blow for the establishment, interventionist wing of the GOP," Jacob Heilbrunn, editor of The National Interest and author of two books on Republican foreign policy, tells Responsible Statecraft.To be sure, there are other elements at play. McConnell is 82. He's had a number of health events in public in recent months. A Trump return to the White House looks like a distinct possibility, and, given McConnell's apparent distaste for the former president, the Kentucky Republican may not want to contend with the pressure of working with him for another four years. Nevertheless, there are reports that McConnell is considering endorsing Trump for a second term.The majority leader, however, has said that he will serve out the rest of his term, which expires in January 2027, so the decision was not entirely informed by his personal life. "It suggests to me that some of this does have to do with the changing composition of the Senate Republican Conference," Jim Antle, executive editor of the Washington Examiner magazine, tells RS.The dynamics of that changing composition are clear: During a vote in the Senate last month on legislation that would provide foreign aid to Ukraine and Israel, 18 of the 30 Senators who were first elected before 2016 supported the bill; only four of the 19 who came to office since voted in favor.McConnell's Foreign Policy LegacyThe post-Trump years have been atypical for McConnell. During his nearly 40 years in the Senate and his 16 years as party leader — the longest such tenure in history — McConnell has rarely made foreign affairs a policy priority and has, despite criticism from conservative activists, laboriously tried to avoid inserting himself into intra-party disputes.But after his relations soured with the former president, McConnell became a symbol of the Republican old guard in Washington that was working to reverse Trump's effects on the party — with a focus on one issue in particular."Of all the ways Trump has reshaped the Republican Party, it's clear that McConnell sees the drift toward isolationism as the most pernicious — particularly at a moment when the fate of Ukraine and perhaps even NATO countries could be determined by the resolve of the Republican Party," Politico's Jonathan Martin reported last summer."I didn't really think he was that important on foreign policy until the Republican consensus on foreign policy started being challenged. And he was a leader in pushing back against those challenges," says Antle."McConnell's legacy is often considered domestic. It certainly was his area of interest," adds Curt Mills, executive director of the American Conservative. "But I think, time and again, McConnell showed himself to be essentially a kind of unreconstructed George W. Bush-style Republican on foreign policy, and really did sort of stick his neck out there as the years went on."However, McConnell's brand of conservatism, particularly on the foreign policy front, has been going out of style. It is reviled by more right-wing members of the party, and old Republican purveyors of it are aging out and retiring.The conservative House Freedom Caucus mocked the departing Senate leader after his announcement, focusing on his recent rhetoric on foreign policy. "Our thoughts are with our Democrat colleagues in the Senate on the retirement of their Co-Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (D-Ukraine)," the group posted from their account on the social media platform X.What's Next?The Senate can be a slow place to transform. Six-year terms mean that Senators are not as subject to the whims of the voter base as their counterparts in the House. The most oft-mentioned replacements for McConnell are the so-called "Three Johns" — Thune of South Dakota, Cornyn of Texas, (the third, Barrasso of Wyoming, has announced on Tuesday that he was forgoing the opportunity to replace McConnell to run for the second leadership spot instead). They are more in the mold of the current majority leader in that they have a more temperamentally conservative approach to politics, unlike some newer GOP politicians who are willing to overthrow institutional norms in Washington.Even though the Senate was a place for more establishment Republicans to have some level of power during the Trump years, Mills argues that the more "America First" wing of the party is more aware of and prepared to push for control of these levers of power. "I do think we're getting to the point now, where the Senate Leader is high profile enough that they can't be this major outlier on the policy," he tells RS. In addition, he says, anybody in the party who has national aspirations will have to advocate for some degree of foreign policy restraint.In terms of policy, the most crucial question confronting Congress is the future of aid to Ukraine. McConnell has been a strong advocate for continuing aid and, for the time being, the spending package is stuck in the House of Representatives. If the House blocks passage of the bill or passes a different version of it, the Senate GOP's position on the issue will once again be tested. The Republican conference had largely been supportive of aiding Ukraine, but the most recent bill passed with support from fewer than half of the members.Despite facing criticism from conservative activists, McConnell has rarely been on the losing side of any debates within the Republican Party during his time as leader, says Antle. Ukraine aid could prove to be a significant exception. And perhaps, given his stance on the issue, McConnell may feel that his voice is better placed elsewhere in the caucus."Maybe now he wants to play more of a Mitt Romney role. Where he's seen as this elder statesman within the party, but he has the freedom to criticize Trump," Antle tells RS. "This is me speculating. But I think it's informed speculation. He may feel that he's reached a point where herding cats in private is less important than speaking out against some of these things in public."The Trump FactorWhere the next Senate GOP leader falls on this and other related issues will depend largely on the outcome of the 2024 presidential election. Trump has reportedly already been involved in the jockeying over McConnell's successor behind-the-scenes, urging Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.), the chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, to run. Regardless of who the leader ends up being, they will likely need to be loyal to Trump personally, but the former president may be more flexible when it comes to his policy agenda."If Trump really wanted to push somebody who was different from McConnell on foreign policy, I think he could have an impact, but I don't think that those are the kinds of considerations that he's going to make," says Antle. "But it does suggest, I think, that that wing of the Senate Republican Conference is only going to get bigger and the kinds of pressures McConnell was resisting, are going to become more difficult to resist."Heilbrunn, on the other hand, contends that if Trump is elected, the battle for Republican foreign policy will effectively be over. "The one thing he actually cares about is foreign policy," he tells RS, adding that Trump will not settle for a Senate advocating for a different approach, and will be "pushing for someone who will be subservient to him."If Trump loses, however, there will be a more contested battle over how the Republican Party may understand the country's role in the world. While Cold War-era hawks have definitely lost the power they once had within the party, they could make the case that Trump represented a short-term outlier if he loses another election.Even if Trump loses, Mills says, "I'm still pretty bullish on the restraint end of the Republican Party," because the momentum in the party's base is aligned with that movement. Foreign policy, he says, is only growing more salient for GOP primary voters.In addition, younger and more recently elected Republicans' views on foreign policy can harken back to the GOP from before the Cold War, which often opposed foreign intervention. In this telling, Cold Warriors like McConnell and the neoconservatives that populated the George W. Bush administration are actually the outliers in the party's history."I think that what Trump represents is an older and probably more durable tradition," says Heilbrunn.
President Obama enters the second half of his first year with very high approval ratings (high 50s to mid-60s) and nearly unanimous support within his own party. He continues to fight his battles for long-term change with discipline and rigor, ignoring possible distractions but also exercising pragmatism and the art of compromise. After his initial successes on the stimulus bill, tobacco regulation, employment discrimination and children's' health coverage, and in spite of questions raised on the mounting deficit, he recently managed to get the House to pass major legislation on energy and climate change, albeit by a narrow vote (219 to 212). His main strategy has been to lay out the general principles and parameters of his final objective and then let Congress write the legislation and fill in the details, thus giving legislators some latitude. Some question whether this strategy involves too much compromise, too many concessions to the other party and to interest groups, to the point that the final product is a watered down version of his initial proposal which will result too weak to solve the core problems. The irony for Obama is that some parts of his proposals that were considered central and non-negotiable are now on the table. A main example is the public option in health care legislation, according to which a government plan would compete with the rest of the private insurers, and consumers would be able to choose which one to buy. This type of competition would bring down the costs, which is one main purpose of health care reform. Republicans are adamantly opposed to this, but even some Democrats in Congress are becoming skeptical about it (the latter, mostly because they will have to face conservative constituencies in the next legislative elections of 2010), and even Obama now appears ready to compromise, if absolutely necessary. In contrast, there is immense support for this initiative all across the country. Does that mean that the actual center of the political public spectrum is today more to the Left than Congressmen and Senators of both parties recognize it to be? Or just that people really want change in health care, and cannot any longer be cowed into a corner by the boogey man of Big Government? Of course, there is a third and perhaps more obvious interpretation and that is that health industry groups exert more influence on Congress than the public itself. But at this time and on this issue the public is more mobilized and demanding than ever before, so Congress should take heed.Similarly, while Obama gets a positive response from the public as he continues to stitch together a broader view of how his proposals on health, energy and the stimulus package all fit together in the creation of a new foundation for the economy, the Republican Party appears bent on opposing him indiscriminately, denying him every possible venue to bipartisanship. That is the only position of strength for a weakened party.The "Party of No", as Rahm Emmanuel calls it, continues to block, sometimes successfully, every initiative the Democrats put on the table. There is a total absence of alternative policy proposals; instead, Republicans are just saying no to comprehensive change. Even as most interest groups convinced that change in health care and energy policies is inevitable are taking part in the negotiations, the Republican Party directive to its senators in the Senate Finance Committee -where health legislation is being discussed- is not to deal at all. The result is that Democrats are being pushed toward one concession after another, and that bad politics are getting in the way of good policy. The Republican strategy, if any, is to instill fear in moderate voters about the mounting deficit, and arouse skepticism about the President's ability to bring about change. They have succeeded in consolidating the extreme right's opposition to everything Obama does, thereby animating an alarming hostility toward him. This is an enormous achievement, if one considers the Republicans' lack of leadership and the personal woes of some of its potential leaders. But they have made no gains in the center and very few with independents. And unexpected events continue to shake the party's foundations.During the sleepy summer days around the Fourth of July, when most Americans go on vacation or take time off to prepare their cookouts and load up on beer and fireworks, the public was jolted by two stunning political developments, both coming from the Republican side and both bringing to a melodramatic end the careers of two potential presidential candidates: the five-day disappearance of South Carolina Governor Stanford, and Sarah Palin's resignation as Governor of Alaska. Governor Stanford, a "straight arrow" Republican with a picture-perfect family which he often paraded in front of the cameras, had always portrayed himself as a family man and a model of fiscal rectitude, going to the extreme of refusing to take the money allocated to his state as part of the stimulus package. After disappearing for five days during which his wife and aides claimed not to "know his exact location, but he was probably hiking along the Appalachian Trail and had turned off his Blackberry", he re-emerged and walked straight into the trap of a press conference. In front of the cameras, he rambled for twenty minutes about his life as a governor, husband of a wonderful woman and dad of four great boys, and asked for forgiveness for letting them all down …in the pursuit of an affair with an Argentine woman he had met in the world-renown resort of Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 2001. After explaining that this was not, in the end, a reckless act of adultery nor an irresponsible abandonment of office, but "a true love story" during which he had found his "soul mate", the Governor decided not to resign and to "try to fall in love again with his wife and continue his political career". We won't cry for him, neither here or in Argentina, but we wish him good luck. While infidelity and other human foibles are not limited to one side of the aisle, for the Republican Party, which claims a monopoly on morality and family values, the last two years must have been a hard trial: from Representative Mark Foley's "sexting" of underage male pages in Congress, to Senator Larry Craig's gay sex soliciting in a public restroom, to Senator Ensign's infidelity to Governor Sanford's Rio de la Plata escapade (unknowingly paid for by South Carolina taxpayers), the party has had its hands full with spinning the unspinnable, and will have a difficult time if it insists on exclusively continue carrying the torch for family values .And then there is Sarah Palin, who, in an equally rambling, bizarre and juvenile statement delivered in her well-known unique and colorful syntax and diction, decided to stun her party, her base and the country as a whole by resigning her governorship 18 months before the end of her term. The reasons are known only to herself and her family, but she represented herself as not wanting to "milk " the State of Alaska treasury during her "lame duck" period, and preferring to bring change for "all our children's future from outside the Governor's office". Among the most commonly heard speculations: that the 16 ethics inquiries into her actions as governor by the Alaskan legislature (mainly Republicans) have put a lot of strain on her life and finances, that she wants to concentrate on a book deal, and that her governorship was getting in the way of her life as a celebrity. Less likely but also heard: that this is a move to pursue higher office, and/or that a new scandal is about to be revealed about her or her family. (Please, no more scandals!)Whatever her motive, her timing for the GOP could not have been worse: not only was Palin the most galvanizing force for the Evangelical Christian base of the party, but with her departure, the party has lost three strong presidential candidates in one month. If we add to this the lamentable performance by Governor Bobby Jindal, another Republican rising star, when he responded to Obama's first State-of-the Union address, the party's presidential candidate landscape is quite deserted. Of course it is still early to talk about 2011 primaries, but considering that the two main pillars of the party, namely fiscal responsibility and family values, have been demolished,(the first by George W. Bush and the second by the peccadilloes and tribulations above recounted), there is a lot of heavy lifting the party must do to become competitive again. Like the Tories since 1997, the Republicans will probably have to lose two or three national elections before they can redefine themselves, charter a new course and become competitive again. The paradox of Republican opposition is that in the short term they have no other recourse but to strongly oppose Obama in the hope of chipping away some of his aura, while in the long term their big demographic problems with the young, women and minorities will force them to move to the center, modernize conservatism, abandon their unerring defense of pure, unrestrained capitalism and speak the language of community and common endeavors. Only then will they be able to reclaim the mantel of the Grand Old (but renewed) Party.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
[spa] Joan Brotat (Barcelona, 1920-1990) fue un artista destacado en el proceso de recuperación de la modernidad pictórica durante los años de la postguerra española, aunque luego cayó progresivamente en el olvido. Esta tesis estudia y establece su trayectoria profesional vinculada a su biografía personal (contexto familiar y social), a los factores inducidos por el sistema artístico local y en relación con en el contexto nacional e internacional (fortuna crítica, evolución artística y comercial). Brotat fue uno de los máximos exponentes de una tendencia que podríamos denominar como figuración primitivista. Definimos aquí las características de esta tendencia, su lugar frente a otras opciones de vanguardia de la época como la abstracción y apuntamos sus variantes y principales representantes. Abordamos también las razones de su declive a partir del análisis de la carrera profesional de Brotat. Descubrimos, gracias al estudio de su archivo familiar, la participación de Brotat en la guerra civil como parte de la Quinta del biberón republicana, hecho que escondió toda su vida y cuyo trauma influyó de toda evidencia en su obra. El análisis iconográfico y evolutivo del ingenuismo nos muestra una dimensión trágica y existencial. Así, su etapa expresionista, singular síntesis entre ingenuismo e informalismo, parece responder a una genuina necesidad psicológica. La comparación de su obra artística son sus proyectos profesionales en el campo de la ilustración infantil nos permiten hacer la diferencia entre naif el ingenuismo, que tanto preocupó a la crítica de la época. Un aspecto fundamental es el descubrimiento de una etapa abstracta a finales de los años cuarenta que contradice la jerarquía evolucionista que explica la figuración esquemática como un paso previo a la abstracción. El primitivismo ingenuista fue una opción consciente y deliberada. En su período de madurez, la obra de Brotat muestra una tendencia al amaneramiento y entra en decadencia, que se puede describir por la perdida de refinamiento y el estancamiento de los argumentos críticos que la apoyaron. La relación con los marchantes (Maurice Bonnefoy y Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún particularmente) se revela ambivalente en sus resultados. Lo mismo sucede con el aprovechamiento de la política artística franquista, dirigida por Luis González Robles. El primitivismo figurativo catalán de postguerra es una combinación coherente (aunque intuitiva y sin programa militante) de medievalismo e ingenuismo. El ingenuismo de vanguardia de postguerra tiene dos manifestaciones, a veces coincidentes y otras divergentes: la radical y la nostálgica. El primitivismo se apoyó en un discurso crítico específico y ocupó un lugar, móvil, en el debate artístico. Estudiamos las diversas fuentes de este primitivismo y constatamos la influencia fundamental de Joan Miró. De entre los referentes internacionales destaca Massimo Campigli. Asimismo, se encuentran paralelos y vínculos con artistas españoles como Rafael Zabaleta, Benjamín Palencia y el núcleo valenciano con Manuel Gil y Salvador Faus. Un caso especialmente interesante es el de Manolo Millares, quien tuvo una relación significativa con Cataluña en esos años. Entre los artistas catalanes, el primitivismo tuvo gran protagonismo y adoptó diversas formas. De Sucre o Joan Ponç representan la vertiente más radical y atormentada, Albert Ràfols Casamada o Joan Vilacasas la opción más ingenua y afrancesada. Se observa una clara tendencia a la politización (Francesc Todó, Josep Guinovart, Estampa Popular). La opción lírica o poética, representada especialmente por Brotat, fue dejada progresivamente de lado. A menudo teñido de nostalgia y religiosidad, coincidente con cierta moda franciscanista, el discurso teórico al respecto del primitivismo fue ambivalente y pasó de la modernidad al conservadurismo. La constatación de una corriente primitivista, de la cual Brotat sería la figura paradigmática en su éxito y su fracaso, obliga a repensar el canon del arte catalán de postguerra. El primitivismo no fue un estadio inmaduro de la modernidad en el camino hacia la abstracción sino que responde al contexto histórico particular de la España de postguerra con soluciones originales.Joan Brotat (Barcelona, 1920-1990) fue un artista destacado en el proceso de recuperación de la modernidad pictórica durante los años de la postguerra española, aunque luego cayó progresivamente en el olvido. Esta tesis estudia y establece su trayectoria profesional vinculada a su biografía personal (contexto familiar y social), a los factores inducidos por el sistema artístico local y en relación con en el contexto nacional e internacional (fortuna crítica, evolución artística y comercial). Brotat fue uno de los máximos exponentes de una tendencia que podríamos denominar como figuración primitivista. Definimos aquí las características de esta tendencia, su lugar frente a otras opciones de vanguardia de la época como la abstracción y apuntamos sus variantes y principales representantes. Abordamos también las razones de su declive a partir del análisis de la carrera profesional de Brotat. Descubrimos, gracias al estudio de su archivo familiar, la participación de Brotat en la guerra civil como parte de la Quinta del biberón republicana, hecho que escondió toda su vida y cuyo trauma influyó de toda evidencia en su obra. El análisis iconográfico y evolutivo del ingenuismo nos muestra una dimensión trágica y existencial. Así, su etapa expresionista, singular síntesis entre ingenuismo e informalismo, parece responder a una genuina necesidad psicológica. La comparación de su obra artística son sus proyectos profesionales en el campo de la ilustración infantil nos permiten hacer la diferencia entre naif el ingenuismo, que tanto preocupó a la crítica de la época. Un aspecto fundamental es el descubrimiento de una etapa abstracta a finales de los años cuarenta que contradice la jerarquía evolucionista que explica la figuración esquemática como un paso previo a la abstracción. El primitivismo ingenuista fue una opción consciente y deliberada. En su período de madurez, la obra de Brotat muestra una tendencia al amaneramiento y entra en decadencia, que se puede describir por la perdida de refinamiento y el estancamiento de los argumentos críticos que la apoyaron. La relación con los marchantes (Maurice Bonnefoy y Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún particularmente) se revela ambivalente en sus resultados. Lo mismo sucede con el aprovechamiento de la política artística franquista, dirigida por Luis González Robles. El primitivismo figurativo catalán de postguerra es una combinación coherente (aunque intuitiva y sin programa militante) de medievalismo e ingenuismo. El ingenuismo de vanguardia de postguerra tiene dos manifestaciones, a veces coincidentes y otras divergentes: la radical y la nostálgica. El primitivismo se apoyó en un discurso crítico específico y ocupó un lugar, móvil, en el debate artístico. Estudiamos las diversas fuentes de este primitivismo y constatamos la influencia fundamental de Joan Miró. De entre los referentes internacionales destaca Massimo Campigli. Asimismo, se encuentran paralelos y vínculos con artistas españoles como Rafael Zabaleta, Benjamín Palencia y el núcleo valenciano con Manuel Gil y Salvador Faus. Un caso especialmente interesante es el de Manolo Millares, quien tuvo una relación significativa con Cataluña en esos años. Entre los artistas catalanes, el primitivismo tuvo gran protagonismo y adoptó diversas formas. De Sucre o Joan Ponç representan la vertiente más radical y atormentada, Albert Ràfols Casamada o Joan Vilacasas la opción más ingenua y afrancesada. Se observa una clara tendencia a la politización (Francesc Todó, Josep Guinovart, Estampa Popular). La opción lírica o poética, representada especialmente por Brotat, fue dejada progresivamente de lado. A menudo teñido de nostalgia y religiosidad, coincidente con cierta moda franciscanista, el discurso teórico al respecto del primitivismo fue ambivalente y pasó de la modernidad al conservadurismo. La constatación de una corriente primitivista, de la cual Brotat sería la figura paradigmática en su éxito y su fracaso, obliga a repensar el canon del arte catalán de postguerra. El primitivismo no fue un estadio inmaduro de la modernidad en el camino hacia la abstracción sino que responde al contexto histórico particular de la España de postguerra con soluciones originales. ; [eng] Joan Brotat (Barcelona, 1920-1990) was a prominente artist in the process of recovery of pictorial modernity in Spain after the Civil War, but then his work gradually fell into oblivion. This thesis studies his professional career, in relation to his personal biography (family and social context), the local art system, and the national and international context (critical fortune, artistic and commercial development). The thesis proposes that Brotat was in fact a paradigmatic figure of a primitivist tendency. Primitivism was not an immature stage of modernity on the way toward abstraction, but responded to the particular historical context of Postwar Spain with original solutions. The success and then failure of Brotat and Primitivism invites to reconsider the canon of Postwar Catalan art. Untill his death, Brotat did hide his involvement in the Civil War, a trauma that marked his work and existence. The iconographic analysis and the evolution of his modern naif style shows a tragic and existential undertones. A key aspect is the discovery of an abstract stage in the late forties contradicting the evolutionary hierarchy that explains schematic figuration as a step toward abstraction. On the contrary, naive primitivism was a conscious and deliberate option. Postwar Catalan Figurative Primitivism was a coherent mix of medievalism and naiveté(although without a declarated program). The naiveté of postwar art has two aspects : the radical and nostalgic, which sometimes appear together and sometimes separately. Among Catalan artists, primitivism had great prominence and took various forms. De Sucre or Joan Ponç represent the more radical and tormented side, Albert Rafols Casamada or Joan Vilacasas the most naive and influenced by French modernism. There is, later, a clear trend towards politization (Francesc Todó Josep Guinovart, Estampa Popular). We studied the various sources of this primitivism and found the fundamental influence of Joan Miró and Massimo Campigli. Likewise, there are links to Spanish artists such as Rafael Zabaleta, Benjamín Palencia, the valencians Manuel Gil and Salvador Faus or Manuel Millares. Often tinged with nostalgia and religiosity, in sinthony with a Franciscan fashion, the theoretical discourse about primitivism was ambivalent and evolved from modernity to conservatism.
One year after a national election in which the Democrats won not only the presidency but 18 congressional seats and 9 new senators, the party lost two major gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey, but won an unexpected congressional seat in upstate New York. Clearly, Obama's coattails did not prove strong enough to bring out the two groups that helped him go over the top in last year's election, namely, the youth vote and the African American votes. There are many lessons to be learned by both parties from this past week' s elections, but there is also the risk of over interpreting results as a prequel of next year's mid-term elections. First, in an "off-off" year, most of the electorate was indifferent to the elections, worried as they are about more pressing issues such as higher taxes, the ever-expanding deficit and more than anything else, about unemployment, which has just surpassed the 10% mark in spite of reported GDP growth of 3.5% this quarter. Second, the state gubernatorial races were played out at the local level and had more to do with the candidates themselves than with the voters 'discontent with the President. Indeed, in a Virginia exit poll, 60% of the voters said that they had based their vote on state issues, while only 24% of those polled said they had used their vote to express their dissatisfaction with the President and 20% to express their support for him. On the other hand, Congressional elections reflect more of the national mood, and here the Democrats were winners: due to an inner brawl among Republicans, they unexpectedly won a seat the Republicans had held since the 1870s in the twenty-third district of New York. still, just as it would be a mistake to give national significance to the state races, it would also be silly to miss the obvious: the preponderant mood in the country is anti-incumbency, and this affects both parties. But clearly, independents who voted for Obama are re-directing their votes toward the Republicans and becoming savvier, more issue specific voters. In addition, both parties have base problems: the Democrats need to figure out how to get their base to the polls during off-year elections, and the Republicans must find ways to control their base so that it does not destroy the party. Turnout was the definitive factor in both gubernatorial races: it fell from 3.7 million to under 2 million in Virginia, and from almost 4 million to 2.3 million in New Jersey. The Republicans and Independents were more energized than the Democratic base, so they voted in larger numbers. Young voters between 18 and 29 years of age represented only 10% in Virginia and 9% in New Jersey. In contrast, in the 2008 presidential race they represented 21% and 17% respectively, and are credited for delivering the states to Obama in both cases. In New Jersey, an unpopular Democratic incumbent, albeit an Obama ally, lost to a new Republican face that ran on a fiscally conservative platform. Obama's appeal was apparently weaker than the voters' aversion for Jon Corzine, so U.S district attorney Chris Christie won, becoming the first Republican to win that position in 12 years. In Virginia, Bob McDonnell underplayed his extreme socially conservative views and his connection to Christian Right leader Pat Robertson. Instead, he ran a positive campaign based on job creation, quality of life for Virginians and fiscal responsibility. His opponent, Creigh Deeds, ran a negative TV ad campaign based on his opponent's social conservatism and his ideology as reflected in a misogynist twenty-year old thesis. In a calculation that backfired, Deeds distanced himself from President Obama for most of his campaign, only to turn to him towards the end. It proved to be too late. On that sunny autumnal day, Democratic voters, especially African Americans and young voters, the two groups than gave Obama his victory in Virginia, were absent from the polls. After eight years of two outstanding Democratic governors, the Executive Mansion in Richmond reverted to Republicans. Unlike Governor Warner who in 2005 prepared the way for his successor, Tim Kaine had spent most of 2009 out of the state, in his new national role as chairman the Democratic National Committee, and did very little to help Deeds. Kaine's national ambition seems to have gotten in the way of his local role as Deeds' promoter and cheerleader, and he became, in the words of Professor Larry Sabato, more of a "partisan rather than a unifying figure" at home. However, the apathy of Democratic voters has deeper roots than just civic irresponsibility or lack of engagement. It is also a reflection of disillusion and even rage with the failure of the Obama administration to create jobs and to deal with Wall Street in stricter terms, for example by breaking up the "too-big-to-fail" banks, introducing stricter regulation of derivatives trading and by reducing of CEO's compensation. Again, in spite of all the rhetoric, Obama seems to have bailed out Wall Street at the expense of middle-class tax payers and small businesses. In sum, Obama's young followers and liberals stayed home because Obama is moving too slowly in crucial issues; independents switched parties because of their own fears of losing their jobs and facing higher taxes, as well as to punish the Democrats for too much government spending with little results for higher employment; and McDonnell benefited as much from a weak, erratic opponent who ran a terrible campaign as he did from his own smart strategy and pragmatic style.While the main problem then for Democrats is how to energize the base so that they can fulfill their civic duty and vote, the Republicans have the opposite problem: how to control their base so that it does not get in the way of allowing the party to field moderate candidates that can get the Independent vote. In this sense, what happened in New York 23rd district may be a blessing in disguise for the Republicans, as it will teach them a lesson in time for next year mid-term election. In this previously little known congressional district near the Canadian border, the Republican Party nominated moderate Assemblywoman DeDe Scozzafava in a special election called to fill the seat of Representative JohnMcHugh (R-NY) who had been appointed Secretary of the Army by President Obama. This was regarded as a safe Republican seat given that the party had held it for over 100 years. However, in a twist of events that took both parties by surprise, Conservatives rebelled against the party nominee, whose social values were deemed too liberal, and fielded their own candidate, Doug Hoffman, with the support of talk show celebrities Rush Limbaugh, Glen Beck and Sarah Palin. The Club for Growth, main supporter of Tea Partiers and Birthers, poured a lot of money in support of Hoffman, and consequently Scozzafava, the official Republican Party nominee, started training in the polls. On the weekend before the election, Scozzafava abandoned the race and endorsed the Democratic candidate! The Right was jubilant, confident of a victory in this rural district, which has very few immigrants and is 93% white. Indeed, Fox news insisted on predicting a "tidal wave" in favor of the Conservative candidate all throughout Election Day, only to be forced to concede at past midnight that instead, the Democratic candidate, Bill Owens, had won. The election in the 23rd district, then, served as a warning to Republicans of whatnot to do in 2010. While the two Republicans that won the gubernatorial races did so by moving to center, thus appealing to Independents and moderates, the main losers in New York state were the Tea Partiers and Birthers who have taken advantage of the vacuum of leadership at the top, have hijacked the Republican Party and made the country at times seem ungovernable. Let it be noted here that both conservative candidates then- to- be governors elect, Chris Christie in New Jersey and Bob McDonnell in Virginia, had rejected Palin's offer to campaign for them. Recognizing the relevance of this kind of wisdom, as well as his good looks and ability to persuade, McDonnell is already being touted as a possible candidate for the 2012 national ticket.2009 will be remembered as the year of anti-incumbency, but this anti-incumbent mood is not so much about Obama, who still enjoys close to 60% of popularity, as it is about government in general. Indeed, every special Congressional election since Obama assumed the presidency has been won by Democrats even in seats previously held by Republicans. In politics, one year is an eternity, so it is difficult to extrapolate the November 3rd results to next year's mid-term election. It all depends on whether the economic stimulus starts to work more consistently and is translated into jobs. The passage of health care reform by the House is undoubtedly a victory for Democrats, but it was a narrow one, with 39 Democrats voting against it, in spite of serious compromises by House Speaker Pelosi, including one amendment that prohibits the use of federal money for abortion and that is already under fire by the party's liberals. If the so-called Stupak amendment is not taken out in House-Senate conference, then the Party may see a huge backlash by women and other groups. Still, health care reform will be a reality by year's end, and once it passes it will become sacred: voters will embrace it (as they did with Medicaid and Medicare, as well as Social Security) and, together with job recovery, it may become the basis of a better mid-term election for Democrats than most pundits are predicting now.Finally, while the two gubernatorial races were won by the Republicans, and can be read as a warning to incumbent governors everywhere in next year's elections, it is clear that the largest group that went to the polls were mainly McCain voters, as well as disgruntled independent voters who shifted to the right. And while this trend is good news for the Republicans, the inexorable weight of demographics is against them: these races were won by an overwhelmingly white and older, more male than female, electorate who constitute at the same time an increasingly smaller percentage of the population as a whole. The fastest-rising voting groups do not vote for the Republican Party, which they consider the party "without ideas". To win next year, the GOP needs to regroup fast, get rid of the Palin-Limbaugh baggage and find new leadership. A year has gone by since their huge electoral loss and they have yet to find it. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
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Bertrand Badie on the Trump Moment, the Science of Suffering, and IR between Power and Weakness
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IR retains a traditional focus on the game of power between states as its defining characteristic. But what, so asks Bertrand Badie, if this means that our discipline is based on a negation of our humanity? A giant in Francophone IR, Badie has labored to instead place human suffering at the center of analysis of the international, by letting loose sociological insights on a truly global empirical reality. In this Talk, Badie—amongst others—challenges the centrality of the idea of state power, which makes little sense in a world where most of the IR agenda is defined by issues emanating from state weakness; argues for the centrality of suffering to a more apt IR; and uses this to contextualize the Trump Moment.
Print version (pdf) of this Talk
What is (or should be), according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
Unquestionably, it would be the matter of change. It is time to conceptualize, and further than that, to theorize the change that is happening in the field of International Relations (IR). Humans have always had the feeling that they are living in a period of upheaval, but contemporary IR is really characterized by several landmarks that illustrate the drastic extent of change. I see at least three of them.
The first one concerns the inclusive nature of the international system. For the first time in the history of mankind, the international system covers nearly the whole humanity, while the Westphalian system was an exclusively European dynamic in which the United States of America entered to turn it into a system, that I would call, Euro-North-American.
The second element, around which publications abound (see notably Mary Kaldor's work, Theory Talk #30), is the deep mutation of the nature of conflict. War used to be, in the Westphalian model, a matter of competition between powers. Today we have the feeling that weakness is replacing power, in that power cannot any longer function as central explanatory term of conflictual situations, which are rather manifestations of state weakness. Think of 'failing' or 'collapsing' states, which refers to the coming apart of nations that have been built badly as well as the deliquescence of social ties. This new form of conflictuality completely turns the international environment upside down and constitutes a second indicator of transformation.
The third aspect concerns mobility. Our international system used to be fully based on the idea of territory and boundaries, on the idea that fixity establishes the competences of States in a very precise way. In this perspective, the state refers to territory—as the definition given by Max Weber states very clearly—but today this territorial notion of politics is challenged by a full range of mobilities, composed of international flows that can be either material, informational, or human.
These are three indicators illustrating a deep transformation of the inner nature of IR that encourage me to speak about 'intersocial relations' rather than 'interstate relations'. The notion of interstate relations no longer captures the entirety of the global game. Our whole theory of IR was based on the Westphalian model as it came out of the peace of Westphalia, as it was confirmed by the accomplishment of the nation-state construction process and as it dominated the historical flow of international events until the fall of the Berlin wall.
Until the fall of the wall, all that was not related to Europe or to the United States of America, or more precisely North-America, was simply called 'periphery', which says enough. Today, by contrast, the periphery is central at least regarding conflictuality. We should therefore drop our Westphalian prism and build up new analytical tools for IR that would take these mutations as their point of departure. Doing away with our Westphalian approach to IR would mean questioning both our classical IR theories and questioning the practical models of action in international politics, which means the uses of diplomacy and warfare.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
You know when we write, when we work, we are first of all influenced by our dissatisfaction. The classical Westphalian approach to IR, as I said earlier, did not satisfy me as I had the feeling that it was focusing on events that no longer had the importance that we kept giving them—for instance the arms race, great power politics, or the traditional diplomatic negotiations—while I was seeing, maybe this was the trigger, that the greatest part of suffering in the world was coming from places that IR theory was not really covering.
I have always told my students that IR is the science of human suffering. This suffering exists of course where we are—in Europe, in North America, they exist everywhere in the world—but the greatest part is outside of the Westphalian area, so the classical approach to IR gives a marginal and distorted image. Africa and the Middle East seen through the Westphalian prism are a dull image, strongly different from the extraordinary wealth, both for good and bad, that these areas of the world have. I've also always held that in a world where 6 to 9 million people starve to death each year, the main foci of traditional IR were derisory. Even terrorism, to which we collectively attribute so much importance, hardly comes near how important a challenge food security is.
My three latest books take a stand against traditional IR theories. In Diplomacy of Connivance (2012) I tried to show that the great power game is really a game way that is much more integrated than we usually say and that this game plays out in all multilateral fora. There is indeed a club, and that is precisely what I wanted to describe, a club of powers—one which results to the detriment of less powerful members in the international system.
In Le Temps des humiliés ('the era of the humiliated', 2014), I tried to crystallize what the classical theory could not express, which is domination seen through the lens of the dominated, humiliation as felt by the humiliated, violence as experienced by the desperate. For instance, even if we look at powers as accomplished as China today—sharing the first place with the USA in terms of GDP—we have to admit that their historical experience of humiliation constitutes a huge source of inspiration when it comes to the elaboration of its foreign policy.
And then, in my last book Nous ne sommes plus seuls au monde ('we are no longer alone in the world', 2016), this critique was even more explicit. We are writing an IR that encompasses only about one billion of human beings, while forgetting all the others. Today it is simply no longer true that these old powers are setting the international agenda. Global politics today is written by the little, the weak, the dominated; often with recourse to extreme forms of violence, but this needs to be analyzed and understood, which would mean to totally change the IR theory.
We should not forget that in large part, IR theory was a given as the USA triumphed in 1945. The well-known 'great power politics' that dominates traditional IR theory, inaugurated by Morgenthau and supported by so many others, described what was true at that time: the ability of American power to set us free from the Nazi monster. Today the challenge is strongly different, and it is by the way meaningful that two of the greatest American internationalist political scientists, Robert Keohane (TheoryTalk #9) and Ned Lebow (Theory Talk #53), have both written books that elude to the end of this global order (respectively After Hegemony and Goodbye Hegemony). Well what interests me is exactly to dig into what comes after hegemony.
What would a student need to become a specialist in International Relations or understand the world in a global way?
First of all, I would advise them to rename their science, as I said earlier, and to call it intersocial relations. The future of what we call IR comes down to the ability to understand the extremely rich, multiple and diversified interactions that are happening among and across the world's societies. It does not mean that we have to completely abandon the state-centric perspective, but rather dethrone states from the middle of this multiplicity of actors in order to realize how very often these states are powerless when faced with these different actors. That would be my first advice.
My second advice would be to look ahead and not back. Do not let yourself be dominated by the Westphalian model, and to try to build up what we need—since almost nothing has been done yet today to construct this post-Westphalian, meta-Westphalian model. Beyond power, there are things that we still misidentify or overlook while they are the driving forces of today's and tomorrow's IR. From this point of view, sociology could prove particularly useful. I consider, for instance, that Émile Durkheim is a very important inspiration to understand the world today. Here is an author to study and to apply to IR.
The third advice that I would give them would be to not forget that IR or intersocial relations are indeed the sciences of human suffering. We should be able to place suffering at the core of the thinking. We've lost far too much time staring at power, now it is time to move on to place human suffering at the center. Why? First of all because it is ethically better; maybe will we be able to learn from it? But also because in today's actual international politics suffering is more proactive than power, which is not necessarily optimistic but if recognized, would allow us a better questioning of new forms of conflictuality. Perhaps unfortunately, the international agenda is no longer fixed with canons, but with tears. Maybe this is the key point on which we should concentrate our reflection.
Your insistence on placing suffering at the center of IR scholarship seems to place you firmly alongside those who recognize "grievance" ratherthan "greed" as a central logic of international politics. What do you make of this parallel?
You are right: the idea of grievance, of recrimination, is a structuring logic of the international game today. We did not see it coming for two reasons. First of all because our traditional analysis of international politics presupposed a unity of time, as if the African time, the Chinese time, the Indian time and the European time where all identical. Yet this is completely wrong because we, in our European culture, have not understood that before Westphalia there were political models, political histories, that profoundly marked the people that would then shape contemporary politics. Remember that China is 4000 years of empire, remember that precolonial Africa was composed of kingdoms, empires, civilizations, philosophies, arts... Remember that India also is multi-millenary. The Westphalian time came to totally deny and crush this temporality, this historicity, almost in a negationist way, which means that, in the spirit of those who were defending the Westphalian model, only this model was associated to the Renaissance; and that the age of enlightenment and reason with a big R had a calling to reformat the world as if it were a hard drive. This was a senseless bet, a bet for which our European ancestors who led it had excuses because at that time we did not know all these histories, at that time we did not have all the knowledge we today have of the other and thus we simply resolved it, through the negation of alterity. Yet, IR ought on the contrary aspire to the accomplishment of alterity. Inevitably, all those who saw themselves denied their historicity, over several centuries and even several millenaries, accumulated a feeling of recrimination, of particularly deep grievances.
The second element is that all of this happened in a context of disequilibrium of power resources, linked to different factors that reflected indeed the fact that at a given moment of time western powers were both literally and figuratively better armed than other societies. Abovementioned negation of alterity was mapped onto, and amplified, by the forceful imposition of a multilateral system that turned into the worst situation, into a proclaimed hierarchy of cultures; as a result and there were, as Jules Ferry put it in the France of the 19th century, 'races'; as in, 'We have the obligation to educate inferior races'. It is not the beginning of history, but it is the beginning of a history of humiliation. And through subsequent waves of globalization, this humiliation has turned into a central nerve running through international life. A nerve that has been used by both the powerful, who made a tool out of humiliating the others to better dominate them (think here of the opium wars, colonization) and simultaneously a nerve that fed the reaction of mobilization in the extra-Westphalian world by those that had to stand up against those who were humiliating them. So you see how it truly lies at the basis of IR. In my mind, it became a forceful paradigm, it explains everything, even though others factors continue to weigh in on actual dynamics.
In order to appreciate all this, we need a sociological approach, which has for me two aspects. Both these aspects must be considered together for the approach to be well understood. The first one is a timeless aspect, which is to consider that everywhere and in all eras politics is a social product. Politics cannot be understood as somehow outside society. This I would say contradicts the majority of IR scholars, who believe excessively in the autonomy of politics and of the state—even if only for analytical purposes. The second element of this sociological approach is the historical or temporal component. That is what I was talking about earlier: with globalization the social fabric strongly progressed compared to the political fabric, and considering that intersocial relations grew, we need a sociological approach to understand them.
Do you think that the Trump period constitutes a fundamental break with the conduct of IR?
Trump himself maybe not, but what he represents certainly. If we look at the USA today we see, since the new millennium, three models succeeding each other. After 11-09 there was a time of neo-conservatism where globalization was considered by American leaders as a means or maybe a chance to universalize the American model, willingly or not. By force, as was the case in Iraq in 2003. This model failed.
This lead to a second model which I would describe as a liberal model, neo-liberal, incarnated by Obama who learnt from the lessons of the failure of neo-conservatism, and had the courage to question the hypothesis hitherto considered as indisputable of American leadership in the world, and who considered that the USA could win only through soft power or smart power or free-trade. That is the reason why Obama was just a little bit interventionist and was counting a lot on the TTIP and on all these transregional agreements.
With Trump we arrive at a third model, one that I would call neo-nationalist, that looks at globalization in a different way. In his perspective, globalization constitutes a chance to satisfy the national American interests. The idea of the national comes back after a long interlude of a globalizing vision. It does not mean that we are not interventionist anymore. What happened in Syria proves it. It means that we will intervene not according to the needs of globalization but rather to American interests. It is about sharing a strong and powerful image of the USA on the one hand and on the other serving the concrete interests of the American people and nation.
This neo-nationalist model is not defended only by Trump, that is the reason why I was saying that we should not consider Trump individually. We find it exactly the same way with Putin. We find it by many other world leaders, such as Erdogan or Duterte or Victor Orbán—really different figures—or Marshal Sissi in Egypt.
We find it as well in attitudes, for instance Brexit in Great Britain, in right-wing neo-populism in Europe: Ms. Le Pen, Mr. Wilders... or in a certain left-wing neo-populism as Mélenchon in France. It is in the air, seeming almost a passing fad. But it constitutes perhaps a double rupture within IR. First of all because since the emergence of globalization, let's say around the 70's, the national interest as a thought category was bit by bit replaced with approaches in terms of collective goods. Today by contrast we witness the abandonment of this image of collective goods for a return to the national interest. This is very clear in Trump's renouncing of the COP21 of Paris. At the same time, second, this constitutes some form of the rehabilitation of the idea of power, which again seeps into the language of IR.
You know the IR scholar is not a neutral person, we have to use our science towards positive action and for the definition of sound public policies. Going against the idea of collective goods, casting doubt on the ideas of human security, environmental security, food security, and sanitary security is extremely dangerous because the composition of national interests and egoism will never converge to a globally coherent policy. It is the weak that will suffer first.
And the same time that power is reinstated as a driving principle of IR praxis, the paradox is that great powers are becoming more and more powerless. If we look only since 1989, and ask, when did state power ever triumph in IR? Where did the strongest ever find a battleship enabling him to resolve a problem to his benefit and according to his goals? Never. Not in Somalia, not in Afghanistan, not in Iraq, not in Syria, not in Palestine. Nowhere. Not in Sahel, not in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nowhere. So I am a little worried, indeed, about this naive and old-fashioned rehabilitation of state power.
Can we say that globalization, or rather the ambition of integration at either the European or global scale, has failed? Can today be considered a good moment to bury of the idea of integration?
I do not like burials, it is not an expression that I would use, but your question is very pertinent. For around twenty years I have been saying and teaching that regional integration constituted an intermediary and realistic level of adaptation between the era of the nation state and that of globalization, which means that I believed for a long time that regional integration was the final step towards a global governance of the world.
I thought for a long time that what was not possible at the global scale, a global government, was possible at the regional level and this would already strongly simplify the world map and thus go in the way of this adhesion to the collective dimension required by globalization. Nevertheless, not only Europe suffers a setback, but all the regional constructions in the world are in a similar situation. Mr. Trump openly shoves the NAFTA agreement, MERCOSUR is down as every State that is composing it has recriminations against it, and we could extend the list… All the forms of integration that have been set by Chavez around his Bolivian ideal have ceased to exist; Africa progresses very slowly in terms of regional integration; the Arab Maghreb Union, which is an essential device, totally failed. Thus indeed the situation does not look good.
In the case of Europe there is a double phenomenon: on the one hand, there is this really grave failure due to the secession of Great Britain from Europe, and then there is a general malaise of the European model. Brexit is really rare, if you look at the contemporary history of IR it is simply unprecedented that a state shuts the door on a regional or global organization. As far as I remember, it only happened a few times before, with Indonesia in the UN in 1964, which lasted only 19 months. It happened with Morocco with the African Union and Morocco is currently reintegrating in it. This British situation came as a thunderbolt, worsened by the fact that paradoxically it is not so much because of regional integration that the British voted against the European Union. It was more from an anti-migration, xenophobic and nationalist (in reference to that nationalism trend that I was earlier talking about) perspective and what is dramatic is that we can clearly see that the nationalist sentiment is really attacking the inner principles of regional integration.
I was saying that in the European case there are internal problems which run even deeper than the British defection, and I will underline at least two of them. First of all there is a democratic deficit of Europe, meaning that Europe was not able to match electoral spaces with the ones where decisions get made; people still vote at the national level while the decisions are taken in Brussels. In consequence, democratic control over these decisions is extremely weak. How to resolve this equation? And here the breakdown is total since very few people are coming up with suggestions. The other factor of this crisis is, according to me, the fact that Europe has been built with success after World War II in a progressive way around association and indeed, Durkheim proved it, the integrative logic makes sense. Unity makes strength and it did make strength once in Europe to prevent war, a third World War, and secondly to encourage the reconstruction of European countries where economy was totally collapsed. This time is now over and it is the fault of Europe to not have known how to recontextualize itself, to react to the new contexts.
Paying one more time tribute to Durkheim who guessed it right, Durkheim said that there are two ways of constructing social ties: around association and around solidarity. I think that the time of association is now over, we should enter in the time of solidarity, which does not consist in saying 'We Germans are associated with Greece', but rather 'We Germans are joined together with Greece because we know that if Greece collapses, in a long term perspective, we will suffer the consequences'. Thus this idea of fundamental unity is an idea that has been a little bit overlooked, abandoned by the Europeans and now they find themselves in a complete paralysis.
Is the decolonization period still having an impact on contemporary IR?
Oh totally, totally. I would first say because it is a major event in the field of IR, which made the World switch from 51 sovereign States of the UN in 1945 to 193 today but above all, a very aggravating circumstance, is that this decolonization has been a complete failure and this failure weighs enormously on international politics.
It has been a failure because decolonization assumed the format of copying the western state model in countries that were accessing independence, while this model was not necessarily adapted, which provoked a proliferation of failed states, and these collapsed states had a terrible effect on IR.
Secondly because decolonization should have led to the enrichment and to the substantial modification of multilateralism, by creating new institutions able to take charge of new challenges resulting from decolonization. Yet, except the creation of UNCTAD in 1964 and of UNDP in 1965, there have been very little innovations in terms of global governance. Thus global governance remains dominated by what I earlier called 'the club', which means the great powers from the north, and this is very dysfunctional for the management of contemporary crises. Then also because the ancient colonial powers happen to find new forms of domination that did somehow complicate the international game. Thus in fact decolonization is a daily aspect of the crisis that the international system faces today.
In conclusion, which question should we have asked? In other terms, which question have we forgot?
I found your questions very pertinent as it allowed the discussion of themes that I consider essentials. Now, the big problem that makes me worry is the great gap between the analysts and the actors in IR. I am not saying that the analysts understood everything, far from it, but I think that IR theorists are very conscious of some of these transformations I have mentioned. If you look at some great authors such as James Rosenau, Ned Lebow or Robert Keohane, to name just a few—there are way more—they all contributed to the reconstruction of IR.
What truly strikes me is the autism of political actors, they think that they are still at the time of the Congress of Vienna and that is an extraordinary source of tension. Thus as long as this spirit of change does not reach political actors, maybe Barack Obama was the first one to enter this game and then the parenthesis was closed, as long as there will not be this move towards the discovery of a new world, maybe as well through the inclusion in our reflection about the international fabric such partners as China, it is not normal that this very powerful China does not have any choice but to share the paradigm and the model of action proper to occidental diplomacy, as long as we would not have done this precise effort, well, we will remain in the negation of the human, and that is the essential problem today, we are unable to understand that at the end there is just one unity, which is the human being.
I had the chance to visit 105 countries and everywhere I met the same men and the same women, with their pain, with their happiness, their hardship, their joy, their sorrow, their needs that were everywhere identical. As long as we will not understand that, well, we will be living in a world that is in total contradiction with what it is truly and essentially. We will live in a world of artifice and thus a world of violence.
Related links
Read Badie's The Arab Spring: A starting point (SER Études 2011) here (pdf)
The short-lived popularity boost of the Osama bin Laden operation having all but faded, President Obama for the first time appears vulnerable and could be defeated in the 2012 election. Indeed, many are starting to wonder if he will be a one-term president like Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush. As congressional leaders continue to meet with Vice President Joe Biden to negotiate a reduction of the federal budget and to avoid a potential default on government debt, the economic recovery seems to be stalling: reports released last week show unemployment rose again to 9.1 % and job growth slowed down, and manufacturing and retail sales are also down from last quarter.The only good news for the President is that the Republican field of candidates, while still fluid, is very weak so far, and the Republican Party leadership divided and ineffective. Hefty potential candidates such as Jeb Bush (undoubtedly the strongest intellect in the GOP today) and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie have eschewed confronting the formidable President-candidate in 2012 and seem to be lying in wait for 2016, when they expect the field to be wide open.The first serious national presidential debate for the Republican candidacy took place on Monday, June 13. Mitt Romney, former governor of Massachusetts and the author of a health plan there which critics contend is very similar to Obama's, emerged as the solid front-runner and Michelle Bachman, an Evangelical Congresswoman from Minnesota and a Tea Party favorite, as the one who can challenge him. She is a former tax lawyer and a mother of five, who also apparently has found time to raise 23 foster kids. She is often compared to Sarah Palin, but most agree that she has more substance, understands how the government and can articulate ideas. She portrays herself as the anti-establishment figure, although she has been in Congress for a while and is at present the Chair of the House Intelligence Committee. Similarly to Palin, she considers the federal government an "elitist conspiracy" against middle-America and has invoked the War Powers Resolution to force Obama to request Congress authorization to continue operations in Libya. Tim Pawlenty, former governor of Minnesota, also an Evangelical with Tea Party following, was expected to be a serious challenger, but missed an opportunity to confront Romney on his health care plan for Massachusetts, which he had severely criticized the day before on national TV, stating it was very similar to Obama's, and going as far as calling Romney a "co-conspirator in Obama care." This lack of courage to confront the front-runner personally has made him a distant third in the primary race. Romney, on the other hand, was very well-prepared, confident in his own image of the businessman/CEO who can fix the jobs problem. The rest of the Republican candidates were a motley crew, starting with Herman Cain, an African-American businessman, owner of a pizza chain and talk show host, followed by Ron Paul, a radical libertarian that in spite of his quirky ways is quite endearing in his candid contempt for government, and Newt Gingrich, whose entire campaign staff had just resigned due to his lack of discipline and inability to run a serious campaign. All candidates focused more on bashing Obama than each other, since it is early in the race and there will be time enough for that this coming fall. Rick Santorum, another fiscal and social conservative (but in this case Catholic) and former Senator for Pennsylvania, completes the second-tier line-up of Republican candidates.But the Republican field has not firmed up yet, and there could be some surprise Republican candidates entering the race, as the President appears more vulnerable. In fact, only yesterday John Huntsman, a new intriguing figure who has been Obama's ambassador to China, joined the fray announcing his candidacy from Liberty Island, next to the Statue of Liberty, in the same spot where Ronald Reagan announced his in 1980. Huntsman, former governor of Utah, is a billionaire, a moderate and a Mormon, just like Romney. Both will skip Iowa, the first test for candidates, and one dominated by Evangelical "value" voters. Both are well-spoken, good looking family men with no rough edges. Unlike Romney, he has very little name recognition at the national level, and spent years as a missionary in China, where he learnt to speak Mandarin fluently. What he brings to the race is his expertise in that country, the main holder of American's debt, and therefore, the one that worries Americans the most. He has framed this primary contest as one between "renewal and decline". He speaks in a very quiet, civil tone and he introduced himself to the public through a stream of unusual videos, one for example that shows the candidate himself, in motocross attire from heads to toe, riding his motorbike across the Utah desert, as dreamy country music plays in the background. The White House is said to be concerned about his candidacy, not only because of moderation, his capacity and his presidential demeanor but also because he has been an insider of this administration and may use information thus acquired against the President. He could become a formidable opponent, a Republican mirror image of the President.Another prospective candidate, who, if he decides to run, could throw all calculations into disarray, is Rick Perry, the Governor of Texas. He is an attractive candidate for the party establishment and has two very strong qualities: first, he is a social conservative who could supersede Bachman and Pawlenty in drawing the Tea Party vote; second, he has been a successful governor who can boast about his job creation record in Texas (40% of all new jobs during the recovery were created in Texas). He is still testing the waters, and similarly to Huntsman, may perhaps use 2012 as a platform that can propel him into the 2016 election. Although he has not announced his candidacy, observers point to his convening of a "National Day of Prayer" for early August as a sign that he may run. He would be a formidable contester, since he can speak both the language of the Tea Party as well as the national language of this 2012 election, which is the economy and jobs.In comparing the Republican Party today with the one of ten years ago, one cannot help but notice the big shift that has occurred, and in doing so, perhaps be less dismissive of Ron Paul's philosophical influence on the party rank and file. The truth is the libertarian streak has made important inroads inside the party, and voters are now serious about not only fiscal conservatism and smaller government, but also a retrenchment of America's role in the world. This was apparent during last week's debate and the public conversations that followed in the airwaves throughout the week. Most of the candidates blasted Obama for intervening in Libya and called for an early withdrawal from Afghanistan. Michelle Bachman invoked the War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973 during Watergate, which obligates the President to seek the approval of Congress 60 days after the beginning of hostilities. The Republican Party has traditionally been the home of National Security "hawks", and the last strong isolationist mood in the party dates to the 1920s. While an isolationist wing emerged again right before Gen. Eisenhower became president, after that it was represented by a very small group, led in the last twenty years or so by Pat Buchanan. Today, a war-weary and budget- conscious American public is in favor of withdrawal from Afghanistan by a wide majority (73% of all Americans, 59% among Republicans), in spite of the fact that most had understood that to be a "war of necessity" as opposed to Iraq, a war of choice. If we count American military presence in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and the tribal areas of Pakistan, today the US is involved in five different conflicts, and spending billions of dollars a month on them, most of which are considered wars of choice. Today, President Obama is in fact a victim of his own success: bin Laden is dead, so Americans want out of Afghanistan. This is echoed loudly enough by his opponents. The President is thus under pressure to bring the troops home not only by libertarians but also by extreme Right candidates (Bachman) and even by mainstream candidates like Huntsman and Romney.After the debate, Republican Senators John Mc Cain and Lindsay Graham and Defense Secretary Gates took to the airwaves to admonish the candidates on this issue, accusing them of choosing politics over policy in matters of national security. Mc Cain went so far as to say that Reagan would not recognize his own party: "This is not the Republican Party of Ronald Reagan, who was always willing to stand up for freedom all over the world". He insisted that Khadafy was crumbling and that US logistical support, intelligence and refueling capabilities had to be continued to finish him off. He went even further and picked the opportunity to criticize Obama for not using America's own airpower, and instead "leading from behind". This was a theme that Bachman had also used in her speech, somewhat incoherently, since she vilified Obama for allowing the French to lead the operation in Libya while at the same time invoking the War Powers Resolution and demanding US withdrawal, since there were no apparent US interests involved there. Mc Cain in his own interview with Christiane Amanpour, later refuted Bachman's claim by stating that Khadafi had consistently supported terrorism, was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 and was about to massacre his own people at Benghazi when NATO intervened and stopped him. "Our interests are our values" and "Sometimes leadership entails sacrifice," he added.To Romney's equivocal reference to the "Afghanis (sic) war of Independence" (an expression that per se brings serious doubts to his basic knowledge of geopolitics) Senator Lindsay Graham also in his own interview, later retorted: "This is not a war of Afghan independence, from my point of view" (of course, it isn't, it's a civil war!). He continued: "This is the center of gravity against the war on terror, radical Islam. It is in our national security interest to make sure that the Taliban never come back". He warned them not to try to position themselves to "the Left" of President Obama on this issue" and he hinted that that decision would lose them the nomination.Among the wide array of opinions, only Tim Pawlenty heeded the party line that the advice of military commanders and the situation on the ground would be the main determinant of troop withdrawals under his watch. Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized the "declinists" who put the short term expediency politics ahead of long-term national security interests. He added that examining the bottom line only is short-sighted, since intervention is not about sheer cost, it is about the cost of failure of early withdrawals, such as Afghanistan in 1989. Earlier, on his last trip as defense secretary, Gates had bluntly told NATO members meeting in Brussels that the military weakness of most members and their lack of will to share risks and costs of NATO operations were putting severe strains on the organization and particularly on the United States. Indeed, less than a third of NATO members are taking part in the Libyan operation, although NATO is a consensus- based organization and therefore, all members voted to approve it.According Secretary Gates, the need to cut spending and radically reduce the budget has become an obsession and sparked a new current of isolationism that now insidiously divides the traditionally hawkish Republican Party. This, he told a Newsweek interviewer, is one of the main reasons that have led to his resignation, after serving two administrations and becoming the epitome of bipartisanship. His unwillingness to plan for more withdrawals and find other ways to reduce the bloated defense budget has been criticized both from the Left and the Right. He complains about how both "Congress budget hawks and defense hawks" constantly interfere with his work. He ends by saying he refuses to be part of a nation that is forced to scale back its military power so much that it can no longer lead. His frustration is apparent; his resignation paved the way for Obama's announcement of troop withdrawal, a few days later.This last week, the presidential politics of war became clearer. Feeling the pressure of Republicans attacking him from his "left flank", President Obama told a war-weary nation that he plans to start withdrawing troops by December this year, ending the surge by the summer of 2012 and bringing home most of the rest by 2014. Although there is a widespread sense that Obama has gotten so involved in the daily details of the war that would prefer to stay on and see his counterinsurgency policy through, he has quickly readjusted to the realities at home and accelerated the withdrawal timeline that his generals had recommended. With his earlier decisions of aggressively pursuing the war on terror, signing off on drone killing missions, and having bin Laden killed inside Pakistan, he successfully beat the image of a Dovish President, weak in National Security. This past Wednesday, with the words, "It is time to do nation-building at home", he acknowledged the public's concerns about the waste of American power, blood and treasure abroad while the country is still suffering from the recession, and quickly moved back to center.This is the spirit of the times. It requires a new type of leadership, one that is strong enough to face down enemies, yet flexible enough to accommodate to the new and constantly shifting realities, to accept a revised status of the nation and to lead it into new era in its history. Time will show whether such leader is among the Republicans new line-up or whether he is already in the White House.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
학위논문(박사)--서울대학교 대학원 :사범대학 협동과정 글로벌교육협력전공,2020. 2. 유성상. ; 본 연구는 1966년부터 1991년까지 세계교회협의회(World Council of Churches, WCC) 개발국(Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development, CCPD 교회개발참여위원회)의 개발교육 사례를 조사하여 조직의 가치, 개발관, 개발교육 접근방식이 어떻게 형성되고 협상되었는지 보여준다. 그리고 개발교육에 관여하는 종교기반단체(faith-based organization, FBO)로서의 세계교회협의회의 관점을 연구하여 개발교육 분야와 개발교육에 관여하는 종교기반단체에 시사점을 준다. 연구 질문은 다음과 같다: 1966년과 1991년 사이에 세계교회협의회와 개발국은 어떻게 개발 및 개발교육을 개념화하였는가? 하위 질문은 다음과 같다. 세계교회협의회에서 비판적개발교육의 출현에 기여한 내외적 요인은 무엇인가? 어떤 요인이 개발 및 개발교육에 대한 관점의 시기적 변화를 초래했는가? 연구 분석의 개념적 틀을 구축하기 위해 비정부기구(NGO)와 종교기반단체 연구를 참고하였고 개발교육의 역사와 아놀드(1988)와 크라우스(2010의 분류 틀을 분석하여 세계교회협의회와 개발국의 사례에 적용할 개념적 틀을 형성하였다. 개발협력에 대한 관점은 자선(charity), 상호의존성(interdependence), 해방(liberation)으로 확립하였고, 개발교육에 대한 접근방식은 홍보 및 기금조성(promotion and fundraising), 인식 제고(awareness raising), 실천 동원(mobilization), 임파워먼트(empowerment)로 하였다. 이 분석틀을 기반으로 자금, 프로젝트, 정치적 입장, 파트너십, 교육에 관한 다섯 가지 핵심 질문을 도출하였다. 연구 방법으로는 세계교회협의회의 아카이브와 도서관에서 1차 및 2차 문헌 자료를 수집하여 분석하였다. 1966년부터 1970년까지의 1단계에서 세계교회협의회는 경제 성장이라는 개발협력 분야의 주류를 따랐다. 구조적 변화가 필요한 반면 선진국과 개발도상국간의 상호의존과 조화를 전제하였다. 세계교회협의회는 교회와 국가들에게 개발원조를 늘리고 예산의 일부를 기부할 것을 장려했다. 개발교육 사무국은 1968년 세계교회협의회에 결성되어 개발 이슈에 대한 인식을 높이고, 선진국 시민들을 정치적 캠페인에 참여시키고, 국제개발협력에 금전적 기여를 장려하였다. 1970년부터 1975년까지의 2단계에서는 개발도상국의 교회들이 사회정의, 자립, 경제성장의 원칙에 기초하여 선진국의 교회와 보다 동등한 파트너십을 요구하였고 세계교회협의회의 개발국이 결성되었다. 새롭게 회자되었던 종속 이론, 해방 신학, 그리고 파울로 프레이리의 비판적 페다고지의 영향을 받은 개발국은 곧 해방, 민중 운동, 의식화 원리를 바탕으로 네트워킹, 분권화, 실험 전략을 채택했다. 개발교육은 조화로운 상호의존성보다는 갈등이 불가피한 해방적 관점에 바탕을 두었다. 개발교육활동으로는 선진국의 교회 관련 개발협력단체의 개발교육분과 또는 정치 행동 집단과 협력하여 워크샵, 또는 캠페인을 개최하였고 이런 협력 단체에 개발교육 기금을 지원하였다. 1975년부터 1981년까지 3단계에서는 세계교회협의회와 개발국에서 개발 협력에 대한 신학 연구와 회원 교회와의 제휴에 초점을 맞추었다. 세계교회협의회는 "정의롭고, 참여가 보장되며, 지속가능한 사회"(Just, Participatory, and Sustainable Society, JPSS)의 비전을 세우고 냉전시기 비동맹국가들의 신국제경제질서를 지원하였다. 1970년대 후반 개발국의 "가난한 자들의 교회"연구는 교회의 발전 참여의 신학적 토대를 만들었다. 그러나 협의회의 교회들은 개발국과 협의회의 정치적 행동을 강조하는 개발협력과 개발교육에 반대했다. 또한 개발국은 선진국 시민들이 개발 이슈의 인식에서 개발을 위한 행동을 취하도록 장려하고, 글로벌 이슈와 지역적 관심사를 연결하며, 자선의식에 호소하지 않고 자금을 조달해야 하는 문제와도 씨름했다. 이러한 문제들은 개발국과 개발교육 협력단체들이 개발교육의 교육 과정을 성찰하여 기존 유형을 식별하고, 에큐메니컬 교육의 모델을 고안하도록 동기를 부여했다. 에큐메니컬 교육은 해방과 의식화의 비판적 모델과 문화 간 이해와 글로벌 인식의 유연한 모델을 통합했다. 그 시기에 예산 삭감, 조직적 중복, 그리고 개발교육을 기독교교육과 교차시키는 요구를 감안하여 1981년에 개발교육은 개발국과 교육국의 공동 사업으로 재정립되었다. 1981년부터 1991년 사이의 4단계에서는 세계적 흐름에 반응하여 개발교육이 새롭게 "정의, 평화, 창조세계의 보전(Justice, Peace, and Integrity of Creation, JPIC)를 위한 교육"으로 불렸다. 정의, 평화, 창조세계의 보전이라는 세계교회협의회의 중점 아젠다는 지역교회와 시민운동의 다양한 문화와 요구에 답하는 새로운 사회윤리적 비전이었다. 이 시기 개발국은 계속해서 활동가적 특성을 유지했지만 이 전 시기보다는 제도적인 교회를 통해 더 많은 일을 했다. 해방과 상호의존이라는 개념을 바탕으로 한 에큐메니컬 교육에 편입된 개발교육은 정의, 평화, 창조세계의 보전 지역 워크숍에서 대화를 통해 "억압하는 자"와 "억압받는 자"를 화해시키는 노력을 하였다. 개발교육을 통한 자금조달과 인지도를 높이는 노력과 비판적 분석을 통한 임파워먼트(empowerment)도 계속되었다. 세계교회협의회와 개발국의 사례는 기독교 에큐메니컬 단체가 어떻게 국제개발협력을 구상하고 개발교육을 촉진했는지 보여준다. 그 과정에서 개발과 개발교육의 원리를 타협하지 않으며 기금을 모으려 애썼다. 그리고 일시적인 봉사 프로젝트를 제공하기 보다는 개발도상국가 협력단체들과 네트워킹을 통해 교육과 시민 변호를 위한 역할을 맡았다. 또한 사회 정의와 구조적 변화를 위한 정치 교육과 행동을 장려했지만, 해방신학과 비판적 페다고지를 마르크스주의와 동일시하는 교회들의 저항에 부딪혔다. 개발국은 개발교육을 주로 추진했던 선진국 단체들과의 관계보다 개발도상국의 단체들의 입장에서 노력했다. 마지막으로 개발국이 강조했던 사회적행동은 점차 신학과 교육에 대한 성찰로 보완되었다. 개발교육은 결국 세계교회협의회의 다른 교육 분과와 결합하여 에큐메니컬 교육에 통합되었다. 이것은 교육학적인 성찰로서 개발교육의 진전이었지만 정치적 행동 요소와는 분리되는 결과를 낳았다. 에큐메니컬 교육에서 강조하는 화해는 가난하고 억압받는 자들의 고충을 충분히 듣고 해결하여 평화와 일치에 이르는 것이었으나 1980년대와 1990년대 전지구적 보수주의와 신자유주의가 대두되면서 에큐메니컬 교육은 갈등을 드러내는 비판적 모델 보다는 조화를 위한 교육이 되었다. 세계교회협의회와 개발국의 개발교육 경험은 몇 가지 함의를 가지고 있다. 오늘날 기금 모금은 계속해서 개발교육의 도구로 사용되고 있다. 개발교육의 도구로써 기금 모금은 투명하고 비판적으로 논의되어야 한다. 또한 개발교육은 비정부기구의 하나의 개발협력프로그램 뿐만 아니라 연대·상호학습의 파트너십을 규정하는 모드로써 단체의 중심적 요소가 되어야 한다. 비판적 개발교육은 또한 정치적 행동 차원을 포함해야 하며, 특히 비정부기구와 종교기반단체를 통한 비정규 교육 분야에서는 더욱 정치행동 차원을 강조해야 한다. 특히 기독교 종교기반단체에게 있어 행동과 성찰의 일치를 갖춘 비판적 개발교육은 이러한 사회 정치적 변혁을 위한 개발협력의 토대가 되며 교회의 개혁을 촉진한다. ; This study examines the case of development education by the World Council of Churches (WCC) primarily through the Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development (CCPD) between 1966 and 1991 to show how the organization's values, development perspectives, and development education approaches were shaped and negotiated through different phases. The WCC's place as an international faith-based development organization (FBO) involved in development education will be examined to find potential implications for both the development education sector and the faith-based organizations approaching development education. The main research question is formulated as follows: between 1966 and 1991, how did the WCC and its subunit CCPD conceptualize development and development education? Sub-questions include: What were some internal and external factors that contributed to the emergence of critical pedagogical development education in the WCC? What factors led to shifts in perspectives on development and development education through different phases? The research questions are answered by examining the history of the WCC and the CCPD and analyzing based on conceptual frameworks drawn from literature review on development education by non-government organizations (NGOs). Categorizations of practices in development education by Arnold (1988) and Krause (2010) were examined to form a conceptual framework with which to examine the WCC's development education. The perspectives on development cooperation were identified as charity, interdependence, and liberation, and the approaches to development education were identified as public relations and fundraising, awareness raising, mobilization, and empowerment. With the framework five key questions were also formulated to analyze the findings on issues of funding, service projects, political stance, partnership with the North and the South, and education as process and outcome. Archival documentary materials were gathered as primary and secondary sources to examine the organization's values based on theology and ecumenical social thought, along with its development perspectives and development education approaches in four different phases. The phases are contextualized through reviews of literature on development education by NGOs in those time periods. Internal and external factors that contributed to shifts in perspectives and approaches were considered. In the first phase from 1966 to 1970, the WCC followed the mainstream perception of development as economic growth. While structural change was necessary, it assumed a harmony of interests between the North and the South. The WCC called for churches and nations to increase development assistance and contribute a share of their budget. The development education secretariat was formed in the WCC in 1968 to raise awareness of development issues, and motivate Northern constituents to participate in political campaigns and encourage monetary contribution. In the second phase from 1970 to 1975, the CCPD was formed based on the requests by the churches in the South for a more equal development partnership with the churches in the North, based on the principles of social justice, self-reliance, and economic growth. Influenced by the emerging dependency theory, liberation theology, and critical pedagogy by Paulo Freire, the CCPD soon incorporated principles of liberation, people's movement, and conscientization, and adopted the strategy of networking, decentralization, and experimentation. Development education was based on a conflict perspective of liberation rather than harmonious interdependence, and was practiced by coordinating visitations, workshops, and consultations for development education partners and political action groups, primarily in the North. Fundraising in the North was to also serve as an instrument for development education. From 1975 to 1981 in the third phase, the WCC and the CCPD supplemented their actions with theological studies, and more specifically focused on partnering with member churches. Development education became even more essential to the CCPD's strategy to support the churches' own reflections. With a new formulation of an ideal society as just, participatory, and sustainable, the WCC sought to support the non-aligned nations in the Cold War global structure with their proposal for a new international economic order. Based on the perspective on development as liberation, the CCPD sought to assume a catalytic role within the WCC to challenge the Council and the churches to question the status quo. The CCPD study on "The Church of the Poor" became the foundational theological articulation on the churches' participation in development. But development education, along with the CCPD and the rest of the Council, encountered resistance from the member churches reluctant to take political action. It was also difficult to move the North's constituents from awareness to action, to connect global issues with their local concerns, and to raise funding without appealing to a sense of charity. These issues motivated the CCPD and its development education partners to reflect on the pedagogical process of development education and identify several existing models, and come up with a model of ecumenical education. Ecumenical education incorporated both the conflict model of liberation and conscientization, and the softer model of global awareness for intercultural understanding. Partly given budget cuts, organizational overlap, and the demands to cross-fertilize development education with Christian education, the desk was realigned as a joint venture between the CCPD and the Subunit on Education in 1981. The global context in the fourth phase between 1981 and 1991 changed the character of development education which was now called education for justice, peace, and integrity of creation. The WCC's priority was to facilitate the conciliar process of justice, peace, and the integrity of creation (JPIC) by responding to various contexts and cultures of the local and regional movements and church groups. The CCPD continued to be activist in character, but became less politically vocal and worked more through the institutional church channels than in the past decade. Development education that was incorporated into ecumenical education based on both the concept of liberation and interdependence was intended to reconcile the oppressor and the oppressed through dialogues in regional JPIC workshops. The fundraising and awareness raising components continued in the CCPD, along with empowerment through critical analysis, though the action component was less highlighted. The WCC and the CCPD's experience show how an international ecumenical organization conceived of international development cooperation and promoted critical development education. The Committee tried with difficulty to hold education and fundraising together without compromising on its values. And rather than providing temporary service projects, the Committee embraced its role in education and advocacy through networking with the partners in the South. It also promoted political education and action for social justice and systemic change, but encountered resistance from those reluctant to commit to political action or side with what they equated with Marxism. The CCPD also tried to prioritize participation and input from the marginalized South, but its relationship with various Northern partners with whom the Commission promoted development education was less clear. The CCPD's emphasis on action was also supplemented by its reflections on theology and pedagogy. Development education was eventually combined with other aspects of education in the WCC and was incorporated into ecumenical education. This advanced pedagogical reflections on development education but resulted in downplaying the critical political action component and separating education from development cooperation in the WCC. The final emphasis on reconciliation in ecumenical education tried to work toward peace and unity while giving due attention to tensions and grievances, but in the general global climate of conservatism and neoliberalism in the 1980s and the 1990s, and the churches' reluctance to address tensions, the WCC returned to the softer forms of development education. The WCC and the CCPD's experience with development education holds several implications. Today fundraising continues to be an instrument of development education. Ways to transparently and critically link both elements must be devised. Specifically, critical development education should also be an essential element in development cooperation and NGOs as not just a program thrust but as a mode that defines partnerships of solidarity and mutual learning. Critical development education should also include a political dimension, especially in the non-formal sectors through NGOs and FBOs. Especially for Christian FBOs, critical development education with its unity of action and reflection should be a foundation for its political activism. Such development education facilitates a way toward the churches and the ecumenical movement's own renewal. ; CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background and rationale 1 1.2 Purpose and research question 13 1.3 Research design and data collection 14 1.4 Overview of chapters 23 CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION BY NGOS 25 2.1 Development education in NGOs and FBOs 26 2.2 NGO pedagogical issues 41 2.3 Types of development education 46 2.4 Conclusion 58 CHAPTER 3. ECUMENICAL SOCIAL THOUGHT IN WCC 60 3.1 Structure and social thought in the WCC 60 3.2 Organizational context of WCC 72 3.3 Conclusion 77 CHAPTER 4. DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION IN WCC AND CCPD 79 4.1 Phase one 1966-1970: Seeking a new kind of development 80 4.1.1 World Conference on Church and Society in Geneva, 1966 80 4.1.2 Cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church 84 4.1.3 WCC Assembly at Uppsala, 1968 88 4.1.4 Development education consultation in 1969 95 4.1.5 From charity to interdependence, with signs of liberation 96 4.2 Phase two 1970-1975: Beginning of CCPD and concretization of strategies 99 4.2.1 Development projects consultation in Montreux, 1970 100 4.2.2 Global situations and WCC affairs in the early 1970s 103 4.2.3 CCPD's development mandate and strategies 107 4.2.4 Development education strategies and programs 117 4.2.5 From interdependence to liberation 130 4.3 Phase three 1975-1981: Evaluation and realignment 134 4.3.1 WCC Assembly in Nairobi and JPSS in Unit II 134 4.3.2 Toward a church in solidarity with the poor 139 4.3.3 Tempering expectations by 1979 145 4.3.4 Reviewing a decade of development education 151 4.3.5 Toward critical reflections 160 4.4 Phase four 1981-1991: Development education joins ecumenical education 163 4.4.1 From Vancouver 1983 to Canberra 1991 163 4.4.2 CCPD in the 1980s 167 4.4.3 Development education as learning for JPIC 171 4.4.4 Back to interdependence 177 4.5 Shifts through phases 180 4.6 Conclusion 189 CHAPTER 5. ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION 192 5.1 Conviction to hold together education and fundraising 193 5.2 Education as essential to CCPD 197 5.3 Commitment to political action 200 5.4 Emergence of Southern initiative 205 5.5 Transition from education for action to education as process 209 5.6 Conclusion 214 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 217 6.1 Summary 217 6.2 A way forward 222 6.3 Limitations and suggestions for further studies 227 6.4 Conclusion 229 BIBLIOGRAPHY 231 APPENDIX 245 국문초록 269 ; Doctor
Most post-modern societies are being challenged by a widening gap that divides their populations by the classic cleavages of age, class, region and religion. Exacerbated by the forces of globalization and the immediacy of technology, they result in constant clashes that cause an exponential increase in social tensions and insecurity. Even if the Norwegian killer was insane and can not be used as example, he was still a member of the dominant culture failing to accommodate to post-modern circumstances. In the United States this gap is vividly evident in the current debt ceiling debate, which is only a symptom of much serious divisions that threaten the country's social unity and political future.A brief look at recent headlines in the United States can give outsiders and idea of the country's social and political environment.On Sunday July 24th, a new law approving gay marriage came into effect in New York, making it the sixth and largest state in the nation (plus the District of Columbia) to have legalized same-sex marriage. In Manhattan, people celebrated on Fifth Avenue, singing and dancing to the music and well-suited lyrics of New York, New York ("If we can make it here, we'll make it anywhere…"). On July 0th, Republican candidates Michelle Bachman and Rick Santoro a "Marriage Vow" swearing fidelity to their spouses, promising they would "vigorously oppose any redefinition of marriage" and would take steps to amend welfare legislation that did not reinforce conventional marriage. This is only a sample of the extreme polarization the country is facing both economically and socially. It is a critical moment in United States history, one that may require a deep reflection on the basic principles the nation was founded upon and a renewal of the social compact.Prodded by the Tea Party leaders, who presently wield an amount of power disproportionate to their numbers, Republican candidates have been signing pledges on an array of different topics in order to prove their conservative credentials. Both Michelle Bachman and Mitt Romney also signed a no-new-taxes pledge, together with a "cut, cap and balance pledge" to amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget and congressional super majorities to raise taxes. These two pledges, albeit non-enforceable and thus largely symbolic, are now the single most important obstacle to reach a deal in Congress about balancing the budget and avoiding default on the national debt. Tea Party Nation leader Judson Phillips has threatened to recruit candidates to mount primary challenges against any GOP member that votes for a compromise on the debt ceiling that involves any type of revenue increases to balance the budget. The GOP Congressional leadership has been hijacked by intransigent ideologues, represented in the House by 87 freshmen with disproportionate power over the more established professional politicians who understand that democratic governance requires give and take, and that politics in a pluralistic society is the art of the achievable.This country was founded on the premise of compromise, negotiation and cooperation, as it is evident from the history of the Constitution and the layers of governmental power devised mainly to counterbalance one another: states versus federal, legislative versus executive, Senate v. House, and an independent judiciary. It was clear even then, that solutions in what promised to be a huge, diverse society with deep regional and religious cleavages would require compromise. But today, in the "worst Congress ever" as Norman Ornstein calls it in his recent article in Foreign Policy, compromise is a bad word. The House is controlled by a GOP freshmen class that owes its seats to Tea Party ideologues and is refusing to raise the debt ceiling even as President Obama has agreed to cuts in spending that include cuts in entitlements, in exchange for ending subsidies on ethanol and other corporate subsidies (he has even given up on the expiration of the Bush era tax cuts he had included in his first proposal). This package that would represent over 3 trillion dollars in cuts from the federal budget, including reductions in Medicare and other social programs, would have allowed the debt ceiling to be raised so that the US could avoid defaulting on its debt by August 2nd. It was on the table last week and close to being signed on by House Speaker John Boehner but he refused it at the last minute because of pressure from his own caucus. The Tea Party is pushing professional legislators toward the abyss, and with them, the whole country. The Tea Party is a social movement that was born out of frustration and disappointment with government spending over the last twelve years. President George W. Bush inherited a budget surplus from the Clinton-Gingrich years. But that surplus quickly vanished as Bush proposed and got passed serious tax cuts on the wealthy and then embarked on two wars that are still going on today. In response, a large coalition of Independents, Republicans and a few former Democrats formed a protest movement that defines itself for what it is against: big government, big media, big banks, unsustainable deficits and intrusive federal regulation. In spite of some evident intrinsic contradictions in their philosophy (for example some the new regulations they so vehemently oppose such as the Dodd-Frank legislation are meant to constrain the actions of "big banks" they so strongly abhor), the Tea Party has been very successful in focusing the public's attention on the federal budget deficit and on the federal debt that has ballooned in the last two decades. Those are its core concerns, together with a deep-seated contempt for and rejection of, everything the well-educated elites are for the most in favor of: environmental sustainability, a foreign policy based on multilateralism, gay rights and immigration reform legislation that recognizes the realities of the estimated twelve million undocumented workers in the country. After two months of wrangling, neither side has managed to get what it wanted, the US credit rating is about to be downgraded (with the subsequent increase in interest rates and damaging effects on an already slow economy) and the vitriolic Washington environment is alienating people on the Right and on the Left. Pressured by the Tea Partiers and their anti-tax obsession, Republicans have refused to compromise to avoid a default, and in so doing they are sabotaging their own chances for 2012. Most Americans are appalled at the GOP's refusal to endorse Obama's proposal that would cut the deficit by $3.7 trillion through a mix of spending cuts, entitlement reform and ending some corporate subsidies and tax deductions. In so doing, the GOP is alienating independent voters that want to avoid default and are ready for a deal. A new political center of gravity is forming. The number of registered voters that identify themselves as Independent is growing (40% in latest poll), while the numbers of Republicans and Democrats are sinking and there is a new online movement from the grassroots to form a third party.Paradoxically, out of all this Byzantine intrigue in the hallways of Congress, and given the outcome of no deal announced on Monday night, President Obama may come out as the winner. To the dismay of his most progressive base, Obama, intent on finding some common ground with the opposition has shifted to the center-right of the political spectrum on his proposals, daring to sacrifice some cuts on entitlements in exchange for revenue increases, only to see them rejected by the Republicans. He is close to winning a stand-alone debt ceiling increase while having proven to be the only reasonable adult in this struggle. This would gain him the support of many independents and help him avoid a confrontation within his own party. It would also allow him to focus on unemployment, the real immediate crisis that most directly impacts people's lives. However, Democrats in the House and Senate are afraid that concessions on reducing some Medicare benefits, for example, or postponing the eligibility age, would ruin the clarity of their message to seniors during the election. Conversely, Tea Partiers see a compromise involving any sort of revenue increases by the government, even non-tax measures such as ending corporate subsidies, as a betrayal of their principles. The Tea Partiers have brought into focus the spending crisis that has been growing unchecked for a long time, and one the country cannot obviously tax its way out of. Some facts cannot be denied: debt is the result of spending not backed by revenue. Total government spending at all levels has risen to 37% of the GDP today from 27% in 1960. It could reach 50% by 2038. The debt-to-GDP ratio has reached 100% today, from 42% in 1980. The big moral struggle is still ahead. There is no question that the government is spending too much, but the real debate is about priorities and the philosophies that underlie those priorities. The President has recognized that the budget deficit is important to voters, most of which have come to the conclusion that since the stimulus spending did not solve the problem of unemployment, deficit reduction appears to be a better way to improve the economy than investing in education, infrastructure and new energy technologies. Obama must acknowledge this, and make it part of his discourse.But the President must also continue to make a case for the common good ("there are things we can still do together", he said in his last speech), the social safety net and America's future. He can do this by personalizing the budget battles the way Clinton did. Are budget battles about choices or necessities? Why give more tax cuts to the wealthy if their wealth has grown through the recession while the rest saw their wealth diminish? Why subsidize corporate agriculture and ethanol production? Social programs like Medicare serve all Americans, why focus on cutting it while giving a pass to the upper income- and- wealth echelon? General elections are won from the center. Strong strident advocates make for weak candidates. Undoubtedly, the 2012 election will be about money, about fiscal discipline, but it will also be about a more equal distribution, and it will require strong leadership from the two respective philosophical corners to come to a consensus. That is why the Republican establishment is so worried about the lack of gravitas in their field of candidates. That is why some yearn for budget whiz Paul Ryan, or Governor Chris Christie or Rick Perry….or anybody really, that looks and sounds as if he can take on Obama in the intricacies of the budget, the debt ceiling, and social programs reform. That may also be why Jeb Bush was asked on Fox News about his intentions to run for President again two days ago. This time his response was more nuanced: he said that while he doesn't anticipate it, he hasn't ruled it out ("but, he added, "I haven't ruled out being in Dancing with the Stars, either").In the meantime, the Wall Street Journal today announced that, based on the Pew Research Center tabulations of SIPP and Census date, the wealth gap between America's whites and its two largest minorities, Blacks and Hispanics, has widened to unprecedented levels due to the housing crisis and the Great Recession. Alan Greenspan, former President of the Federal Reserve has said repeatedly that the wealth gap that has grown consistently for the last decade is a threat not only to our country but to capitalism itself. Poverty and unemployment are a combustive mix: if fiscal responsibility ends up being based on the back of the poor, social conflict will erupt. It is unconscionable, for example, to think that hedge fund managers pay significantly less taxes than their secretaries.Some Republicans want to abolish every piece of social legislation and re-litigate every progressive judicial decision since the New Deal. As part of pledge game, Michelle Bachman and four other candidates also signed the "Susan B. Anthony pledge "promising to appoint abortion opponents to their cabinets and to deny all funding for Planned Parenthood when they become presidents. The bizarre "Marriage Vow "pledge signed by Bachmann and Santoro not only opposes same-sex marriage and includes a personal promise to be faithful to their spouses, but (most peculiarly yet redundantly) it also rejects Sharia Law (which, by the way, like Bachman, also opposes gay marriage and female adultery, which it punishes by death!)The only candidate that has refused to sign any pledge is Jon Huntsman, who understands the perils of siding too closely with the rebellious Tea Party. Even if some of its main points have successfully brought into focus the deficit issue, the Tea Party is still supported by a minority and resented by most Republicans. Its anti-technocratic, anti-Washington message has resonance, but it may have pushed the GOP too far into a corner. Its message is also becoming blurred when it steps into the social arena: its racist and homophobic overtones do not reflect the spirit of the times and are offensive to the "millenials", the youngest generation of voters born in the 80s and 90s, which Republicans still hope to attract in 2012. Social movements are major vehicles of participation and can re-energize a worn out party. They reflect the spirit of the times, often in an extremist way that is what gives them prominence: their passion for the cause, their original approach, are all important, but their message has to resonate with the public if they are to succeed. They emerge, coalesce, grow and achieve some successes. However, once their main point is made, three things can happen: they can become a party, their main ideas can be incorporated into mainstream politics, or they dissipate and be quickly forgotten. The Tea Party brought into focus the issue of fiscal responsibility, it infused conservatism with new energy and found a natural home in the Republican Party, which had become profligate, and will have to prove from now on that it is sincere about austerity. Its impact is undeniable: it has also attracted Independents and in so doing, has per force moved the Democratic Party to the center-right. Mimicking the "big tent" approach of Republicans, the Tea Party has lately been focusing strategically on fiscal responsibility, limited government and free markets and its main groups have avoided divisive social issues when speaking to the general public. But their demands of ideological purity from their candidates, their emphasis on returning to the strict meaning of the Constitution and the values of the Founding Father, their defense of states rights and gun rights, belie their claims of inclusiveness for all Americans; in its coded language, its contempt for immigrants and its not-so- veiled racism, one senses a strongly reactionary sentiment bordering on uncontainable fanaticism which is completely out of step with most Americans and which will make it very difficult to widen its appeal beyond what it has already achieved.To paraphrase deceased Republican leader Barry Goldwater, the Tea Party's aim isnot to streamline government or make it more efficient, but to get rid of every piece of social legislation and economic regulation passed since the New Deal. Their purpose is not to share the burden of the weakest members of society, nor to educate their children so they can have equality of opportunity, but to defend the individual freedoms of those who can stand on their own. In sum, they are extremists for whom tolerance and moderation are vices, not virtues, and therefore they have no place in a democracy.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
