Suchergebnisse

Titre de départ. ; Texte sur deux colonnes. ; Brochures produite par le Liberal-Conservative Party. ; Reproduction électronique. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode d'accès: World Wide Web. ; 44

Par le Parti conservateur du Canada? ; Comprend un index. ; Reproduction électronique. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode d'accès: World Wide Web. ; 44

Tables. ; Signé (p. [4]): R.L. Borden. Borden était le chef du Liberal-Conservative Party durant les années 1901-1920. Cf. Encyclopedia Canadiana. ; Aussi disponible en anglais. Voir le numéro de microfiche de l'ICMH 72054. ; '"Le gouvernement est responsable pour tout ce qui peut se produire dans chaque département" Wilfrid Laurier.' ; Reproduction électronique. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode d'accès: World Wide Web. ; 44

Master microform held by: CaOONL. ; At head of title: Conservateurs et liberaux. ; Mode of access: Internet.

International audience ; This article will look at the Conservative MPs who campaigned for Brexit in the run-up to the referendum on 23rd June 2016. After a brief overview of the evolution of the label Euroscepticism and attitudes towards EU membership in the party, it will first try and sketch out the new face of Conservative Euroscepticism in the House of Commons, with a special focus on the 2015 intake of MPs who are supposedly "less pale, male and stale". Through a series of indicators related to parliamentary behaviour, this article will argue that the new Brexiteers are now less dependent on party leadership but more loyal to and representative of their voters. It will finally offer tentative explanations of this new phenomenon, based on party organisational changes which arguably paved the way for the emergence of a new type of Conservative MP. To put it simply, if Euroscepticism has changed within the party, it is essentially because Conservative MPs have radically changed. ; Cet article s'intéresse aux députés conservateurs qui ont fait campagne pour le Brexit au moment du référendum du 23 juin 2016. Après un bref survol de l'évolution du terme "euroscepticisme" et des attitudes conservatrices envers l'appartenance à l'Union européenne, l'article s'efforcera de dessiner le nouveau visage de l'euroscepticisme conservateur au sein de la Chambre des Communes, en s'attardant plus particulièrement sur les nouveaux élus de 2015 qui sont censés inclure plus de femmes, de minorités ethniques et de jeunes. Grâce à une série d'indicateurs liés au comportement parlementaire, cet article montrera que les nouveaux Brexiteers sont désormais moins dépendants de l'équipe dirigeante mais aussi plus fidèles à leurs électeurs et représentatifs de leurs attitudes. Il s'agira enfin de proposer des explications possibles de ce nouveau phénomène, en s'appuyant sur les changements organisationnels au sein du parti qui ont, selon nous, ouvert la voie à l'émergence d'un nouveau type de député. En termes plus simples, si ...

International audience ; This article will look at the Conservative MPs who campaigned for Brexit in the run-up to the referendum on 23rd June 2016. After a brief overview of the evolution of the label Euroscepticism and attitudes towards EU membership in the party, it will first try and sketch out the new face of Conservative Euroscepticism in the House of Commons, with a special focus on the 2015 intake of MPs who are supposedly "less pale, male and stale". Through a series of indicators related to parliamentary behaviour, this article will argue that the new Brexiteers are now less dependent on party leadership but more loyal to and representative of their voters. It will finally offer tentative explanations of this new phenomenon, based on party organisational changes which arguably paved the way for the emergence of a new type of Conservative MP. To put it simply, if Euroscepticism has changed within the party, it is essentially because Conservative MPs have radically changed. ; Cet article s'intéresse aux députés conservateurs qui ont fait campagne pour le Brexit au moment du référendum du 23 juin 2016. Après un bref survol de l'évolution du terme "euroscepticisme" et des attitudes conservatrices envers l'appartenance à l'Union européenne, l'article s'efforcera de dessiner le nouveau visage de l'euroscepticisme conservateur au sein de la Chambre des Communes, en s'attardant plus particulièrement sur les nouveaux élus de 2015 qui sont censés inclure plus de femmes, de minorités ethniques et de jeunes. Grâce à une série d'indicateurs liés au comportement parlementaire, cet article montrera que les nouveaux Brexiteers sont désormais moins dépendants de l'équipe dirigeante mais aussi plus fidèles à leurs électeurs et représentatifs de leurs attitudes. Il s'agira enfin de proposer des explications possibles de ce nouveau phénomène, en s'appuyant sur les changements organisationnels au sein du parti qui ont, selon nous, ouvert la voie à l'émergence d'un nouveau type de député. En termes plus simples, si l'euroscepticisme au sein du parti a changé, c'est essentiellement parce que les députés conservateurs ont changé de manière radicale.

Titre de la couverture. ; Probablement écrit par Arthur Dansereau. ; Reproduction électronique. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode d'accès: World Wide Web. ; 44

En tête du titre: Conservateurs et libéraux. ; Reproduction électronique. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode d'accès: World Wide Web. ; 44

Titre de la couverture. ; Reproduction électronique. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Mode d'accès: World Wide Web. ; 44

The principal organ of the Conservative party dealing with French history and politics ; Mode of access: Internet.

The aim of this study is to make a social history of the Turkish Democrat Party from 1946 to 1950. There are many essays about the Turkish Democrat Party in political history. Mainly, these works are based on macro and state-centered sources: state archives, national press, and parliamentary debates. Very few studies attempt to assess the social dynamics that led to the Democrat Party coming to power and holding it for a 10-year period. My claim is that to understand the social dynamics that led to the Democrat Party's rise, we must look at its grassroots organizations and local recruitment. Therefore, I examine four different areas of Turkey—Izmir, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, and Adana—in order to better understand the Democrat Party's social base. I use sources like the local press and memoirs of local politicians, as well as diplomatic reports, sociological works, and oral interviews with eyewitnesses from the period. This work aims to paint a comprehensive picture of the Democrat Party's social base by revealing the important role that rural elite, artisans, and small-town shop-keepers played in shaping the party's conservative character. ; Ce travail propose une sociologie historique du Parti démocrate turc, qui est fondé en 1946, arrive au pouvoir en 1950, et y reste jusqu'à un coup d'Etat de l'armée, en 1960. La sociologie de ce parti permet d'éclairer la compréhension du passage d'un régime de parti unique à un système de compétition partisane en Turquie. Pour cela, nous avons choisi une séquence chronologique longue, qui va de la fondation du parti en 1946 à sa chute en 1960. En effet, observer la création, puis la structuration du Parti démocrate nous permet de voir le rôle qu'il joue dans l'acculturation à la civilisation électorale, la promotion de nouvelles élites, mais aussi les continuités avec le parti unique, et le verrouillage progressif du champ politique, pour retourner à une situation autoritaire vers la fin des années 1950. Une sociologie fine du parti nous permettra ainsi de comprendre comment il ...

The aim of this study is to produce a social history of the Turkish Democrat Party from 1946 to 1950. While there are already many essays about the Turkish Democrat Party in political history, these works are mainly based on macro and state-centred sources: state archives, national press, parliamentary debates, etc. Very few studies attempt to assess the social dynamics that led to the Turkish Democrat Party's accession to power, and to understand how it came to hold power for a ten year period. My contention is that the key to understanding the social dynamics that led to the Democrat Party's decade-long grasping of power lies in its grassroots organization and local recruitment. I therefore look at four different areas of Turkey, in order to draw a consistent scheme of the Democrat Party's social base: Izmir, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Adana. To that end I use sources such as the local press and memoirs of local politicians, as well as diplomatic reports, sociological work and oral testimony from eye-witnesses of the period. My work thus aims to present a more complex picture of the Democrat Party's social base than has hitherto been achieved, by revealing the importance of the role played by the rural elite and small-town artisans and shop-keepers, all of whom shaped the Democrat Party's conservative nature. ; Ce travail propose une sociologie historique du Parti démocrate turc, qui est fondé en 1946, arrive au pouvoir en 1950, et y reste jusqu'à un coup d'État de l'armée, en 1960. La sociologie de ce parti permet d'éclairer la compréhension du passage d'un régime de parti unique à un système de compétition partisane en Turquie. Pour cela, nous avons choisi une séquence chronologique longue, qui va de la fondation du parti en 1946 à sa chute en 1960. En effet, observer la création, puis la structuration du Parti démocrate nous permet de voir le rôle qu'il joue dans l'acculturation à la civilisation électorale, la promotion de nouvelles élites, mais aussi les continuités avec le parti unique, et le verrouillage ...

The primary system in Colombia from the 1990 presidential election comes into play in a specific political context. Since the end of the 'national front', which allowed the Liberal and the Conservative Party to succeed in power, the balance of Colombian bipartism has indeed broken in favour of the liberal party which has become a genuine dominant party. ; Le système de primaires en Colombie à partir de l'élection présidentielle de 1990 intervient dans un contexte politique spécifique. Depuis la fin du de "front national" qui permettait au libéral et au parti conservateur de se succéder au pouvoir, l'équilibre du bipartisme colombien s'est en effet rompu au profit du parti libéral devenu un véritable parti dominant.

The Tea Party enters the scene in February 2009 in the United States. On February 19, a CNBC journalist protests on-air against the economic bailout plans voted by President Barack Obama, and invites viewers to organize a « Tea Party » in the Chicago harbor. This contributes to trigger an unprecedented phenomenon, as numerous mass protest rallies soon organize throughout the country, followed by the creation of dozens, then hundreds of local Tea Party groups. Experts are astonished at the swiftness and magnitude of the movement. All the more so in 2010, when the Tea Party starts claiming political objectives and shows intent of institutionalizing, proving a threat to the Republican Establishment. However, President Obama is reelected in 2012 and this is interpreted as a devastating loss for the movement, for which obituaries are published in several liberal media. Lackluster results in the 2014 mid-term elections seem to confirm this forecast, especially since the Republican Party succeeds at keeping the movement at bay until the primaries for the presidential candidate nomination in 2015. But then there is a reversal; the Grand Old Party clearly radicalizes, as the extremely conservative Republican platform notably shows. And the election of outsider Donald Trump to the presidency in November 2016, a conjunction of numerous electoral factors, is also the result of organizational efforts on the right side of the political spectrum, to which the Tea Party largely contributed. To better apprehend this movement, it is necessary to understand that it combines top-down and bottom-up forces. From its appearance, the Tea Party has indisputably benefitted from colossal resources from interest groups and think tanks such as FreedomWorks, American Majority, Americans for Prosperity or The Heritage Foundation, but also from conservative media. Either organizational or rhetorical, these resources are primeval for the movement's organization and activism. Nevertheless, there are voluntary activists working at the basis of ...

The Tea Party enters the scene in February 2009 in the United States. On February 19, a CNBC journalist protests on-air against the economic bailout plans voted by President Barack Obama, and invites viewers to organize a « Tea Party » in the Chicago harbor. This contributes to trigger an unprecedented phenomenon, as numerous mass protest rallies soon organize throughout the country, followed by the creation of dozens, then hundreds of local Tea Party groups. Experts are astonished at the swiftness and magnitude of the movement. All the more so in 2010, when the Tea Party starts claiming political objectives and shows intent of institutionalizing, proving a threat to the Republican Establishment. However, President Obama is reelected in 2012 and this is interpreted as a devastating loss for the movement, for which obituaries are published in several liberal media. Lackluster results in the 2014 mid-term elections seem to confirm this forecast, especially since the Republican Party succeeds at keeping the movement at bay until the primaries for the presidential candidate nomination in 2015. But then there is a reversal; the Grand Old Party clearly radicalizes, as the extremely conservative Republican platform notably shows. And the election of outsider Donald Trump to the presidency in November 2016, a conjunction of numerous electoral factors, is also the result of organizational efforts on the right side of the political spectrum, to which the Tea Party largely contributed. To better apprehend this movement, it is necessary to understand that it combines top-down and bottom-up forces. From its appearance, the Tea Party has indisputably benefitted from colossal resources from interest groups and think tanks such as FreedomWorks, American Majority, Americans for Prosperity or The Heritage Foundation, but also from conservative media. Either organizational or rhetorical, these resources are primeval for the movement's organization and activism. Nevertheless, there are voluntary activists working at the basis of ...