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Referenda provide the opportunity for voters to express political economic protest and provide additional ways to support parties they vote for in elections. Alter-natively, referenda also provide voters a chance to express their policy references in a way that does not affect which party will lead the government. The rejection of the 2016 Italian Constitutional referendum by 60% of voters and the approval the 2020 Italian Constitutional Referendum by 70% of voters could be a result of changing political economic conditions, influences related to partisanship and party leadership, or a change in approval of the reforms contained within the referendum. The article examines these possibilities in turn and then in a multivariate analysis. First, the overall change in economic discontent, satisfaction with the governing coalition and leaders, and belief in the content of the reforms between 2016 and 2020 will be examined. We also examine the how voters of each of the parties in the 2018 general election shifted on these variables. Then individual level analysis of consistent voters and switchers will assess the relative strength of partisanship, economic, political, and referendum-specific factors in convincing voters to switch their vote. We find that referendum-specific factors had the strongest predictive power followed by those related to government approval. Voters approved of the contents that would reduce the number of politicians in Italy and used the referendum to express support or displeasure with the incumbent's policy programme. Our results contribute to the studies on second-order elections where voters are allowed for greater expressive preferences.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE V. CHADHA PROVIDES A RARE INSIGHT INTO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL. ON THE SURFACE, THE CHADHA DECISION DEALT WITH A NARROW LEGAL QUESTION: WAS THE IMMIGRATION ACT'S PROVISION OF A SINGLE-HOUSE LEGISLATIVE VETO CONSTITUTIONAL? THE SUPREME COURT HELD THIS PROVISION CONTRARY TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE VETO WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ACT OF LEGISLATION THAT WAS NEITHER PASSED UPON BY BOTH HOUSES NOR PRESENTED FOR APPROVAL TO THE PRESIDENT. ALTHOUGH THIS DECISION MAY SEEM NARROW, CHADHA EXPOSED THE ROOTS OF THE CONTEMPORARY U.S. REGIME BECAUSE IT RAISED FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF BUREAUCRACY. CHADHA MADE IT OBVIOUS THAT CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY HAD BECOME A PRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM.

Proponents of electoral quotas have a 'dependent interpretation' of democracy, i.e. they have formed an opinion on which decision-making rules are fair on the basis of their prior approval of the outcomes these rules are likely to generate. The article argues that this position causes an irresolvable problem for constitutional processes that seek to legitimately enact institutional change. While constitutional revision governed by formal equality allows the introduction of electoral quotas, this avenue is normatively untenable for proponents of affirmative action if they are consistent with their claim that formal equality reproduces biases and power asymmetries at all levels of decision-making. Their critique raises a fundamental challenge to the constitutional revision rule itself as equally unfair. Without consensus on the decision-making process by which new post-constitutional rules can be legitimately enacted, procedural fairness becomes an issue impossible to resolve at the stage of constitutional choice. This problem of legitimation affects all instances of constitutional choice in which there are opposing views not only about the desired outcome of the process but also about the decision-making rules that govern constitutional choice.

AbstractIn many countries, constitutional amendments require the direct approval of voters, but the consequences of fundamental changes to the powers and operations of the state are difficult to anticipate. The referendums literature suggests that citizens weigh their prior beliefs about the merits of proposals against the heuristic provided by the partisanship of the proposer, but the relative salience of these factors across constitutional issue areas remains underexplored. This paper examines the determinants of citizen preferences on 12 diverse constitutional issues, based on a novel survey experiment in Japan. We show that support for amendments is greater when its proposer is described as non-partisan. However, constitutional ideology moderates this effect. Those who prefer idealistic constitutions that elevate national traditions tend to value proposals that expand government powers, compared to those who prefer pragmatic constitutions that constrain government authority. These results highlight the significance of constitutional beliefs that are independent of partisanship.

The article presents the author's analysis of the constitutional acts of European states with a bicameral parliament with a view to fixing some typical forms of interaction between the parliament chambers in them. The study has showed that the joint sessions (on taking the oath by the head of state, presidential elections, deciding to declare war, granting pardon); formation of permanent and temporary committees and commissions; formation of the higher bodies of state power or appointment of officials serve as typical forms of interaction between the parliament chambers. Within the legislative sphere, it is disclosed such typical forms of interaction between the parliament chambers as the bill approval in both chambers in an identical version and "tacit consent". It is concluded that the typical forms of interaction between the parliament chambers of European states reflect their sovereign but established approaches, elaborated by the doctrine and tested by practice.

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Part 1 Perspectives in International Law -- Chapter 1 International Law and Non-recognized Entities: Towards a Frozen Future? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Case Studies in This Volume -- 3 How These Entities May Be Described - A Political Science Approach -- 4 An International Law Approach - Self-determination and Secession -- 5 The Case Studies in This Collection - An Overview -- 5.1 Catalonia (and Scotland as a Comparator) -- 5.2 Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- 5.3 dnr and lnr -- 5.4 Nagorno-Karabakh or Artsakh -- 5.5 Transnistria or pmr -- 5.6 The Russian Regions, Especially the Ethnic (National) Republics -- 5.7 Crimea -- 6 The UN Seal of Approval, and the Route to Admission -- 7 Conclusion -- Chapter 2 International Organizations and Non-State Territorial Entities -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Statehood -- 2.1 Removing a Counterclaim to Territorial Integrity -- 2.2 Conceptualizing Statehood -- 2.3 The Role of Recognition -- 3 Statehood and Territorial Illegality -- 3.1 The Obligation of Collective Non-Recognition -- 3.2 Non-Recognized Illegal States? -- 3.3 Non-State Territorial Entities -- 4 Statehood and the United Nations -- 4.1 UN Membership and Statehood -- 4.2 UN Observer State Status -- 4.3 International Legal Capacity and the "Vienna Formula" -- 5 Conclusion -- Chapter 3 The Arrow of Passports in the Quiver of Russia: Eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Perspective -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Legal Framework: Some Remarks -- 2.1 Nottebohm: Obscuring Rather than Enlightening -- 2.2 Kin-States and National Minorities -- 3 Extraterritorial Naturalization in the Post-Soviet Space -- 3.1 Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- 3.2 Eastern Ukraine -- 4 Assessment in Light of International Law.

The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 authorised the Prime Minister to give notice under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty of the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU. The Act was adopted in response to R (Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, in which the Supreme Court held, by majority, that the royal prerogative did not authorise the Government to begin the process of withdrawal from the EU Treaties. The House of Commons resisted attempts by the House of Lords to include conditions concerning the status of EU nationals and requiring subsequent parliamentary approval. Parliament's refusal to limit the Government's power to begin withdrawal from the EU was foreseeable – indeed it was foreseen by Lord Carnwath in his dissent in Miller (at [273]) – in light of the resolution of the House of Commons on 7 December 2016, the third day of the Supreme Court hearing, confirming the House's support for the Government to trigger Article 50 by 31 March 2017. Not that the litigation was futile. The Supreme Court's judgment raised the political cost of triggering Article 50, empowering the House of Lords and providing an occasion to oppose withdrawal and/or to propose conditions on notification or withdrawal. It is arguable that the Government ought in any case – quite apart from the law – to have invited the Houses of Parliament to signify their support for triggering Article 50, whether by way of resolutions in each House or by primary legislation. The Constitution Committee of the House of Lords argued as much in its report The Invoking of Article 50 (HL Paper 44, 13 September 2016) and there is much to be said for it.

The issue of the mechanism for the approval of the laws and regulations needs to be assessed for their constitutionality because it will deal with the authority of the President and the House of Representatives (DPR) in the formation of legislation. The method used in this legal research is the normative juridical method. The results showed that the unconstitutionality of Article 52 and Article 71 of Law 12 of 2011 was because there was a reduction in the authority of the DPR in the Perpu made by the President because the DPR did not yet have the authority to refuse all or accept a portion of the Perpu with conditions for improvement.Keyword: Constitutional, Perpu, DPR, President.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Parliamentary Participation in EU Affairs According to EU Primary Law -- 1.2 Parliamentary Participation in Treaty Revision Largo Sensu -- 1.2.1 General Remarks -- 1.2.2 Ordinary Revision Procedure -- 1.2.3 Simplified Revision Procedure -- 1.2.4 General Bridging Clauses as Another Simplified Revision Procedure -- 1.2.5 Decisions Requiring the Approval by the Member States in Accordance with Their Respective Constitutional Requirements -- 1.2.6 Special Bridging Clauses -- 1.2.7 Other Treaty-Amending Provisions -- 1.3 The Evolution of the General Bridging Clauses -- References -- 2 The General Bridging Clauses of Article 48(7) TEU -- 2.1 Scope of Application -- 2.2 Exceptions -- 2.2.1 Written Exceptions (Article 353 TFEU) -- 2.2.2 Unwritten Exceptions -- 2.3 "Area" or "Case" -- 2.4 Relationship Between the Two General Bridging Clauses -- 2.5 Legal Effects, Revocability and Judicial Review -- 2.5.1 Legal Effects -- 2.5.2 Revocability -- 2.5.3 Judicial Review -- References -- 3 Special Bridging Clauses -- 3.1 Sector-Specific Bridging Clauses -- 3.1.1 Social Policy -- 3.1.2 Environmental Policy -- 3.1.3 Family Law with Cross-Border Implications -- 3.1.4 Multiannual Financial Framework -- 3.1.5 Relationship to the General Bridging Clauses -- 3.2 Enhanced Cooperation -- 3.3 Article 31(3) TEU as Lex Specialis? -- 3.4 "Semi-Passerelle" Clauses -- References -- 4 Procedure for Activating the General Bridging Clauses -- 4.1 Participation of the National Parliaments in General -- 4.2 Initiative of the European Council -- 4.3 Veto Right of National Parliaments -- 4.3.1 Making Known the Opposition of the National Parliament to the European Council Initiative -- 4.3.2 National Procedures in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems -- 4.3.2.1 Predominance of a Parliamentary Chamber

Рассматриваются проблемы взаимодействия Конституционного Суда Республики Беларусь и судов общей юрисдикции в сфере утверждения конституционной законности. Анализируются обстоятельства, препятствующие реализации положений ч. 2 ст. 112 Конституции Республики Беларусь на практике, и предлагаются законодательные варианты их устранения. Особое внимание уделяется обоснованию необходимости внедрения в Республике Беларусь института преюдициального запроса и пересмотру роли Верховного Суда Республики Беларусь в механизме, предусмотренном ч. 2 ст. 112 Конституции Республики Беларусь. ; The article deals with the problems of interaction between the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Belarus and the courts of general jurisdiction in the area of constitutional legality. The circumstances that impede the implementation of the provisions of part two of article 112 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus in practice are analyzed, and legislative options for their elimination are proposed. Special attention is paid to justifying the need to introduce the institution of a preliminary ruling in the Republic of Belarus and review the role of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus in the mechanism provided by the second part of article 112 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus.

In this article Professor Diane Lourdes Dick examines the Parental Notice of Abortion Act (the Act) that was passed in 1999 by the Florida Legislature, which required minors seeking an abortion to either notify a parent prior to the procedure or obtain court approval to waive parental notice. A minor choosing the latter option must demonstrate to a court that she is either mature enough to make the decision or that, despite a court's finding that she lacks sufficient maturity, parental notification is clearly not in her best interest. The statute has never been enforced and the right to privacy has been the main issue in each case examined in this article.

After the Civil War, Congress required ten former Confederate states to rewrite their constitutions before they could be readmitted to the Union. An electorate composed of newly enfranchised former slaves, native southern whites (minus significant numbers of disenfranchised former Confederate officials), and a small contingent of "carpetbaggers," or outside whites, sent delegates to ten constitutional conventions. Derogatorily labeled "black and tan" by their detractors, these assemblies wrote constitutions and submitted them to Congress and to the voters in their respective states for approval. Blacks, Carpetbaggers, and Scalawags offers a quantitative study of these decisive but little-understood assemblies -- the first elected bodies in the United States to include a significant number of blacks. Richard L. Hume and Jerry B. Gough scoured manuscript census returns to determine the age, occupation, property holdings, literacy, and slaveholdings of 839 of the conventions' 1,018 delegates. Carefully analyzing convention voting records on certain issues -- including race, suffrage, and government structure -- they correlate delegates' voting patterns with their racial and socioeconomic status. The authors then assign a "Republican support score" to each delegate who voted often enough to count, establishing the degree to which each delegate adhered to the Republican leaders' program at his convention. Using these scores, they divide the delegates into three groups -- radicals, swing voters, and conservatives -- and incorporate their quantitative findings into the narrative histories of each convention, providing, for the first time, a detailed analysis of these long-overlooked assemblies. Hume and Gough's comprehensive study offers an objective look at the accomplishments and shortcomings of the conventions and humanizes the delegates who

Since World War II, it has become increasingly common practice for presidents to use non-defensive military force abroad without obtaining congressional pre-approval, thereby leaving Congress with no meaningful role in the decision. This modern practice is clearly at odds with the Constitution's text and original meaning. A wealth of scholarly commentary concludes that the Constitution grants Congress alone the power to authorize non-defensive military force. Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, ample commentary also concludes that a president has inherent constitutional power only to defend the nation from an actual or impending attack. This Essay rejects the notion that a president's independent constitutional authority to use non-defensive military force is, as a matter of constitutional law, left solely to the routine political give and take of the elected branches. In a republic based upon fundamental individual rights to life, liberty, and property—and of a limited central government constrained by fundamental law—legislative acts and well-accepted principles of necessity must govern a president's legal authority to invade individual rights through the use of military force. A more complete contextual and structural reading of the Constitution's text, as well as early government practice and relevant Supreme Court precedent, demonstrate that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution believed these basic, rule-of-law and separation-of-powers principles to be etched into the Constitution's original design. This Essay briefly reviews the current situation and comprehensively surveys the Constitution's allocation of war- and military-related powers to demonstrate Congress's extensive authority over war and the nation's armed forces. This review strongly confirms the view that the Constitution requires Congress to affirmatively authorize all non-defensive military force and provides Congress with several powers to check a president's use and command of the military. It then briefly posits some of the reasons the relevant constitutional norms have eroded, clarifies why aberrant past practice cannot amend the Constitution's separation of war powers, and explains why Congress must reestablish its authority, briefly suggesting two ways that it may do so.