This examination of Japan's constitutional style is based on the manner in which the following factors have contributed to its development or have become elements of it: past constitutional history, the broad reaction against militarism and authoritarianism, basic constitutional principles, the renunciation of war, the electoral system, the structure of government, the relationship between the government and the people, education and the mass media, the intellectuals, changing social relations, popular controversy and the issue of revision. The conclusion will be that the 1947 Constitution has been firmly woven into the general institutional framework of Japanese society and will endure. Even so, neither the Constitution nor the constitutional style will be immutable; embedded in Japanese society they will change as the society changes.
Mr. Justice Powell has publicly characterized the 1974 Term of the Supreme. Court as a "dull" one. Whatever the accuracy of that description, the 1974 Term was, in the public eye, a quiet one. When, late in the Term, the Court ordered the death penalty case held over for reargument, it ensured that the 1974 Term would generate few front-page testimonials to the supreme authority of the Supreme Court. But neither a dull nor a quiet Term can obscure the current reality that the Court's claim to be the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution" appears to command more nearly universal respect today than at any time since Chief Justice Marshall invoked that document to deny Mr. Marbury the commission to which he was legally entitled. After a history of far more struggle than is generally remembered, it is now settled that (absent a constitutional amendment) the Court has the last say, and in that sense its constitutional interpretations are both authoritative and final. The Court's great prestige has, however, tended to deflect "careful inquiry into the limits beyond which its decisions, although authoritative, are not final. Even as the Justices have developed the habit of writing constitutional opinions that look like detailed legislative codes, the Court's great prestige has fostered the impression that every detailed rule laid down has the same dignity as the constitutional text itself. This impression should be understood as the illusion it is. Indeed, a wide variety of Supreme Court pronouncements are subject to modification and even reversal through ordinary political processes. For example, Congress may validate a state law previously invalidated by the Court as an unreasonable burden upon commerce. Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court explicitly recognized that its "Miranda warnings" might be modified by Congress and, perhaps, even by the states. Were our understandings of judicial review not affected by the mystique surrounding Marbury v. Madison, it might be more readily recognized that a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional "interpretation" is best understood as something of a quite different order – a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress. I hope to demonstrate that a theory of such a constitutional common law is necessary to explain satisfactorily a number of "constitutional" doctrines, and to outline a principled basis for a specialized common law rooted in the Constitution. Finally, I will suggest some implications of express recognition of a constitutional common law of individual liberty.
For about a quarter of a century-from the 1920's into the 1940's-no American state adopted a new constitution. By midcentury, however, interest in revising these fundamental laws had burgeoned. So widespread was the movement for constitutional revision that by 1970 a leading student of the subject commented that there was at that time "more official effort directed toward revising and rewriting state constitutions than at any time in the nation's history with the possible exception of the Civil War and Reconstruction era."
Due to its unavoidable involvement in the political process, the Supreme Court has often been an object of congressional attack. Excellent descriptive studies have been made of certain periods of conflict between Congress and the Court,' but there is a lack of writing which systematically analyzes relations between Congress and the Court throughout American history. It is the purpose of this: paper to analyze in a partially quantitative manner some of the factors which seem to account for the occurrence or nonoccurrence and for the success or failure of congressional attempts to curb the Court.
Here, Philip Bobbitt studies the basis for the legitimacy of judicial review by examining six types of constitutional argument – historical, textual, structural, prudential doctrinal, and ethical – through the unusual method of contrasting sketches of prominent legal figures responding to the constitutional crises of their day. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1054/thumbnail.jpg
Includes proposed revisions of Article III, Article IV, Article XXIV, Articles V, VII, VIII, Article VI ; At head of title: State of California ; October, 1965." ; Cover title ; Includes bibliographical references ; Mode of access: Internet.
Pages also numbered 428-478. ; Original ed. issued as no. 9 of Education, history, and politics, which forms the 9th series of Johns Hopkins University studies in historical and political science. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The history of universities has been one of intermittent struggle them or their constituent members and external groups seeking exercise control over the activities of teachers and students. Many European and American universities first developed in close co-ordination with churches. The ecclesiastical authorities long exercised, and some- times still do exercise, great control over curriculum, pedagogy extracurricular activities.1 Orthodoxy, not free inquiry, has more often not been the demand of the church. The secularisation of universities has freed them from much of the imposed religious orthodoxy, but has brought new agents of control into the picture, the most notable of which are private benefactors and the state. Private beneficence has been marked by the fewest intrusions, but except in the United States, Canada and Japan, private wealth has been an insignificant source of support in comparison to governmental largesse. Even so, the great donors of privately accumulated wealth have not always been willing to yield all control over the ways in which their gifts have been used by universities.
"April 20, 1965."--Letter of transmittal ; "Enclosed is a background study relationg to Executive Powers and accompanying document, "Guide to Organization of the Executive Branch -- California State Government."--Letter of transmittal ; Cover title ; Mode of access: Internet.
no. 1. The convention.--no. 2. Constitutions of Pennsylvania. Constitution of the United States.--no. 3. A history of Pennsylvania constitutions.--no. 4. Local government.--no. 5. The judiciary.--no. 6. Legislative apportionment.--no. 7. Taxation and state finance.--no. 8. Bibliography.--no. 9. Index. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The passage of the Jarvis-Gann amendment (Proposition 13) in California in June 1978 focused widespread attention on constitutional constraints on government's power to tax. In addition, Proposition 13, along with the political events that led up to the inception of this particular amendment and subsequent amendments in other states, reversed the traditional negative attitude concerning constraints upon government implicitly expounded by many scholars and public servants. This dissertation presents an overview of constitutional tax limits at the state level in the United States and examines the constitutional evolution of four selected states. The methodology employed is essentially historical and comparative. This study reveals that constitutional tax limits do indeed constrain government although they have been often used for purposes other than strictly limiting the power to tax. The evidence presented indicates that the potency of constitutional tax limits was recognized as early as the formation of the United States and that at the state level the evolutionary experience of constitutional tax limits is quite rich. A significant finding of this study is that the methods that are available to amend state constitutions play an important role in the evolutionary process of constitutional change. This is the feature that distinguishes the 1978 California experience from earlier attempts to limit government's taxing powers found in American history. The historical accounts suggest that representative democracy does not always yield socially desired outcomes and that the citizen initiative, a form of direct democracy, may provide a workable means of circumventing many problems associated with representative democracy. ; Ph. D.
Reprint of 1897 ed., published by Government Printing Office, Washington. ; "A calendar of amendments proposed to the Constitution of the United States, from the date of its ratification to March 4, 1889": p. 306-421. ; Bibliography: p. 422-429. ; Mode of access: Internet.
vi, 160 p. ; 28 cm. ; University of Michigan. Center for Japanese Studies. ; The intent of the Charter Oath / Robert M. Spaulding, Jr. -- Japanese political reaction to constitutional revision 1945-46 / Peter G. Cornwall -- United States reparations policy toward Japan September 1945 to May 1949 / Bruce M. Brenn -- The origins and policies of the Japan Teachers' Union 1945-56 / Richard J. Smethurst.
