Suchergebnisse

In a July 2008 decision the German Federal Constitutional Court called upon the German Bundestag to amend the Federal Election Act in order to remove the occurrence of "negative weight of votes". To this end, an adjustment procedure is proposed that operates in three steps. The initial step calculates an initial seat apportionment in just the same way as is done currently. If the initial apportionment is completely carried by proportionality. The final step then performs the sub apportionments of the nationwide seats of a party to this party's Land lists by augmenting the allocations from the initial step. The procedure promises numerous advantages over other alternatives that have been proposed, notwithstanding a few disadvantages. Various are available, though, where the disadvantages are toned down in one way or the other. Adapted from the source document.

In July 2008 the German electoral law was declared unconstitutional by the German Federal Constitutional Court because it could violate the principles of direct & equal elections. Not much time is left until June 2011, the date by which the legislature needs to have amended this law in such a way as to eliminate the effect of negative vote weights. In order to support the related debate & to substantiate it with quantitative data, it is shown where & to which extent negative vote weights occurred again in the 2009 election. To assess possible consequences of electoral reform calculations are conducted for the most important proposals in the current debate how they would have changed the actual seat apportionment in the 17th German Bundestag had been enacted before September 2009. Adapted from the source document.

The article compares four electoral reform models discussed in the German Parliament (Bundestag) to eliminate the so-called effect of 'inverse value' ruled unconstitutional by the German constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). It focuses on the effect of the reform models on the unconstitutional part of the electoral law and their advantages and disadvantages compared to the existing electoral system. The article concludes that the reform model of the CDU/CSU and FDP is the worst -- except all others. Adapted from the source document.

Under the current federal electoral law, an increase in the number of second votes for a given party may cause a loss of seats for that party. This so-called "negative vote weight" has recently been declared unconstitutional by the German Federal Constitutional Court. One way of eliminating the negative vote weight that has not received much attention in the current debate on electoral reform is allocating seats by states. Contrary to other approaches in literature, this one aims at preserving the existing mixed electoral system with its unique electoral effects -- including the possibility of surplus seats -- , instead of replacing it with a substantially different system. A surplus mandates are a means of facilitating parliamentary majorities they should be regarded as a suitable component of the German mixed electoral system & that they deserve to be preserved. Adapted from the source document.

A review essay on a book by Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert [Eds], Das Verfassungsrecht der Europaischen Union mit Europaischer. A Commentary ([The European Union/Community Treaty. The Constitutional Law of the European Union and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary] Munchen: Auflage, C. H. Beck Verlag, 2007) Beck Verlag.

The participants in Weimar discussions argued about the relationship between politics & law & based these arguments on generational assessments of constitutional history, with younger participants utilizing constitutional theory as a new & foreign form of theoretical association of politics & law. The association between generation, political persuasion, & juristic profession is investigated & balanced in a brief systematic exploration of the theoretical relationship between politics & law & a brief look at the prior methodological disagreements in the Kaiser era. The open discussion of the relationship between politics & law explains the current topicality of the Weimar constitutional law. The association of politics & law is not solely the result of political persuasion, but also a projection of a particular generation of the Weimar epoch that grew intellectually with the brittleness of the late constitutional period, & was confronted with the need to develop a new political constitutional theory. L. Kehl

On June 30, 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon (Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon) is compatible with the German Constitution. However, the court called for more participatory rights for both Bundestag & Bundesrat in European Union lawmaking & treaty amendment procedures, other than provided for so far by laws accompanying the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Through the Responsibility for Integration Act (IntVG) the Bundestag has implemented the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. The IntVG contains 25 treaty amendment procedures not requiring ratification. In practice, section 8 IntVG should be the most relevant provision concerning participation of both Bundestag & Bundesrat when the flexibility clause (Art. 352) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is applied. Adapted from the source document.

The shift of political power from legislators to judges in contemporary democracies is examined within the theoretical framework of Carl Schmitt's (1912 & 1938) views on constitutional law & making comparative references to Niklas Luhmann's (1993) system-theoretical proposals. Questions how the nonlegal becomes legal, what is the relationship between the norm & decision-making process in the judicial interpretation of constitutional law, & whether legal opinions issued in constitutionality cases are creations ex nihilo are addressed from the perspective of Schmitt's decisionism & Luhmann's notion of system's autopoiesis. The relationship between the social systems of law & politics & decision rendering as a political dimension of jurisprudence are discussed; the "decision paradox" is discussed at some length. The weaknesses of Schmitt's decisionism vis-a-vis the deconstructivist, system-theoretical decision-making theory are pointed out in an analysis of opinions rendered by the German Constitutional Court. It is concluded that legal decisions are impermanent & subjective despite their seeking precedence, argumentation, & procedure for objective decision making. However, the difference between power & jurisprudence is that the former is interested in only making a decision, regardless of procedural or argumentative obstacles. Legal decisions are made not ex nihilo by an authoritative decision maker but searches for truth & fairness, & as such, they are signification processes separating the before from the after. Z. Dubiel

Volksrepublik (VR). Overview of debates on China's constitutional reform announced 2003.