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La 4e de couverture indique : " Derived from the renowned multi-volume International Encyclopaedia of Laws, this very useful analysis of constitutional law in Argentina provides essential information on the country's sources of constitutional law, its form of government, and its administrative structure. Lawyers who handle transnational matters will appreciate the clarifications of particular terminology and its application. Throughout the book, the treatment emphasizes the specific points at which constitutional law affects the interpretation of legal rules and procedure. Thorough coverage by a local expert fully describes the political system, the historical background, the role of treaties, legislation, jurisprudence, and administrative regulations. The discussion of the form and structure of government outlines its legal status, the jurisdiction and workings of the central state organs, the subdivisions of the state, its decentralized authorities, and concepts of citizenship. Special issues include the legal position of aliens, foreign relations, taxing and spending powers, emergency laws, the power of the military, and the constitutional relationship between church and state. Details are presented in such a way that readers who are unfamiliar with specific terms and concepts in varying contexts will fully grasp their meaning and significance. Its succinct yet scholarly nature, as well as the practical quality of the information it provides, make this book a valuable time-saving tool for both practising and academic jurists. Lawyers representing parties with interests in Argentina will welcome this guide, and academics and researchers will appreciate its value in the study of comparative constitutional law."

This is the first event of the Transsystemic Law Series ; The University of Victoria follows a transsystemic method of teaching and thinking about law to educate across different legal orders, emphasize the relevance of Indigenous legal traditions to Canada, and contribute to understandings of law that are different from long-established legal views. Join the second presentation of our Transsystemic Law Series. Professor John Borrows will explain why a transsystemic approach to constitutional law contributes not only to understanding how different communities organize as distinctive political units, but also to giving Indigenous legal traditions equal footing with common and civil law traditions in Canada. ; UVic Graduate Student Law & Society Research Group ; Faculty ; Unreviewed

Virtually all constitutional scholars agree, and the Supreme Court has uniformly held, that our entire system of constitutional democracy is premised in important part on the dictate of judicial review, i.e., the power of the judiciary to exercise the final say as to the meaning of the countermajoritarian Constitution's provisions. Absent judicial review, the fundamental speed bumps to tyranny that the Framers so carefully inserted into our political structure would be rendered all but useless at best and a fraud on the electorate at worst. Yet puzzlingly, most of the very same scholars and judges assume that the very political branches that the Constitution is designed to restrain will fully control the remedies to be issued. Thus, all the political branches need to do to avoid constitutional control is deny the courts any power to enforce their decisions. Such a logically inconsistent dichotomy indirectly destroys the essence of the judicial review process that is so central to American constitutional democracy. Yet neither constitutional scholars nor the Supreme Court have recognized either the serious logical flaw or the potentially grave practical dangers in vesting in the very branches sought to be controlled by the Constitution the final power to determine the scope—indeed, the existence—of remedies to enforce constitutional dictates. This Article explains the inherent theoretical and practical link between constitutional review and constitutional remedies, demonstrating that full control of constitutional remedies belongs in the judiciary, not the political branches. It then explains how judicial inference of constitutional remedies in the face of textual silence on the issue can be justified by principled theories of textual interpretation, highlights the inadequacy of scholarly work in this area, and answers potential counterarguments. Finally, it applies this theory of constitutional remedies to the Supreme Court's implied remedies jurisprudence.