Suchergebnisse

In 1970 Belgium established three Communities: the French, Flemish and German-speaking Communities. It was then in 1980 that three regions were set up: Walloon, Flemish and Brussels. Further amendments to the Constitution were made on 7 and 15 July 1988, as well as a special law of 8 August 1988 amending the original law of 8 August 1980. It is essential to say that most of the changes and principles governing the organisation and functioning of both the three Communities and the three regions date back to 1970 and 1980. The international nature of the Community's role in 1970 is significant. In 1980, an Arbitration Court was provided for by the Constitution and established to settle conflicts between the laws and decrees of the Communities and the Regions. The Federal State is characterised by two features: autonomy and co-operation. In 1988, the Arbitration Court continued the work of constitutional justice and verifies the conformity of laws or decrees with the provisions of international law and in particular European law. ; En 1970 la Belgique a instauré trois Communautés : les Communautés française, flamande et germanophone. Puis c'est en 1980 que se sont mises en place trois Régions : wallonne, flamande et bruxelloise. De nouveaux amendements à la Constitution ont été faits le 7 et le 15 juillet 1988, ainsi qu'une loi spéciale du 8 août 1988 qui est venue modifier la loi originale du 8 août 1980. Il est indispensable de dire que l'essentiel des changements et des principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement des trois Communautés aussi bien que des trois Régions datent de 1970 et de 1980. Le caractère international du rôle que les Communautés ont joué en 1970 est significatif. En 1980, une Cour d'arbitrage a été prévue par la Constitution et créée afin de régler les conflits entre les lois et les décrets des Communautés et des Régions. L'Etat fédéral se caractérise par deux traits : l'autonomie et la co-opération. En 1988 la Cour d'arbitrage poursuit l'oeuvre de justice constitutionnelle et vérifie la ...

1 towards new constitutional politics of citizenship, identity and minority protection1.1 introduction: remarks on terminology; 1.2 erosion of the foundations of the classical concept of citizenship; 1.3 devaluation and extension of citizenship; 1.4 citizenship and democracy; 1.5 multiculturalism and minority rights; 1.6 conclusion; 2 strong religion and weak minorities: a cautionary tale from europe; 2.1 de-privatized religion: a challenge to public reason; 2.2 the illusion of religious pluralism: jewish schools and muslim veils.

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...