Suchergebnisse

A phrase like "Parliament decisions on its own behalf" has not been codified in Spanish legal and political discourse. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are certain issues where political parties within parliament possess distinct interests that may influence their legislative choices. To counter the potential hazards involved, various elements have demonstrated varying degrees of efficiency in ensuring that decision are being made for the common good, despite the influence of party-specific concerns.

By Théo Fournier. This essay argues that rule-of-law culture could be an avenue of research to address the issue of constitutional resilience of liberal democratic regimes, i.e. the capacity of liberal constitution to resist the passage of time and to remain legitimate in the eyes of the citizenry.

On July 4 2023, the Court of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) issued its advisory opinion in RS v Steuerverwaltung des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein's Constitutional Court had already found in 2020 that a difference in tax rate on income for resident and non-resident employees was incompatible with the free movement of workers. Nonetheless, the Administrative Court of Liechtenstein found it necessary to refer the exact same issue to the EFTA Court, upon which the EFTA Court came to a similar conclusion as the Constitutional Court. The reason thereto? The Constitutional Court had suspended the annulment of the national law for reasons of legal certainty. The question consequently arose of how the national court should further proceed. Should it immediately give full effect to the law of the European Economic Area (EEA) by following the EFTA Court and disapplying the national legislation, or should it give priority to the findings of its own Constitutional Court and nonetheless apply the national legislation, even if that legislation breaches EEA law? How should the national court deal with this conflict of allegiance?

Indonesia will have the world's biggest one-day election in 2024. More than 200 million voters will go to the ballots to choose the next president and legislative members on 14 February, opening a fresh chapter for the nation's leadership after a decade of President Joko Widodo's rule. In recent weeks, the Constitutional Court has been flooded with back-to-back filings for judicial review of Indonesia's General Election Law. Against the backdrop of Indonesia's declining levels of trust in public institution, the Court's rulings might not only change the rules of Indonesia's electoral game but also threaten to further impair its own independence and integrity.

It is never a good sign when Viktor Orbán celebrates the election results of another country. Last Wednesday was one of those days. For the first time in the history of Dutch politics, a far-right party became by far the biggest party in the Dutch parliament. It is bad news in many respects, and even more, because the Dutch constitutional system knows a lack of formal rule of law safeguards. In contrast to countries such as Italy or Germany, the Dutch constitutional system is not prepared for a democratic move to the anti-liberal far right.

On 15 June, the Bundestag approved a minimum percentage threshold for elections to the European Parliament (EP). Shortly before the summer break, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) also agreed to the clause. German lawmakers already failed twice in this endeavour before the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, short BVerfG). This time, the German legislator can refer to a binding EU legal act backing its reform efforts. This means the electoral threshold must now be treated (also by the constitutional court) as determined by EU law – with all consequences. However, even a 2% hurdle is not 100% safe from the BVerfG.

Ahead of the next parliamentary elections, a core question is whether and if so how we can restore Poland's rule of law. While the current effort is understandably focused on resurrecting the Constitutional Court and rebuilding an independent judiciary and prosecution, a purely institutional approach won't be enough. Instead, it is imperative to mobilize and build lasting defiance on the ground.

The Supreme Court, India's apex constitutional court, recently delivered its disappointing decision in Supriyo Chakraborty v Union India (Supriyo), rejecting marriage equality in Indian law. The much-awaited decision was heard by a constitution bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court and dealt with far-reaching questions of both Indian constitutional law and family law. The decision is characteristic of the Indian Supreme Court's ongoing phase of great deference to the executive and legislative branches but also marks a sharp and worrying break from the court's otherwise progressive jurisprudence on issues of gender and sexuality.

On December 3, Venezuelans will vote in a referendum on the annexation of Esequibo to the territory of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This blog post argues that the referendum has implications for both domestic constitutional law and international law. Since the referendum cannot have any practical effect under international law, it also violates the voters' constitutional right to participate freely in public affairs. By prioritizing solely the interests of Venezuela over the sovereignty of Guyana, the referendum might be contrary to the principles of peaceful dispute settlement and the prohibition of force, as stipulated in the United Nations Charter. It could also challenge the established legal doctrine of state consent and infringe upon the principle of prioritizing international obligations over national law.

On November 3, 2023, the Italian Council of Ministers approved a Bill to amend the Constitution, encapsulating what Giorgia Meloni's Cabinet advertises as a measure to enhance executive stability and streamline policy implementation for medium to long-term objectives. The real goal appears to be cementing the Prime Minister's grip on power after general elections, as evidenced by the intention to enshrine the majority bonus in the Constitution. Yet, from a constitutional law perspective, the majority bonus raises a fundamental issue related to how the Italian Constitutional Court interprets the eternity clause in the Constitution.

In this conversation with RevDem editor and a re:constitution fellow Kasia Krzyżanowska, Krzysztof Izdebski (Batory Foundation) and Bartosz Pilitowski (Court Watch Poland) discuss all the current challenges the Polish government is facing with the legal legacy left by the Law and Justice party. How to restore trust in the judicial institutions? How to deal with the irregularly established Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary? What should be the role of the judges in designing the judicial system?

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Türkei auf dem Weg in die Erdoganokratie - kann man von Gleichschaltung sprechen?

Schulz nennt "Cumhuriyet"-Festnahmen nicht tolerabel - Zeit online
Gericht erlässt Haftbefehl gegen "Cumhuriyet"-Chefredakteur - SZ.de


Bundeswehr-Recruiting

"Die Rekruten" (YouTube-Channel)



Trumps Wahlkampf-Exzesse könnten in Wahrheit psychologisch geschickte Manipulationen sein

Deutschlandfunk-Konferenz "Formate des Politischen"
Elisabeth Wehling - Homepage
Politik, Stimmungen und Emotionen – Beobachtungen aus dem US-Präsidentschaftswahlkampf, Vortrag von Elisabeth Wellig (MP3)
Service-Ecke: Die Wahlen in den USA von den Wiss. Diensten des Bundestages


Brexit nur mit Parlament

May darf Brexit nicht ohne Parlament einleiten - SZ.de
The High Court's Brexit Decision: A Lesson in Constitutional Law for the UK Government - Verfassungsblog


GEMA und YouTube haben sich geeinigt

Musikrechte: YouTube einigt sich mit GEMA - heise online
Automatische Abrechnung: Wie Youtube und die Gera genaue Daten über den Abruf von Musik erhalten - Johannes Boie, SZ

One of the most critical challenges in the process of restoring the rule of law in Poland after the period of 'Law and Justice' rule will be regulating the situation in the Constitutional Tribunal. After the unlawful election of three judges by the Sejm in November 2015 and the subsequent recognition of their judicial status by the new President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Julia Przyłębska, the Constitutional Tribunal lost its independence and authority. Instead of defending the Constitution and the rule of law, the Constitutional Tribunal often legitimizes controversial Government actions and openly questions the European standards. Rebuilding the Constitutional Tribunal's authority and restoring its proper functioning will undoubtedly be a challenging task. It must involve at least two actions: firstly, the removal of improperly elected individuals from adjudication and secondly, the regulation of the consequences of their judgments. In the following brief text, I will specifically address the latter issue, based on the report published by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in June 2023.

In the last eight years Poland experienced an illiberal shift. Key elements of constitutional democracy were undermined. The story is well-known to public law scholars, particularly with respect to judicial reforms. However, off most people's radar have been the changes which increased the role of state-controlled and state-owned firms (SOEs) in the Polish economy which have supported Poland's illiberal tendencies. Pre-election period is illustrative in this respect, with the ruling majority benefitting from various kinds of support from SOEs which undermined a level playing field. The Polish experience arguably sheds light on constitutional democracies' weaknesses in effectively addressing the links between political and market power which can further democratic backsliding. In this blogpost, I will highlight why the existing legal framework, in particular remedies available in law aimed at imposing limits on the use of market power, i.e. competition law, are insufficient to address this risk and why a broader debate in public law is necessary in this respect.

Three years ago, in the wake of the Weiss judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court, we proposed the creation of a "Mixed Chamber" in the Court of Justice of the European Union, to rule in last instance on judicial disputes on points of Union competence. The rationale of a Chamber so composed is not obvious. After all, in a Union in which EU Law has primacy over national law, in which the autonomy of EU law is all-pervasive and where the Court of Justice is the ultimate interpreter of EU law, why should a Mixed Chamber be needed? We believe there are at least three good reasons that make a Mixed Chamber as salient as ever.