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In 1970 Belgium established three Communities: the French, Flemish and German-speaking Communities. It was then in 1980 that three regions were set up: Walloon, Flemish and Brussels. Further amendments to the Constitution were made on 7 and 15 July 1988, as well as a special law of 8 August 1988 amending the original law of 8 August 1980. It is essential to say that most of the changes and principles governing the organisation and functioning of both the three Communities and the three regions date back to 1970 and 1980. The international nature of the Community's role in 1970 is significant. In 1980, an Arbitration Court was provided for by the Constitution and established to settle conflicts between the laws and decrees of the Communities and the Regions. The Federal State is characterised by two features: autonomy and co-operation. In 1988, the Arbitration Court continued the work of constitutional justice and verifies the conformity of laws or decrees with the provisions of international law and in particular European law. ; En 1970 la Belgique a instauré trois Communautés : les Communautés française, flamande et germanophone. Puis c'est en 1980 que se sont mises en place trois Régions : wallonne, flamande et bruxelloise. De nouveaux amendements à la Constitution ont été faits le 7 et le 15 juillet 1988, ainsi qu'une loi spéciale du 8 août 1988 qui est venue modifier la loi originale du 8 août 1980. Il est indispensable de dire que l'essentiel des changements et des principes d'organisation et de fonctionnement des trois Communautés aussi bien que des trois Régions datent de 1970 et de 1980. Le caractère international du rôle que les Communautés ont joué en 1970 est significatif. En 1980, une Cour d'arbitrage a été prévue par la Constitution et créée afin de régler les conflits entre les lois et les décrets des Communautés et des Régions. L'Etat fédéral se caractérise par deux traits : l'autonomie et la co-opération. En 1988 la Cour d'arbitrage poursuit l'oeuvre de justice constitutionnelle et vérifie la ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The present thesis proposes to return to the place of fiction within constitutional law. It will be a question here of considering fiction as a tool used by the constitutional judge in order to respond to the specificities of the supreme norm. Although fiction is never invoked by the judge, it remains present in his reasoning. The research work that has been written attempts to come back to the constituent's relations with regard to fiction, which allows the constitutional text a certain flexibility, necessary to be part of a logic of sustainability. The Constitution occupies a special place within the legal order. It would have such a value that it would become unalterable. Nevertheless, this specificity would have an impact on its practice, in particular when the supreme standard would be confronted with the evolutions of the company. Fiction would offer an alternative to the constitutional judge to apply the values provided for by the standard, while allowing him to free himself from the rigidity imposed by the written word.However, there is no question of proposing a cataloging of different fictions, which would potentially be used. It will be a question here of observing the logics, which can animate, for example, the constitutional judge, when he uses, consciously or not, fiction. The place of fiction within the supreme norm appears to be revealing of the very nature of law. An opposition would thus be created, between the law which is considered as the representation of the real and the fiction, which leads the constitutional judge on more uncertain grounds. Fiction, however, appears to be a necessity since it makes it possible to transcribe and support the logic of the constitutional judge. This thought becomes intelligible in order to allow a better understanding of constitutional law. ; La présente thèse se propose de revenir sur la place de la fiction au sein du droit constitutionnel. Il sera ici question de considérer la fiction comme un outil employé par le juge constitutionnel, afin de répondre aux ...

The issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as "political empiricism" in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970's and advocates a "legal empiricism". Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for "case law empiricism", widely discussed in this analysis. ; Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l'empirisme et du ...

The issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as "political empiricism" in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970's and advocates a "legal empiricism". Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for "case law empiricism", widely discussed in this analysis. ; Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l'empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d'induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d'une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L'idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d'abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d'interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l'alternance entre l'empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s'efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s'agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l'évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l'identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d'élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l'évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l'évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s'agit d'abord, d'un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d'un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étude.

A phrase like "Parliament decisions on its own behalf" has not been codified in Spanish legal and political discourse. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are certain issues where political parties within parliament possess distinct interests that may influence their legislative choices. To counter the potential hazards involved, various elements have demonstrated varying degrees of efficiency in ensuring that decision are being made for the common good, despite the influence of party-specific concerns.

The article tries to lay down the perspectives and the development of Belgian constitutional law within the next 20 years (2010-2030).

Nearly three decades have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the time, the scholarly community was keen on joining Fukuyama in his belief in the "end of history" that was supposed to propel Russia away from the ideological "otherness" of the Soviet legal thought towards European liberal democratic values. The new spirit of optimism of 1991 had created a deceptive euphoria: Russia's dark legacies of Communism and authoritarian rule were seen merely as a bump on the road. Yet, the dream of united Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok had failed to materialize.

The subject of the study is norms or rules of exception in constitutional law. We have to examine what is legal reality of laws qualified as "rules of exception" (special text) and what purpose they serve in the French constitutional order. The joint analysis of constitutional and legislative texts, constitutional and administrative jurisprudence, as weIl as doctrinal speech allows to define the material content of the notion of exception. This concept refers to the norm of limitation. SpecificaIly, the exception is a limitation that is applied by the legislator either to the scope of the validity of a legal norm too broad or to implementation of the law when this implementation diverts the rule of law of its purposes or is ineffective, inadequate to solve a particular situation. Defmed as a limitation norm, the notion of exception is a real contribution to constitutional law. lndeed, by contributing to the resolution of antinomy norms by conciliation and not by repealing, this concept f1l1s gaps and entiches constitutionallaw. Being a particularly effective instrument of legal reformism, the notion of exception is a tool to adapt the law to the social circumstances by "softness". Harmonizing standards with conflicting contents, this concept more generally contributes to the discussion on the balance of the legalorder. ; L'étude consiste à étudier les normes ou règles d'exception en droit constitutionnel. Il s'agit de s'interroger sur le point de savoir quelle réalité juridique recouvrent les lois qualifiées d'exception (textes exceptionnels) et à quelle finalité servent-elles dans l'ordre constitutionnel français? L'analyse conjointe ( textes constitutionnels, législatifs, des jurisprudences constitutionnelle, administrative ainsi que des discours de la doctrine permet de circonscrire le contenu matériel la notion d'exception. Celle-ci désigne la nonne de limitation. Plus précisément, l'exception est une limitation que le législateur fait tantôt à l'étendue de la validité d'une norme juridique de portée trop ...

The subject of the study is norms or rules of exception in constitutional law. We have to examine what is legal reality of laws qualified as "rules of exception" (special text) and what purpose they serve in the French constitutional order. The joint analysis of constitutional and legislative texts, constitutional and administrative jurisprudence, as weIl as doctrinal speech allows to define the material content of the notion of exception. This concept refers to the norm of limitation. SpecificaIly, the exception is a limitation that is applied by the legislator either to the scope of the validity of a legal norm too broad or to implementation of the law when this implementation diverts the rule of law of its purposes or is ineffective, inadequate to solve a particular situation. Defmed as a limitation norm, the notion of exception is a real contribution to constitutional law. lndeed, by contributing to the resolution of antinomy norms by conciliation and not by repealing, this concept f1l1s gaps and entiches constitutionallaw. Being a particularly effective instrument of legal reformism, the notion of exception is a tool to adapt the law to the social circumstances by "softness". Harmonizing standards with conflicting contents, this concept more generally contributes to the discussion on the balance of the legalorder. ; L'étude consiste à étudier les normes ou règles d'exception en droit constitutionnel. Il s'agit de s'interroger sur le point de savoir quelle réalité juridique recouvrent les lois qualifiées d'exception (textes exceptionnels) et à quelle finalité servent-elles dans l'ordre constitutionnel français? L'analyse conjointe ( textes constitutionnels, législatifs, des jurisprudences constitutionnelle, administrative ainsi que des discours de la doctrine permet de circonscrire le contenu matériel la notion d'exception. Celle-ci désigne la nonne de limitation. Plus précisément, l'exception est une limitation que le législateur fait tantôt à l'étendue de la validité d'une norme juridique de portée trop générale, tantôt à l'application stricte du droit lorsqu'une telle application détourne la règle de droit de ses propres finalités ou s'avère inefficace, inadéquate à résoudre une situation particulière. Définie comme une norme de limitation, la notion d'exception est d'un apport certain en droit constitutionnel. En effet, en contribuant à la résolution des normes antinomiques par la conciliation et non par l'abrogation, cette notion comble les lacunes et enrichit le droit constitutionnel. Étant un instrument particulièrement efficace du réformisme juridique, la notion d'exception est donc un outil d'adaptation du droit aux circonstances sociales en « douceur ». Harmonisant les normes ayant des contenus contradictoires, cette notion contribue plus généralement à la réflexion sur l'équilibre de l'ordre juridique.

This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State's perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State's foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles Eisenmann, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity: to establish and to maintain "good relations" outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent's choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State's interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State's monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs. ; L'étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l'État. L'approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l'État lui-même, et à travers l'action des organes compétents organisés dans l'État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l'État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à ...

This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State's perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State's foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles Eisenmann, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity: to establish and to maintain "good relations" outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent's choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State's interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State's monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs. ; L'étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l'État. L'approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l'État lui-même, et à travers l'action des organes compétents organisés dans l'État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l'État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à ...

This study presents constitutional law as an ideal framework to analyze the foreign relations of the State. Through a double standpoint, it examines these relations from the State's perspective and through the action of the empowered organs of the State. In this way, the study aims to highlight the institutional and normative specificities of State's foreign relations. When the State establishes diplomatic and military relations at the outer-limits of its borders, it assumes a singular role compared to other political non-state unities. It performs a political function (fonction-fin), as defined by Charles Eisenmann, which belongs to the field of foreign relations. This political function is hold by the State in order to fulfill one basic need of the sovereign collectivity: to establish and to maintain "good relations" outside its boundaries – irrespective of the conflictual or cooperative nature of these relations. Because law and politics are intertwined, the function of foreign relations do not pre-define the distribution of powers within the State. Nevertheless, it exerts some influence on the constituent's choices and on the practices of the empowered organs. At the interface between the State's interior and exterior, constitutional analysis enables therefore to reexamine many elements usually taken as evident. This study assesses them and observe its effects. For example, it is possible to nuance the State's monopoly on foreign relations and, through a historical perspective, to moderate the governmental concentration of the direction of foreign affairs. ; L'étude proposée soutient que le droit constitutionnel offre un cadre privilégié pour observer les relations extérieures de l'État. L'approche envisage de les appréhender à la fois au prisme de l'État lui-même, et à travers l'action des organes compétents organisés dans l'État. Cette étude entend ainsi mettre en lumière les spécificités institutionnelles et normatives des relations extérieures de l'État. Lorsque celui-ci établit des rapports à l'extérieur de ses frontières au moyen de ses outils diplomatique et militaire, il assume un rôle singulier en comparaison des autres unités politiques non étatiques. En effet, il remplit une fonction-fin, au sens de Charles Eisenmann, propre à la matière des relations extérieures. Cette fonction politique est assurée par l'État afin de répondre à un besoin de la collectivité souveraine, à savoir nouer de « bons rapports » au-dehors de son territoire – sans préjuger si la relation en cause est conflictuelle ou coopérative. En raison de l'imbrication du droit et du politique, la fonction des relations extérieures de l'État, si elle ne préjuge pas de la répartition des compétences au sein de celui-ci, n'est pas sans influencer les choix du constituant et la pratique des organes habilités. Placée à l'interface entre le dedans et le dehors de l'État, l'analyse constitutionnelle permet de réinterroger plusieurs éléments souvent présentés comme relevant de l'évidence. L'étude conduit autant à les examiner qu'à en observer les effets. Ainsi est-il possible, par exemple, de relativiser le monopole étatique des relations extérieures ou encore de tempérer, au regard de l'histoire, la concentration gouvernementale de la direction des affaires extérieures.

At the threshold of the 21st century European Union gives a renewed sens of the concept of supranationality. This concept, basic aspiration as well as a perfectible principle of which end is integration, constitutes a dominant feature of European framework reflecting its sui generis nature. The concept of supranationality presupposes a complete legal system superposed to that of other member countries expressing the will peculiar to European identity. It is via the coming together of the States which this concept creates, that it reveals a social solidarity propicious to the development of a public system of values and to the advent of a global support that the organization needs to bloom. The original aspect of the supranational nature, as a new form of political organisation, is mainly the result of the relationships it has with States, and furthermore, with the individuals who are its subjects and whose common good is its objective. It is in European commitment the Nation-State finds the means of reinforcing itself. The constitutionalisation which brings to light the double aspect of the concept of national sovereignty, renders the State a mere instrument in the service of the nation. The Nation-State endows a status, which constitutes a kind of supranational conditioning, that proves the compatibility of the two legal systems. The adaptability shown by the Nation-State is by no way a sign of atrophy of its original principle of unity. The constitutional integration of supranationality gives the opportunity of consolidating its essence while reasserting the intangibility of its political unity. The respect of national membership and of the link between an individual and its nation seem to be the primary conditions on which depends the efficiency of the supranational traits. The individual, who is the ultimate subject of the supranational action as well as the source of its legitimacy, is the one through whom European organisation finds its raison d'être. ; L'Union européenne offre au 21ème siècle une image ...