Suchergebnisse

El presente documento reporta el estudio sobre el concepto de familia en la legislación y en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Constitucional Colombiana, y concluye que en el Artículo 42 de la Constitución Política existe un concepto de familia, recogido de forma implícita y explícita en la legislación sobre la materia; sin embargo, su interpretación no es un tema pacífico, y en especial en lo referente a las formas constitucionalmente admisibles de conformar una familia en Colombia ; The present article studies the family concept in the legislation and in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Colombian Court, and concludes that in the Article 42 of the Political Constitution there exists a concept of family, gathered from implicit and explicit form in the legislation on the matter; nevertheless, your interpretation is not a pacific topic, and especially in what concerns the forms constitutionally admissible of shaping a family

Why should America restrain itself in detaining, interrogating, and targeting terrorists when they show it no similar forbearance? Is it fair to expect one side to fight by more stringent rules than the other, placing itself at disadvantage? Is the disadvantaged side then permitted to use the tactics and strategies of its opponent? If so, then America's most controversial counterterrorism practices are justified as commensurate responses to indiscriminate terror. Yet different ethical standards prove entirely fitting, the author finds, in a conflict between a network of suicidal terrorists seeking mass atrocity at any cost and a constitutional democracy committed to respecting human dignity and the rule of law. The most important reciprocity involves neither uniform application of fair rules nor their enforcement by a simple-minded tit-for-tat. Real reciprocity instead entails contributing to an emergent global contract that encompasses the law of war and from which all peoples may mutually benefit

As Malta is bracing herself up for the membership of the European Community it seems timely to reflect upon the effects of the membership on the national legal systems. Politicians and economists face a challenge of this new venture in their own fields but lawyers, apart from the challenge, have to prepare themselves for a mighty shock to the national system. The waves of this shock will reverberate throughout the whole system for membership means more than a new political alignment or adjustments of economic policy or trade rules. It is so because the EC is a '' new legal order in International Law embracing not only the member states but also their citizens" (Case 26 / 62: Van Gcnd v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1963) ECR 1 at 29). It has been established by law and it is governed by law, hence the tendency towards a legalistic bureaucracy in the management of its affairs. ; peer-reviewed

Carl Schmitt's provocative & ambiguous statement Souveran ist, wer uber den Ausnahmezustand entscheided (sovereign is he who makes the decision on the state of emergency), opening his book Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveranitat ([Four Chapters on the Theory of Sovereignty] Berlin, 1922), is examined, with special attention to its pertinence to the contemporary theory of constitutional law & the debate on the sovereignty of states which are members of the European Union (EU). After discussing the notion of sovereignty & surveying its conceptualizations in 19th & 20th-century political science & theory of constitutional & international law, the post-WWII history of Germany is examined as a special case illustrating the validity of Schmitt's maxim. The possible conflicts between the constitutions of EU member states & the recently drafted EU constitution are considered. Z. Dubiel

The reconfiguration of the security landscape in recent years has resulted in the transformation of the relationship between the individual and the state. A catalyst toward this transformation has been the growing link between securitization and preemptive surveillance, and the focus of security governance on the assessment of risk (Amoore and de Goede 2008). Central in this context is the focus on the future, and the aim of preemptive surveillance to identify and predict risk and dangerousness (Bigo 2006). The preemptive turn in surveillance has been based largely upon the collection, processing, and exchange of personal data, which has in turn been marked by three key features. The first feature involves the purpose of data collection and processing. This is no longer focused solely on data to address the commission of specific, identified criminal offenses, but focuses rather on the use of personal data to predict risk and preempt future activity. The second feature involves the nature of the data in question. On the one hand, preemptive surveillance focuses increasingly on the collection of personal data generated by ordinary, everyday life activities. This includes records of financial transactions (Mitsilegas 2003; de Goede 2012), of airline travel (PNR) reservations (Mitsilegas 2005), and of mobile phone telecommunications (Mitsilegas 2009). The focus on monitoring everyday life results in mass surveillance, marked by the collection and storage of personal data in bulk. On the other hand, the focus on prediction and preemption has been linked with the deepening of surveillance via the collection of sensitive personal data from the human body, such as DNA samples and biometrics (Lyon 2001; Amoore 2006). The third feature of preemptive surveillance involves the actors of surveillance. A key element in this context, linked with the focus on the monitoring of everyday life, is the privatization of surveillance under what has been named a "responsibilisation strategy," aiming to co-opt the private sector in the fight against crime (Garland 1996). Thus, banks and other financial and non-financial institutions (including lawyers), airlines and mobile phone companies are legally obliged to collect, store, and reactively or proactively transfer personal data to state authorities. The privatization of surveillance has been accompanied by the expansion of state actors of surveillance. Maximum access to databases has been allowed to security agencies, notwithstanding the purpose of the database. A prime example in this context is access by law enforcement authorities to immigration databases such as the EU Visa Information System (Mitsilegas 2012) which reflects what has been deemed the (in)security continuum, transferring the illegitimacy of criminality to immigration (Bigo 1996). Adapted from the source document.

The widespreadunderstandingthat the ECJ'searly fundamental rights jurisprudence in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) and other cases was developed in response to judgments of theGerman and Italian Constitutional Courts has recently been questioned.Delledonne and Fabbriniclaimboth that the conventional account ischronologically inaccurate -the European Court's famous fundamental rights decisions came beforethose of the German and Italian courts -and that it relies on an understanding ofpostwarhuman rights leadershipby these national constitutional courts which a closer look at theiractual record does not support.This paper demonstrates however that there is substantially more evidence that the Court of Justice was responding to the concerns of the German and Italian constitutional courts than is frequently set out by either critics or supporters of the more conventional approach. The Court of Justice's famous fundamental rights decisions did indeed comeafterthis issue had been first highlightedin judgments ofthe German and Italianconstitutionalcourts; thethreat to the uniform application of European law posed by the fundamental rights aspect of thesejudgments wasprominently notedin the writings ofECJ judges;andthe caution shownby the German and Italian constitutional courtsin reviewing postwar domestic legislation on human rights groundsis not in conflict with an active rolein promoting the ECJ's new human rights jurisprudence. In short therefore,there isconsiderableevidence that the ECJ was motivated to create its new human rights jurisprudence by the possible threatto the uniform applicationof European law posed by theGerman and Italianconstitutional courts.

Virginia's courts interpret the Virginia Administrative Process Act (VAPA) to prohibit judicial review of administrative decisions that grant or deny public assistance funds. Virginia is therefore one of only three states which fail to provide judicial review of such decisions. This article advocates judicial review of public assistance hearing decisions on the basis of principles of statutory construction and constitutional law. The article concludes that Virginia's minority status indicates a failure to meet traditional notions of fairness.

Global poverty and the politics of good intentions /Sundhya Pahuja --Human rights and development : a fragmented discourse /Issa G. Shivji --Rights and development : a social power perspective /Ananya Mukherjee-Reed --Is a new 'TREMF' human rights paradigm emerging? Evidence from Nigeria /Obiora Chinedu Okafor --The transformation of Africa : a critique of rights in transitional justice /Makau W. Mutua --Marks indicating conditions of origin in rights-based sustainable development /Nicole Aylwin and Rosemary J. Coombe --Rethinking the convergence of human rights and labour rights in international law : depoliticisation and excess /Vidya Kumar --Measuring the world : indicators, human rights and global governance /Sally Engle Merry --Governing by measuring : the millenium development goals in global governance /Kerry Rittich --Reparations and development /Naomi Roht-Arriaza --Making history or making peace : when prosecutions should give way to truth commissions and peace negotiations /Martha Minow --Transitional justice as global project : critical reflections /Rosemary Nagy --Holding up a mirror to the process of transition? The coercive sterilisation of Romani women in the Czech Republic post-1991 /Morag Goodwin --Symptoms of sovereignty? Apologies, indigenous rights and reconciliation in Australia and Canada /Kirsten Anker --Working through 'bitter experiences' towards a purified European identity? A critique of the disregard for history in European constitutional theory and practice /Christian Joerges --The trials of history : losing justice in the monstrous and the banal /Vasuki Nesiah --Sociological jurisprudence 2.0 : updating law's inter-disciplinarity in a global context /Peer Zumbansen --Epilogue:Progressive law versus the critique of law & development : strategies of double agency revisited /Bryant G. Garth.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Very Modest Beginnings -- 2. The Court in a Two-Party Republic -- 3. The States and the Republic -- 4. The Sectional Crisis and the Jacksonian Court -- 5. Civil War and Reconstruction -- 6. Industrialization America -- 7. Progressivism, Normalcy, and Depression -- 8. After the New Deal Constitutional Revolution -- 9. Reforming America -- 10. An Uneasy Status Quo -- 11. An Imperial Court -- 12. The Kennedy Court -- 13. The Republican Dream Court -- Chronology -- Notes -- Bibliographic Essay -- Index of Cases -- General Index -- Back Cover.

Рассматриваются вопросы становления н развития правового статуса Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации как специализированного органа конституционного контроля, самостоятельно и независимо осуществляющего судебную власть посредством конституционного судопроизводства. Анализ действующего Федерального конституционного закона "О Конституционном Суде РФ"*, принятого 21 июля 1994 г., приводит к выводу, что он в соответствии с Конституцией РФ 1993 г. сохранил за Конституционным Судом роль гаранта конституционной законности и вместе с тем внес значительные коррективы в его компетенцию и организационно-правовые формы деятельности по сравнению с прежним законодательством. ; The article is devoted to the problems concerned the process of formation and development of the Constitutional Courts legal status, as a specialized in the constitutional control body, which independently carries out the judicial authority through the constituonal proceeding. The analysis of the Federal Constitutional Law currently in force "About the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation" adopted in July, 21 st, 1994, leads to the conclusion, that under the Constituon of 1993, the Law provides the Constitution Court with a role of guaranter of the constitutional legality, and of the same time, the Law amends the considerable corrections into the organisational legal forms of its activity in comparison with the former legislation.

In contemporary debates over copyright, the figure of the author is too-often absent. As a result, these discussions tend to lose sight of copyright's role in fostering creativity. I believe that refocusing discussion on authors – the constitutional subjects of copyright – should restore a proper perspective on copyright law, as a system designed to advance the public goal of expanding knowledge, by means of stimulating the efforts and imaginations of private creative actors. Copyright cannot be understood merely as a grudgingly tolerated way-station on the road to the public domain. Nor does a view of copyright as a necessary incentive to invest in dissemination of copy-vulnerable productions adequately account for the nature and scope of legal protections. Much of copyright law in the US and abroad makes sense only if one recognizes the centrality of the author, the human creator of the work. Because copyright arises out of the act of creating a work, authors have moral claims that neither corporate intermediaries nor consumer end-users can (straightfacedly) assert. This makes it all the important to attempt to discern just what authorship means in today's copyright systems. This Article endeavors to explore the concept of authorship in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. It considers legislative, judicial and secondary authorities in the US, the UK, Canada and Australia, as well as in the civil law countries of France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The legal systems here examined appear to agree that an author is a human being who exercises subjective judgment in composing the work and who controls its execution. But that description may neither fully capture nor exhaust the category of "authors." Contending additional or alternative authorial characteristics range from sweat of the ordinary brow, to highly skilled labor, to intent to be a creative author, to investment. The under- or over-inclusiveness of the subjective judgment criterion depends on which of these other characteristics national laws credit. Despite these variations, I nonetheless conclude that in copyright law, an author is (or should be) a human creator who, notwithstanding the constraints of her task, succeeds in exercising minimal personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work. Because, and to the extent that, she molds the work to her vision (be it even a myopic one), she is entitled not only to recognition and payment, but to exert some artistic control over it. If copyright laws do not derive their authority from human creativity, but instead seek merely to compensate investment, then the scope of protection should be rethought and perhaps reduced.

With the transfer of government shares in 17 electricity generation and distribution companies in November 2013, Nigeria crossed the Rubicon in the privatization process. This process began in earnest in 2003 with the liberalization of the telecom sector as part of a strategic reform to improve efficiency in these utility sectors. So far, privatization has not improved the quality of service in these sectors. The problem has been traced to the failure of regulation. The major problem is that the regulatory regime had not matured before privatization. This immaturity manifests mostly in the failure to protect consumer interests. This article reviews regulatory deficits post-privatization. It assesses potential conflict between principles of market orthodoxy and those of constitutional governance and argues for a rule-of-law approach to regulation post-privatization that is focused on blending of promotion of market efficiency and protection of fundamental rights.Keywords: Liberalization, Privatization, Regulation, Market Efficiency, Rule of Law