Constitutional Amendment
In: Middle East Studies Association bulletin, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 60-61
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In: Middle East Studies Association bulletin, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 60-61
In: American political science review, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 258-259
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (ed. Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Oxford University Press 2016)
SSRN
In: Review of social economy: the journal for the Association for Social Economics, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 174-175
ISSN: 1470-1162
In: American political science review, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 445-451
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: The Parliamentarian: journal of the parliaments of the Commonwealth, Band 79, Heft 2, S. 195-198
ISSN: 0031-2282
SINCE ACHIEVING POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN 1964, ZAMBIA HAS HAD THREE CONSTITUTIONS. IN ADDITION, VARIOUS AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO ALTER SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. THIS ARTICLE SUMMARIZES SOME SALIENT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND THE IMPACTS THEY HAVE HAD ON ZAMBIA'S PARLIAMENT, THE JUDICIARY, AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
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Working paper
Constitutional amendment ordinarily channels public deliberation through formal, transparent and predictable procedures designed to express the informed aggregated choices of political, popular and institutional actors. Yet the Government of Canada's proposed senator selection reforms concealed a democratically problematic strategy to innovate an informal, obscure and irregular method of constitutional amendment: constitutional amendment by stealth. There are three distinguishing features of constitutional amendment by stealth—distinctions that make stealth amendment stand apart from other types of informal constitutional change: the circumvention of formal amendment rules, the intentional creation of a convention, and the twinned consequences of both promoting and weakening democracy. Constitutional amendment by stealth occurs where political actors consciously establish a new democratic practice whose repetition is intended to compel their successors into compliance. Over time, this practice matures into an unwritten constitutional convention, and consequently becomes informally entrenched in the constitution, though without the democratic legitimacy we commonly associate with an amendment. In this Article, I theorize constitutional amendment by stealth from legal, theoretical and comparative perspectives, and consider its consequences for the rule of law.
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In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 45, Heft 5
ISSN: 1467-825X
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 45, Heft 5, S. 17533B
ISSN: 0001-9844
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 296
ISSN: 1537-5935
In: PS, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 296-296
ISSN: 2325-7172
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 331
ISSN: 1537-5935
In: PS, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 331-331
ISSN: 2325-7172
In: Heritage
Frontmatter -- Preface -- Foreword / Dawson, R. MacGregor -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I: The Constitution Of Canada -- I. The Constitution Defined -- II. The Flexibility of the Constitution -- Part II. How Past Amendments Were Secured -- III. How Past Amendments Were Secured -- Part III. The Amending Process To-Day -- IV. An Address from Both Houses of Parliament -- V. The Participation of the Provinces -- VI. The Role of the British Parliament -- VII. Conflicting Views on the Amending Process -- Part IV. Proposals For A New Amending Machinery -- VIII. Changes of Procedure Advocated in the Past -- IX. An Approach to the Future -- Appendices -- Bibliography -- Index