Suchergebnisse

Poland is currently under criticism for an amendment of the Constitutional Tribunal Act passed by the new government majority party called Law and Justice (PiS). In 2015 the legislative change was adopted, which introduced an obligation for the Constitutional Tribunal to discuss an unconstitutionality of an act only in the presence of at least 13 judges, under the chairmanship of President or Vice President of the Constitutional Tribunal. An act is unconstitutional if two-thirds of the judges vote for it. This text compares this requirement with the adjustment in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia in the past and present. ; Článek se zabývá sporem o obsazení polského Ústavního tribunálu v roce 2015 a úpravu procesních pravidel jeho jednání iniciované novou vládní většinou strany Právo a spravedlnosti. V roce 2015 byla přijata zákonná změna, která zavedla povinnost, aby Ústavní tribunál mohl jednat o neústavnosti zákona jen za přítomnosti nejméně 13 soudců, za předsednictví předsedy nebo místopředsedy Ústavního tribunálu s tím, že pro neústavnost zákona se musí vyslovit dvě třetiny soudců. Článek porovnává tento požadavek s úpravou v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku v současnosti i minulosti.

The purpose of the present study is to describe the role of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the CT) in environmental protection by analysing selected cases in this scope in terms of the procedures applied in their examination. A deeper feature of the individual rulings would require much wider considerations1; therefore, the reflections presented below are to a certain extent synthetic and illustrative. In recent years, the regulations on the functioning of the Polish Constitutional Court were subject to some change (e.g. with respect to the rules of appointing the CT judges), reflecting the unfolding political disputes. Despite this, the issues related to the paths of the procedure before the CT has not principally changed. Ce Act of 30 November 2016 on the Organisation and the Procedure of Proceedings Before the Constitutional Court2 continues to apply the existing solutions. In consequence, the CT rulings adopted under the previous legal status also remain valid today.

The purpose of the present study is to describe the role of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the CT) in environmental protection by analysing selected cases in this scope in terms of the procedures applied in their examination. A deeper feature of the individual rulings would require much wider considerations1; therefore, the reflections presented below are to a certain extent synthetic and illustrative. In recent years, the regulations on the functioning of the Polish Constitutional Court were subject to some change (e.g. with respect to the rules of appointing the CT judges), reflecting the unfolding political disputes. Despite this, the issues related to the paths of the procedure before the CT has not principally changed. Ce Act of 30 November 2016 on the Organisation and the Procedure of Proceedings Before the Constitutional Court2 continues to apply the existing solutions. In consequence, the CT rulings adopted under the previous legal status also remain valid today.

Different theories have been developed, mainly in the context of the United States, to explain judicial decision-making. In this respect, there is an important ongoing debate over whether judges are guided by the law or by personal ideology. The analysis of the decision-making in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal seems to support the existence of some party alignment. It is to say that judicial behavior is influenced by the ideology, either because judges' preferences coincide with the interests of a specific party or because the judges are incentivized to show their loyalty to a party. Party alignment exists but subject to institutional influences. These results are in line with previous findings for other constitutional courts in Europe.

High courts with abstract review powers to find laws unconstitutional may provide a strong check on other political actors and influence public policy if the judges in these courts are impartial decision makers. This paper tests existing judicial decision-making theories in relation to the behavior of judges on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal who are selected exclusively by Congress. Taking advantage of an original data set of judges' votes on the Tribunal, we find that the origin of the law and whether the enacting governments at the national and subnational levels are still in power at the time of judicial review are important determinants of judicial behavior. Judges' own political loyalties seem to have no perceived effect on decision making, which suggests that political affiliations are trumped by strategic concerns of judges due to the institutional design of the Tribunal as well as the political context in which it operates. Adapted from the source document.

On 11 July 2013, a new draft law on the Constitutional Tribunal was submitted to the Parliament by the President of the Polish Republic. The first reading of the draft took place on 29 August 2013, then it was sent to further works in the parliamentary Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the parliamentary Legislative Committee. Keywords: Polish Constitution, parliamentary Committee on Justice and Human Right, parliamentary Legislative Committee

High courts with abstract review powers to find laws unconstitutional. - may provide a strong check on other political actors and influence. - public policy if the judges in these courts are impartial decision makers. This. - paper tests existing judicial decision-making theories in relation to the behavior. - of judges on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal who are selected. - exclusively by Congress. Taking advantage of an original data set of judges'. - votes on the Tribunal, we find that the origin of the law and whether the. - enacting governments at the national and subnational levels are still in power. - at the time of judicial review are important determinants of judicial behavior. - Judges' own political loyalties seem to have no perceived effect on decision. - making, which suggests that political affiliations are trumped by strategic. - concerns of judges due to the institutional design of the Tribunal as well as. - the political context in which it operates. (JPLA/GIGA)

"High courts with abstract review powers to find laws unconstitutional may provide a strong check on other political actors and influence public policy if the judges in these courts are impartial decision makers. This paper tests existing judicial decision-making theories in relation to the behavior of judges on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal who are selected exclusively by Congress. Taking advantage of an original data set of judges' votes on the Tribunal, we find that the origin of the law and whether the enacting governments at the national and subnational levels are still in power at the time of judicial review are important determinants of judicial behavior. Judges' own political loyalties seem to have no perceived effect on decision making, which suggests that political affiliations are trumped by strategic concerns of judges due to the institutional design of the Tribunal as well as the political context in which it operates." (author's abstract)

The analysis herein, while mainly descriptive, presents the main foundations of the Constitutional Tribunal's jurisprudence in matters of hierarchical control of the constitutionality of laws concerning the EU. It distinguishes some principles, concepts and constitutional theories which, according to the Constitutional Tribunal, set the limits of European integration. The main thesis of the paper is that, in this context, the basic and decisive rule is the supremacy of the Constitution, which does not have exceptions or limitations. A hypothesis was also formulated that the Solange II maxim does not reflect the actual state of European constitutionalism, in which the level of protection of fundamental rights is significantly increased while possible collisions between the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and the Member States should be solved by means of the clauses provided in Articles 51–54 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

While the comparative courts literature has yielded valuable insights into confrontations between political elites and judges, we still know relatively little about if and how jurisprudential methodology affects the ability of constitutional courts to survive such crises. How does the choice between originalism versus living constitutionalism affect a court's relationship with the other branches of government? Do political elites tend to be more hostile towards certain methods of interpretation? The 2012 impeachment of Myanmar's Constitutional Tribunal presents an interesting example of the interplay between jurisprudence and politics. After fifty years of military rule, Myanmar's 2008 Constitution produced a new civilian government that appeared committed to political reform. However, when the Tribunal ruled that legislative committees did not have constitutional status, the legislature impeached all nine members, forcing them to resign. Less than two years after it was created, the Constitutional Tribunal was essentially defunct. This article argues that the Constitutional Tribunal's approach towards constitutional interpretation did not ameliorate—and might have exacerbated—the crisis. Using a textualist or originalist methodology, the Tribunal struck down national legislation in four out of the five cases it heard. However, the Tribunal's reasoning did not balance the legislature's interests, much less account for the dramatic political reforms. The Tribunal also never provided a defense to its constitutional review power, and many legislators feared that the Tribunal was usurping their newfound power. Had the Tribunal adopted a more flexible approach—such as proportionality or living constitutionalism—it might have soothed the legislature's fears while still reaching similar policy outcomes.