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Constructivismabout practical judgments, as I understand it, is the notion that our true normative judgments represent a normative reality, while denying that that reality is independent of our exer-cise of moral and practical judgment. The Kantian strain of practical constructivism (through Kant himself, John Rawls, Christine Korsgaard, and others) has been so influential that it is tempting to identify the constructivist approach in practical domains with the Kantian development of the out-look. In this essay I explore a somewhat different variety of practical constructivism, which I callAristotelian Constructivism. My aim is to establish conceptual space for this form of constructivism by indicating both in what ways it agrees with its Kantian counterparts and in what ways it differs. I argue that Aristotelian Constructivism is on one sense more faithful to the constructivist enterprise than the Kantian varieties, in that its understanding of both the establishment of practical truthandthe vindication of the theory itself is constructivist.

This article shows the relevance of Oakeshott's political philosophy for the contemporary constructivist debate in International Relations. First, the article argues that Oakeshott's perspective stresses that political institutions are based on norms and relationships which result from human understanding. Second, it elaborates on Nicholas Rengger's recent work and reveals that Oakeshott's On Human Conduct presents considerations pertaining to international politics that are consistent with his broader political philosophy. These observations concern the nature of war, the historical role of colonialism and the evolution of international society. Third, this article discusses Terry Nardin's notion of 'practical association' and Christian Reus-Smit's criticism of it. It contends that international civil association is a relationship between states based on understood and socially constructed moral values and practices. Finally, the article claims that customary international law declares and reflects these values and practices. As such, it reveals that Oakeshott's notion of authority and his theory of civil association illuminate the possibility of an international legal order without a legislative office. This is of particular relevance also because of the Hobbesian influence on Oakeshott. Overall, this article illustrates how Michael Oakeshott's theory of civil association sheds light on the nature of international society and law.

Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask "How do we know there are material objects?" and not "How do you know which are the female beetles?" Similarly,moralepistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims.

Albert Weale's Democratic Justice and the Social Contract is an important book. It offers an innovative and original (proceduralist) account of justice. In so doing, it places what Brian Barry called 'the empirical method' at the centre of normative political philosophy's attempts to generate determinate answers to moral questions. This article-written from the perspective of someone sympathetic to both the commitment to mutual advantage and the empirical method – focuses on the kind of argument it is that Weale is offering and in particular on the nature of his constructivist project. It argues that Weale's commitment to equality lies outside the constructivist project and that this undermines his aspiration to genuine constructivism. The article goes on to consider, on the basis of arguments found in Democratic Justice and the Social Contract, various ways in which Weale might have grounded his egalitarian commitments from within the constructivist project.

Abstract
In these comments, I share some remarks concerning two main points lying at the core of Gava's book Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics: Gava's reconstruction and account of a transcendental deduction, its relation to a metaphysical deduction, and more specifically his reading of the B-Deduction. I will discuss Gava's arguments in order to highlight the key tenets of his interpretation and raise questions related to (1) the meaning and scope of the notion of 'transcendental'; and (2) the commitment to – and the extent of – what we might call 'cognitive constructivism'.

InPolitical Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of "political constructivism" to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an "overlapping consensus." Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's "political" philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The "method of convergence" would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

This paper aims to investigate whether and in what respects the conceptions of the body and of agency that Judith Butler develops in Bodies That Matter are useful contributions to feminist theory. The discussion focuses on the clarification and critical assessment of the arguments Butler presents to refute the charges of linguistic monism and determinism.

The social theoretic turn inaugurated under the rise of constructivism in International Relations has, among other themes, created a much-enlarged space for treating norms as efficacious explanatory variables in analyses of world politics. In this article, I reconstruct mainstream constructivists' inclinations toward what I argue are sociological accounts of norms, in which the question of the latter's justification is comprehensively sidelined. I initially show how constructivists' strategy of delineating their approaches from Critical Theory and post-structural analyses sustains social theoretic commitments, which compound this problem. In the second part of the article, I focus on Richard Price's programmatic attempt to reconcile the constructivist achievements in empirical research on the efficacy of norms with normative theorizing. The idea of building a bridge from 'isses' to 'oughts' labors, as I demonstrate, from the outset under construction problems, which cannot be resolved on the premises from which Price seeks to operate. Concluding this part, I consider the possibility of supplementing Price's account with consequentialist normative theory, and demonstrate that this would incur further problems for a normative theoretic framework for the study of world politics. In the final part, I outline key themes of Critical Theory with the aim of addressing some persistent misunderstandings about its scope, social theoretic outlook, and normative commitments. Linking back to the critical appraisal of mainstream constructivism's norm-sociological commitments, I suggest that despite some important limitations of its own, Critical Theory is in a better position to address 'isses' and 'oughts' than constructivists' readings of it would suggest. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

In Political Liberalism, John Rawls describes a metaethical procedure -- political constructivism -- whereby political theorists formulate political principles by assembling and reworking ideas from the public political culture. To many of his moral realist and moral constructivist critics, Rawls's procedure is simply a recent version of the "popular moral philosophy" that Kant excoriates in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. In this article, I defend the idea of political constructivism on philosophical and political grounds. Initially, I argue that political constructivism is the best available methodology for self-legislating, socially embedded and fallible human beings; then I show that political constructivism may produce principles that could garner the principled assent of Euro-American Muslims such as Taha Jabir Al-Alwani. The article concludes by considering how political constructivism might be employed to formulate new political principles for Euro-American societies experiencing and confronting the Islamic revival. Adapted from the source document.