Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; LUISS PhD Thesis
In this dissertation I show that constructivist liberal philosophers are confronted by a dilemma. On the one hand, the conceptions of persons that they appeal to are so thin that contradictory conclusions can be derived from those very same conceptions. Where one philosopher thinks that his or her conception excludes the capitalistic economic liberties from the list of basic rights, it is possible to show with great plausibility the opposite conclusion and vice-versa. The status of the capitalist economic liberties carries significant implications not only for the structure of the economy but also for the place and role of other normative values that more directly affect other areas of life. If it can be shown that a conception of persons leads to contradictory results when it comes to the status of the economic liberties in particular, then the general shape of society will change in significant and inevitable ways as well. In order to avoid this horn of the dilemma, some philosophers seek to thicken their conceptions of persons. In doing so, I maintain that they come to beg too many questions and subsequently undermine whatever normative conclusions they sought to derive from their conception of persons. I analyze this connection within the context of the theories of political philosophers writing from different traditions of liberal thought. To do so I first distinguish between how the concept of personhood has been employed in moral philosophy as opposed to political philosophy. The chapters then move from liberal theories more progressively oriented, such as John Rawls's theory of justice, to more moderate positions, such as John Tomasi's market democracy, to Robert Nozick's libertarianism. In the first two cases I argue that the conceptions of persons employed by Rawls and Tomasi are thin, and that it is possible to show that their conceptions lead to conclusions in conflict with their own stated positions. In the case of libertarianism, I argue that libertarians generally construe self-ownership thickly ...
Radical constructivists appeal to self-legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self-legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self-legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self-legislation more firmly to the self-disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self-legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self-legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self-legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.
The paper proposes to reconsider the methodology and history of economics radically, whether present day mainstream or heterodox versions of it. The profession of economists must definitely abandon Cartesian dualism and adopt Vygotskian constructivism. In fact constructivist economics already existed in the past and was cognitively very successful and socially very useful. It was the economics of Gustav Schmoller's historico-ethical school and the institutionalist economics of John R. Commons, traditions of which are totally ignored by the contemporary community of economists. The former tradition was based on Dilthey's hermeneutics and the latter on Peirce's pragmatism. It is worth to underline that hermeneutics and pragmatism are both predecessors of Vygotskian constructivism. During the last two decades a lot was written by economists on pragmatist, constructivist and discursive approaches to the methodology and history of economics, but those who wrote on these topics viewed them from the dualistic point of view. My paper is an appeal to economists to reconsider Methodenstreit. The dispute of methods between Schmoller and Menger can be considered as a repetition of a similar dispute taking place more than two hundred years earlier between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes. Schmoller-Menger dispute started soon after the beginning of the institutionalisation of experimentally-oriented economics which happened with the creation in 1873 of the Vereinfür Sozialpolitik. Boyle-Hobbes dispute started in 1660, when the Royal Society of London had been founded, the cradle of the institution of science. Schmoller was one of the creators of the Verein, and Boyle was one of the founders of the Royal Society. The activities of both societies were similar in several respects: they represented efforts to collect data, working out of detailed reports and collective evaluation of obtained results. For Hobbes, as for Menger, the model of 'science' was geometry. Boyle and Schmoller privileged collecting and analysing data. Boyle did win the dispute, Schmoller did loose. It happened because of different attitudes of powerful groups in societies towards natural scientific experimental research and experimental social research. They were interested in the former, and they saw much more danger than benefit for them in the latter. On the contrary, they were interested in abstract theoretical constructions justifying the market vision of society and laissez-faire. This kind of constructions corresponded to deeply enrooted scholastic traditions of European universities to teach theology and linked with it philosophy. In the framework of these traditions, mathematics was considered as a summit of the scientific approach. On the one hand, the adoption of constructivism by economists would turn their discipline into a science functionally close to natural sciences. On the other hand the Vygotskian constructivism, as a social and political philosophy, once accepted by economists, may lead them to become preachers of the communitarian liberalism with its emphasis on social responsibility, deliberative democracy, and discourse ethics.
The paper proposes to reconsider the methodology and history of economics radically, whether present day mainstream or heterodox versions of it. The profession of economists must definitely abandon Cartesian dualism and adopt Vygotskian constructivism. In fact constructivist economics already existed in the past and was cognitively very successful and socially very useful. It was the economics of Gustav Schmoller's historico-ethical school and the institutionalist economics of John R. Commons, traditions of which are totally ignored by the contemporary community of economists. The former tradition was based on Dilthey's hermeneutics and the latter on Peirce's pragmatism. It is worth to underline that hermeneutics and pragmatism are both predecessors of Vygotskian constructivism. During the last two decades a lot was written by economists on pragmatist, constructivist and discursive approaches to the methodology and history of economics, but those who wrote on these topics viewed them from the dualistic point of view. My paper is an appeal to economists to reconsider Methodenstreit. The dispute of methods between Schmoller and Menger can be considered as a repetition of a similar dispute taking place more than two hundred years earlier between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes. Schmoller-Menger dispute started soon after the beginning of the institutionalisation of experimentally-oriented economics which happened with the creation in 1873 of the Vereinfür Sozialpolitik. Boyle-Hobbes dispute started in 1660, when the Royal Society of London had been founded, the cradle of the institution of science. Schmoller was one of the creators of the Verein, and Boyle was one of the founders of the Royal Society. The activities of both societies were similar in several respects: they represented efforts to collect data, working out of detailed reports and collective evaluation of obtained results. For Hobbes, as for Menger, the model of 'science' was geometry. Boyle and Schmoller privileged collecting and analysing data. Boyle did win the dispute, Schmoller did loose. It happened because of different attitudes of powerful groups in societies towards natural scientific experimental research and experimental social research. They were interested in the former, and they saw much more danger than benefit for them in the latter. On the contrary, they were interested in abstract theoretical constructions justifying the market vision of society and laissez-faire. This kind of constructions corresponded to deeply enrooted scholastic traditions of European universities to teach theology and linked with it philosophy. In the framework of these traditions, mathematics was considered as a summit of the scientific approach. On the one hand, the adoption of constructivism by economists would turn their discipline into a science functionally close to natural sciences. On the other hand the Vygotskian constructivism, as a social and political philosophy, once accepted by economists, may lead them to become preachers of the communitarian liberalism with its emphasis on social responsibility, deliberative democracy, and discourse ethics.
Since the turn of this century, constructivism has dramatically influenced science education and, particularly in Muslim countries, the teaching of evolution. This influence came about gradually. After the 1980's, Muslim graduate students studying Education in Western universities have been taught constructivism both as a theory of learning and a philosophy, more specifically, as an epistemological theory. This has impacted these students' views of the nature of science, scientific argumentation, multiculturalism, and the function of democratic values and practices in education. The scope of this influence raises a number of serious questions: Has constructivism introduced a mode of reasoning into science and science education that is foreign to, and even anathema to, scientific discourse? Why does almost every science education research paper suggest or imply negotiation with clergy and religious NGOs? Such questions are discussed in the present paper. To answer these questions, this paper examines in the context of Enlightenment and secularism theoretical frameworks, the methodologies, and suggestions regarding the teaching of evolution in Muslim countries. ; Since the turn of this century, constructivism has dramatically influenced science education and, particularly in Muslim countries, the teaching of evolution. This influence came about gradually. After the 1980's, Muslim graduate students studying Education in Western universities have been taught constructivism both as a theory of learning and a philosophy, more specifically, as an epistemological theory. This has impacted these students' views of the nature of science, scientific argumentation, multiculturalism, and the function of democratic values and practices in education. The scope of this influence raises a number of serious questions: Has constructivism introduced a mode of reasoning into science and science education that is foreign to, and even anathema to, scientific discourse? Why does almost every science education research paper suggest or imply negotiation with clergy and religious NGOs? Such questions are discussed in the present paper. To answer these questions, this paper examines in the context of Enlightenment and secularism theoretical frameworks, the methodologies, and suggestions regarding the teaching of evolution in Muslim countries.
This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the art of the possible , rendering Kant s impartial standpoint by means of the original position (Rawls) or the procedures of discourse ethics (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice s failure, discovering, in Kant s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the undecidability of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. Reasonable faith in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which ...
The paper compares Pierre Bourdieu's sociological approach with the one developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The aim of the paper is to identify the complementarities and incongruences of these approaches. The main similarity consists in the intention to "dialectically" overcome/bridge the gap between "objectivism" and "subjectivism" in social theory. Another parallel includes a negative attitude towards the relativistic tendencies of postmodernism. These authors share the thematization of: the body as a locus of social influences, the centrality of language in social life, the social functions of knowledge, and the importance of power in social relations. Differences in theorizing are attributed to the different intellectual, theoretical, and socio-cultural contexts in which these scientists operated. The divergences of these theoretical approaches become evident when one examines the different meaning and significance attached to the concepts of individuation, structure, action, habitus and habitualization, structure of relevance and relation of common-sense and scientific knowledge. Finally, there is a visible difference in political views: Bourdieu was a critic "from the left," while Berger and Luckmann were self-proclaimed liberal conservatives. ; U radu se poredi sociološki pristup Pjera Burdijea sa onim koji su razvili Peter Berger i Tomas Lukman. Cilј rada je da se identifikuju komplementarnosti i razilaženja ovih pristupa. Glavna sličnost se sastoji u nameri da se "dijalektički" prevaziđe/premosti jaz između "objektivizma" i "subjektivizma" u društvenoj teoriji. Druga paralela uključuju negativan stav prema relativističkim tendencijama postmodernizma. Ono što je zajedničko za ove autore je tematizacija: tela kao mesta društvenih uticaja, centralnosti jezika u društvenom životu, društvenih funk cija znanja i značaja moći u društvenim odnosima. Razlike u teoretisanju se pripisuju različi tim intelektualnim, teorijskim i socio-kulturnim kontekstima u kojima su ovi naučnici delovali. Razilaženja ...
In recent years, some theorists have raised their distrust in metaethical research. Such worries include concerns about the intelligibility of metaethical discourse; claims about the meaninglessness of metaethical discussions; and finally the idea that metaethical debates are to be addressed by substantive theorizing only, namely that metaethical discussions are actually dealt by engaging in first-order, normative discourse. According to these worries, metaethics is either useless or just is a part of normative ethics and metaethicists are either hopeless, or simply in denial about what they are doing. Prominent examples of such convictions are Roanld Dworkin [Dworkin 1996, 2011] and Catherine Korsgaard [Korsgaard 2003]. I call this "metaethical quietism". Such aggressive attitude has also been prominent in mainstream political philosophy since Rawls. According to Rawls, political philosophy should not engage with questions of the ontology of morals, or metaethics in general, to be more practically useful. In this paper, I question whether quietism can be successful and argue that metaethical inquiry may be useful to normative theorizing. The paper proceeds as follows: first, I consider and rebut Dworkin and Korsgaard's arguments for metaethical quietism. Second, I compare them to Rawls's political liberalism and argue that, despite some common aims, Rawls's approach differs significantly from theirs. Finally, I consider whether metaethics can be useful to political philosophy. In attacking metaethics, Dworkin and Korsgaard have different aims. The first wants to rule out all forms of scepticism about values made possible by defending any kind of Archimedeanism. A theory is Archimedean if it purports to "stand outside a whole body of belief and to judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it" [Dworkin 1996, 88]. The latter, on the contrary, presents a theory of the practical function of moral concept as a broad charge against moral realism, intended as a metaphysical theory about normative entities, which exist independently of moral concepts. Despite such differences, they can be considered metaethical quietists for they share three main claims: 1) there is no metaethical grounding for normative ethics, thus morality is autonomous; 2) we should give up on metaphysics, moral theories need to be metaphysically light ; 3) moral philosophy is to provide normative judgments and practical solutions to moral problems and, thus, moral philosophy is to be considered eminently practical. Considering these three points, it might be possible to wonder whether Rawls's political liberalism should be considered a form of metaethical quietism. Indeed, holding that non-moral theses are irrelevant to the justification of moral theories, Rawls defends moral theory as a discipline independent from any philosophical inquiry [Rawls 1974]. Moreover, proposing a freestanding conception, neutral towards any moral and philosophical doctrine to provide the basis for an overlapping consensus, political liberalism explicitly aims not to appeal to any metaphysics to sustain itself [Rawls 1993]. Finally, political liberalism employs political constructivism, which "deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically speaking" [Rawls, 1985]. However, despite these apparent similarities, there is a fundamental difference between Rawls's account and Dworkin and Korsgaard's metaethical quietism. Although Dworkin and Korsgaard present their positions as if they were opposing metaethics as a theoretical enterprise, they cannot help to work within its field. Dworkin presents a two-step argument against metaethics contending that the distinction between normative and metaethical claims dissolves because it is not possible to have a metaethical proposition neutral about the content of substantive moral claims. Metaethics fails to be neutral, the argument goes, if two conditions apply: if it is possible to find a plausible normative interpretation of metaethical claims; and it is also possible to demonstrate that metaethical claims are philosophically distinct from normative propositions. Contra Dworkin, it is important to stress that providing cases in which the two conditions apply is not enough to prove that all possible metaethical claims are in fact normative. Consider the following proposition "there is a right answer to the question whether X is morally right". This is a distinct metaethical claim, not committed to any normative view for it is consistent with both X being morally right, or X being morally wrong. More generally, it is possible to wonder whether anti-Archimedeanism can be defended without taking an Archimedean standpoint: does not anti-Archimedeanis need Archimedean leverage to be consistent? If Dworkin says that his anti-Archimedeanist position is indeed metaethical, his account is self-refuting. If he succeeds in showing that anti-Archimedeanism is actually a part of normative philosophy, it is not clear why he engages in a debate he considers non-existent. Korsgaard, on the contrary, argues for a sharp contrast between theoretical and practical reasonings, which have different kinds of content. In this sense, theoretical reasoning purports to describe reality, whether practical reasoning refers to the solution of a practical problem. Korsgaard seems to think that since theoretical and practical reasoning are different in content and metaethics regards itself as a theoretical discipline, it is misplaced. Indeed, moral concepts are practical and, thus, "there is [no] difference between doing metaethics and doing normative or practical ethics." [Korsgaard 2003, 121] However, if Korsgaard is aiming to go "beyond" metaethical debates, it is not clear why she engages with and directly challenges traditional metaethical theories, such as realism and expressivism. Moreover, it is possible to argue that Korsgaard is just defending a peculiar metaethical theory, a sort of response-dependence realism [McPherson 2010]. Dworkin and Korsgaard endorse metaethical quietism in order to defend the idea that normative ethics is autonomous in the sense of not being influenced by non-moral theories. However, their views cannot really do without metaethics, so I now consider whether Rawls's political constructivism can achieve such aim. Rawls claims the autonomy of political philosophy and he maintains his political conception to be "robust", so that changes in other related fields of inquiry do not challenge its justification. In this sense, Rawls is more radical than Dworkin and Korsgaard for he argues for the independence of political philosophy not only from metaethics, but also from substantive moral theories. Moreover, he does not question the value of metaethics per se: from his point of view, citizens can discuss metaethical questions as much as they want. However, a political philosopher who wants to provide a solution to a practical problem (in his case that of the stability for the right reasons in liberal pluralistic societies) needs to avoid such questions. Metaethical issues are misplaced in political philosophy because they rely on a different ground. This is why political constructivism does not compete with moral intuitionism or Kantian constructivism. It simply does not engage with questions about the nature of moral propositions. Here Rawls's proposal resembles Rorty's invite to "stop the debate" for it pragmatically does not work [see, Rorty 1982], and his attempt to reconcile different worldviews looks like a Wittgensteinian therapy for liberal societies. I call this, "philosophical quietism". It seems that quietism wants to secure the independence and autonomy of normative theory. The discussion above shows that such a strategy is at least problematic. And if metaethics can be considered an independent field of inquiry (though it may not be neutral) it seems that there are certain problems, relevant also to political philosophy, that need to be addressed by metaethical inquiry to be correctly evaluated. One the most long-standing problems in political philosophy is that of disagreement in pluralistic society, but disagreement is a traditional and inescapable subject for metaethicists. Indeed, it makes a difference whether disagreement is dealt from a relativistic, subjectivist, or objectivist perspective for this affects how moral disputes are to be considered and handled. If emotivism turns out to be correct disagreements are to be settled by persuasion, whereas if moral realism is true a posteriori argument are going to be weighted more than if error theory is correct. The point is that if political philosophers are to address the problem of disagreement, metaethical understanding is fundamental to assess the object of inquiry. Different understandings of disagreement, let them be more ore less consistent with our experience, imply different normative answers. In this sense, disagreement is a paradigmatic case for the need of metaethical understanding in political philosophy.
In: Frankel Pratt , S 2016 , ' Pragmatism as Ontology, Not (Just) as Epistemology : Exploring the full horizon of pragmatism as an approach to IR theory ' , International Studies Review , vol. 18 , no. 3 , viv003 , pp. 508-527 . https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv003
This article is in many ways a pragmatist's critique of pragmatism in international relations (IR), focusing on what practices scholars have engaged in by drawing upon pragmatism and how to resolve problems that become apparent in considering them. Scholars of IR have used pragmatism largely (though not exclusively) to examine issues of an epistemological or methodological nature, focusing mainly on pragmatism as a philosophy of science. Often overlooked, however, is that pragmatism is not just a philosophy of science, but a distinctive and in some respects quite radical school of metaphysics, and it implies a particularly flexible form of social ontology. I, thus, argue for broader horizons in pragmatist theory in IR. I criticize the overly epistemological or methodological focus of the existing ways many IR scholars have used pragmatism and discuss of how pragmatist social theory fits within existing scholarship in the field. Finally, I suggest how pragmatist social theory can contribute to ongoing IR research programs by dissolving the dualisms of agent and structure, realism and idealism, and normative and strategic action. In other words, as a coherent set of principles, pragmatism offers the foundations for a new movement in the study of international politics— indeed, such a movement has already begun, and I suggest that its horizons are particularly broad.
Constructivism is the metaethical position stating that although we cannot have direct access to moral facts, we can still come up with a set of principles that can be justified and that ought to be respected by individuals. The strength of these moral principles derives from the fact that they are the result of a procedure respecting certain desirable conditions. Constructivism concerns the methodology of political philosophy, being preoccupied with the process of generating and justifying moral principles. In this review article I present the main contentions of constructivism (focusing especially on the Kantian constructivism advanced by Rawls and Scanlon), describe its positioning on the realist–antirealist axis, and compare it with its main competitor in the field of metaethical views, intuitionism. I dedicate a separate section to the method of reflective equilibrium, which represents an important part of several metaethical accounts, be they constructivist, realist, or intuitionist. I show how reflective equilibrium represents the main instrument constructivists can employ in order to capture the appeal of relying on intuitions in moral theorizing, without leaning toward intuitionism. Toward the end of the article I present G. A. Cohen's (2003, 2008) criticism of constructivism. I focus on the replies Ronzoni and Valentini (2008), Hall (2013), de Maagt (2014, 2016) and Rossi (2016) give to Cohen, ending with a criticism of my own.
The main purpose of this article is to carry out a constructivist analysis of the concept of law regarding two of the most important principles in Kant's political philosophy: the principle of right and the idea of the original contract. The article starts out with a brief presentation of the meaning of Kantian constructivism, and then goes on to analyze the concept of right and of the attributes that define citizenships: freedom, equality, and civil independence. Finally, it examines the Kantian conception of the original contract in order to demonstrate that, according to Kant, there are political duties of both right and virtue.
Constructivism is one of philosophy of knowledge that emphasizes that our knowledge is (shapes) construction of ourselves. Knowledge is not an idea of reality. Knowledge is always a result of cognitive construction of reality by one's activities. Some psychologists who started on constructivism approach are Piaget and Vygostky. The difference between them is where Piaget more emphasizes and discusses constructivism of learning process personally but Vygostky develops constructivism of learning process socially. Both of Individual Cognitive Constructivist and Sociocultural Constructivist dominate the constructivism concept. Constructivism learning consider that student continuously examine new information which contrast with old rule and revise the rule it is no longer appropriate. For encouraging student more active involve in learning process, it is should that: 1) learning atmosphere is democratic; 2) learning activities goes interactively and student-centered; 3) teacher encourages student to learn autonomously and responsible for their learning activities. Looking at the education practice in Indonesia, the concept constructivism is not implemented yet, although its concept is purposed, for example in KTSP (Kurikulum Tingkat Satuan Pendidikan) that clearly gives freedom to education units included teachers to build student competency that suitable with student needs and interest. One of some main problems of in learning in formal education (school) recently is lowness of student absorption. It was showed by student result learning average that still bad. This is of course a result of learning process that still conventional and far to touch student dimension, it means how actually learning is.
The article deals with conceptual ideas and orientators of Northern American model of adult education. It is substantiated, that Nothern American model of adult education is based on the following philosophical directions: liberalism, progressivism, behaviorism, humanism, radicalism, constructivism. Liberalism has ancient roots and comes from the fact that since man is the real source of progress in society, it is necessary to ensure his rights and freedoms, providing equal access to education regardless of social status and well-being. The basic principle of liberal education is singled out, in particular, to develop a personality that is consonant with the purpose of a liberal education in ancient times - the education of citizens who can become active participants in a democratic society. It is proved that non-formal adult education should be continuous, focus on the development of intellectual abilities, be accessible to all sections of the population, and its content must meet their needs. It was found out that the historical roots of the philosophy of progressivism associated with progressive political movement in society and education. Its basis is the concept of interaction between education and society, empirical theory of education democratization of education. It was found out that behavioral direction, whose founder was John Watson, appeared in the USA in the early XX century. Based on the theory of Pavlov's conditioned reflexes, his supporters (J. Watson, B. Sninner E. Thorndike) examined personality as a set of behavioral responses to stimuli of the environment. It is identified that the purpose of adult education - behavior modification adult-oriented changes in humans. It was proved, that unlike behaviorists, representatives of humanistic direction (J. Brown, Johnson, Maslow, M. Knowles, K. Rogers, etc.) considered man independent, active, open to change and self-actualization person. It was stressed, that the founders of the radical trend, based on theories of anarchism, marxism, socialism, considering education in general and adult education, in particular, as an important mechanism to achieve radical changes in society. It updates the social role of non-formal adult education, because it requires critical thinking and personal participation in these changes. It was found out, that according to philosophy of constructivism person is unique in his/her vision of the world, beliefs, outlook because he/she is able to construct his/her personal understanding of reality. A teacher is not just a transmitter of knowledge,he/she serves as the consultant, moderator, facilitator. The analysis of scientific literature showed that adult education in the USA has evolved with the development of society, and has a long history and some traditions, mainly seen as informal adult education, aimed at self-improvement of adult to meet his/her educational needs; mechanism of civil society formation.