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Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; LUISS PhD Thesis

El artículo expone la justicia como un problema político desde la perspectiva del filósofo John Rawls. En su desarrollo se señalan las implicaciones del constructivismo kantiano en el constructivismo político rawlsiano. Se discute cómo la conexión entre estos dos tipos de constructivismo, proporciona un procedimiento de construcción, en el que agentes racionalmente autónomos, sujetos a condiciones razonables, elaboran acuerdos sobre principios públicos de justicia para lograr un sistema justo de cooperación que trascienda generacionalmente. Se concluye, mostrando las limitaciones y alcances de esta propuesta en el pensamiento filosófico y político contemporáneo. ; This paper discusses justice in terms of political problem as viewed by John Rawls' philosophy. It claims that the Kantian politic constructivism has some implications on the base of the Rawlsian liberalism. It argues about how the connection between these two different types of constructivism provides a construction procedure in which rational autonomous agents, submitted to reasonable conditions, make agreements concerning public principles about justice in order to reach a fair system of cooperation that goes beyond the generations. It concludes showing the limitations and achievements of the proposal in contemporary political philosophy.

El artículo expone la justicia como un problema político desde la perspectiva del filósofo John Rawls. En su desarrollo se señalan las implicaciones del constructivismo kantiano en el constructivismo político rawlsiano. Se discute cómo la conexión entre estos dos tipos de constructivismo, proporciona un procedimiento de construcción, en el que agentes racionalmente autónomos, sujetos a condiciones razonables, elaboran acuerdos sobre principios públicos de justicia para lograr un sistema justo de cooperación que trascienda generacionalmente. Se concluye, mostrando las limitaciones y alcances de esta propuesta en el pensamiento filosófico y político contemporáneo. ; This paper discusses justice in terms of political problem as viewed by John Rawls' philosophy. It claims that the Kantian politic constructivism has some implications on the base of the Rawlsian liberalism. It argues about how the connection between these two different types of constructivism provides a construction procedure in which rational autonomous agents, submitted to reasonable conditions, make agreements concerning public principles about justice in order to reach a fair system of cooperation that goes beyond the generations. It concludes showing the limitations and achievements of the proposal in contemporary political philosophy.

This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the art of the possible , rendering Kant s impartial standpoint by means of the original position (Rawls) or the procedures of discourse ethics (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice s failure, discovering, in Kant s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the undecidability of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. Reasonable faith in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which ...

In recent years, some theorists have raised their distrust in metaethical research. Such worries include concerns about the intelligibility of metaethical discourse; claims about the meaninglessness of metaethical discussions; and finally the idea that metaethical debates are to be addressed by substantive theorizing only, namely that metaethical discussions are actually dealt by engaging in first-order, normative discourse. According to these worries, metaethics is either useless or just is a part of normative ethics and metaethicists are either hopeless, or simply in denial about what they are doing. Prominent examples of such convictions are Roanld Dworkin [Dworkin 1996, 2011] and Catherine Korsgaard [Korsgaard 2003]. I call this "metaethical quietism". Such aggressive attitude has also been prominent in mainstream political philosophy since Rawls. According to Rawls, political philosophy should not engage with questions of the ontology of morals, or metaethics in general, to be more practically useful. In this paper, I question whether quietism can be successful and argue that metaethical inquiry may be useful to normative theorizing. The paper proceeds as follows: first, I consider and rebut Dworkin and Korsgaard's arguments for metaethical quietism. Second, I compare them to Rawls's political liberalism and argue that, despite some common aims, Rawls's approach differs significantly from theirs. Finally, I consider whether metaethics can be useful to political philosophy. In attacking metaethics, Dworkin and Korsgaard have different aims. The first wants to rule out all forms of scepticism about values made possible by defending any kind of Archimedeanism. A theory is Archimedean if it purports to "stand outside a whole body of belief and to judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it" [Dworkin 1996, 88]. The latter, on the contrary, presents a theory of the practical function of moral concept as a broad charge against moral realism, intended as a metaphysical theory about normative entities, which exist independently of moral concepts. Despite such differences, they can be considered metaethical quietists for they share three main claims: 1) there is no metaethical grounding for normative ethics, thus morality is autonomous; 2) we should give up on metaphysics, moral theories need to be metaphysically light ; 3) moral philosophy is to provide normative judgments and practical solutions to moral problems and, thus, moral philosophy is to be considered eminently practical. Considering these three points, it might be possible to wonder whether Rawls's political liberalism should be considered a form of metaethical quietism. Indeed, holding that non-moral theses are irrelevant to the justification of moral theories, Rawls defends moral theory as a discipline independent from any philosophical inquiry [Rawls 1974]. Moreover, proposing a freestanding conception, neutral towards any moral and philosophical doctrine to provide the basis for an overlapping consensus, political liberalism explicitly aims not to appeal to any metaphysics to sustain itself [Rawls 1993]. Finally, political liberalism employs political constructivism, which "deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically speaking" [Rawls, 1985]. However, despite these apparent similarities, there is a fundamental difference between Rawls's account and Dworkin and Korsgaard's metaethical quietism. Although Dworkin and Korsgaard present their positions as if they were opposing metaethics as a theoretical enterprise, they cannot help to work within its field. Dworkin presents a two-step argument against metaethics contending that the distinction between normative and metaethical claims dissolves because it is not possible to have a metaethical proposition neutral about the content of substantive moral claims. Metaethics fails to be neutral, the argument goes, if two conditions apply: if it is possible to find a plausible normative interpretation of metaethical claims; and it is also possible to demonstrate that metaethical claims are philosophically distinct from normative propositions. Contra Dworkin, it is important to stress that providing cases in which the two conditions apply is not enough to prove that all possible metaethical claims are in fact normative. Consider the following proposition "there is a right answer to the question whether X is morally right". This is a distinct metaethical claim, not committed to any normative view for it is consistent with both X being morally right, or X being morally wrong. More generally, it is possible to wonder whether anti-Archimedeanism can be defended without taking an Archimedean standpoint: does not anti-Archimedeanis need Archimedean leverage to be consistent? If Dworkin says that his anti-Archimedeanist position is indeed metaethical, his account is self-refuting. If he succeeds in showing that anti-Archimedeanism is actually a part of normative philosophy, it is not clear why he engages in a debate he considers non-existent. Korsgaard, on the contrary, argues for a sharp contrast between theoretical and practical reasonings, which have different kinds of content. In this sense, theoretical reasoning purports to describe reality, whether practical reasoning refers to the solution of a practical problem. Korsgaard seems to think that since theoretical and practical reasoning are different in content and metaethics regards itself as a theoretical discipline, it is misplaced. Indeed, moral concepts are practical and, thus, "there is [no] difference between doing metaethics and doing normative or practical ethics." [Korsgaard 2003, 121] However, if Korsgaard is aiming to go "beyond" metaethical debates, it is not clear why she engages with and directly challenges traditional metaethical theories, such as realism and expressivism. Moreover, it is possible to argue that Korsgaard is just defending a peculiar metaethical theory, a sort of response-dependence realism [McPherson 2010]. Dworkin and Korsgaard endorse metaethical quietism in order to defend the idea that normative ethics is autonomous in the sense of not being influenced by non-moral theories. However, their views cannot really do without metaethics, so I now consider whether Rawls's political constructivism can achieve such aim. Rawls claims the autonomy of political philosophy and he maintains his political conception to be "robust", so that changes in other related fields of inquiry do not challenge its justification. In this sense, Rawls is more radical than Dworkin and Korsgaard for he argues for the independence of political philosophy not only from metaethics, but also from substantive moral theories. Moreover, he does not question the value of metaethics per se: from his point of view, citizens can discuss metaethical questions as much as they want. However, a political philosopher who wants to provide a solution to a practical problem (in his case that of the stability for the right reasons in liberal pluralistic societies) needs to avoid such questions. Metaethical issues are misplaced in political philosophy because they rely on a different ground. This is why political constructivism does not compete with moral intuitionism or Kantian constructivism. It simply does not engage with questions about the nature of moral propositions. Here Rawls's proposal resembles Rorty's invite to "stop the debate" for it pragmatically does not work [see, Rorty 1982], and his attempt to reconcile different worldviews looks like a Wittgensteinian therapy for liberal societies. I call this, "philosophical quietism". It seems that quietism wants to secure the independence and autonomy of normative theory. The discussion above shows that such a strategy is at least problematic. And if metaethics can be considered an independent field of inquiry (though it may not be neutral) it seems that there are certain problems, relevant also to political philosophy, that need to be addressed by metaethical inquiry to be correctly evaluated. One the most long-standing problems in political philosophy is that of disagreement in pluralistic society, but disagreement is a traditional and inescapable subject for metaethicists. Indeed, it makes a difference whether disagreement is dealt from a relativistic, subjectivist, or objectivist perspective for this affects how moral disputes are to be considered and handled. If emotivism turns out to be correct disagreements are to be settled by persuasion, whereas if moral realism is true a posteriori argument are going to be weighted more than if error theory is correct. The point is that if political philosophers are to address the problem of disagreement, metaethical understanding is fundamental to assess the object of inquiry. Different understandings of disagreement, let them be more ore less consistent with our experience, imply different normative answers. In this sense, disagreement is a paradigmatic case for the need of metaethical understanding in political philosophy.

This article proposes a discussion of the contributions of three influential current theories on critical thinking in Latin America: discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau, the "potential present" epistemology of Hugo Zemelman and philosophy of liberation by Enrique Dussel. The article aims to analyze in these proposals the theoretical and historical role of political subjects that are contesting the establishment of social order and the contributions of these theories for understanding social movements in Latin America. ; Se propone una discusión de los aportes de tres teorías actuales influyentes en el pensamiento crítico latinoamericano: la teoría del discurso de Ernesto Laclau, la epistemología del presente potencial de Hugo Zemelman y la filosofía de la liberación de Enrique Dussel. El objetivo del artículo es analizar en estas propuestas el lugar teórico e histórico que tienen los sujetos políticos que disputan la constitución del orden social y los aportes de estas teorías para la comprensión de los movimientos sociales en América Latina. Documento incorporado en 2018 en el marco del "Programa de becas de experiencia laboral" de la Biblioteca Profesor Guillermo Obiols para estudiantes de Bibliotecología, a partir de un procedimiento técnico de captura de datos desarrollado por el personal del IdIHCS. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educac

Se propone una discusión de los aportes de tres teorías actuales influyentes en el pensamiento crítico latinoamericano: la teoría del discurso de Ernesto Laclau, la epistemología del presente potencial de Hugo Zemelman y la filosofía de la liberación de Enrique Dussel. El objetivo del artículo es analizar en estas propuestas el lugar teórico e histórico que tienen los sujetos políticos que disputan la constitución del orden social y los aportes de estas teorías para la comprensión de los movimientos sociales en América Latina. ; This article proposes a discussion of the contributions of three influential current theories on critical thinking in Latin America: discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau, the ?potential present? epistemology of Hugo Zemelman and philosophy of liberation by Enrique Dussel. The article aims to analyze in these proposals the theoretical and historical role of political subjects that are contesting the establishment of social order and the contributions of these theories for understanding social movements in Latin America. ; Fil: Retamozo, Martín. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.

Se propone una discusión de los aportes de tres teorías actuales influyentes en el pensamiento crítico latinoamericano: la teoría del discurso de Ernesto Laclau, la epistemología del presente potencial de Hugo Zemelman y la filosofía de la liberación de Enrique Dussel. El objetivo del artículo es analizar en estas propuestas el lugar teórico e histórico que tienen los sujetos políticos que disputan la constitución del orden social y los aportes de estas teorías para la comprensión de los movimientos sociales en América Latina. ; This article proposes a discussion of the contributions of three influential current theories on critical thinking in Latin America: discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau, the ?potential present? epistemology of Hugo Zemelman and philosophy of liberation by Enrique Dussel. The article aims to analyze in these proposals the theoretical and historical role of political subjects that are contesting the establishment of social order and the contributions of these theories for understanding social movements in Latin America. ; Fil: Retamozo, Martín. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.

Se propone una discusión de los aportes de tres teorías actuales influyentes en el pensamiento crítico latinoamericano: la teoría del discurso de Ernesto Laclau, la epistemología del presente potencial de Hugo Zemelman y la filosofía de la liberación de Enrique Dussel. El objetivo del artículo es analizar en estas propuestas el lugar teórico e histórico que tienen los sujetos políticos que disputan la constitución del orden social y los aportes de estas teorías para la comprensión de los movimientos sociales en América Latina. ; This article proposes a discussion of the contributions of three influential current theories on critical thinking in Latin America: discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau, the "potential present" epistemology of Hugo Zemelman and philosophy of liberation by Enrique Dussel. The article aims to analyze in these proposals the theoretical and historical role of political subjects that are contesting the establishment of social order and the contributions of these theories for understanding social movements in Latin America. ; Documento incorporado en 2018 en el marco del "Programa de becas de experiencia laboral" de la Biblioteca Profesor Guillermo Obiols para estudiantes de Bibliotecología, a partir de un procedimiento técnico de captura de datos desarrollado por el personal del IdIHCS. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educac

The main purpose of this article is to carry out a constructivist analysis of the concept of law regarding two of the most important principles in Kant's political philosophy: the principle of right and the idea of the original contract. The article starts out with a brief presentation of the meaning of Kantian constructivism, and then goes on to analyze the concept of right and of the attributes that define citizenships: freedom, equality, and civil independence. Finally, it examines the Kantian conception of the original contract in order to demonstrate that, according to Kant, there are political duties of both right and virtue.

The peculiar kind of «truths» focused on by Rawls, Habermas and some other authors —a new Holy Family in Social Philosophy— arise from various theoretical constructions of (and for) Scholar-Dreammakers. This study aims to clear up which are the basic fallacies in such approaches. Their «truths» consist essentially of some tautological reasoning: a mere logical entailment, analytic arguments; if taken as empirical statements, their assertions are false or, at least, an enormous exaggeration. That reasoning is built on certain stipulative definitions of «rationality» and straightway they are persuasively introduced as absolute axioms for the field of Practical Reason. This provides an ideology that fits the taste of certain sectors of the academic world, which overlooks how people's normal thoughts and their ways of acting do in fact work. Such an ideology disguises, particularly, not only the mentality prevailing in actual political behavior, but also the very practice of legal reasoning.—Issues: I. General Aspects. II. Fundamental Features of Essentialism (their main theses lack empirical backing). III. «Universal» Discursive Rationality (tautologies or professorial narcissism?). IV. Eventual «correspondences» on the Logical Level (what «Logic»?: «explanation», «justification», «foundations»). V. Eventual «correspondences» on the Empirical Level (which «practical» effectiveness?). VI. Summary/Conclusion. ; Las «verdades» de que se trata en aproximaciones como las promovidas por Rawls, Habermas y los autores «constructivistas» en general, consisten básicamente en unos razonamientos tautológicos; si se pretende tomarlas por verdades empíricas, son falsas o al menos constituyen una tremenda exageración. Esos razonamientos se edifican a partir de ciertas definiciones estipulativas del término «racionalidad», que ahí son persuasivamente introducidas como axiomas sin más para la Razón práctica. Todo ello suministra una ideología, ajustada al paladar de ciertos sectores del mundo académico, mediante la cual se deja ...

A thesis submitted to for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Bedfordshire ; Over recent decades, China has opened up to the wider world in a myriad of ways. By 2020 – a decade hence – it will be transformed from its scarcely-visited-1980s self, to become the most visited nation on earth. It is therefore important to gauge how China is being represented through the immensely-powerful signifying practices of tourism. Predicated on the view that reciprocal understanding between China (or 'the East') has never been high with 'the West', this critico-interpretive study explores how China is symbolized / projected via the meditative agency of tourism – that is, by a collaborative projective Leviathan, which predominantly authorizes via longstanding eurocentric visions. Industrially-scripted representations of tourism are inspected regarding their normalizing (Foucauldian) capacity to naturalise certain visions of China's inheritances and drawcards whilst unrecognizing / denying others. Underpinned by the multiple-truth-cognisance of social constructivism (especially that of Lincoln and Cuba), this emergent study is based upon Kincheloean bricoleurship. Initially seeking to crystallize found representational repertoires of / about 'China' by the use of multiple methods, it becomes – following difficulties in finding decision-takers who were both China-aware and active in such acts of signification (who could be both interviewed and work-shadowed) – an inquiry rescaffolded as a multiple-data-set exploration of worldmaking discursivity. The investigation makes critical use of Nyiri's recent examination of the Chinese government's ortholalia (i.e., its cultural authority) in regulating what China is and how it should be staged / performed / projected, and of various newspress articles on the late soft power articulation of both the nation's forty-centuries of 'brilliant history' and its 'sudden modern vitality'. The inquiry progresses by condemning the general and ubiquitous inadequacy of the twin fields of Tourism Management / Tourism Studies to school either practitioners or researchers as Confucian-style organic intellectuals, able to comprehend the international economic foundations of tourism, yet also appreciate its deep cultural, political, and psychic rhizomata. It culminates in the development of an 'organic intellectual' research agenda (after Venn), signposted to direct immediate but longrun inspection of these Foucauldian / Confucian acts of the ongoing (?) normalized or compossible (cogenerative) worlding of China.

This dissertation is a contribution to the debate about 'climate justice', i.e. a call for a just and feasible distribution of responsibility for addressing climate change. The main argument is a proposal for a cautious, practicable, and necessary step in the right direction: given the set of theoretical and practical obstacles to climate justice, we must begin by making contemporary development practices sustainable. In times of climate change, this is done by recognising and responding to the fact that emissions of greenhouse gases, with climate change as their result, are an immanent threat to any reflectively embraced development project. In the universal pursuit of progress, the basic needs of both present and future people are put at risk. Even so, a political stalemate and a business- as-usual attitude prevail. The situation is paralysed by an uncertainty about the exact impacts of choices made and by the reasonable disagreement of modern societies. The result is passiveness, and the passing on of a slowly and indiscernibly growing problem to future generations. This dissertation conveys a crucial message about the need to make our development sustainable. Instead of delaying action through trying to resolve the intractable epistemic and normative uncertainty fully, the focus should be on vindicating already shared points of practical convergence. On the constructivist method here adopted, the task is to characterise the agent and the situation faced from a practical and first-person point of view. More specifically, to specify the practical problem climate change gives rise to; the moral importance of needs (chapter three); how a principled priority of basic needs can be defended (chapter four), intergenerationally (chapter five) and internationally (chapter six); and what natural and social limits there are to development (chapter seven). These conceptions narrow the practice of development in the present context: it can be concluded that development must not risk the basic needs of anyone implicated. This common ground brackets off disagreement irrelevant to the urgent need to act, and so brings together otherwise deeply divided agents. A sufficientarian basic needs-principle, as the focus of an overlapping consensus, is practicable and anticipatory in the disuniting moral conundrum of climate change.

Las «verdades» de que se trata en aproximaciones como las promovidas por Rawls, Habermas y los autores «constructivistas» en general, consisten básicamente en unos razonamientos tautológicos; si se pretende tomarlas por verdades empíricas, son falsas o al menos constituyen una tremenda exageración. Esos razonamientos se edifican a partir de ciertas definiciones estipulativas del término «racionalidad», que ahí son persuasivamente introducidas como axiomas sin más para la Razón práctica. Todo ello suministra una ideología, ajustada al paladar de ciertos sectores del mundo académico, mediante la cual se deja fuera de foco cómo funcionan efectivamente el pensamiento y la conducta de la gente en general. Asimismo ella disimula, en especial, la mentalidad dominante en las conductas políticas reales y los resortes propios del razonamiento jurídico profesional en la práctica. El presente estudio pone sobre el tapete las falacias básicas más generales de tales aproximaciones, a través de los siguientes ítems: I. Generalidades. II. Rasgos fundamentales de la orientación esencialista (sus principales tesis carecen de sustentación empírica). III. Racionalidad discursiva «universal» (¿tautologías o narcisismo profesoral?). IV. Eventuales «correspondencias» de orden lógico (¿qué «lógica»?: «explicación», justificación», «fundamentaciones»). V. Eventuales «correspondencias» de orden empírico (¿qué efectividad «práctica»?). VI. Síntesis y conclusión. ; The peculiar kind of «truths» focused on by Rawls, Habermas and some other authors —a new Holy Family in Social Philosophy— arise from various theoretical constructions of (and for) Scholar-Dreammakers. This study aims to clear up which are the basic fallacies in such approaches. Their «truths» consist essentially of some tautological reasoning: a mere logical entailment, analytic arguments; if taken as empirical statements, their assertions are false or, at least, an enormous exaggeration. That reasoning is built on certain stipulative definitions of «rationality» and straightway they are persuasively introduced as absolute axioms for the field of Practical Reason. This provides an ideology that fits the taste of certain sectors of the academic world, which overlooks how people's normal thoughts and their ways of acting do in fact work. Such an ideology disguises, particularly, not only the mentality prevailing in actual political behavior, but also the very practice of legal reasoning.—Issues: I. General Aspects. II. Fundamental Features of Essentialism (their main theses lack empirical backing). III. «Universal» Discursive Rationality (tautologies or professorial narcissism?). IV. Eventual «correspondences» on the Logical Level (what «Logic»?: «explanation», «justification», «foundations»). V. Eventual «correspondences» on the Empirical Level (which «practical» effectiveness?). VI. Summary/Conclusion.

This thesis aims to analyse the effect of hydrocarbons on Russian foreign policy in the post-communist period. In doing so it employs a constructivist meta-theory (actorstructure framework) and Susan Strange's approach to international political economy (IPE). The role of hydrocarbons in both the international political economy and Russia's domestic political economy is analysed. Thereafter a historical narrative outlining the affect of hydrocarbons on foreign policy from 1991-2008 is offered. There is also a brief focus on the role of Gazprom in Russian foreign policy. It is found that hydrocarbons affected Russian foreign policy through the impact they had on the state's ability to control the domestic political economy (which was diminished in the 1991-1999 period, but strengthened as international oil prices rose thereafter). Hydrocarbons, though a source of power, are also found to tie the Russian state to the interdependent international political economy of the globalised era. The analysis finds that the case supports the constructivist emphasis on the importance of understanding domestic issues when addressing the foreign policies of states. It also finds that the approaches used, Wendt's constructivism and Strange's IPE theory, work well in conjunction to illuminate foreign policy issues. A criticism of Strange's approach, however, is highlighted. She fails to give adequate attention to matters of geography in her model. This, it is argued, would be a fruitful endeavour for future IPE analysis, especially if addressed through the case of hydrocarbons in the IPE.