Realist Constructivism and Realist-Constructivisms
In: International studies review, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 348-352
ISSN: 1468-2486
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In: International studies review, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 348-352
ISSN: 1468-2486
Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; Norms, Reasons and Constructivism. Constructivism and Objectivity. Varieties of Constructivism. Constructivism and Its Premises. Re-Defining Constructivism. ; LUISS PhD Thesis
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In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 300-329
ISSN: 1471-6437
Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask "How do we know there are material objects?" and not "How do you know which are the female beetles?" Similarly,moralepistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims.
In: International relations in a constructed world
In: Capitalism, nature, socialism: CNS ; a journal of socialist ecology, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 97-126
ISSN: 1045-5752
In: Theories of International Relations, S. 217-240
In: Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
In: New Series; Volume 24
The author of this chapter defines the tension within Oakeshott's philosophy on socio-political construction & deconstructs his conceptualization of constructivism & relativism in relationship to truth. Although Oakeshott's philosophy can relate to a strong constructivism, his anti-rationalism & conceptualization of truth preclude his acceptance of the "rational" constructivist political agenda. Various philosophers' views on truth (Hacking, McCullagh, Sellars, Goldman) are applied as problematizations of Oakeshott's worldview. Oakeshott's ambiguous relativism is recognized to have a misplaced skepticism & inconsistent relativism (Podoksik) emanating from the irreducible pluralism based on the distinct spheres of knowledge generated by separate domains of modes. The severe critiques of the sociological arenas of politics, education & science exemplify this misplacement. The irreducible plurality of his modes (science, history) require different methods of inquiry to produce knowledge, thus forbidding cross disciplinary commonalities leading to an assumption of coherentism that should direct Oakeshott to relativism. But, reciprocal relations between conceptual creativity & nature are excluded by his separation of modal knowledge. 60 References. J. Harwell
In: American philosophy
In: New international relations
In: Questions de communication, Heft 5, S. 161-168
ISSN: 2259-8901