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This paper outlines a plausible mechanism whereby the country of Honduras could curtail gang violence within its borders with the eventual intent of exterminating gangs in Honduras. First, the need for such a plan is presented, with current statistics on the violence in Honduras. The paper then explores the possible use of an adapted form of Cold War containment policy against Honduran gangs. This method of containment would work by hindering the activities of the gangs and more importantly by addressing the societal factors that contribute to gang proliferation. It would contain gangs ideologically, economically, and socially, inhibiting their growth by stifling their economy and their supply of new members. This paper reviews anti- gang strategies that have proved ineffective and the reasons for their ineffectiveness. After it explicates the nature of the two main gangs in Honduras, it discusses containment and its history, and how Cold War containment policy could be applied in Honduras. The method, location, and responsibilities of the involved parties are described. Concerns relating to the adaptability of containment are also addressed. Lastly, this paper briefly discusses the current situation in Honduras's political relationship with the United States.

The civil war in Syria has caused the deaths of more than 230,000 civilians and combatants, has led to one of the largest refugee crises in recent memory, and has destabilized the Levant. It therefore represents an extraordinarily challenging foreign policy conundrum. A wide variety of responses—ranging from the imposition of no-fly zones to doing nothing—have been considered in Ottawa and in allied capitals since 2011. Each one, however, raises potentially significant challenges. This article explores how Canada has considered those alternatives. As is systematically the case for a non-great power, Canada's policy options were shaped more by deliberations in allied capitals—especially Washington—and only thereafter by actual developments in Syria. After laying out Canada's interests relative to the war in Syria, the article describes four policy alternatives that Canada has faced since 2011, as seen through the lenses of liberal pacifism, liberal interventionism, isolationism, and containment. Among this menu of deeply flawed options, containment has steadily emerged as Canada's de facto approach. That approach has been correct: it is the least bad course of action available since it best allows Ottawa to protect and promote its interests. Nevertheless, Canada could take additional steps to implement a more comprehensive containment framework.

Since 1947 the major foreign policy of the United States government has been containment. This policy of creating situations of strength which would prevent the extension of Communist power and influence in the world was first proclaimed in the Truman Doctrine (March 12, 1947). The policy had been anticipated in 1946 when the battleship Missouri visited Turkey and some forty Mediterranean ports. In the course of this display the Missouri was joined by two aircraft carriers, seven cruisers, and eighteen destroyers. The early sensitivity to Soviet threats to the Middle East and its approaches, revealed in the Doctrine and that naval demonstration, was not consistently maintained at this time or later. Perhaps, indeed, American foreign policy only operates with fullest energy, when directly confronted with a serious Soviet threat. At any rate, it may be argued that for the period 1946–1955, when the Soviet Union was neither conspicuously active nor influential in the Middle East, United States policy contributed little to the solution or easing of the area's all but intractable problems. So to describe the problems is to propose a good excuse, but they were the problems, and, unfortunately, they did not wither from neglect or incantations.

Since making it out as the most powerful nation following the Second World War, Washington has demonstrated and employed two independent yet interlocking policies of Exceptionalism and Containment in its foreign policy. American exceptionalism is ingrained in its pride as the most powerful military and economic power, and a champion of democracy. While Washington sees itself as exceptional, it also believes that the fruition of its national interest and strategic objectives depends on bestowing friendly states with exceptional code. To place the discussion in perspective, we take Iran as a case study and explore the transition of Iran from being a recipient of American exceptional code, a strategic tool of American containment policy, to becoming an object of containment itself. The article applies George Kennan's exceptionalism and containment strategy on USA–Iran relations in both Shah's rule and post-revolution era. We conclude that decades of US exceptionalism in the region have multiplied into regional challenges for the USA itself and raised the importance of Iran and increased its security threats.

The primary aim of this study is to further our understanding of the measures taken to contain epidemics in Portugal during the nineteenth century. The first cordons sanitaires along the country's land border were organized in 1800 and 1804 to prevent the spread of plague and yellow fever from Spain. Later, as also happened in countries with better public health regulations, liberal governments in Portugal did not shy away from implementing the quarantine procedures they had inherited from previous absolutist governments. This is clearly seen in the establishment of probably the last land-based cordon sanitaire to protect the country, which was set up in 1885 to guard against the cholera that was devastating Spain.

We study the dynamic impact of Covid-19, economic mobility, and containment policy shocks. We use Bayesian panel structural vector autoregressions with daily data for 44 countries, identified through sign and zero restrictions. Incidence and mobility shocks raise cases and deaths significantly for two months. Restrictive policy shocks lower mobility immediately, cases after one week, and deaths after three weeks. Non-pharmaceutical interventions explain half of the variation in mobility, cases, and deaths worldwide. These flattened the pandemic curve, while deepening the global mobility recession. The policy tradeoff is 1 p.p. less mobility per day for 9% fewer deaths after two months.