Suchergebnisse

Das Werk befasst sich mit den rechtlichen Auswirkungen der Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens über das Vermögen eines Energie-Contractors. Es wird untersucht, welche Folgen die Insolvenz für die Rechtsbeziehungen der Beteiligten hat und wie im Rahmen des Insolvenzverfahrens mit Sicherheiten sowie der Energieerzeugungsanlage verfahren werden kann. Hierbei stellen sich besondere rechtliche Fragen in Zusammenhang mit dem Fortbestehen der Energieversorgung und Rechten an der für das Energie-Contracting dringend erforderlichen Energieerzeugungsanlage. Beleuchtet werden in Bezug auf die Insolvenz außerdem das Rechtsverhältnis des Contractors zu einem Kreditgeber sowie die regelmäßig bestehenden dinglichen Rechte

Das Werk befasst sich mit den rechtlichen Auswirkungen der Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens über das Vermögen eines Energie-Contractors. Es wird untersucht, welche Folgen die Insolvenz für die Rechtsbeziehungen der Beteiligten hat und wie im Rahmen des Insolvenzverfahrens mit Sicherheiten sowie der Energieerzeugungsanlage verfahren werden kann. Hierbei stellen sich besondere rechtliche Fragen in Zusammenhang mit dem Fortbestehen der Energieversorgung und Rechten an der für das Energie-Contracting dringend erforderlichen Energieerzeugungsanlage. Beleuchtet werden in Bezug auf die Insolvenz außerdem das Rechtsverhältnis des Contractors zu einem Kreditgeber sowie die regelmäßig bestehenden dinglichen Rechte. ReiheVeröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierecht an der Universität zu Köln - Band 177.

Contractors compose part of the total force for U.S. warfare capability in Iraq. Some augment U.S. warfare capability; others do not. Some of the contractors are controlled by the military; others are controlled by civilian (nonmilitary/political) government agencies. The problem: Who are the contractors and how has the nature of government oversight and control over contractors determined whether contractor contributions augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War? Argument: It is the degree of government control over contractors that determines whether the contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on warfare capability. Ultimately the findings support this argument. My method is a single case study that compares two groups of individual cases. The first group is composed of firms that have military contract administrators; the second has nonmilitary/political administrators. The individual cases are framed by a research question set to trace contractor control and contributions to changes in warfare capability. The firms are identified by function type and contract administrator. The military had procedures for controlling contractors when the war started, but failed to follow through on them. Contractor fraud and the Abu Ghraib scandal were the result. With congressional oversight and military control, contractors contributed to the size of the military force structure and augmented warfare capability. Contractors modernized military capability with technology support; in addition, they provide specialized skills such as language capability and oil well maintenance. All of these functions augment warfare capability. However, both military dependence on contractors and contractor lobbying are fundamental threats to military readiness and warfare capability. Nonmilitary/political administrators had no force structure, plans, or procedures for contractor control at the start of the war; control policy was written as an afterthought. Contractors provided the force structure, building skills, and police training essential for the warfare capability goal of rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. However, armed security firms that were used to protect rebuilders became a threat to political order because the nonmilitary/political control policies for contractors did not change with the political situation. Thus, the nonmilitary/political administrators' failure to control contractors is linked to the erosion of warfare capability.

The terms 'mercenary' and 'contractor' are most often used by academic writers as synonyms. That article seeks to show that, in addition to that similarity, which has not been proved, factors of convergence and, above all, differences distinguish mercenaries from contractors, defined as employees of private military and security undertakings. The law in force makes it possible to establish similarities as to their legal category and differences in their legal status. However, in order to restore the synchronisation between facts and law, while making the relevant legal rules more consistent and effective, it is argued that applicable national, regional and international law must achieve an equivalent, and thus unitary, legal regime for both types of natural persons. ; International audience The terms "mercenary" and "contractor" are used most often by doctrine as synonyms. This article aims to demonstrate that beyond this equivalence, which has not been proven to surplus, convergence of factors, especially differences characterize mercenary compared to contractors, employees defined as military and security companies private. The current law allows, in fact, establish similarities in their legal category of belonging and differences, in terms of their legal status of attachment. But to restore synchrony between the facts and the law, while giving greater coherence and efficiency to the relevant legal rules, it is argued that the law on the national, regional and international levels must achieve an equivalent legal regime and therefore unitary, for these two types of individuals. ; The terms 'mercenary' and 'contractor' are most often used by academic writers as synonyms. That article seeks to show that, in addition to that similarity, which has not been proved, factors of convergence and, above all, differences distinguish mercenaries from contractors, defined as employees of private military and security undertakings. The law in force makes it possible to establish similarities as to their legal category and ...

The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual Acquisition Research Program. This annual event showcases the research projects funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. Featuring keynote speakers, plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within the DoD today. By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and program management. For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit our program website at: www.acquisitionresearch.org. For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research Symposium during the third week of May, please visit our conference website at: www.researchsymposium.org.;The author's previous research surveyed issues and policies related to the trend toward increased reliance on contractors in combat and other contingency operations, documented relevant case studies, and, presented analyses and recommendations. The current research presents a background summary and updates relevant policy developments since the earlier research. It then takes a distinctly different approach than the earlier study. Instead of trying to extract additional lessons from case studies of current events, this research attempts to gain historical perspective through case studies of earlier conflicts, primarily World War II. Rather than attempting to survey a catalog of issues, this research concentrates on a narrow set of issues. The issues reviewed in this paper relate to the extent contractors can and should be made an integral part of the mission team in combat and contingency operations. If contractors have become integral to the success of combat and contingency operations, shouldn't they be responsive and responsible to the commander formally charged with mission success? Expressed another way, can and should the concept of unity of command be applied to contractors in a combat theater? Assuming that contractors should be integrated into joint task force operations in a way that creates the essence of unity of command, how can that be accomplished? The question of contractor control/unity of command can be relatively simply stated as suggested in the previous paragraph. This research found, however, that the path toward combatant commander control of contractors is complicated by divergent policies, conflicting belief systems, disconnections between policy theory and on the ground reality, and a variety of legal and regulatory hurdles. A key aspect of the commander's ability to control the forces in his theater, uniformed military or civilian contractor, is the ability to direct available forces to perform the most critical tasks when necessary. In a combat zone, the performance of critical tasks may involve activities that constitute or approach direct participation in combat. This is not an issue for uniformed military personnel; every soldier can be made a rifleman when necessary. However, civilians who directly participate in combat risk becoming illegal combatants under international law, compromise their potential status as prisoners of war, and potentially become subject to criminal sanctions. Civilian contractors may find themselves participating directly in combat because their contract work calls for such action (e.g. ; certain weapons system or security contractors) or due to exigent circumstances. As pointed out in the author's earlier work, there are a number of issues concerning contractors in combat scenarios that need to be resolved. Policy developments have addressed many of these issues in a variety of ways. Progress continues to be made in a number of areas. Recent developments have not, however, assured that the theater commander has effective control over contractor personnel in his area of responsibility. Current policy purports to prohibit direct participation in combat by contractors; but, there seems to be no rigorous method to ensure that contractors (either as part of contract work or due to exigent circumstances) do not actually participate in combat. Moreover, the concept of direct participation is not fixed in international law but is still evolving. This research aims to examine both these areas and, if possible recommend policies and approaches that will assure that the theater commander and his subordinates effectively control civilian contractors that support them; and, that only uniformed military personnel will actually participate in combat. Both participation and combat itself may be more amorphous in a war on terrorism than in some other conflicts. A corollary to the commander's control of the activities of contractor personnel is the concern that civilian contractors that are exposed to the risks of combat receive the same force protection, administrative support, and amenities afforded to soldiers under similar circumstances. ; Third Annual Acquisition Research Symposium ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.