Suchergebnisse

Both those who are critical of the current structure of corporate governance, and those who support it, share a common set of prenaises. The corporation is owned by its shareholders: managers exert power and responsibility on behalf of their shareholders: corporate governance is a question of effective accountability to shareholders. If there are problems, they should be dealt with by making these mechanisms more effective. This article challenges that view.The principal-agent model bears no relationship to the way large companies are actually run. The attempt to bring reality in line with the model is one possible road to reform: another is to adjust the model to reality. Shareholders do not own large companies, in any ordinary sense of the word own. Firms like BT or BP are social institutions, owned by nobody. The distinction between plc and the owner managed limited company should be real, and not just titular. Corporate managers are not the agents of the shareholders, but the trustees of the assets of the corporation, which include its reputation, its distinctive capabilities, and the skills of the employees and suppliers. Their objective should not be to maximise shareholder value but to further the interests of the business.This account is probably a better description of the current state of British company law than the principal-agent model, but we advocate a new company statute to put the matter beyond doubt. Disposing of the fiction that executives are the agents of shareholders allows us to establish an effective system for achieving the key goals of corporate governance: freedom for managers to manage, combined with real accountability for their performance. We advocate a fixed four-year term for company chief executives, involving a wide ranging and searching review of effectiveness which would involve not only directors and shareholders but advisors, associated companies and employees.It is better that property should be private, but that man should make it common in use …. it is the task of the legislator to see that the citizens become like that. Aristotle

Zusammenfassung
In diesem Beitrag werden die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen einem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Ordnungsrahmen und Corporate Governance analysiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass Handlungsspielräume sowohl bei Public Ordering als auch bei Private Ordering zu einer Nutzenmaximierung ohne Rücksicht auf externe Effekte für Dritte führen. Der Grund hierfür liegt in den gleichlaufenden Interessen von Management und Anteilseignern, die sich aus der Gesamtnutzensteigerung der Vertragsparteien ergeben. Während bei der privaten Regelsetzung Defizite des Corporate Governance in Form eines Entscheidungskonsenses auf den Ordnungsrahmen projiziert werden und somit die Funktionsfähigkeit der öffentlichen Regelsetzung einschränken, werden Defizite des Ordnungsrahmens bei öffentlicher Regelsetzung auf Corporate Governance Strukturen übertragen. Aus diesen Umständen ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit einer normativen Ausgestaltung von Corporate Governance und einer Einbettung in den gesamtwirtschaftlichen Ordnungsrahmen. Dazu ist die Schaffung eines freien Wettbewerbssystems notwendig, das die Konstellation eines Gefangenendilemmas zwischen Marktteilnehmern gewährleistet und zur Reduktion des moralischen Risikos beiträgt.

This paper has analysed the Italian prevailing corporate governance system in terms of issues such as ownership and control structures, structure and functioning of the boards, executive remuneration and evaluation, the mission of the companies, the role of banks and market for corporate control. The issues determined by the presence of the blockholder have been analysed as well as the changes that derive from the Draghi reform. The Italian system of corporate governance seems to be effectively summarised by the expression 'weak managers, strong blockholders and unprotected minority shareholders', paraphrasing Roe's (1994) sentence.

Corporate governance is developing rapidly in many countries across the world. In this paper we analyse the existing state of corporate governance in a country in the Middle East: Bahrain. We employ a survey methodology, with a questionnaire being sent to all of the companies listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange Market. An analysis of the responses reveals that Bahraini companies have in place some of the features of corporate governance best practice with boards dominated by non–executive directors, for example, and the separation of the roles of Chair and CEO. However, it is not clear how effective the nomination/appointments process is and directors tend to be fairly entrenched. In terms of risk management and control, the majority of Bahraini companies have an internal audit department and risk management control. Overall, it seems that Bahraini companies have a number of key corporate governance structural features in place, but that there remains further progress to be made.