Somaltex / Praxy Fernandes -- Jowhar Sugar Factory / Ales Vahčič -- The cigarette and match factory / Vladimir Kreačić -- The Foundry and Mechanical Workshop / Zia Uddin Ahmed -- Cyprus Telecommunications Authority / Ales Vahčič ... [et al.] -- The Electricity Authority of Cyprus / Praxy Fernandes, Costakis Panayiotou and John Charalambides -- Air Jamaica / Praxy Fernandes and Marie Slyfield -- Jamaica Railway Corporation / Vladimir Kreačić and Phyllis Green
Abstract. Firms of different business strategy types reveal different behavioural patterns in their innovation and business performance while facing various difficulties as they seek to adapt to a turbulent competitive environment. Accordingly, we want to make progress by using the dynamic view, which follows the Schumpeterian perspective of firm behaviour through innovation (business) strategy. We advocate a dynamic approach to the strategic and behavioural patterns influencing business performance that is appropriate for small and mediumsized firms as well as giant corporations in highly competitive industries and catching-up economies. Thus, by combining different theoretical approaches we develop an alternative conceptual 'cost-advantage leader-follower' (CALF) model of innovation for when firms are developing cost-cutting process inventions.
To magistrsko delo analizira obrambno sodelovanje držav višegrajske skupine s poudarkom na sodelovanju na področju obrambne industrije in sodobne obrambne trgovine med državami. Čeprav se zdi, da je višegrajska skupina zelo povezana in trdna zveza držav, se v literaturi pojavljajo prav nasprotna mnenja. Četudi so vsem državam skupine skupne težave zaradi zastarele vojaške opreme in potrebe po modernih oborožitvenih sistemih ter kljub obetavnim izjavam politikov, je sodelovanje na tem področju zelo skopo. Obrambne industrije višegrajskih držav so čedalje bolj vpete v proizvodne procese zahodnih vojaških multinacionalnih korporacij, politični odločevalci višegrajske skupine pa še vedno niso pripravljeni izdatno podpreti iskrenega sodelovanja med državami, kot na primer skupnih dobav. Četudi lahko pri analizi obrambnih sektorjev skupine zaznamo celo vrsto strukturnih problemov, pa se obrambna trgovina višegrajskih držav ujema z njihovo zunanjo in varnostno politiko. To ujemanje samo po sebi ne izključuje ostalih težav v obrambnih industrijskih sektorjih, ki ovirajo sodelovanje držav, služi pa kot nadaljnji dokaz, kako so obrambno-industrijski sektorji držav tesno povezani z njihovo zunanjo in varnostno politiko. ; This master thesis analyses the defense cooperation of the Visegrad group countries with specific focus on the collaboration initiatives in the defence industry sector and ongoing arms trade relations among the countries. While the Visegrad group seems a coherent and a solid group of countries, many experts on this field argue quite the contrary. Despite the common issues regarding the obsolete military force, the need for newer or modernized weapon systems and, above all, the political declarations promoting the defence industry cooperation among the group countries, there have been little steps taken apart from the promising rhetoric. The countries' defence industries are progressively more involved in the work process of the Western defence corporations, while the political decision makers are still not really keen on genuine cooperation such as common acquisition of arms in intra-group level. While a whole set of obstacles for the deeper cooperation can be identified, foreign and security directions of the countries resemble the trade relations in the arms market. Although this matching as such does not necessarily prove that the group's foreign and security policies solely and by itself negatively contribute to the closer defence industry cooperation, it serves as another proof how the defence industrial complex is tightly connected to one country's foreign and security policy.
Raziskovalno delo se ukvarja s problemom neobjektivnosti ter vse večjega števila napak, ki jih delajo bonitetne agencije. Še posebej pozorni bomo na tri največje agencije na svetu, to so: S&P, Moody's ter Fitch, ki skupaj zavzemajo več kot 95% celotnega bonitetnega trga. Podrobneje si bomo ogledali pretekle finančne/gospodarske krize in napačno vrednotenje ameriških propadlih koncernov. Napačne bonitetne ocene, ki so prenizke ali previsoke, imajo velik vpliv na določene, za državo zelo pomembne, parametre. Višjo bonitetno oceno kot dobi država, po nižjih stroški se bo lahko zadolževala in obratno. Do neobjektivnosti pri vrednotenju pride iz večih razlogov. Najpogostejši razlog je profitni motiv agencij, ki privede do konflikta interesov. Agencije v veliki večini poslujejo po poslovnem modelu "izdajatelj plača", kar pomeni, da je naročnik in plačnik ocene, izdajatelj vrednostnega papirja. Ker agencije plača nekdo, kogar morajo objektivno oceniti, prihaja do konflikta interesov, saj so v osnovi agencije profitne institucije, ki poslujejo z enormno visokimi dobički. Problem se nahaja tudi v skoncentriranosti agencij na območju Združenih držav Amerike in zelo omejenem številu agencij, kar priča o oligopliji ter pomanjkanju konkurence. V zgodovini se je pojavilo veliko primerov, v katerih so bonitetne agencije storile hude napake in te napake so nosile posledice. Ugotovimo pa lahko tudi, da agencije niso znale niti pravočasno predvideti prihajajočih finančnih kriz in pred njimi posvariti. ; This research work deals with the problem of the lack of objectivity and a growing number of errors made by the credit rating agencies. Particular attention will be given to the three largest agencies in the world, namely: S&P, Moody's and Fitch, which together occupy more than 95% of the total credit market share. We will analyse this against several practical examples of past financial crises as well as defaulting of major US corporations such as Enron, Lehman Brothers, AIG and others. Misratings, whether too low or too high, have a significant impact on certain important parameters of a given country. The higher the rating a country gets, the lower its cost of borrowing will be, and vice versa. The lack of objectivity in the evaluation process occurs for several reasons. Most commonly, the reason is the profit motive of the agencies, which leads to a conflict of interest. Agencies in the vast majority operate on a business model following the "issuer pays" principle, which means that the client and payer of the ratings is the issuer of the security. Since the agencies get paid by someone whom they should objectively evaluate, this creates a conflict of interests, given the fact that they are essentially profitable institutions with enormously high earnings. Additional problem lies in the high concentration of agencies in the territory of the United States as well as in the limited number of operating agencies on a whole, reflecting the oligopoly of the markert and a severe lack of competition. There are a lot of historical examples in which credit rating agencies committed serious errors which carried consequences. We can also conclude, that the agencies have failed to accuretely anticipate and warn of the upcoming financial crises.
