W artykule ukazane zostało zagadnienie stabilności funkcjonowania kolegialnego członu władzy wykonawczej – rządu. Stabilność władzy wykonawczej, obok partycypacji obywatelskiej w wyborach oraz utrzymania porządku politycznego, jest jednym z elementów szerszego pojęcia, jakim jest stabilność polityczna państwa. Doświadczenia historyczne (zwłaszcza Francji III i IV Republiki oraz Włoch) ukazują, jak ważnym zagadnieniem jest możliwość stabilnego i efektywnego działania rządu. Odnosząc tytułowe zagadnienie do polskiego modelu ustrojowego, autor dokonuje analizy norm konstytucyjnych determinujących zasady powoływania Rady Ministrów oraz możliwości jej odwołania. ; The article deals with the stability of the functioning of a collegial body of the executive power – the government. The stability of the executive power, together with citizens' participation in the elections and maintenance of political order, is one of the elements of a broader concept of a state's political stability. Historical experiences (especially those of the French Third and the Fourth Republic and Italy) demonstrate the importance of stable and effective functioning of a government. Relating the issue in question to the Polish model of government, the author analyses constitutional norms laying down the principles of appointing the Council of Ministers and the possibilities of its dismissal.
Each national parliament of the EU -28 has put in place scrutiny procedures to reinforce democratic control over EU matters and to ensure democratic accountability in EU decision making. One widespread type of Austrian scrutiny is the "mandating system". As the name indicates, systems where the focus in on the process of EU decision-making rather than on an individual document emanating from the EU institutions belong to this scrutiny model. The principal subject of scrutiny is often the national government's position in the Council. The procedural system includes in some cases a power for a E uropean Affairs Committee to give a direct mandate to a government before a minister can endorse legislation in Council meetings. Such systems are today in place in countries such as Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary. ; Jeszcze przed formalnym przystąpieniem Austrii do struktur integracyjnych w noweli konstytucyjnej z dnia 15 grudnia 1994 r. określone zostały konstytucyjnoprawne podstawy mechanizmu współpracy parlamentu z rządem w zakresie spraw związanych z członkostwem we Wspólnotach/Unii. Wprowadzony do Federalnej Ustawy Konstytucyjnej nowy podrozdział B zatytułowany Unia Europejska (art. 23a–23f) stworzył szeroki mechanizm konsultacyjny między ciałami ustawodawczymi – Radą Narodową i Radą Federalną a rządem federalnym w sprawach dotyczących członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Wiedeński model kontroli spraw unijnych gwarantuje obu izbom parlamentu aktywny udział w wewnątrzpaństwowych procesach decyzyjnych dotyczących spraw integracyjnych. Kooperatywne współdziałanie parlamentu i rządu w sprawach związanych z członkostwem w Unii Europejskiej stara się bowiem godzić interesy narodowe z wymogami integracyjnymi. Wiedeński system kontroli spraw unijnych stał się wzorcem dla rozwiązań ustrojowych przyjętych m.in. w chorwackim Saborze, słowackiej Radzie Narodowej oraz węgierskim Zgromadzeniu Narodowym.
Jeszcze przed formalnym przystąpieniem Austrii do struktur integracyjnych w noweli konstytucyjnej z dnia 15 grudnia 1994 r. określone zostały konstytucyjnoprawne podstawy mechanizmu współpracy parlamentu z rządem w zakresie spraw związanych z członkostwem we Wspólnotach/Unii. Wprowadzony do Federalnej Ustawy Konstytucyjnej nowy podrozdział B zatytułowany Unia Europejska (art. 23a–23f) stworzył szeroki mechanizm konsultacyjny między ciałami ustawodawczymi – Radą Narodową i Radą Federalną a rządem federalnym w sprawach dotyczących członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej. Wiedeński model kontroli spraw unijnych gwarantuje obu izbom parlamentu aktywny udział w wewnątrzpaństwowych procesach decyzyjnych dotyczących spraw integracyjnych. Kooperatywne współdziałanie parlamentu i rządu w sprawach związanych z członkostwem w Unii Europejskiej stara się bowiem godzić interesy narodowe z wymogami integracyjnymi. Wiedeński system kontroli spraw unijnych stał się wzorcem dla rozwiązań ustrojowych przyjętych m.in. w chorwackim Saborze, słowackiej Radzie Narodowej oraz węgierskim Zgromadzeniu Narodowym. ; Each national parliament of the EU -28 has put in place scrutiny procedures to reinforce democratic control over EU matters and to ensure democratic accountability in EU decision making. One widespread type of Austrian scrutiny is the "mandating system". As the name indicates, systems where the focus in on the process of EU decision-making rather than on an individual document emanating from the EU institutions belong to this scrutiny model. The principal subject of scrutiny is often the national government's position in the Council. The procedural system includes in some cases a power for a E uropean Affairs Committee to give a direct mandate to a government before a minister can endorse legislation in Council meetings. Such systems are today in place in countries such as Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary.
Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Przedmiotem artykułu jest odpowiedzialność polityczna Rady Ministrów w Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej. Zgodnie z konstytucją z 22 lipca 1952 r. rząd odpowiadał przed Sejmem, a na wniosek premiera zmiany w jego składzie mogły być również dokonywane przez Radę Państwa. Autor dokonał analizy wszystkich przypadków odwołania premiera oraz rządu przez Sejm PRL, poszukując odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy w jakimkolwiek stopniu wydarzenia te były podobne do wotum nieufności funkcjonującego w państwach demokratycznych. W Polsce Ludowej zmiany w składzie rządu – co do zasady – dokonywane były przez Sejm, a jedynie wyjątkowo przez Radę Państwa. Głosowanie w parlamencie miało znaczenie jedynie formalne, a rzeczywiste decyzje personalne podejmowane były przez kierownictwo PZPR. Pozycja Sejmu stała się silniejsza w ostatnich latach PRL. Dymisja rządu Zbigniewa Messnera w 1988 r. nastąpiła w wyniku parlamentarnej krytyki, może być więc uznana za typowe wotum nieufności. Autor omawia także obowiązujący w PRL zwyczaj konstytucyjny, zgodnie z którym, mimo że nie nakazywała tego konstytucja, na pierwszym po wyborach posiedzeniu Sejmu premier zgłaszał dymisję rządu. Zazwyczaj nie dochodziło wówczas do istotnych zmian w składzie Rady Ministrów, którą powoływano pod kierownictwem tego samego polityka. ; The article treats about the political responsibility of the Council of Ministers in Polish People's Republic. Due to the constitution of July 22nd, 1952 the government was responsible to the Sejm. Changes of ministers could be done also by Council of the State, but only at the request of the prime minister. The vote of parliament had only formal importance, because the real personal decisions were made by the leaders of Th e Polish United Workers' Party. Th e constitutional position of Sejm became stronger in the last years of PRL. Th e dismissal of Zbigniew Messner's government took place as the result of the parliamentary opposition to this government, so it can be considered as the real vote of no confi dence. The author describes also the constitutional custom, not based on the norms of the constitution, which ordered to the prime minister to declare the dismissal of his government aft er the parliamentary elections, during the fi rst session of new-elected Sejm. Usually it didn't mean important changes in the Coucil of Ministers, which was still led by the same person as the prime minister.
It is the purpose of both parts of the article to present the Prime Minister as a body subject to Sejm control. To achieve the above, an attempt has been made to characterise his legal and governmental status with the consideration given to the factors determining such status, especially those factors that are basic for the presentation of the Prime Minister and fit within the subjective and objective scope of the Sejm control over the government activity. Considerations in this respect are carried out based on the normative regulations, mainly on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland adopted on 2 April 1997.The article mainly includes the analysis of the legal and governmental status subject to Sejm control over the Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers as a chairman of the collective executive decision-making body of the Polish government, that is, the Council of Ministers. The focus has been placed on the role of the Prime Minister in shaping the make-up of the government, his power to discharge and reshuffle cabinet members and influence to consolidate the government. Subsequently, the position of the Prime Minister within the Council of Ministers was submitted to more profound analysis including the contemplation of such normative solutions crucial for this position as authority to represent the Council of Ministers, coordinate the work of the Council of Ministers ensure the implementation of policy adopted by the cabinet, define the manners of the implementation of policy of the Council of Ministers, and coordinate and control work of the cabinet members. ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako organu podlegającego kontroli sejmowej. Starano się tego dokonać przez scharakteryzowanie jego statusu prawnoustrojowego z uwzględnieniem zwłaszcza tych czynników określających ów status, które zdają się mieć najbardziej zasadnicze znaczenie dla zaprezentowania premiera "mieszczącego się" w zakresie podmiotowym i przedmiotowym sejmowej kontroli działalności rządu. Rozważania w tym zakresie prowadzone są na gruncie regulacji normatywnych, głównie Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r.W niniejszym artykule poddano analizie przede wszystkim status prawnoustrojowy podlegającego kontroli sejmowej Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako przewodniczącego kolegialnego organu egzekutywy, czyli Rady Ministrów. Skoncentrowano uwagę na roli Prezesa Rady Ministrów w kształtowaniu składu rządu oraz dokonywaniu zmian w tym składzie, a także jego wpływie na trwałość rządu. Następnie poddano głębszej analizie pozycję Prezesa Rady Ministrów w samej Radzie Ministrów, rozważając takie rozwiązania normatywne decydujące o tej pozycji, jak kompetencje do: reprezentowania przez niego Rady Ministrów, kierowania pracami Rady Ministrów, zapewnienia wykonywania polityki Rady Ministrów i określania sposobów jej wykonywania, koordynacji i kontroli pracy członków Rady Ministrów.
The aim of the article is to explain the reasons for the introduction of mediation in administrative law. Mediation is presented in the light of the Recommendation of the Committee of the Council of Ministers R (2001)9 of 5 September 2001 on Alternatives to Litigation Between Administrative Authorities and Private Parties. The adoption of this act was justified by the situation of administrative courts in the member states of the Council of Europe. The common problems in the area of justice were the excessive number of court cases, excessive formalisation of court proceedings and a dispute resolution model that would disregard solutions that could satisfy both parties to the administrative dispute. It was also stated that these problems might have a negative impact on citizens' access to justice and lead to the violation of the rights of the parties to court proceedings, referred to in Article 6 par. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The measures that may constitute an alternative to the judicial resolution of administrative disputes in the Recommendation include: internal control of administrative acts, amicable proceedings/conciliation, mediation, settlement and arbitration. This Recommendation has shaped the Polish solutions in the field of introducing alternative dispute resolution methods to administrative law. However, in the realities of the Polish legal conditions included in the Recommendation, the proposals have become an incentive to introduce only the institution of mediation. First, it became part of the court-administrative proceedings, and then it was introduced to the administrative proceedings. Currently, when after the introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure, the use of ADR methods under administrative law has again become the subject of a broader interest in the doctrine, it is worth recalling the reasons why in 2001 the Council of Europe recommended introducing alternatives to national legal orders. ; The aim of the article is to explain the reasons for the introduction of mediation in administrative law. Mediation is presented in the light of the Recommendation of the Committee of the Council of Ministers R (2001)9 of 5 September 2001 on Alternatives to Litigation Between Administrative Authorities and Private Parties. The adoption of this act was justified by the situation of administrative courts in the member states of the Council of Europe. The common problems in the area of justice were the excessive number of court cases, excessive formalisation of court proceedings and a dispute resolution model that would disregard solutions that could satisfy both parties to the administrative dispute. It was also stated that these problems might have a negative impact on citizens' access to justice and lead to the violation of the rights of the parties to court proceedings, referred to in Article 6 par. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The measures that may constitute an alternative to the judicial resolution of administrative disputes in the Recommendation include: internal control of administrative acts, amicable proceedings/conciliation, mediation, settlement and arbitration. This Recommendation has shaped the Polish solutions in the field of introducing alternative dispute resolution methods to administrative law. However, in the realities of the Polish legal conditions included in the Recommendation, the proposals have become an incentive to introduce only the institution of mediation. First, it became part of the court-administrative proceedings, and then it was introduced to the administrative proceedings. Currently, when after the introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure, the use of ADR methods under administrative law has again become the subject of a broader interest in the doctrine, it is worth recalling the reasons why in 2001 the Council of Europe recommended introducing alternatives to national legal orders.
The aim of the article is to explain the reasons for the introduction of mediation in administrative law. Mediation is presented in the light of the Recommendation of the Committee of the Council of Ministers R (2001)9 of 5 September 2001 on Alternatives to Litigation Between Administrative Authorities and Private Parties. The adoption of this act was justified by the situation of administrative courts in the member states of the Council of Europe. The common problems in the area of justice were the excessive number of court cases, excessive formalisation of court proceedings and a dispute resolution model that would disregard solutions that could satisfy both parties to the administrative dispute. It was also stated that these problems might have a negative impact on citizens' access to justice and lead to the violation of the rights of the parties to court proceedings, referred to in Article 6 par. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The measures that may constitute an alternative to the judicial resolution of administrative disputes in the Recommendation include: internal control of administrative acts, amicable proceedings/conciliation, mediation, settlement and arbitration. This Recommendation has shaped the Polish solutions in the field of introducing alternative dispute resolution methods to administrative law. However, in the realities of the Polish legal conditions included in the Recommendation, the proposals have become an incentive to introduce only the institution of mediation. First, it became part of the court-administrative proceedings, and then it was introduced to the administrative proceedings. Currently, when after the introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure, the use of ADR methods under administrative law has again become the subject of a broader interest in the doctrine, it is worth recalling the reasons why in 2001 the Council of Europe recommended introducing alternatives to national legal orders. ; 83 ; 100 ; 5
In this article the attention is paid to other roles of the Prime Minister in governmental institutions as a body subject to Sejm control, to mention only his position within the governmental administration (vis-à-vis deputy prime ministers, ministers outside cabinet, "non-governmental" organizations of state administration); position of the Prime Minister as a sole supreme body of state administration; his relations with other central bodies of state administration (President, Sejm, Supreme Audit Office). The problem of accountability of the Prime Minister to Sejm has also been contemplated.Making an attempt in both parts of the article to evaluate the influence of various factors on legal and governmental status of the Prime Minister as a body subject to Sejm control, the following has been stated: a) The Prime Minister holds a very strong position and plays a leading role within the structures and functioning mechanisms of the Council of Ministers and in relations with "non-governmental" bodies of state administration, b) position of the Prime Minister in managing the Council of Ministers, a body ranking number one within the structures of executive power and wide authority of the Prime Minister including non-legal factors result in an important role played by the Prime Minister within the entire system of the authorities of the Republic of Poland. These factors also confirm how important is Sejm control of the Prime Minister's activity for the proper implementation of the principle of separation and balance of powers. ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie innych ról ustrojowych Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako organu podlegającego kontroli sejmowej, takich jak: jego pozycja w strukturach administracji rządowej (wobec wiceprezesów Rady Ministrów, ministrów poza rządem, "pozarządowych" organów rządowej administracji); pozycja Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako jednoosobowego naczelnego organu administracji rządowej; jego relacje z innymi naczelnymi organami państwowymi (Prezydentem, Sejmem, Najwyższą Izbą Kontroli). Rozważono też problem odpowiedzialności parlamentarnej Prezesa Rady Ministrów przed Sejmem.Podejmując próbę generalnej oceny (rozważanego w częściach I i II artykułu) wpływu różnych czynników na status prawnoustrojowy Prezesa Rady Ministrów jako organu podlegającego kontroli sejmowej, stwierdzono między innymi, że: a) Prezes Rady Ministrów zajmuje bardzo silną pozycję i odgrywa wiodącą rolę w strukturach i mechanizmach funkcjonowania Rady Ministrów oraz w stosunkach z "pozarządowymi" organami rządowej administracji, b) pozycja Prezesa Rady Ministrów w kierowanej przez niego Radzie Ministrów (organie usytuowanym na pierwszym miejscu w strukturze władzy wykonawczej) oraz rozległy zakres jego kompetencji powodują, wraz z czynnikami o charakterze pozaprawnym, że to właśnie on odgrywa ważną rolę w całym systemie rządów RP. Te czynniki również przekonują, jak istotne znaczenie dla prawidłowego urzeczywistniania zasady podziału władzy i równowagi władz ma kontrola sejmowa aktywności Prezesa Rady Ministrów.
The Peoples' Councils and Local Self-Government System Act of 20 July 1983 introduced certain new elements to local administration system. Treating people's councils as organs of local self-government was one of those elements. People's councils and organs of municipal and rural residents self-government are handled in the new regulation as parts of the same organizational structure (of local self- -government system). It resulted in an increase of weight of decentralization and supervision problems in aspect of local administration. The present article contains a study of regulation pertaining to supervision excercised in three systems: 1. supervision performed upon people's councils, 2. supervision upon organs of municipal and rural self-government and 3. supervision upon administrative organs of people's councils. In the first system, supervision is performed by the Council of State (upon all councils in principle) and by voivodship (district) councils upon municipal, quarter, and rural district councils. The supervision covers control of legality of decisions and corrective means which cannot violate a principle of independence in activities. The newly introduced obligation of lending assistance to supervised organs is characteristic for a socialist state. The Polish Seym (Diet) is also obliged by the Act to take care of self-government charakter of people's councils, special means are provided for the Council of State to be used in instances of violating independence of people's councils by other organs. Supervision of rural self-government organs is trusted to rural district council and to its presidium, while supervision upon municipal self-government organs is performed by municipal (quarter) council and its presidium. Means of control are not intensive there but also the scope of affairs relegated to that self government is not substantial at least as far as decisional competence is concerned. In practice, the supervision upon organs of administration of people's councils is of a crucial importance, as those are implementing tasks of people's councils. On the central level, the supervision is divided onto various organs: Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, Minister of Administration and Region-Shaping Economy and branch ministers, what can threaten with inconsistencies in performing that function. On the voivodship level, the supervision is performed by voivodes and heads of departments of voivodship administration upon relevant organs of administration on the level of rural district, city, quarter. Yet, competence of higher level organs is differentiated subject to tasks performed by local organs of administration. In the decentralised sphere (when organs of administration act as executive organs of people's councils), means of exercised influence are those of supervision. But if those organs act in the sphere excluded from the competence of people's councils, the means are close to hierarchical subordination. That latter influence is named governance in the Act. The differentiated influence is effected by a dual role of local organs of administration since a dualistic model of local administration (self- -governmental and governmental) is rejected in the Act. ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016
Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; U schyłku 1815 r. ukonstytuowały się władze konstytucyjne Królestwa Polskiego – Rada Administracyjna i Ogólne Zgromadzenie Rady Stanu – i przystąpiły do intensywnych prac nad rozwinięciem postanowień konstytucyjnych. Za sprawę priorytetową uznano organizację komisji rządowych. Minister spraw wewnętrznych i policji Tadeusz Mostowski już na drugim posiedzeniu Rady Administracyjnej 31 grudnia 1815 r. przedstawił projekt Zasad do organizacji władz ministerialnych. Podczas dyskusji nad tym projektem, który fi nalnie nie uzyskał sankcji namiestnika i nie został skierowany do dalszych prac, obradujący ministrowie skupili się na kwestii "usamodzielnienia" radców stanu "zawiadujących" poszczególnymi wydziałami w komisjach rządowych i "ustopniowania władz". Analiza tejże debaty stanowi główny przedmiot artykułu. Podczas gdy namiestnik Józef Zajączek przeciwny był usamodzielnianiu radców stanu i dążył do koncentracji władzy administracyjnej w rękach ministrów, jego oponenci – w analizowanej debacie głównie Tadeusz Matuszewicz – opowiadali się za przyznaniem radcom stanu kierującym wydziałami większej samodzielności. Polaryzacja stanowisk w tej kwestii stanowiła preludium późniejszego sporu o kolegialność w komisjach rządowych – pierwszej ustrojowej batalii o wykładnię konstytucji Królestwa Polskiego, którą na forum Rady Stanu toczył namiestnik z większością pozostałych jej członków. ; Right at the end of 1815, the constitutional authorities of the Kingdom of Poland – Administrative Council and the General Assembly of the Council of State – were established. Soon thereaft er, they undertook some intensive work on developing constitutional provisions. Th eir priority was the organization of governmental commissions. Th e Minister of Internal Aff airs and Police, Tadeusz Mostowski presented a draft concerning the Principles of organization of ministerial authorities just at the second session of the Administrative Council, held on 31 December 1815. In the course of discussions on the draft , which ultimately was not sanctioned by the viceroy and was not submitted for further proceedings, the ministers focused on the issue of giving more autonomy to state counsellors who headed individual divisions in governmental commissions, as well as on "grading the authorities". Th e analysis of this debate is the main focus of the present article. While viceroy Józef Zajączek was against granting autonomy to state counsellors and strove for the concentration of administrative power in the hands of ministers, his opponents – mainly Tadeusz Matuszewicz advocated the idea. Th e polarization of the opinions in this matter marked the prelude to a subsequent dispute on collegiality in governmental commissions – the very fi rst battle about the interpretation of the Kingdom constitution, waged by the viceroy against the majority of its members at the Council of State.
The article discusses the process of formation of internal makret of 12 member states of the European Communities and analyses its implications for Poland. Attention was paid to the fact that European internal market is a consequence of economic integration within the Communities. In June 1985 the Commission prepared for the Council of Ministers the so-called White Paper on the implementation of internal market. Its content is very interesting, for it defines the features of internal market and contains about 300 proposals to implement internal market in various spheres. These proposals are accompanied by a detailed schedule of their realization. By the end of 1988 the Council of Ministers took about 90 decisions with respect to the internal market implementation; further steps are being discussed in working groups. The White Paper was later confirmed by Single European Acts, having the binding force of treaties. Single European Acts define the notion of internal market of member states of the Communities, proclaim the rule of qualified majority vote for decisions taken by the Council and set the deadline for a full realization of internal market for December 31, 1992. Various economic implications for Poland result from the above. It is indispensable for Polish economy to achieve a certain degree of convergence with the economies of member states of the Communities. In order to accomplish it, deep reforms of the structure of economy and management are necessary. The article indicates main directions of reforms and ways of carrying them out. It is a very demanding task for the Polish economic policy. Otherwise, Poland would find itself outside the economic relations with the Communities. Therefore, the article is against "emergency" reforms and instead postulates the realization of far-reaching reforms which would take into account the changes on the economic map of Europe. ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016
Archives occupy a special place in academic research. The aim of the paper is to present sources for research on the functioning of the Regency Council in the resources of the Archives of New Records in Warsaw (AAN). The documentation collected in the AAN is dispersed (it is stored in several archival units: the Civil Cabinet of the Regency Council, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Provisioning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and private files) and most often complements each other. The aforementioned documents allow for the presentation of both the organization of governments, their personnel, as well as the analysis of the "governing process" and the connections between the Regency Council and subordinate institutions, social organizations, and the occupation authorities.
The Governments of the Kingdom of Poland ( 1917–1918 ). Members and modes of functioningThe process of restoration of the Kingdom of Poland was started by the Act of 5th November 1916, issued by the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary (after pushing out the Russian army from Polish territory and establishing the Regency Council). The foundations of Polish state administration were laid by the Regency Council through establishing Polish governments with Prime Ministers. The competencies of the government were delineated by the Act of 3rd January 1918 "about the temporary organization of the head authorities in the Kingdom of Poland". The act differentiated the executive power into the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministry and the Ministers themselves. The scope of Prime Minister's duties was defined the Patent of 12th September 1917 and the act of 03th January 1918. Neither of the documents made it clear, however, what authority, and according to what procedure, should appoint the Prime Minister. The new government was approved by the Regency Council only as requested by the already appointed Prime Minister. For sure it highlighted the independency of the "Ministers' President" from the rest of the government, whose work he supervised. During the time of the Regency Council five cabinets were established, including two provisional governments. Evaluating the cabinets, it should be highlighted that the cabinet of Jan Kucharzewski was the one which actively sought practical experience in managing the Council of Ministry, which later was used by their successors. Their other big achievement was preparation of a lot of projects of legal acts necessary for the development of the new Polish State. The cabinet of Jan Steczkowski continued this process, but after establishing the Council of State in June 1918 (whose role was overestimated) it slowed down in its work of overtaking the successive parts of country administration, and instead started establishing diplomatic offices, which turned out nothing but a faint attempt to show the illusory independency of the Kingdom of Poland. The cabinet of Józef Świeżyński struggled to demonstrate the independency of the Polish government in front of the German and Austrian governments, trying even to distance itself from the Regency Council. It is worth emphasizing the intense work of the provisional governments on taking over the state issues by Polish political subjects. Even though the possibilities of the first cabinets were very limited, they did establish the beginnings of Polish regular state administration and in this way educated the regular state administration officers for the future Polish State.
In the article the author has analyzed the public administration competent for security policy, centered under the aegis of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers itself. By reviewing the most important legal acts, and based on texts were included the competences and tasks of the institutions established to protect the life and health of citizens of the Republic of Poland, during the time of warand peace. Leaning at scientific journals author described the main functions of institutions that support government and the prime minister in the security policy. By making analysis and based on the descriptions, author reveals changes in the process of creating of institutions protecting internal and external security together under the umbrella of government activity as executive power. ; W ramach artykułu autor dokonał analizy organów administracji publicznej właściwej w sprawach polityki bezpieczeństwa, skupionej pod egidą Prezesa Rady Ministrów i samej Rady Ministrów. Dokonując przeglądu najważniejszych aktów prawnych oraz bazując na tekstach źródłowych, ujęte zostały główne kompetencje i zadania instytucji mających na celu ochronę życia i zdrowia obywateli Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej zarówno w okresie wojny, jak i pokoju. Wspierając się publikacjami ciągłymi, autor określił główne funkcje organów powołanych do wsparcia rządu i instytucji premiera w polityce bezpieczeństwa. Dokonując analizy oraz opierając się na deskrypcji, autor wyszczególnia zmiany w budowaniu i formułowaniu organów chroniących bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne skupionych pod parasolem działalności rządu jako władzy wykonawczej.
On the political-legal plane, the direct consequence of the May coup organized by Józef Piłsudski in 1926 was an amendment of the March constitution of 1921. The above amendment was commonly referred to as the August amendment from the name of the month in which the two laws changing the constitution had been passed (2 August 1926). The core of the August amendment consisted in a strengthening of the position of the executive organs of the state at the expense of the Diet and the senate. The president obtained the right to dissolve parliament before the end of its term, following the motion of the ministers' council. Moreover, the president obtained the prerogatives to pass resolutions with the power of parliamentary laws and obtained new budgetary prerogatives. Parliament, on the other hand, became restricted as regards its powers to pass a no confidence vote towards the Ministers' Council or any individual minister. The political conceptions implemented by the interwar government aimed at doing away with the principle of a tri-partite division of state power in favor of a concentration of power in the hands of the state's president. The above conception had been fully realized in the new constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1935.
