Suchergebnisse

par Gabriel Naudé. Avecque les reflexions historiques, morales, chrétiennes et politiques de L.D.M.C.S.D.S.E.D.M. . ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: Regensburg, Staatliche Bibliothek -- 999/Jur.833

In Africa coup plots are by far the most common challenge to the continuity of regimes. In this paper we investigate proneness to coups by drawing on our previous work on proneness to civil war. The most striking aspect of our results is the similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars. Standard indicators of grievance such as political repression and economic inequality do not feature as significant influences. A common core of economic factors underpins proneness to coups and civil wars: low income and a lack of growth. Both are also subject to 'traps' – once a coup or civil war has occurred, further events are much more likely. We have attempted to investigate whether policies that favor the military reduce the risk of coups, but have found that if anything, their effect is perverse: high military spending may even increase the risk of a coup.

In Africa coup plots are by far the most common challenge to the continuity of regimes. In this paper we investigate proneness to coups by drawing on our previous work on proneness to civil war. The most striking aspect of our results is the similarity in the causes of coups and civil wars. Standard indicators of grievance such as political repression and economic inequality do not feature as significant influences. A common core of economic factors underpins proneness to coups and civil wars: low income and a lack of growth. Both are also subject to 'traps' – once a coup or civil war has occurred, further events are much more likely. We have attempted to investigate whether policies that favor the military reduce the risk of coups, but have found that if anything, their effect is perverse: high military spending may even increase the risk of a coup.

The Basotho nation and its proto state came into being in the first half of the 19th centmy. In 1868 the territory became the colonial possession of the British Crown. As a colonial possession, Britain entrenched its colonial policies in a newly acquired territoiy. Its loss of political sovereignty and indigenous independencewas implicit in the Annexation Proclamation which declared that "the said tribe of the Basotho shall be, and shall be taken to be to all intents and pmposes British subjects, and the territoiy of the said tribe shall be, and shall be taken to be British territory". Bringing the Basotho under British subjugation meant an end to and the amelioration of the communal practices and the beliefs of the Basotho. As British subjects, the Basotho had to conform to the voice of the new masters. This conformity was emphasised in the churches, schools and communal assemblies (Lipitsong) under the supervision of the British officials. Some chiefs collaboratedwith the new rulers to suppress possible insurrection among the Basotho.

There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.

Coups d'état have occurred around the world since time immemorial but have been more commonplace amongst African states. They have typically yielded bloodshed and instability and, they inevitably culminate in the gross violation of the most basic human rights. They also arguably constitute a perennial threat in the politics of African states and, they have been condemned in numerous instances. Such condemnation brings to the fore, questions as to international law's position on coups d'état. In light of International law placing a high premium on the doctrine of national sovereignty, it is tempting to conclude that coups d'état are beyond the scope of international law thus not being proscribed. This position is further strengthened by the absence of international treaties/conventions proscribing coups d'état. It can, however, be argued that the recognition given to the notion of democracy by some treaties/conventions such as the UDHR, CEDAW, and ICCPR, may amount to an implicit proscription of coups d'état under international law. There is also, a right to democracy, along with a proscription of coups d'état under customary international law as reflected by state practice. African states, being specially affected by the scourge of coups d'état, have played a leading role in the development of the customary international law proscription of coups d'état. Regardless of it being difficult for state responsibility to ensue, coups d'état constitute wrongful acts at international law.

This essay argues that the so called "politic laicization" is inseparable of a State sacralization and that this is, at the beginning of the Modern Age, the political "mystery" in itself. To prove so, "Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État" (1639), by Gabriel Naudé, will be explored in the light of some of Ernst H. Kantorowicz's recitals. It will be shown that the political actions carried out in the name of the "Mysteries of State" are no more and no less than the Prince's coups d'État. These actions reveal the mysteries just by fulfilling them. State secret, or even better, the secrecy and mystery in the theological dimension of a modern "absolute State" is, in fact, the sacredness of the State. Accordingly, coup d'État as Naudé defines it – a genuine secret of State – expresses the sacred sphere of the "Mysteries of State". ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Mode of access: Internet. ; "Epitre" signed: L.D.M. (L.DuMay) conseiller secr`etaire de Steur de Mayence. cf.Brit.Mus.cat.

We provide evidence that political instability deteriorates economic growth. We establish this result based on panel difference-in-differences strategies and dynamic panel data models using a large sample of 180 countries, a novel geocoded dataset for 2,660 regions, and micro data for about 250,000 households. We exploit coups d'état as a source of exogenous variation in political instability, as they are difficult to anticipate, mirror the political zeitgeist, and reduce measurement error. We use spatial variations and synthetic control methods for identification and find that periods of instability reduce growth by 2-3 percentage points, increase unemployment, and impair health and life satisfaction.

Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Bibl.Mont. 4612

Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Pol.g. 688

We provide evidence that political instability deteriorates economic growth. We establish this result based on panel difference-in-differences strategies and dynamic panel data models using a large sample of 180 countries, a novel geocoded dataset for 2,660 regions, and micro data for about 250,000 households. We exploit coups d'état as a source of exogenous variation in political instability, as they are difficult to anticipate, mirror the political zeitgeist, and reduce measurement error. We use spatial variations and synthetic control methods for identification and find that periods of instability reduce growth by 2-3 percentage points, increase unemployment, and impair health and life satisfaction. The adverse effects are stronger for women than for men.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.

Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.