Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.
In the early morning hours after the July 15, 2016 Turkish military coup, Turkish President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan FaceTimed in to CNNTürk to issue an apparently desperate call for Turkish citizens to occupy city squares and "defend democracy." Erdoğan's call was loudly repeated by Islamic calls to prayer from muezzins synchronized nationwide via text message. Hearing these calls, thousands of Turks ventured out and collectively reclaimed urban streets and squares for Erdoğan's government. This paper examines the process by which Islamic calls to prayer forged Turkish citizens into a unisonous body that claimed and transformed secular urban spaces, initiating an epochal neo-Ottoman shift in Turkish politics. I engage with this process via a hybrid virtual-physical ethnographic site derived from coup resistance, treating YouTube videos and contemporary Turkish media as both windows into on-the-ground resistance and sites at which Turks negotiate their political subjectivity. To unpack the role of sacred sound and affective embodiment in leading coup resistance and transforming space (Hirschkind 2006; Massey 2005; Thrift 2009), I employ Turino's theories of Peircean semiotics and participatory music making. I argue that Islamic calls to prayer-led resistance not only turns the tables on the repressive sonic regimes of Republican Turkey, but also challenges understanding of twenty-first century nationalisms rising in the twittersphere. In the early hours of July 16, 2016, Facetime and text message laid the foundations, but it was Islamic calls to prayer resounding in streets and squares that forged citizens into a unisonous body capable of transforming secular urban space and the future of Turkish politics.
Over the last several decades, both economists and political scientists have shown interest in coups d'état. Numerous studies have been dedicated to understanding the causes of coups. However, model uncertainty still looms large. About one hundred potential determinants of coups have been proposed, but no consensus has emerged on an established baseline model for analyzing coups. We address this problem by testing the sensitivity of inferences to over three million model permutations in an extreme bounds analysis. Overall, we test the robustness of 66 factors proposed in the empirical literature based on a monthly sample of 164 countries that covers the years 1952 to 2011. We find that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups.
In a general framework of migrations motivated by different causes (socioeconomic, political, military, etc.), this article analyzes the effects produced in Athens by the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404, understood as two peculiar situations that combine political conflicts within the citizen community with population displacement and exiles. ; En un marco general de migraciones motivadas por diferentes causas (socioeconómicas, políticas, militares, etc.), en este artículo se analizan los efectos que producen en Atenas los golpes oligárquicos de 411 y 404, entendidos como dos situaciones peculiares que combinan los conflictos políticos dentro de la comunidad ciudadana con desplazamientos de población y exilios.
There is a strong temptation to take the metaphor of "coup d'état" too seriously and follow it up by showing that it is not all that accurate. Normally we speak of a coup d'état, at least in a democratic setting, when there is an illegitimate capture of the existing power structures by a group that has no mandate (normally, electoral) to rule. So the coup d'état used in its proper locus, that is, in the description of the political power-capture, has both normative and descriptive content: (1) normatively, it has usually a condemnatory color; (2) descriptively, it identifies a change of the ruling group within more-or-less unchanged authority structures. None of these ingredients applies to the intriguing and thought-provoking analysis offered by Alec Stone Sweet: (1) juridical coups d'état are clearly not condemned by him: at least he tells us that his analysis is purely descriptive rather than normative; (2) juridical coups d'état result in fundamentally altered authority structures: indeed, it is, for Stone Sweet, their main definitional feature. So taken pedantically, the metaphor of coup d'état is singularly inadequate for Stone Sweet's purposes.
L'offensiva sul palazzo presidenziale (La Moneda) a Santiago del Cile del Martedì 11 Settembre del 1973 pose la fine ad una delle tradizioni democratiche più lunghe della regione. Aprì la strada alle politiche (intese come "policies") e linee guida concepite e sviluppate dai cosiddetti "Chicago boys", economisti cileni seguaci di Milton Friedman. E tutto questo all'insegna di uno spietato regno di terrore fascista – un regno che portò all'esecuzione di migliaia di persone che si dichiararono o furono semplicemente sospettate di essere di sinistra. ; peer-reviewed
This is a comparative study of military coups in Africa south of the Sahara between 1958 and 1980. The study is divided into three parts. The first part deals with some different theories found in literature concerning coups d'état on a more general level. The second part is an empirical review concentrating on the justifications given by the military leaders for their interventions. The third part is an attempt to compare the explanations given by the researchers in Part one with the justifications presented in Part two. ; Contents: Part I. Diverse Attempts to Explain Military Intervention in Politics -- 1. Military Rule -- 2. Explanations Connected with Foreign Interests and Foreign Influence -- 3. Explanations Connected with Societal Conditions -- 4. Explanations Connected with Government-Military Relations -- 5. Explanations Connected with Intramilitary Conditions -- 6. Explanations Connected with Individual Perspectives -- Part II. Empirical Presentation and Typology -- 7. Various Justifications -- 8. Different Types of Coups -- 9. Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa -- Part III. Attempts by the Military to Explain Their Involvement in Politics -- 10. Foreign Interests and Foreign Influence -- 11. Societal Conditions -- 12. Government-Military Relations -- 13. Intramilitary professionalism -- 14. Individual Perspectives
In: Albrecht , H & Eibl , F 2018 , ' How to Keep Officers in the Barracks? Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups ' , INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY , vol. 62 , no. 2 , pp. 315–328 . https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx085
What are the most efficient strategies to prevent coups d'état? The answer depends on whether the coup is attempted by elite officers or by lower ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities to perpetrate a coup. As a result, the success of coup-proofing critically depends on coup agency. Using original data on coup agency, public spending and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find counter-balancing and higher shares of defense spending to be effective for preventing elite officer coups. Combat officer coups are best prevented by increasing social spending. Political liberalization has an ambivalent effect on military agents, decreasing coup risk for combat officer, but making elite officer coups more likely. Our findings suggest the necessity to differentiate between specific coup types and rethink coups as purely elite-led power grabs to fully explore the rationale of junior coup plotters.
Armies have recurrently intervened in politics by leading (or giving support to) coups d'état. Several authors suggest that civilian governments have used military spending to overcome armies' grievances and avoid their insubordination. However, recent quantitative analyses do not reach conclusive results when exploring the impact of total military expenditure on the frequency and the success of coups d'état. We argue that total military spending might not be a good indicator of governments' effort to gain the loyalty of the army, as it may conceal relevant changes in the composition of the military budget. This paper aims to open the military spending 'black box'. While total military spending does not seem to have any relationship with the frequency of coups, payments to officers (along with other coup-proofing strategies) appears to be associated to a lower frequency of coups in 1850-1915 Spain.
In: Bjørnskov , C & Rode , M 2020 , ' Regime types and regime change : A new dataset on democracy, coups, and political institutions ' , Review of International Organizations , vol. 15 , no. 2 , pp. 531-551 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09345-1
Social scientists have created a variety of datasets in recent years that quantify political regimes, but these often provide little data on phases of regime transitions. Our aim is to contribute to filling this gap, by providing an update and expansion of the Democracy-Dictatorship data by Cheibub et al. (Public Choice, 143, 67–101, 2010), originally introduced by Alvarez et al. (Studies in Comparative International Development, 31(2), 3–36, 1996), where we add the following three features: First, we expand coverage to a total of 192 sovereign countries and 16 currently self-governing territories between 1950 and 2018, including periods under colonial rule for more than ninety entities. Second, we provide more institutional details that are deemed of importance in the relevant literature. Third, we include a new, self-created indicator of successful and failed coups d'état, which is currently the most complete of its kind. We further illustrate the usefulness of the new dataset by documenting the importance of political institutions under colonial rule for democratic development after independence, making use of our much more detailed data on colonial institutions. Findings indicate that more participatory colonial institutions have a positive and lasting effect for democratic development after transition to independence.
Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'nın en eski ve büyük medeniyetlerinden biri olan Mısır, sahip olduğu verimli Nil topraklarıyla, zengin petrol ve doğalgaz kaynaklarına yakınlığıyla, Afrika ve Asya kıtalarını birbirine bağlayan yollar üzerinde stratejik bir konuma sahiptir. Ayrıca Arap ülkeleri içinde üçüncü, Afrika kıtasında ise ikinci büyük ekonomiye sahip olan Mısır, önemli bir deniz ticaret yolu olan Süveyş Kanalı ile Asya ve Avrupa ticaretinin kavşak noktasında bulunmaktadır.Beş yüz yıllık ortak dini ve tarihi mirasa sahip olan Mısır ve Türkiye köklü ekonomik ve toplumsal bağlarla ilişkilerini bugüne kadar sürdürmüştür. Türkiye ve Mısır ilişkileri dünya ve özellikle bölgedeki siyasi ve ekonomik gelişmelere göre şekillenmiştir. Türkiye'deki 1980 askeri darbesinden sonraki dönemde gelişmeye başlayan Türkiye ve Mısır siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkileri 2000'lı yıllarda hız kazanmıştır. Dünyada siyasi ve ekonomik etkiye sahip olan güçlerin bölgeye müdahalesiyle Türkiye ve Mısır ilişkileri olumsuz etkilenmesine rağmen ticari ilişkiler gelişmektedir.Tez üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde; Türkiye'nin coğrafi yapısı, tarihi, siyasi, idari ve sosyal yapısı, ekonomik yapısı ve ticareti değerlendirilmiştir. İkinci bölümde; Mısır'ın coğrafi yapısı, tarihi, siyasi, idari ve sosyal yapısı, ekonomik yapısı ve ticareti değerlendirilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde ise; Türkiye'nin ve Mısır'ın dış ticaret verileri, ithalat ve ihracat yaptıkları ülkeler, başlıca ithalat ve ihracat yaptığı ürünler, Avrupa Birliği ve Orta Doğu ülkeleriyle ekonomik ilişkileri, kendi aralarında yapmış oldukları Anlaşma ve Protokoller, 2008 – 2017 yılları arasında Mısır ve Türkiye ticari ilişkileri, kendi aralarında yaptıkları ticarette yaşanan sorunlar, 2013 Askeri Darbe Öncesi ve Sonrası Türkiye ve Mısır Arasındaki Ticaretin Karşılaştırması ile ilişkilerde son durum başlığı yer almaktadır. --- Egypt, one of the oldest and largest civilizations of the Middle East and North Africa, has a strategic position on the roads connecting Africa and Asia with its fertile Nile lands and rich oil and natural gas resources. Egypt, which is the third largest in the Arab countries and the second largest in the African continent, is located at the crossroads of Asian and European trade with the Suez Canal, an important maritime trade route.Five hundred years of common religious and historical heritage having relations with Egypt and Turkey deep-rooted economic and social ties has continued until today. Turkey and Egypt relationship has been shaped by political and economic developments in the world and in particular regions. To develop in the period after the 1980 military coup in Turkey, Turkey and Egypt began political and economic relations have gained momentum in the 2000s. With the intervention of the forces that have political and economic influence in the world, Turkey and Egypt relations are developing commercial relations, although adversely affected.The thesis consists of three parts. In the first chapter; geographical structure of Turkey, historical, political, administrative and social structure, economic structure and trade are evaluated. In the second part; Egypt's geographical structure, historical, political, administrative and social structure, economic structure and trade have been evaluated. In the third section; Turkey and Egypt's foreign trade data, imports and exports and countries of major import and export his products, economic relations with the European Union and Middle East countries, their agreement they have made with each other and Protocols, between 2008 - 2017, Egypt and Turkey trade relations, the problems experienced in their trade among themselves, Before and After the 2013 military coup in Turkey, and Egypt's relations with the comparison between trade is the last state title.
A coup d'état is an illegal attempt by military or civilian officials to replace the incumbent leadership by force. However, it is sometimes difficult to define a "coup d'état. The term has been used by many analysts to refer to violent political actions in fact (e.g., the invasion of the Capitol in Washington) or in public expressions of the military to change domestic security policy in order to safeguard national unity. In many countries, often developing and African, "Coups d'Etats" are more frequent, notably because on the one hand the institutions are not yet sufficiently strong and on the other hand the economic and social conditions of these countries do not fail to raise problems of daily life that produce popular discontent. The national economy of the countries concerned suffers more or less strong consequences at the end of a coup d'état, depending on the damping power exercised by multinational firms, the inertia of national economic actors or the appearance of internal conflicts (civil war) or economic sanctions by the international community. ; Un Coup d'Etat exprime une tentative illégale de militaires ou de responsables civils de remplacer aux dirigeants en place par utilisant la force. Cependant, il est parfois difficile de définir un « Coup d'Etat ». Ce qualificatif a été utilisé par de nombreux analystes concernant des actions politiques violentes dans les faits (envahissement du Capitole à Washington) ou dans les expressions publiques des militaires pour changer la politique intérieure de sécurité en vue de sauvegarder l'unité nationale. Dans de nombreux pays, souvent en développement et africains, les « Coups d'Etats » sont plus fréquents, notamment parce que d'une part les institutions ne sont pas encore suffisamment fortes et d'autre part les conditions économiques et sociales de ces pays ne manquent pas de soulever des problèmes de vie quotidienne qui produit un mécontentement populaire. L'économie nationale des pays concernés subit des conséquences plus ou moins fortes à l'issue d'un ...
A coup d'état is an illegal attempt by military or civilian officials to replace the incumbent leadership by force. However, it is sometimes difficult to define a "coup d'état. The term has been used by many analysts to refer to violent political actions in fact (e.g., the invasion of the Capitol in Washington) or in public expressions of the military to change domestic security policy in order to safeguard national unity. In many countries, often developing and African, "Coups d'Etats" are more frequent, notably because on the one hand the institutions are not yet sufficiently strong and on the other hand the economic and social conditions of these countries do not fail to raise problems of daily life that produce popular discontent. The national economy of the countries concerned suffers more or less strong consequences at the end of a coup d'état, depending on the damping power exercised by multinational firms, the inertia of national economic actors or the appearance of internal conflicts (civil war) or economic sanctions by the international community. ; Un Coup d'Etat exprime une tentative illégale de militaires ou de responsables civils de remplacer aux dirigeants en place par utilisant la force. Cependant, il est parfois difficile de définir un « Coup d'Etat ». Ce qualificatif a été utilisé par de nombreux analystes concernant des actions politiques violentes dans les faits (envahissement du Capitole à Washington) ou dans les expressions publiques des militaires pour changer la politique intérieure de sécurité en vue de sauvegarder l'unité nationale. Dans de nombreux pays, souvent en développement et africains, les « Coups d'Etats » sont plus fréquents, notamment parce que d'une part les institutions ne sont pas encore suffisamment fortes et d'autre part les conditions économiques et sociales de ces pays ne manquent pas de soulever des problèmes de vie quotidienne qui produit un mécontentement populaire. L'économie nationale des pays concernés subit des conséquences plus ou moins fortes à l'issue d'un ...
A coup d'état is an illegal attempt by military or civilian officials to replace the incumbent leadership by force. However, it is sometimes difficult to define a "coup d'état. The term has been used by many analysts to refer to violent political actions in fact (e.g., the invasion of the Capitol in Washington) or in public expressions of the military to change domestic security policy in order to safeguard national unity. In many countries, often developing and African, "Coups d'Etats" are more frequent, notably because on the one hand the institutions are not yet sufficiently strong and on the other hand the economic and social conditions of these countries do not fail to raise problems of daily life that produce popular discontent. The national economy of the countries concerned suffers more or less strong consequences at the end of a coup d'état, depending on the damping power exercised by multinational firms, the inertia of national economic actors or the appearance of internal conflicts (civil war) or economic sanctions by the international community. ; Un Coup d'Etat exprime une tentative illégale de militaires ou de responsables civils de remplacer aux dirigeants en place par utilisant la force. Cependant, il est parfois difficile de définir un « Coup d'Etat ». Ce qualificatif a été utilisé par de nombreux analystes concernant des actions politiques violentes dans les faits (envahissement du Capitole à Washington) ou dans les expressions publiques des militaires pour changer la politique intérieure de sécurité en vue de sauvegarder l'unité nationale. Dans de nombreux pays, souvent en développement et africains, les « Coups d'Etats » sont plus fréquents, notamment parce que d'une part les institutions ne sont pas encore suffisamment fortes et d'autre part les conditions économiques et sociales de ces pays ne manquent pas de soulever des problèmes de vie quotidienne qui produit un mécontentement populaire. L'économie nationale des pays concernés subit des conséquences plus ou moins fortes à l'issue d'un ...
