Suchergebnisse

TheAugust 1983 overthrow of Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo by Captain Thomas Sankara in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), the New Year's Eve abrupt termination in Nigeria of Black Africa's largest multi-party democracy, and the decision by the Guinean army in April 1984 to remove their party leaders after the death of President Sékou Touré, illustrate two of the most salient realities of contemporary African politics: (1) militarycoups d'étatare the principal form of régime change, and (2) they can happen under any type of political system–a functioning democracy, a personalistic civilian dictatorship, or an already existing military junta.1

Early studies of African coups have largely focused on domestic determinants such as social mobilization, economic conditions, and the characteristics of the military itself. Scant attention has been paid to the political effects of arms transfers on military intervention in Africa. Considering that defense spending may meet the demands of the armed forces, absorb vital social and economic resources needed for development, retard the growth of the civilian domestic product, or strengthen the political position of the military, it is likely that expenditures on arms imports may directly or indirectly affect the likelihood of coups in sub-Saharan African countries. Utilizing theories of arms transfers and coups d'état, a causal model was constructed and data were collected for 35 African nations. An event-count analysis in conjunction with conventional regression techniques was employed for statistical estimation. The findings suggest that arms transfers serve to meet the military's corporate interests and have a long-term direct effect on reducing the likelihood of coups in Africa. However, arms transfers contribute to African regime instability indirectly by enhancing the military's position vis-a-vis civilian institutions in society. Former French colonies have experienced significantly fewer coups than the rest of Africa, but throughout sub-Saharan Africa, countries that experienced an economic downturn or a coup are more likely to have military intervention in politics.

Abstract
This essay responds to recent critiques of the U.S. State Department's inconsistent application of congressionally mandated foreign-aid restrictions following several successful coups d'état in countries receiving USAID foreign assistance. This demographic analysis, which conforms to an age-structural modeling and forecasting protocol that was originally developed for U.S. strategic intelligence efforts, finds: (1.) a disproportionately high level of coup vulnerability (the probability of experiencing a successful coup) among youthful countries (median age equal to or less than 25.5 years), particularly among states in the early-youthful segment of this phase (median age equal to or less than 20.5 years); and (2.) a dramatic one-time decline in coup vulnerability among all phases of the age-structural transition following the end of the Cold War. This essay's two-decade forecast of an expected gradual decline in coups is consistent with the slow and halting pace of age-structural change that is currently projected by the 2022 revision of the UN Population Division's medium scenario for countries along the equatorial midriff of Africa, and in parts of the Middle East and southcentral Asia. These findings support an alternative criticism – not of the U.S. State Department's reluctance to restrict foreign assistance to coup perpetrators, but of currently mandated restrictions that neglect to exempt USAID programs known to advance the age-structural transition (i.e. those that extend girls' educational attainment, improve access to family planning and other reproductive health services, or expand women's autonomy and rights).

There is a burgeoning literature on how to deal with populism in advanced liberal democracies, which puts a strong emphasis on legalist and pluralist methods. There is also a new and expanding literature that looks at the consequences of coups d'état for democracies by employing large-N data sets. These two recent literatures, however, do not speak to one another, based on the underlying assumption that coups against populists were a distinctly twentieth-century Latin American phenomenon. Yet the cases of Venezuela in 2002, Thailand in 2006 and Turkey in 2016 show that anti-populist coups have also occurred in the twenty-first century. Focussing on these cases, the article enquires about the extent to which military coups succeed against populists. The main finding is that although anti-populist coups may initially take over the government, populism survives in the long run. Thus, anti-populist coups fail in their own terms and they do not succeed in eradicating populism. In fact, in the aftermath of a coup, populism gains further legitimacy against what it calls repressive elites, while possibilities for democratisation are further eroded. This is because populists tap into existing socio-cultural divides and politically mobilise the hitherto underrepresented sectors in their societies that endure military interventions.

This book examines the responsibility of judges of domestic courts following unconstitutional usurpation of power of government (coups d'tat). It explores judges' liability for failing to discharge their judicial duty independently and impartially, and the criminality of usurpers and their accomplices and collaborators for their violation of fundamental rights and freedoms or commission of crimes of international concern. Written by a highly regarded non-Western author, the book is coherent and meticulously researched, covering an approach to coups in an insightful and fascinating fashion. It includes a sophisticated and thorough analysis of the relevant comparative jurisprudence of domestic and international courts, with concrete examples of the best practices among decisions of domestic courts in countries that have experienced coups d'tat. With an increasing global interest in the phenomenon of coups, democratic backsliding and the place and role of the judiciary as the only hope to rein in acts of unconstitutional usurpation of power, the book will be essential reading for members of the legal profession, those cherishing democracy as well as students and researchers in constitutional law, law and political science, public international law, international human rights law, international criminal law, regime changes, transitional justice and international organizations.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- List of Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- Overview -- Scope of this book -- Modus operandi of unconstitutional usurpation of power -- Judges' roles in unconstitutional usurpation of power -- Practical challenges -- Methodological and related normative questions -- 2 Legal bases to assess the lawfulness of unconstitutional usurpation of power -- Legal bases used to validate coups -- Legal bases used to invalidate coups -- Concluding remarks -- 3 Permissible parameters for judges in post-coup suppression of fundamental rights and freedoms -- International conventions and rules of customary international law on the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms -- States of emergency and derogation of fundamental rights and freedoms -- Military tribunals -- Law enforcement measures -- Refusal to render judgments on 'political questions' -- Concluding remarks -- 4 Availability or non-availability of defences for judges in relation to judicial responsibility post-coups -- Individual criminal responsibility arising from judges' roles in an oppressive regime -- Independence of judiciary and allegiance to the new 'constitutional' order -- Superior orders -- Duress -- Judicial immunity -- Concluding remarks -- 5 Amnesties, pardons, immunities and other restrictions on the prosecution of usurpers of power and their accomplices or collaborators -- Amnesties, pardons and immunities -- Statutes of limitations -- Transitional justice -- A right balance -- Concluding remarks -- 6 International or extra-territorial criminal prosecution of coups-related crimes of international concern -- Prosecution before the International Criminal Court, ad hoc international tribunals and hybrid courts -- Prosecution in foreign courts exercising universal jurisdiction -- 7 Epilogue -- Index.

Coups d'état have occurred around the world since time immemorial but have been more commonplace amongst African states. They have typically yielded bloodshed and instability and, they inevitably culminate in the gross violation of the most basic human rights. They also arguably constitute a perennial threat in the politics of African states and, they have been condemned in numerous instances. Such condemnation brings to the fore, questions as to international law's position on coups d'état. In light of International law placing a high premium on the doctrine of national sovereignty, it is tempting to conclude that coups d'état are beyond the scope of international law thus not being proscribed. This position is further strengthened by the absence of international treaties/conventions proscribing coups d'état. It can, however, be argued that the recognition given to the notion of democracy by some treaties/conventions such as the UDHR, CEDAW, and ICCPR, may amount to an implicit proscription of coups d'état under international law. There is also, a right to democracy, along with a proscription of coups d'état under customary international law as reflected by state practice. African states, being specially affected by the scourge of coups d'état, have played a leading role in the development of the customary international law proscription of coups d'état. Regardless of it being difficult for state responsibility to ensue, coups d'état constitute wrongful acts at international law.

We present a model of coups in autocracies. Assuming that policy choices cannot be observed but are correlated with the short‐run performance of the economy we find that: (a) the threat of a coup disciplines autocrats; (b) coups are more likely in recessions; (c) increasing per capita income has an ambiguous effect on the probability of a coup. The implications of the model are consistent with the evidence. On average, one recession in the previous year increases the probability of a coup attempt by 47 percent. By contrast, the effect of the level of per capita income is weak.

How do dictators coup-proof their armed forces from within the barracks? Coup-proofing is an important aspect of autocratic survival, but execution can be challenging due to the secrecy of plots and the vast size of the armed forces. Counterbalanced state security forces are more effective at resisting coups, but less effective at noticing signs of plots before they can be launched. If dictators wish to prevent coup attempts from occurring in the first place, they may decide to recruit and commission cadres of loyalists directly into the armed forces as political officers, tasked with monitoring for and reporting signs of disloyalty within the ranks. This article explores the development and use of these political officers within dictatorships, arguing that they are especially effective at preventing coup attempts. It also makes the case that their institutional design, while effective at detecting coup plots, makes them less useful at resisting coups that have reached the execution phase. I test these arguments on a cross-national sample of dictatorships from 1950 to 2010, finding strong evidence that political officers are incredibly effective coup detectors, but not coup resisters. These findings have important implications, particularly as several resilient modern dictatorships continue to rule with well-developed political officer systems.