Kant's concept of "perpetual peace" is the cornerstone of the rational human right that, in the form of international law, bears upon all states. However, the prerequisite for enduring international legal security & peace is that the internal affairs of states are based on constitutional & republican principles. Although Kant is clearly aware of the antinomies & paradoxes of a world league of states, he nevertheless postulates the ideal of a world league of republican states, since it corresponds to the general striving of nature & moral consciousness; such a league would guarantee a relatively peaceful coexistence among the states, based on international legal precepts. Hegel has often (& wrongfully) been accused of being an apologist of war; in fact, he only realized (having in mind the realities of sovereign national states) the inevitability of multilateral conflicts -- including military ones. His disproval of Kant's ideal of a league of states is based on his disbelief in the feasibility of supranational law, which should be superior to the absolute sovereignty of the state & keep an eye on & contain its partial interests. Adapted from the source document.
Historical precedents & a host of international documents -- from Daniel Webster's speech on the Caroline Affair of 1837 to the 1949 Geneva Convention & recent UN Security Council resolutions -- are perused to take a legal stand on the 1999 NATO intervention against Serbia to stop the Kosovo genocide. A distinction is made between humanitarian intervention, humanitarian relief action, & the right of a sovereign state to intervene abroad to protect the life of its citizens. It is opined that there is no international law granting states the right to take a military action on behalf of citizens of another state. However, a set of rules of action in exceptional circumstances sanctioning a military humanitarian intervention is established, outlining a scenario where such an intervention would be legal. It is pointed out that the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo met the criteria & satisfied the conditions necessary for a lawful humanitarian intervention, & the NATO military action should be viewed as such. Adapted from the source document.
The authors of this text consider the third form of representation developed in the medieval doctrine of corporation, the so-called identity or pars pro toto representation. It concerns a relationship in which a part of the corporation -- council, assembly, or some members -- is considered identical to the whole body of the corporation in terms of its activity. The main purpose of identity representation is to mediate the idea of legal unity of corporation with the multitude of its members or parts of which it consists: by the act of representation different parts of the corporation form its legal unity at the moment of reaching decisions. Unlike in agency representation, the position of the representative is thus not the consequence of authorisation or of the transfer of power of action by those represented: the representative and the represented are not two separate legal entities; rather, it is considered that with the action of its "elevated" part, the corporation acts by itself. The text presents three fundamental subtypes of identity representation: Marsilius of Padua's valentior pars, rendering majority decisions on issues concerning the corporation as a whole, and a permanent representative body. Special attention is given to the Conciliar Movement in which identity representation played an important part, and to the first association of representation through identity with the idea of authorisation in the thought of Nicholas of Cues. The text looks into estate assemblies of German Lander (provinces) in the period prior to the French Revolution as an example of historic institutionalisation of identity representation. Adapted from the source document.
The author shows the importance of Hobbes' political thought in formulating the modern state. His contractual argument did not become obsolete as his scientific method. Hobbes breaks from the Aristotelian & natural rights tradition, or rather, he gives the concept of natural right an entirely new meaning. In this context the state of nature, contract & state are logical constructs, & not concepts in direct causal relationship. Hobbes' contract is not just a contract about the system of government; it is what society begins with. The contract is only the ground for the formation of the sociability of the individual, if it is at the same time the ground for establishing the government. The author emphasizes that, just like Kant, Hobbes & Locke consider leaving the state of nature necessary, not simply because of pragmatic reasons, but because the state has to legitimate itself as a claim of pure practical reason. Therefore, the author, following Kant, holds that the duty towards civil society & state cannot be based in the context of Hobbes' & Locke's philosophy, because, although the creation of state can be seen as an act of prudence, that in itself does not show a real obligation to pass from the state of nature to the state of law. The author also notes Hobbes' error in constructing a state independent from ownership. Contrary to him, Kant reasonably & legally bases theory of property as decisive part of his contractualism & creates a philosophical & legal foundation for the philosophy of the state. References. Adapted from the source document.
Was Wesley Clark, NATO's commander-in-chief, right when he said that, instead of launching operation 'Allied Force' against it, the allies should have electronically isolated SR Yugoslavia? Yugoslav hackers & crackers used to good advantage the freedom of cyberspace. During NATO's intervention, they declared a real 'virtual war' to all the countries supportive of this campaign, particularly to the US. By swooping down by all available means on numerous official web pages of various American institutions & totally abusing the communicational freedoms on the Net, Yugoslav hackers in fact demonstrated a small part of the possibilities of the new e-force. However, the deleterious consequences of Yugoslav online users' activities were so harmful that they prodded the international community into issuing a blunt warning to the Serbian Telecom -- we shall switch you off from the Internet! The objective of this research is primarily to evidence a totally novel phenomenon on the Internet, the first organized virtual war taking place in cyberspace, at the time when a real military campaign was waged against SRY. One of the outcomes of these activities was 'striking out' the documents from the Net that had been preserved only in Mucalo & Svilicic's archive. There are no additional scientific resources, since the key sources for this article were the Internet & newspaper articles. Although envisaged as a medium available to all, the Internet must soon be safeguarded & protected by legal means. Otherwise, it might simply cave in under the onslaught of all abuses & innumerable viruses circulating the global cyberspace. Due to the increase in the number of users & services, it may be expected that soon a completely new branch of criminal law is to emerge -- computer crime. 2 Figures, 21 References. Adapted from the source document.
The author discusses the relationship between Hegel & Hobbes with regard to the tradition of natural law. Both thinkers start by considering the state of nature as a construct of reason. Yet while Hobbes describes the state of nature as the original state of the human race, Hegel in describing it rejects any social context. They both present natural law as an absolute fact of the individual's freedom, starting from which the whole political community has to be erected. The essential difference between Hobbes & Hegel begins with the demonstration of the ways in which radical individualism is being transcended. Hobbes believes that natural law has only been suppressed by the predominance of a legal & political order, while according to Hegel, the state of nature is a fiction & natural law achieves its realization only in a custom-ruled community. In Hegel the system of mediation is so powerful that a return to the state of nature appears to be impossible. In Hobbes, the natural state of war of all against all (Behemoth) is latent in the political community (Leviathan). The political community (Leviathan) exists only as long as it is able to suppress chaos (Behemoth). Adapted from the source document.
Using Luhmann's terminology, the author promotes the thesis that internal changes of constitutions are a nondemocratic constitutional/legal process & thus a political problem; ie, a constitution is exposed to political life, but also to an unmarked place within a constitutional system. This place is marked by constitutional judges who change constitutions on a case-by-case basis, either innovatively, precedently, or, of course, nondemocratically. Since democratic politics & constitutional law are different forms of activity, the question is which is the criterion for appraising the new things. How, then, to reject something as unlawful & nonpolitical? The author claims that this judgment can only be done by people with a refined moral sense. This requires the inclusion of those who create & interpret constitutions as the law of the polity so they ought to be selected very carefully. Thus, citizens are doubly burdened: (1) They have to understand constitutional changes to perceive their interest in them. (2) They have to appreciate the architects of constitutions to trust them. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.
Using Luhmann's terminology, the author promotes the thesis that internal changes of constitutions are a nondemocratic constitutional/legal process & thus a political problem; ie, a constitution is exposed to political life, but also to an unmarked place within a constitutional system. This place is marked by constitutional judges who change constitutions on a case-by-case basis, either innovatively, precedently, or, of course, nondemocratically. Since democratic politics & constitutional law are different forms of activity, the question is which is the criterion for appraising the new things. How, then, to reject something as unlawful & nonpolitical? The author claims that this judgment can only be done by people with a refined moral sense. This requires the inclusion of those who create & interpret constitutions as the law of the polity so they ought to be selected very carefully. Thus, citizens are doubly burdened: (1) They have to understand constitutional changes to perceive their interest in them. (2) They have to appreciate the architects of constitutions to trust them. 15 References. Adapted from the source document.
The paper deals with the innovations the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe brings into the field of human rights. One of them is incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the very Constitution. In this way, a political declaration adopted in Nice has become a legal document, achieving also constitutionalization of fundamental rights at the Union level. Secondly, there is an explicit possibility for the EU to accede the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms. Within that context the author considers the relationship between the Charter of Human Rights & the European Convention, as well as the relationship between the two courts: the European Court of Human Rights & the European Court of Justice. References. Adapted from the source document.
In accordance with his practical philosophy, which views the essence of morality & right as "ought to" (Sollen), Kant deduces his notion of perpetual peace as the paragon of the relationship among rulers & states. Hegel's criticism of this view in his Philosophy of Law points to its three major flaws. The first is the very nature of the international legal system, which operates among independent states & whose sanctions do not provide a supra-sovereignty of a pan-international state. Further, treaties & agreements among states have no praetor & do not exclude war as "the natural state" among them. Finally, there is no universal international will, but only particular wills of individual states, which hardly achieve a consensus on war & peace. As a postulate of practical reason, perpetual peace remains a sheer ideal. Adapted from the source document.
How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocks of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modem (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modem social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modem social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part) law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action-guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within the limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.
How is law as both a set of standards of conduct and a way of reasoning related to politics, economy and culture? The approach to the problem taken in the paper is practical and instrumental rather than theoretical for its own sake. The aim is to appraise the subject-matter with a view of facilitating its change towards the basic values of the inquiry. Since the values are postulated by a stipulative definition of law, which implies relations of law to politics, economy and even culture, it may appear that the approach unduly trivializes rather than solves the problem. The approach may nonetheless be valid, if the stipulated definition of law is sufficiently integral, that is, inclusive. To that end the paper attempts to integrate into the stipulated definition of law three major philosophical traditions, which are still building blocs of -- and hence the keys to -- contemporary doctrines and cultures. In the classical (ontological) key (which is analysed in the first part of the paper) law is conceived of as a constituting and correcting aspect of the whole consisting of politics, economy, law and religion qua centerpiece of culture. In the modern (epistemological) key (analysed in the second part of the paper) ideas of law range from the conceptions that law is the constituent of modern social systems and hence an indispensable means of identifying modern social phenomena to the theories that law, as well as politics, economy and culture, is a phenomenon reducible to its natural causes. In the contemporary (linguistic) key (also in the second part), law, which is the constituent even of religion, can be understood only from within of the culture -- including politics and economy -- into which it is woven. The three traditions differ most markedly in their views of the contact between reason and action. In contrast to the classical tradition, which recognizes that reason can be action guiding, reason and action are in the epistemological key separated by a logical gap, whereas in the linguistic key they are hardly distinguishable. The triple solution of the problem of inquiry increases both heuristic and practical potentials of the stipulated definition of law. By integrating diverse philosophical traditions, the definition is serviceable to the integrity of a pluralistic legal order, that is, to achieving the postulated basic values within limits of the law. However, the approach taken in the paper, while more inclusive than more partisan approaches, is still merely an approach, which is in the final analysis also partisan. Moreover, when seen from a culture that has not been integrated by the definition, the approach may be parochial or even inimical. Adapted from the source document.
