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The author claims that classical liberalism solely recognizes the individualist perspective of maximizing individual profit & totally bypasses the issue of solidarity. Only as the consequence of workers' movement & the Marxist critique of the freewheeling market did the welfare state emerge to make up for the lack of solidarity. The welfare state, however, is based on a combination of the opposing principles: freedom & social justice, the state of law & social responsibility, the right to an unfettered individual development & the limitations to individual freedom through welfare institutions. The contradictions & the crisis of the welfare state have resulted in a series of criticisms. Contrary to the liberal & social-democratic critique, the author bases his position on the precepts of a bourgeois society as an ambience of civic solidarity. Such an attitude takes the civic responsibility for granted not only regarding legal & political but also social prerequisites for practicing civic autonomy. Adapted from the source document.

The author claims that classical liberalism solely recognizes the individualist perspective of maximizing individual profit & totally bypasses the issue of solidarity. Only as the consequence of workers' movement & the Marxist critique of the freewheeling market did the welfare state emerge to make up for the lack of solidarity. The welfare state, however, is based on a combination of the opposing principles: freedom & social justice, the state of law & social responsibility, the right to an unfettered individual development & the limitations to individual freedom through welfare institutions. The contradictions & the crisis of the welfare state have resulted in a series of criticisms. Contrary to the liberal & social-democratic critique, the author bases his position on the precepts of a bourgeois society as an ambience of civic solidarity. Such an attitude takes the civic responsibility for granted not only regarding legal & political but also social prerequisites for practicing civic autonomy. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks at a book with the promising title Law and Revolution, particularly, promising to those prone to think about law strategically. Starting from the main points of the book & of some interpretations of legal history that qualify these points, the author then demonstrates how negligible appear to be the possibilities of strategic action in the renewal & development of Croatian law. Adapted from the source document.

Commenting on the article by R. Badinter (1996, this issue), the author contends that experts in international law are not broad-minded regarding the establishment of a state. Most legal experts take for granted the statements of the international judiciary on the existence of certain rules of general international law & consider them validated & indisputable. This fiction has been given support by states, since they uphold only those legal statements that suit their interests. The author analyses the Opinions of the Arbitration Committee on the process of the disintegration & the Criteria for the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia as well as the criteria for the creation of the new states. He considers this precedent as central for international judiciary law. Adapted from the source document.

The author deals with one of the "classic" components of the state governed by law -- the principle of judges' autonomy -- using the example of the German legal system & its practice after the unification of 1990. Following a short outline of the evolution of the postulate of judges' autonomy, the author depicts the institutional framework of the present-day German judiciary, & then the quandaries ensuing from the unification of the legal systems of the two Germanies. Finally, the author describes Croatian problems. The Republic of Croatia, as a country in transition, & due to the specific circumstances caused by the Patriotic War, has found itself in a similar predicament. It has responded to these challenges, but not as successfully as Germany. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes political, philosophical, ethical, & legal implications of the trial in which, in August of 1997, some former members of the Politburo of the United Socialist Party of the former Democratic Republic of Germany were sentenced to prison terms after they had been found guilty for the murders committed by the East German border patrols when trying to prevent people from fleeing to the West. The legal grounds for such a sentence are dubious, not only because it runs counter to the ban on the retroactive enforcement of legal provisions but also because it presupposes the universal validity of the Western concept of human rights. If the intention was to react legally to what, from the Western point of view, were unpardonable acts during the communist reign, then the most prominent representatives of that system should have been -- in accordance with wartime law -- treated as enemies defeated in a (cold) war. Adapted from the source document.

In this text the author deals with the analysis of the fundamental legal texts regulating local self-government & administration in the Republic of Croatia & to what extent they are 'the fall guys' to be blamed for the state the systems of local self-government & administration are in. He concludes that these laws are a major generator (though not the only one) of the crisis of local self-government & administration in the Republic of Croatia. 16 References. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's concept of "perpetual peace" is the cornerstone of the rational human right that, in the form of international law, bears upon all states. However, the prerequisite for enduring international legal security & peace is that the internal affairs of states are based on constitutional & republican principles. Although Kant is clearly aware of the antinomies & paradoxes of a world league of states, he nevertheless postulates the ideal of a world league of republican states, since it corresponds to the general striving of nature & moral consciousness; such a league would guarantee a relatively peaceful coexistence among the states, based on international legal precepts. Hegel has often (& wrongfully) been accused of being an apologist of war; in fact, he only realized (having in mind the realities of sovereign national states) the inevitability of multilateral conflicts -- including military ones. His disproval of Kant's ideal of a league of states is based on his disbelief in the feasibility of supranational law, which should be superior to the absolute sovereignty of the state & keep an eye on & contain its partial interests. Adapted from the source document.

The author discusses the relationship between Hegel & Hobbes with regard to the tradition of natural law. Both thinkers start by considering the state of nature as a construct of reason. Yet while Hobbes describes the state of nature as the original state of the human race, Hegel in describing it rejects any social context. They both present natural law as an absolute fact of the individual's freedom, starting from which the whole political community has to be erected. The essential difference between Hobbes & Hegel begins with the demonstration of the ways in which radical individualism is being transcended. Hobbes believes that natural law has only been suppressed by the predominance of a legal & political order, while according to Hegel, the state of nature is a fiction & natural law achieves its realization only in a custom-ruled community. In Hegel the system of mediation is so powerful that a return to the state of nature appears to be impossible. In Hobbes, the natural state of war of all against all (Behemoth) is latent in the political community (Leviathan). The political community (Leviathan) exists only as long as it is able to suppress chaos (Behemoth). Adapted from the source document.

In accordance with his practical philosophy, which views the essence of morality & right as "ought to" (Sollen), Kant deduces his notion of perpetual peace as the paragon of the relationship among rulers & states. Hegel's criticism of this view in his Philosophy of Law points to its three major flaws. The first is the very nature of the international legal system, which operates among independent states & whose sanctions do not provide a supra-sovereignty of a pan-international state. Further, treaties & agreements among states have no praetor & do not exclude war as "the natural state" among them. Finally, there is no universal international will, but only particular wills of individual states, which hardly achieve a consensus on war & peace. As a postulate of practical reason, perpetual peace remains a sheer ideal. Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.

The idea of the existence of the legal foundations of the opposition implies granting certain rights to opposition that finds in the parliament a privileged means of its expression & recognition. The diversified "statute of the opposition" is the basic feature of contemporary constitutional democracies, both traditional & "nouveau." The text points to the terminological & other differences between the opposition as an institution & other forms in which parliamentary opposition finds its affirmation, as well as to the means apportioned to the opposition, both in the rule-of-law states & in the new democracies, including Croatia. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the theoretical postulates of Emile Durkheim's concept of solidarity, which in Croatia -- due to the circumstances -- has outstanding theoretical & practical significance. The author looks into the theories that shaped Durkheim's idea of solidarity: that of legal solidarity, a major theoretical development, particularly within French administrative law of the time (with a special emphasis on the seminal book by Leon Bourgeois); & that of the theory of community, focusing on German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies as well as on some of his predecessors such as Otto von Gierke, Henry Sumner Maine, & Fustel de Coulanges. The author claims that this mental framework immensely influenced Durkheim's concept of solidarity, which he put forward in his famous study De la division du travail social in 1893. The author reviews Durkheim's central postulates & discusses the distinctions between the so-called "mechanical" & "organic" solidarity. Finally, certain faults in Durkheim's theory are pointed out. Nevertheless, & despite these well-founded objections, Durkheim's solidarity theory remains an "object lesson" in understanding solidarity. 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the theoretical postulates of Emile Durkheim's concept of solidarity, which in Croatia -- due to the circumstances -- has outstanding theoretical & practical significance. The author looks into the theories that shaped Durkheim's idea of solidarity: that of legal solidarity, a major theoretical development, particularly within French administrative law of the time (with a special emphasis on the seminal book by Leon Bourgeois); & that of the theory of community, focusing on German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies as well as on some of his predecessors such as Otto von Gierke, Henry Sumner Maine, & Fustel de Coulanges. The author claims that this mental framework immensely influenced Durkheim's concept of solidarity, which he put forward in his famous study De la division du travail social in 1893. The author reviews Durkheim's central postulates & discusses the distinctions between the so-called "mechanical" & "organic" solidarity. Finally, certain faults in Durkheim's theory are pointed out. Nevertheless, & despite these well-founded objections, Durkheim's solidarity theory remains an "object lesson" in understanding solidarity. 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

The Croatian Constitutional Court, by its decision of 24 June 1992, partly rejected a request to start proceedings, & partly terminated already started proceedings, to determine the constitutionality of some thirty emergency decrees passed by the President of Croatian Republic during the undeclared war with Serbia & Yugoslav People's Army in the second half of 1991. The Court backed its decision inter alia by the following arguments: The President has the power to pass emergency decrees without first declaring a state of emergency. Presidential emergency decrees can be retroactive, since the Croatian Constitution does not specifically forbid their retroactivity. The Court's reasoning, which endorses a permanent coup d'etat, is probably a corollary of the idea, taken for granted by some Croatian constitutional lawyers, that the Croatian Constitution is modeled on the Constitution of the French 5th Republic, so that the sweeping powers of the French President belong also to his Croatian counterpart. The paper challenges the idea & discusses the relevance of comparative constitutional theory for Croatian constitutional practice. The first three sections demonstrate that, despite political similarities between the early years of the French 5th Republic & the Croatian Republic, the two semi-presidential systems differ in several important constitutional & legal respects so that the powers -- especially emergency powers -- of the French President cannot be used as a persuasive authority to interpret powers of the Croatian President. Section four indicates that if anything in the French law is authoritative in interpreting Croatian constitutional provisions on state of emergency, it is the effort of the French Conseil d'etat to control, to a limited extent, the legality of presidential emergency decrees. The last section points out that assumptions used by the Croatian Constitutional Court in interpreting presidential powers are more in accord with Weimar Constitution than with the Constitution of the 5th French Republic. The paper ends with the warning that unrestrained exercise of presidential powers in Croatia may lead, as it did in Mussolini's Italy & the Weimar Republic, to dictatorship. Adapted from the source document.