Suchergebnisse

The concept of rule of law in criminal process is based on the assumption that social differences can & should be screened out of criminal proceedings. Both propositions are questionable. Three principal approaches to the politics of criminal process are reviewed: conflict between crime control & due process; neo-Marxist theories of legal domination; & social reality theory. Inadequacies in all three are noted, leading to a three-dimensional theory of social segmentation by race/ethnicity, class, & role. This perspective is applied to police-citizen contact, plea bargaining, & formal trial, revealing complexities not captured in the usual analyses. Despite the value of the role of law framework in protecting freedom, an alternative framework of discretionary justice needs to be formulated to embody the actual concepts of legal personnel, giving decisionmakers authority to adapt rules & procedures to segmental variation. In The Rule of Law in Criminal Justice: An Innocent Convicted, Lief H. Carter & Loren P. Beth (University of Georgia, Athens) note the slippery use of the concept of rule of law by Scheingold, provide the conventional definition of this concept, & show how in its terms the criminal justice system may respond to the fact of cultural cleavage. So far as Scheingold's definition revolves around the notion of equality, it is misapplied. In Reaffirming the Verdict: A Reply to Professors Carter and Beth, Scheingold notes Carter's & Beth's substantial agreement with the proposed reforms, together with their assertion that these are needed to implement the rule of law. In fact, these proposals significantly revise the aim of the legal system from the formal equality implied by the concept of rule of law to substantial equality. 1 Figure. W. H. Stoddard.