Suchergebnisse

The main goal of the ciminal procedure is the truth, and within this reaching substantive justice. In the first Code of Criminal Procedure of Hungary (Act No. XXXIII. of 1896), this was essential, too. Looking back at Ferenc Finkey, this study looks into whether substantive justice is available in the proceedings for legal remedy. It examines two remedies: the proceeding on complaint of nullity (in Act No. XXXIII. of 1896), and judicial review (in Act No. XC of 2017).

Child protection in justice is designed to prevent crime among children and juveniles, to keep them away from further crime, and to reintegrate young offenders into society. So, it also covers the areas of prevention, enforcement, and aftercare. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, it was recognized that child protection covers the elimination of a child's financial vulnerability, the prevention of moral misconduct, and the representation of the interests of both orphans and the unhealthy. The country's opportunities have been influenced not only by political ideologies but also by the human and material casualties suffered as a result of the two world wars. The current focus of child protection in justice is always on socio-economic and political problems. Examining the personality and family relationships of juvenile offenders also went a long way in the designated period. The protection of children in justice also affects the areas of administrative law, criminal substantive and procedural law, and criminology. At the end of the paper, I compare the institution of patronage and the preventive patronage.

In my article, I examine some of legal opinions of Ferenc Finkey's with regard to substantive criminal law, from the perspective of today's criminal lawyer. I present the concept of criminal offence in Finkey's works, dealing with the issues of unlawfulness and guilt, also pointing to aspects not discussed in the previous literature. In the case of the act of trying to kill a dead person, my opinion is that it is more proper to establish criminal liablity for an unsuitable attempt of homicide instead of excluding liability. Regarding to the continued offence, I accept the the young Finkey's position, while with regard to the concurrence by one act, I do not agree with Finkey at all. My conclusion is that Ferenc Finkey's books and articles would be welcome for today's criminal lawyers to get acquainted with them as well.

The field of investigation of penology, the concept of criminal penalty as well as its general and specific goals and content have not changed despite drafting and formulating more and more types of criminal penalties in the penal/criminal codes over the past several decades. Regardless of the aforementioned, penology these days must have specific responses to situations – whether it is justified to extend the sphere of criminal penalties to penalties in case of which the goal of imposing penalty can be achieved in other ways, or whether it is necessary to apply the traditional penal measures to facts or perpetrators, in case of whom applying other measures can be more efficient in order to achieve either the protection of society or general prevention. This study is aimed at finding answers to these questions.

"There has been a lot of controversy among the Hungarian jurisprudence regarding the creation of the new Hungarian Criminal Procedure Act. It was also raised whether there was a need for a new code of procedure at all, whether it was not enough to adapt the existing regulations of the old Criminal Procedure Act to the new Criminal Code.
The Criminal Procedure Act, which has been in force since July 1 2018, may seem a distant start compared to Ferenc Finkey's work, but we will see that knowledge of the legal history and the processes involved are essential to understanding the changes in the present.
This is specially true for changes that affect the principles on which criminal proceedings are based. One of the biggest changes in the new Criminal Procedure Code – at the level of the priciples – is undoubtedly the relegation of the principle of official proceedings to the background, as it often turns to opportunism rather than officiality in order to increase simplification and efficiency.
In fact, in his work, Finkey has already perfectly described the mechanisms that we can discover in today's changes. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that his work may have provided a basis for fundamental changes in the new Criminal Procedure Code. His theories presented in this study shed excellent light on the dynamics that have permeated all areas of legal history in law and on the processes that, if we recognize them help us understand why it is necessary for our laws to be recreated sometimes.
All in all, we can see that the principles are never of absolute value, but their meaning is constantly changing, as the legislatorial ways breath in the spirit of the current age. When these principles are no longer able to keep up with change, they must be re-formed. And if we are to form such an important principle, we need to enforce a new vision throughout criminal proceedings that makes it necessary not only to make amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure but also to create a whole new law.
In order to see the real effects of the present innovations and the actual processes it has initiated in our criminal procedural law, a comprehensive analysis of the practice will be needed. We need to examine how quickly law enforcement can respond to the loss of space in centuries-old traditions. It may also be a question of whether we can talk about a real loss of space at all, as it is also conceivable that the principle of officiality has narrowed at the level of the normative text, but the old routine, attitude, and instincts live on in the application of law. The outcome of this examination may also raise important questions, including legal certainty. It is essential that once our procedural law has reached the point where it had to be born again, the application of the law be reborn with it."

In my article, I deal with the prohibition of customary law and analogy to the detriment of the perpetrator. Both mentioned prohibitions arise from the principle of legality. The starting point of the analysis is a decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court in 1898 dealing with the criminal offence of theft related to electricity. I presented examples of the extensive and then of the restrictive interpretation by Hungarian criminal courts. My conclusion is that the principle of legality may obviously infringe, for example, criminal liability extended by analogy. However, an overly restrictive interpretation must also be avoided, as this could threaten to violate the state's obligation for criminalization.