Suchergebnisse

Međunarodni kazneni sud novo je međunarodno tijelo kojem je glavni cilj istraga i suđenje slučajeva genocida, ratnih zločina, te zločina protiv čovječnosti u zemljama članicama. Iako su Sjedinjene Američke Države u 2000. potpisale Rimski statut, međunarodnu povelju iz 1998. koja predstavlja osnovicu Međunarodnog kaznenog suda, Busheva vlada napravila je velik zaokret godinu dana kasnije, potpuno se ograđujući od svake ideje o suđenju Amerikancima izvan zemlje. Tekst analizira glavne argumente američke vanjske politike povezane s Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom, od navodne pristranosti Suda, te odnosa između Suda i Ujedinjenih naroda, pa sve do pitanja američkog suvereniteta. Također, ponuđena je i međunarodnopravna politička kritika nedavnih poteza američke vlade, koji štete i američkim nacionalnim interesima, i međunarodnoj sigurnosti. ; The International Criminal Court is a new international body constituted with the aim of prosecuting and trying cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Although in 2000 the United States signed the 1998 Rome Statute, which is the foundation of the International Criminal Court, the Bush Administration took a radically different position the following year, protecting itself from any idea of trying American citizens abroad. This text analyses the main U.S. foreign policy arguments pertaining to the ICC, from the alleged impartiality of the Court and the relationship between the Court and the United Nations, to the question of American sovereignty. In addition, the text offers an international legal and political critique of the recent U.S. policy actions, which harmed both American national interests, as well as international security.

ICT industry has decisive impact on the articulation of American national interests in cyberspace. The private sector presents itself as a guardian of privacy rights against criminal intrusions and possible government's misuse. But in reality certain initiatives for closer cooperation between private sector and government at the expense of privacy rights have come from ICT industry. This article presents the evolution of public-private partnership in cybersecurity issues. The partnership resulted in the establishment of a military-cyber-industrial complex which significantly influenced the drafting of CISPA and ACTA documents. Presidential Policy Directive 20 expresses to a much greater extent the interests of ICT industry than the values and purposes of International Strategy for Cyberspace. Adapted from the source document.

ICT industry has decisive impact on the articulation of American national interests in cyberspace. The private sector presents itself as a guardian of privacy rights against criminal intrusions and possible government's misuse. But in reality certain initiatives for closer cooperation between private sector and government at the expense of privacy rights have come from ICT industry. This article presents the evolution of public-private partnership in cybersecurity issues. The partnership resulted in the establishment of a military-cyber-industrial complex which significantly influenced the drafting of CISPA and ACTA documents. Presidential Policy Directive 20 expresses to a much greater extent the interests of ICT industry than the values and purposes of International Strategy for Cyberspace. Adapted from the source document.

Previše je komentatora koji krivnju za zločin povezuju s drogom. Da, oni su uistinu povezani, ali smjer uzrokovanja ide gotovo suprotno. Radi se o tome da zabrana supstanci koje uzrokoju ovisnost vodi do zločinačkog ponašanja, a ne obrnuto. Ukoliko želimo sigurnost povezanu s drogom, utoliko je legalizacija preferentno rješenje za javnu politiku. ; All too many commentators blame crime on drugs. Yes, the two are indeed correlated, but the direction of causation is almost entirely in the opposite direction. It is the prohibition of addictive substances that leads to criminal behavior, not the other way around. If we want drug safety, legalization is the preferred public policy solution.

U posljednje vrijeme u hrvatskom javnom prostoru ponovno je aktualizirana problematika kažnjavanja seksualnih delikata na štetu djece. U medijskim istupima nevladine udruge i pojedinci iznijeli su jasne zahtjeve za povišenjem propisanih kazni u zakonu i oštrijim kažnjavanjem počinitelja od strane sudova. Kako bi se ocijenilo jesu li takvi zahtjevi utemeljeni, u radu se detaljno analiziraju najteža kaznena djela iz Glave VII. KZ/11 i Glave XIV. KZ/97. Usporedbom odgovarajućih zakonskih odredaba procijenjena je politika zakonodavca u sankcioniranju najtežih kaznenih djela protiv spolnog integriteta djeteta u posljednjih deset godina. Jedan od istraživačkih ciljeva bio je i istražiti u kojoj se to mjeri razlikuje u zakonskim odredbama zacrtana i u sudskim presudama primijenjena kaznena represija. U tu svrhu prikupljeni su i analizirani podaci o kažnjavanju počinitelja najtežih seksualnih delikata na štetu djece u RH u razdoblju od 2008. do zaključno 2017. Osim analize na makrorazini provedena je i analiza izbora vrste i mjere kaznenih sankcija prema navedenim parametrima u praksi županijskih i općinskih sudova u Splitu i Rijeci. Na temelju normativne ocjene postojećih zakonskih rješenja i njihove konkretne primjene u sudskoj praksi predlažu se smjernice za poboljšanje kažnjavanja počinitelja najtežih kaznenih djela spolnog zlostavljanja i iskorištavanja djeteta. ; The issue of punishing sexual crimes against children has recently once again become very topical in Croatian public space. Clear requests by NGOs and individuals have been expressed in the media for more stringent sanctions to be prescribed in the legislation and for the more severe punishment of sexual crimes against children. In order to assess whether such requests are founded, this paper analyses in detail the criminal offences referred to in Title VII CC/11 and Title XIV CC/97. A comparison of the relevant legal provisions provides an assessment of the legislator's policy regarding the sanctioning of the most serious crimes against the sexual ...

U državama zapadne Europe 1990-ih povećava se broj osoba koje traže međunarodnu zaštitu. Suočene s velikim iz bjegličkim krizama, a u kontekstu proklamirane slobode kretanjana području Europske unije i postojećih razlika u nacionalnim sustavima azila, države članice intenzivnije razvijaju suradnju na području azila i migracija. Do stupanja na snagu Ugovora iz Amsterdama 1. svibnja 1999. područje policijske i pravosudne suradnje u kaznenim stvarima pripadalo je tzv. »trećem stupu« prema kojem su politika azila, migracijska politika i politika vezana uz državljane trećih zemalja definirane samo kao »pitanja od zajedničkog interesa« i pripadala su u suverena prava država članica. Ugovorom iz Amsterdama ustonovljuje se »zajednički europski sustav azila«, a zajednička politika azila postaje dijelom »prvoga stupa«. Potpisivanjem Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju u procesu pridruživanja EU Republika Hrvatska preuzela je obvezu implementiranja načela i pravila pravne stečevine Europske unije u nacionalno zakonodavstvo, koja obuhvaća i pravila o azilu, u okviru Poglavlja 24.: Pravda, sloboda i sigurost. ; The number of individuals who sought international protection increased in the west European countries during the 1990s. Faced with huge refugee crises and bound by the proclaimed free movement of people in the EU territories and the differences in the national asylum systems, the Member States were developing intensive interstate co-operation in the fields of asylum and migrations. Before the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 1, 1999, police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters had belonged to the third pillar of the European Union. It meant that asylum policy, migration policy, and policy concerning citizens of the third countries defined merely as »the issues of mutual interest« and belonged to the sovereign rights of the Member States. The Treaty of Amsterdam established »Common European asylum system« and the common asylum policy became part of the first pillar. By signing the Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with the EU, Croatia has assumed the obligation to incorporate the principles and rules of the EU acquis communautaire in its legislation. This includes the asylum regulations contained in Chapter 24 »Justice, Freedom, and Security«.

Migracijski val od 2014. do 2016. u kojem je velik broj djece i majki iz država Sjevernog trokuta na putu prema krajnjem odredištu SAD-u bio u tranzitu Meksikom okarakteriziran je krizom. Kriza je podrazumijevala postojanje prijetnje koja opravdava provođenje izvanrednih mjera. Teza rada je da pod utjecajem SAD-a Meksiko migrante u tranzitu smatra prijetnjom sigurnosti građanima Meksika, a ne ugroženim pripadnicima istoga kulturnoga kruga koje treba zaštititi. Stoga se prema njima ne odnosi u skladu s ciljem ljudske sigurnosti, već primjenjuje silu. Rad predstavlja studiju slučaja. U prvom odjeljku dani su prikaz vrsta migracija i poimanje migracija u kontekstu ljudske i građanske sigurnosti, dok su u drugom analizirani potisni i privlačni faktori migracija iz država Sjevernog trokuta. U trećem odjeljku prikazana je politika tranzitne države Meksika prema ilegalnim migrantima. U radu je izložen sud o migracijskoj politici Meksika prema migrantima u tranzitu. Zaključeno je da je iz perspektive ljudske sigurnosti politika bila »loša« jer je bila diskriminirajuća i u neskladu s kulturno-političkim kontekstom te moralnim i zakonskim normama. No gledano iz perspektive nacionalne sigurnosti politika je bila »dobra« jer je bila ostvariva, postigla je rezultate uz prihvatljiv trošak ljudi i sredstva i njome su obranjeni državni interesi Meksika – dobri odnosi sa SAD-om. ; This article will attempt to answer two questions; first, in what way did the Government of Mexico attempt to resolve the influx of a large number of migrants, children and family members, from the Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras) who were transiting Mexico on their way to the United States in the 2014–2016 period? Second, why have migrants continued to arrive even after the adoption of the Mexican Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) of 2014, which was supposed to resolve the migration crisis and put an end to arrests and deportation? At the same time, the article will try to assess, according to Haines (2013), whether the Mexican post-2014 migration policy has been "good" (in line with the political and cultural context, achievable and effective with acceptable costs of staff and resources), or "bad" (discriminatory and incompatible with existing moral and legal norms). The thesis of the article is that under the influence of the United States, Mexico is treating migrants in transit as a security threat, rather than as members of the same cultural circle who require protection. So, instead of helping them, Mexico uses coercion to suppress them. While traditional threats are endangering the survival of the state, new threats to the state are also endangering individuals. The article consists of an introduction, three sections and a conclusion. The first section will provide an explanation of the relationship between migration and security (traditional national security and human security). The second section analyses the pull-and-push factors of migration from the Northern Triangle countries. This is followed by Mexico's transit policy towards illegal migrants, which is discussed in the third section. Case study research was used as a methodological strategy. The migration wave in the 2014–2016 period, consisting of many children and mothers from the Northern Triangle states transiting through Mexico on their way to the United States, was characterised as a crisis. A crisis implies the existence of a threat justifying the imposition of extraordinary measures. The issue of migrants in transit through Mexico was no novelty. Since the late 1980s, under the pressure of the United States, Mexico has been deporting migrants in transit back to their countries of origin. As Mexico has increasingly associated with the United States, there has emerged a growing need for greater compliance with "American requirements" and for the understanding of "American fears" of illegal migrants. After 11 September 2001, the fear became almost paranoid. Mexican presidents Fox, Calderon, and Nieto brought about and implemented a restrictive migration policy in line with the US policy, according to which migrants posed a threat to national security. Although repeatedly emphasising its intention to protect the migrants in transit, Mexico militarised and securitised its migration policy. This was particularly apparent after the 2014 Frontera Sur programme, which applied the same methods – arrest, deportation and denial of asylum – to the vulnerable population of women and children who largely satisfied the criteria for refugee status recognition. The PFS emphasised the intent to protect migrants, to better manage border crossings and to create security and prosperity zones in the south of the country. However, after two years of the programme's implementation it can be concluded that none of the objectives above have been achieved. Indeed, migrants in transit are additionally exposed to strife, suffering, and violations of their fundamental human rights, both by criminal organisations and the forces of law and order. Therefore, their transit has become much more uncertain than it was before. At the same time, human rights are violated by the state of Mexico itself, which denies migrants the right to asylum or recognition of humanitarian visas. The border in the south of the country has not become more secure. That PFS complies with US interests is apparent from the fact that the United States is its main source of funding, since it has managed to link the combat against drugs and migrants in transit via the Merida Initiative. The question is why have migrants continued to arrive despite everything mentioned above? It was their hope that somehow, they would reach the USA or, in the worst case, remain in Mexico. The most elementary human right, the right to life, is endangered in the countries of the Northern Triangle. In addition to personal insecurity, there are other human security threats in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador forcing the citizens to flee and emigrate from political, economic, environmental, and health and food insecurity. With everything being said, it is not easy to evaluate the Mexican migration policy. From a perspective of human security, it was "bad" because it was discriminatory and incompatible with the cultural and political context, as well as with moral and legal norms. Evaluated from a national security perspective, it was "good" because it was achievable, it has yielded results with an acceptable cost of staff and resources and has achieved state interests – good relations with the United States. At the same time, it is one of the tools Mexico can use in the future if Trump should decide against Mexican interests (significant taxing of Mexican products or deporting the many Mexican citizens illegally residing in the United States). Since Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador belong to the same cultural (historical, religious and linguistic circle), it was presumed that Mexico would pursue a policy that favours migrants and their protection; however, that did not happen. The authors agree with Kimball (2007: 140) that in the long run, Mexico will not be able to simultaneously advocate and implement both the pro- and anti-immigrant policy. The problem of the migrant wave, mostly consisting of mothers and children from the Northern Triangle countries, who were in transit through Mexico during 2014–2016, was attempted to be resolved via securitisation rather than care about their security. Castles de Haas and Miller (2014: 5) state that in the case of Mexico, there is a proliferation of migration transition, since it is turning from an emigration into an immigration country. To be more specific, with Trump coming to power, Mexico is increasingly not just a transit country, but also an ultimate destination country. Trump's immigration policy regarding immigrants from Central America suffers from deep historical amnesia related to the role of the USA in the Central American conflict of the 1980s, which has significantly destabilised the region. Moreover, Trump denounces and demonises as dangerous criminals the families, women and children, who have fled from violence contributed to by the USA (Portillo Villeda and Miklos, 2017: 53–54). This is one of the reasons the number of arrested migrants from Central America on the southern border of the United States has significantly decreased, but the number of asylum seekers in Mexico has increased threefold. There is a hope that new Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador would perceive vulnerable Northern Triangle migrants more as a threat to human rather than national security.

"Kristalna noć" najčešće se povezuje s nacističkim uništavanjem židovske imovine 1938., ali u kontekstu rata u Hrvatskoj neki taj pojam koriste i za uništavanje srpske imovine u Zadru i njegovoj okolici 2. svibnja 1991. Dok se u većini hrvatske javnosti taj događaj ignorira, dio javnosti interpretira ga kao početak progona srpskoga stanovništva u organizaciji Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, zadarskih općinskih vlasti te hrvatske policije. Takav stav uglavnom je posljedica medijskih manipulacija i nema uporište u činjenicama. Premda se dio povjesničara u svojim znanstvenim radovima dotaknuo zbivanja u Zadru početkom svibnja 1991., zadarska "kristalna noć" uglavnom je ostala historiografski neistražena. Rad se temelji na neobjavljenim arhivskim izvorima Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske, Jugoslavenske narodne armije, tisku i relevantnoj literaturi. ; On 2 May 1991, Serbian property in Zadar and its surrounding area came under attack. The attacks took place after months of tensions between Croats and Serbs, and later became known as the 'Night of Broken Glass'. These tensions were the direct consequence of the Serbian armed rebellion that erupted in northern Dalmatia, Lika, and the hinterland of Zadar in August 1991. The public security system that met the rebellion was created in January 1990, when the Secretariat of the Interior for the area of the Benkovac, Biograd na Moru, Obrovac, Pag, and Zadar municipalities was established in Zadar. In this area, Croats were an absolute majority in the Biograd na Moru and Zadar municipalities, and the Serbs in the Benkovac and Obrovac municipalities. The rebellion prompted divisions not only among the population, but also among the police. By January 1991, most policemen of Serbian nationality had left the Zadar police force and joined the rebels. Despite being weakened in terms of manpower, the Zadar police for the most part managed to successfully preserve public safety. The security situation worsened after a skirmish between Croatian police and rebel Serbs at the Plitvice Lakes on 31 March 1991. A significant increase in shootings, setting of bombs, road blockades, and other forms of criminal activity, mostly nationally motivated, was recorded. In addition to the rebel Serbs, the instability was caused by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which deployed its forces in Zadar's hinterland in early April 1991, causing alarm among the Croatian population. This deployment was part of a broader plan through which the YPA sought to set up a 'buffer zone' in order to close off the areas held by rebel Serbs and prevent the Croatian police from interfering. On 2 May 1991, the security situation throughout Croatia, and therefore in the area under the jurisdiction of the Zadar police, collapsed. Serb rebels killed 12 Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo near Vukovar, and severely wounded Zadar policeman Franko Lisica in Polača near Biograd na Moru; he soon died of his wounds. Despite the Croatian authorities' calls for peace, spontaneous unrest erupted throughout Croatia, and Serbian property and companies were attacked. Furthermore, there were incidents involving the YPA. The mood of the Croatian population in Zadar after the murder of the policeman Lisica was similar to that in other parts of Croatia. Despite the municipal authorities' calls for peace and their organising of a peaceful protest march, various uncoordinated groups demolished and plundered Serbian property on 2 May. The Zadar police failed to stop them because most of the policemen were engaged in the area affected by the Serb rebellion, while others were busy protecting the residential buildings in Zadar in which members of the YPA and their families resided. Soon, due to a feeling of insecurity, a mass exodus of Serbs from Zadar took place; these Serbs took refuge in the areas occupied by the rebels. Apart from the Zadar Serbs, Croats in the areas held by Serb rebels also began to leave their homes in early May 1991. On 1 May 1991, rebel Serbs drove many Croats from the areas around Knin. On the night of 6 to 7 May, as an act of revenge for the events in Zadar, the property of Croats, Albanians, and Croatian companies was attacked and plundered. Different sources give different data regarding the extent of the damage caused to Serbian property. Criminal charges raised by the Croatian police against unknown perpetrators on 2 May 1991 mention that 175 catering establishments, commercial premises, stands, kiosks, and automobiles were damaged. Apart from the property of Serbs, property belonging to Croats, Muslims, Roma, and Croatian companies was also damaged. There are numerous prejudices and controversies regarding the 'Night of Broken Glass', which mostly ignore the then security-political context. Certainly, there were those among the Croats who did not consider the attacks on Serbian property and their exodus from Zadar as anything controversial, but available sources clearly point towards the conclusion that the destruction of Serbian property was not organised and was not a part of the policy of the Croatian leadership.

Tijekom jedanaest godina rada Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata prikupio je veliku količinu arhivskoga gradiva nastalog djelovanjem pojedinaca, odnosno javnog arhivskoga gradiva nastalog tijekom Domovinskog rata, a koje je završilo u posjedu privatnih osoba ili raznih udruga te kao takvo ustupljeno Centru. Riječ je o raznolikom gradivu, konvencionalnog i nekonvencionalnog karaktera, vojne i civilne provenijencije, čiji su stvaratelji bili pripadnici hrvatskih snaga, snaga Jugoslavenske narodne armije i pobunjenih Srba, civilne osobe, državni i vojni dužnosnici ili zainteresirani pojedinci. U radu će se prikazati osnovne značajke i vrste takvoga gradiva, načini akvizicije, postupak vrednovanja i pohrane te njegova dostupnost, historiografska vrijednost te sumirati stečena iskustva. ; For different reasons the important records from the period of the Homeland War were also kept or are still kept by the private holders, whether these records were created by institutions or individuals, associations and organizations. By acknowledging the importance of such records and the sensitivity in its acquiring the Croatian Memorial-Documentation Centre of the Homeland War has started to collect them ever since it was established in 2005. By establishing the Centre as the central institution for archival and scientific research of the Homeland War, the Centre is recognised in the public as a trustworthy institution to which everyone interested to hand over the records can turn to. The private holders of the archives from the Homeland War can be divided into those who are the creators of archives and those who in various ways became possessors of public archives. The Centre can acquire records of private holders in two ways; mostly through donations, and partly by purchasing records that are particularly valuable and that were created as someone's authorship. After acquiring, the records are registered, appraised and classified, after which they form individual fonds or they supplement existing fonds and collections. Among the conventional archives, besides military documentation, the Centre acquired various newspapers, magazines and official papers, military maps, political and military posters, caricatures etc. The majority of the acquired records were digitized, due to a more efficient storage and keeping, as well as the desire of holders to keep the originals. The majority of archives from private holders are unconventional records (photographs, video and audio clips), i.e. the re-recorded and digitized conventional records. The archives acquired from individual private holders were in terms of subject and quantity appraised as a rounded off whole and after the archival processing it was decided to form personal papers. By the end of 2016 the Centre had ten of them. Besides these, the Centre also stores memoirist records of private holders, whether it concerns records created by structured interviews or written entries of the direct participants of the Homeland War. The Centre published part of these in 17 books as part of its publishing activity. Also, several photo-monographs were published based on the received or bought photographs from the private holders. Among the private holders from which the Centre got the archives are also the historians-researchers who gave or deposited in the Centre the materials they used, after finishing a certain research or a book. The majority of the acquired and processed archives of private holders are available to researchers through fonds and collections of the Centre. The basic problem regarding the acquiring of the records of private holders pertains to certain indistinctness in the Act on the Archives and the ignorance of holders regarding their obligations prescribed by the law which entails relinquishing of the public archives to the Centre. Besides ignorance, some of the holders advertently kept these records in their keeping mostly out of fear of misuse and the negative perception of the activity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, after the acquittal of the generals Gotovina and Markač in late 2012 and the greater public recognisability of the Centre, the inflow of archives from public holders has been increased. Another problem in acquiring records of this kind is the parallel activity of certain individuals and associations with similar archival activities. As far as arranging is concerned, due to the large quantities of acquired records and their stockpiling in the future it will be necessary to pay greater attention to their appraisal and disposal. Still, it could be said that the archives of the private holders prominently features in the Centre's professional archival policy and that so far the important amount of such records had been acquired. Despite certain difficulties concerning their processing, these records are an important source for archivists, researchers and historians, particularly for subjects that are wider than the more usual political and military ones.

Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.

O stanju privatnih šuma u RH u nekoliko smo navrata pisali u Uvodnicima Šumarskog lista, a 2017. godine "Stanje privatnih šuma u Republici Hrvatskoj" bila je stručna tema povodom obilježavanja Dana hrvatskoga šumarstva. Prema podacima Šumskogospodarske osnove područja Republike Hrvatske iz 2016. godine, površina šuma i šumskih zemljišta u RH iznosi 2 759 039,05 ha. Od ukupne površine u državnom je vlasništvu 2 097 318 ha (76 %), a 24 %, tj. 661 721 ha u vlasništvu je privatnih šumovlasnika. Članak 14. Zakona o šumama definira prema površini šuma i šumskog zemljišta privatne šumoposjednike na male s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta do 20 ha, srednje s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 20, a manjom od 300 ha i velike šumoposjednike s površinom šuma i/ili šumskog zemljišta većom od 300 ha. Prema toj klasifikaciji preko 99 % površina šuma i šumskog zemljišta pripada malim šumoposjednicima, njih 418 654, što daje prosječnu veličinu posjeda od 0,5 ha. Kao što ste već u uvodnom dijelu mogli zamijetiti, miješaju se pojmovi šumovlasnik i šumoposjednik, što je rezultat dvojnog vođenja zemljišnih knjiga kroz gruntovnicu i katastar, a njihova nesređenost otežava definiranja stvarnih odnosa. Rješavanje problema uređenja imovinsko-pravnih odnosa uvijek naglašavamo kao prioritet i prvi preduvjet stvaranja organiziranog društva. Isto tako vrijeme je da jasno razlučimo namjenu i korištenje šumskog i poljoprivrednog zemljišta. Od vremena Austro-ugarske monarhije, kada je napravljena prva razdioba, usprkos brojnim zakonskim odredbama, to još nismo učinili. Tako je primjerice velik dio šuma u privatnom vlasništvu nastao obraštanjem poljoprivrednog zemljišta, koje se još uvijek u zemljišnim knjigama vodi kao livada, pašnjak ili oranica. Istovremeno na apsolutnom šumskom zemljištu u državnim šumama podižemo maslinike i vinograde ili izdajemo dozvole za pašarenje??? Povijesne okolnosti definirale su danas izuzetno male posjede šumskog zemljišta u privatnom vlasništvu koji ne omogućuju kontinuirani prihod vlasnicima, već se jednokratnim zahvatom pokušava izvući što veća financijska korist bez pridržavanja potrajnosti, osnovnog načela u šumarstvu. Svijest o potrebi funkcionalnog udruživanja i planiranja šumskouzgojnih zahvata na razini odjela i odsjeka kod naših šumovlasnika nažalost još nije zaživjela, pa se usprkos tomu što za većinu privatnih šuma imamo izrađene programe gospodarenja, ono se u praksi svodi na nepovezane zahvate na pojedinim česticama. U privatnim šumama malih posjednika sve se češće događaju kriminalne radnje vezane za sječu bez doznake, krađu, izvođenje radova pridobivanja drveta od neregistriranih ili nelicenciranih izvođača, nekontrolirano stavljanje drveta u promet, nelegalna trgovina drvetom itd. Nepostojeća jasna i transparentna (tržišna) politika formiranja cijena drveta u Hrvatskoj pogoduje raznim preprodavačima, a vrijedna sirovina bez ikakve kontrole obično završava na stranom tržištu. Sve to navodi nas na razmišljanje o odgovornosti, države kao zakonodavca i njenog odnosa prema toj kategoriji privatnog vlasništva, ali i općeg dobra zaštićenog Ustavom RH. Postavimo ovdje pitanje odgovornosti cijele šumarske struke i njenih institucija, kao i naših kolega ovlaštenih inženjera koji često na terenu provode doznaku, ili otpremu, po načelu "od nečega se mora živjeti". Ako svi, kao što to čini struka, zažmirimo pred ovim problemom, teško da ćemo se u budućnosti moći hvaliti tradicijom potrajnog i prirodnog gospodarenja našim šumama. Prvi preduvjet uvođenja reda u privatnim šumama malih posjednika je organiziranje čuvarske službe. Prema aktualnom ZOŠ-u čuvanje šuma prepušteno je vlasnicima, što je s obzirom na njihovo stanje i dobnu strukturu praktički neprovedivo, ili je dana mogućnost da to obavljaju Udruge šumoposjednika, što se opet u praksi rijetko događa. Kroz povijest uvijek su postojali čuvari šume, bili to općinski (sreski) lugari do sredine 20. stoljeća ili su to donedavno kod nas obavljali djelatnici Hrvatskih šuma. Kako bi riješili ovu situaciju postoji nekoliko opcija: Þ Vratiti nadležnost Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o. preregistracijom ove tvrtke. Þ Osigurati provođenje čuvarske službe kroz lokalnu samoupravu, kao što je to bilo propisano prethodnim ZOŠ-om, no u praksi nije bilo sprovedeno. Þ Osnovati "Šumsku policiju" s jasnim ovlastima koja će osigurati red i spriječiti kriminalne radnje. Þ Osnovati Državnu instituciju (agenciju) za šume, koja bi provodila javne ovlasti i interese neovisno o vlasništvu nad šumama i omogućila bi smisleno i sveobuhvatno planiranje i gospodarenje šumama na svim razinama. Uredništvo ; The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia has been treated in the Editorial section of the Forestry Journal on several occasions, and in 2017 "The status of private forests in the Republic of Croatia" was a topic discussed at the Day of Croatian Forestry. According to the Forest Management Plan of the Republic of Croatia from 2016, forests and forestland in Croatia cover 2,759,039.05 ha. Of the overall area, state owned forests account for 2,097,318 a (76 %), while privately owned forests account for 661,721 ha (24 %). Article 14 of the Law on Forests classifies private forest owners into three groups: small owners with forests and/or forestland of up to 20 ha, medium owners with forests and/or forestland of more than 20 ha but less than 300 ha, and large forest owners with forest area and/or forestland exceeding 300 ha. According to this classification, over 99 % of the area of forests and forestland are owned by small forest owners (418,654 owners), which means that the average size of the forest property is 0.5 ha. As you may have noticed in the introductory part, there is an ambiguity relating to the terms forest owner and forest holder, which is the result of the dual keeping of land books through the land register and cadastre. Their unsettled status makes it more difficult to define real relationships. We always stress that the regulation of property-legal relations is the priority and the first precondition for creating an organized society. We must also make a clear distinction between the purpose and the use of forest and agricultural land. The first division was made during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but despite numerous legal provisions we have not yet done so since. Thus, for example, a large part of privately owned forests came into being by agricultural land being overgrown, but in land registers they are still registered as meadows, pastures, or ploughland. At the same time, we raise olive groves and vineyards or issue permits for grazing over an absolute forest land in state forests??? Due to historical circumstances, there are exceptionally small areas of forestland in private ownership today, and as such they do not ensure continuous income to their owners. Instead, there is an attempt to derive as much financial profit as possible through one operation without adhering to the principle of sustainability, the fundamental principle in forestry. The awareness of the need to functionally merge and plan silvicultural treatments at the level of compartments and sub-compartments has regrettably not yet taken root among Croatian forest owners. Therefore, despite the fact that management plans have been drawn for most private forests, in practice management is reduced to disconnected operations in individual plots. Private forests of small forest holders are witnessing an increase in criminal actions such as felling without marking, theft, timber extraction by unregistered or unlicenced contractors, uncontrolled placing of timber on the market, illegal timber trade, etc. The absence of clear and transparent (market) price forming policy in Croatia favours various resellers, while valuable raw material, usually without any control, ends up on foreign markets. All this makes us think about the responsibility of the state as a legislator and its attitude towards this category of private property, but also towards the common good protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Let us also tackle the responsibility of the entire forestry profession and its institutions, as well as our colleagues, certified engineers, who mark trees or dispatch timber in the field guided by the principle "one must have something to live on". If we, as a profession, turn a blind eye to this problem, we will hardly be able to boast in the future of the tradition of sustainable and close-to-nature management of our forests. The first precondition for installing the order in private forests of small holders involves setting up a guard service. According to the valid Law on Forests, the guarding of forests is the responsibility of their owners, which is practically unfeasible given their condition and age structure, or this could be done by forest owners' associations, which again rarely happens in practice. Throughout history there have always been forest guards. Until the mid-20th century they were municipal (regional) forest rangers, and until very recently this job was performed by employees of the company Croatian Forests. There are several options which might solve this situation: Þ Restore the jurisdiction of Croatian Forests Ltd by re-registering the company. Þ Implement guard services through local self-government bodies, similar to the regulations set down in the previous Law on Forests; however, this was not applied in practice. Þ Establish a "Forest Police" service with clearly defined powers to ensure order and prevent criminal activities. Þ Establish a State Forest Institution (Agency), which will exercise public powers and promote interests independently of forest ownership, as well as enable meaningful and comprehensive planning and management at all levels. Editorial Boards