Suchergebnisse

'Mit den polizeilichen Eingreifkräften der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) hat sich die EU ein Interventionsinstrument geschaffen, das viel versprechende Möglichkeiten der Krisenbehandlung eröffnet, aber auch hohe Anforderungen stellt, wie die ersten Einsätze in Bosnien-Herzegowina (seit Januar 2003), Mazedonien (seit Dezember 2003) und in der DR Kongo (seit April 2005) zeigen. Obwohl einzelne Mitgliedstaaten der EU schon seit Jahren internationale Polizeiaufgaben wahrgenommen haben, stellt sich doch als Schwierigkeit heraus, dass es in Brüssel bisher kein eigenes, auf Polizeikräften aufbauendes Krisenmanagement gab. So haben sich etwa die Europäische Kommission und der Ministerrat noch nicht genug darauf eingestellt, Planung und Durchführung von Operationen arbeitsteilig vorzunehmen. Probleme treten auch bei Mandats- und Rekrutierungsfragen, bei den Ausstattungs- und Finanzierungsverfahren sowie bei der Zusammenarbeit mit lokalen Behörden und internationalen Partnern auf. Sie machen deutlich, dass die europäischen Polizeikräfte noch nicht ganz auf ihre Auslandsaufgaben eingestellt worden sind. Die Studie untersucht die Schwierigkeiten im einzelnen und macht Vorschläge, sie zu überwinden. Hauptempfehlung ist, die Polizeikräfte als Krisenmanager aufzuwerten, das heißt, ihren Status und ihre Professionalität zu erhöhen. Damit würde die EU nicht nur der zentralen Aufgabe von Krisenintervention (Gewährleistung innerer Ordnung) entsprechen, sondern könnte sich auch als kompetenter Partner in der internationalen Sicherheitspolitik (zivil-militärischer Ansatz) profilieren. Die Darlegungen beziehen Berichte aus den EU-Institutionen sowie Informationen von an Missionen beteiligten Polizeibeamten ein.' (Autorenreferat)

A review of the literature on crisis intervention in practice settings supports the view that, when an individual or a family is in a state of crisis, this mode of treatment is often the most effective because crises, if unresolved, leave those persons involved more vulnerable to life's other problems.

This study assesses the efficacy of the treatment approach implemented in the Bern Crisis Intervention Program, where particular emphasis is placed on the remediation of suicide ideation and suicidal behavior, and depression, fear, and phobia are generally considered to be contributing factors. Four questionnaires addressing psychopathology, emotional well-being, social anxiety, and personality were administered prior to and after the treatment of 51 patients over a period of 2 to 3 weeks. The reduction of symptoms contributing to suicidal ideation and behavior was interpreted as indirect evidence of an antisuicidal effect of the program. Significant improvements were found in the psychopathology ratings, with depression and anxiety showing the largest reductions. The impact on personality and social phobia, however, was only moderate, and on average patients still exhibited symptoms after attending the program. This residual symptomatology points to the necessity of introducing a two-step therapy approach of intensive intervention targeted at the precipitating causes of the crisis, augmented by long-term therapy to treat underlying problems.

"This case book is about crises. It is not about trauma or disaster, although certainly crises occur in both. Overlap of the three areas exist, and while crisis intervention is practiced with traumatic events ranging from lethal auto wrecks to natural disasters, it is very different from long-term trauma therapy. Crisis intervention may include assisting someone who is suicidal or homicidal, but also includes non-life threatening situations such as child custody fights, school failure, drug use, and a host of other situational and transient problems (Myer & James, 2007). In contrast, trauma counseling often follows crisis intervention with people who are not able to re-establish a daily routine because the memory of the incident creates an independent schema that affects functioning over a period of time (McFarlane & Yehuda, 1996). That said, there are different types of crises and we will attempt to portray some of those and the ethical issues that may accompany them. Before going further, we want you know that while writing this book, something became clearer to us. Through our experiences, we knew that the application of ethical principles during crisis intervention is awkward at best, and nearly impossible in the worst-case scenario. How do you maintain confidentiality when working in a Red Cross shelter with a person or family whose house has been destroyed by a wildfire? People are walking around, and you are not in a comfortable private office. What does a crisis worker do when someone is unable to make a phone call to get information or much needed resources? How will the client get the assistance that will help restore a sense of control? You, as the crisis worker, may need to make that phone call to help the person. We found that applying ethical principles in crisis intervention is like putting a square peg into a round hole. Not matter what you do; there are gaps. Please don't misunderstand, we are not suggesting that ethical principles do not apply to crisis intervention work. Rather we are attempting to find a way to apply them in a way that makes sense, and we believe the concepts of Relational Cultural Theory (RCT) (Jordan 2018; Miller 1976; Duffey & Haberstroh, 2020) is a framework to fill in those gaps"--

The current mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention are inadequate. As the crisis in Darfur has highlighted, the international community lacks both the willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention and the ability to do so legitimately. This article considers a cosmopolitan solution to these problems: the creation of a standing army for the United Nations. There have been a number of proposals for such a force, including many recently. However, they contain two central flaws: the force proposed would be, firstly, too small and, secondly, too dependent on major states. Accordingly, I argue that, to be a substantial improvement on the current situation, such a force would need to be, firstly, much larger and, secondly, in the hands of cosmopolitan democratic institutions. This two-part solution would solve the problems faced by current interveners, but is unlikely to be realised soon. Accordingly, I argue that our immediate efforts should instead be concentrated on improving regional organisations??? ability to intervene.