Suchergebnisse

The paper analyses the most important aspects of the draft Act on antitrust damages which is the result of the legislative efforts to implement the EU Directive on Antitrust damages into Croatian legislation.

The author presents the basic contours of 1945, which was marked by the end of the war, the collapse of the Independent State of Croatia, the establishment of Federal State of Croatia as a component of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia and the seizure of authority by the Communist Party of Yugoslav (KPJ). After the end of a liberation and civil war, the KPJ took power into its hands and created the essential prerequisites for the federal reorganization of the Yugoslav state and the revolutionary change of society in compliance with its revolutionary and federalist ideas and through the application of experiences from the USSR. The emphasis is on the most important moves by the KPJ in the first year of its rule and the fate of the main anti-communist forces in Croatia.

IN ENGLISH: The Atheist Bus Campaign in Croatia was initiated by Ms. Bojana Genov, the coordinator of the Women's Network in Croatia. The ad "No God, no master" was put on street car No. 14 in Zagreb, the capitol of Croatia, on March 5, 2009. After only one day the ad was removed, but the social response to this quite short campaign lasted for several months. The authors describe the historical, political and social context important for understanding and situating the campaign in Croatia. They analyse the legal and social responses to the campaign and in conclusion they summarize the effects of the campaign in Croatia. --- IN CROATIAN: Ateističku autobusnu kampanju u Hrvatskoj inicirala je gđa. Bojana Genov, koordinatorica Ženske mreže u Hrvatskoj. Oglas "Bez Boga, bez gospodara" bio je stavljen na tramvaj br. 14 u Zagrebu, glavnom gradu Hrvatske, 5. ožujka 2009. godine. Nakon samo jednog dana oglas je bio uklonjen, ali društvena reakcija na ovu prilično kratku kampanju trajala je nekoliko mjeseci. Autorice opisuju povijesni, politički i društveni kontekst važan za razumijevanje i kontekstualiziranje kampanje u Hrvatskoj te analiziraju zakonske i društvene odgovore na kampanju. U zaključku sumiraju odjeke kampanje u Hrvatskoj.

The results of the research described above were obtained on a representative sample of Croatian youth from 15-24 years of age in the second half of 2002. The research was carried on in the context of a regional research project on youth under the auspices of the PRONI institute from Sweden. The main objective of the project was to provide empirical data on life, needs, attitudes and aspirations of young people as a means of assisting the process of youth policy review. The process was initiated by the Council of Europe with a view to strengthen youth participation in democratic changes of the countries in the region. This report is the most recent one in a long and well-established tradition of studying youth issues in Croatia. Therefore, it often includes comments and references to earlier research findings for the purpose of determining the changes in youth trends, as well as for the purpose of validity testing of our data. On the other side, the data presented in this report may, together with earlier studies, be used as a reference point in the process of reviewing the National Programme of Action for Youth, as well as in developing a comprehensive, efficient and youth-centred national youth policy. The core of the findings is probably that the criteria for determining the upper age-level of youth period should be reviewed and extended to include those who are 30 years of age. The fact that more and more young people remain longer in education, that they decide to marry and have children later in their life, that they consider changing their job and probably, if possible, enroll in re-training programmes for that purpose, as well as that they desire to reach full independence by relying on their own abilities and endeavour, speaks in favour of the need to redesign our traditional approaches to youth upper age-limits. Other findings that help us understand some important dimensions and trends of contemporary life of Croatian youth are summarised below. The most basic socio-demographic data demonstrate that very few young people from our research who are 24 and below are married and few think of having children before the age of 25. About half of them live in a two-child nuclear family in a house/apartment of their own that, averagely, comprises more than two rooms. Very few have an opportunity to live in an apartment of their own, although four fifths express desire to live separately. The aspiration towards such independence is mainly motivated by socio-economic and maturity factors: it is a prominent feature of young people who are university students, whose fathers have more education, and who are over 20. Since the chances of having their own apartment in a reasonable period of time are rather minimal, not only due to the difficulties in finding a job but due to extremely high prices in the housing sector, such prolonged co-habitation and dependency on parents and/or relatives is a frequent cause of young people' s frustrations and is probably related to, together with other factors such as poverty and limited capacity of pre-school child-care institutions, a constant decrease in the average number of children per family. On average, young people are satisfied with their present life and expect no change in the future. Despite a high unemployment rate especially among them, approximately three quarters assess their own present and future life, the life of their closest friends and their peers in Western Europe as good or excellent. Their optimism is somewhat even higher than it was found in the end of 1990s. When asked to imagine their life in 10 years ahead majority see it as a success, either in general terms or in specific terms of their professional advancement or family happiness. Dissatisfaction with present life grows with age and with opportunities to enter the world of work and become fully independent, since the young between 20-24 years of age, both employed and unemployed are more inclined to perceive their present life as unsatisfactory. Interestingly enough, the age does not have influence on the assessment of future, which means, in the context of this research, that young people in general, irrespective of age, equally believe that future brings better opportunities. In reference to their professional and educational aspirations, almost two thirds of the young want to continue education, while one fourth of them think of finding a job. The differences are mainly determined by residential, social, and age factors. Thus, a primary aspiration of pupils and university students, as well as of those who live in Zagreb or in families of higher socio-economic status, is to continue their education. Contrary to them, rural young people, those who live in low-income families, as well as those who are over 20 are more inclined to seek for a job or to continuing the job they currently hold. Over two fifths of young people plan to leave their present place of residence so as to be able to meet their professional and educational aspirations. Almost half of this group prefer to move somewhere inside the country, most often to a bigger city which is perceived as the place that offers better opportunities for career and social positioning, while other half think of going abroad. The percentage of the young planning to leave the country for good rose from 11% in 1986 and 18% in 1999 to 19% in 2002. Their migratory plans are connected to their residential status, i.e. to the conditions in the place or region where the young actually live. Young people from Zagreb are less willing to go somewhere else; rural youth and youth from Eastern Croatia wish to migrate to another place inside Croatia more than any other group, while all groups (except youth from Middle and Northern Croatia who want that somewhat more than others) equally (do not) want to settle abroad. Data on a desired place for living are quite similar to those on migratory plans. The number of youth preferring to remain in their present place of residence and the number of those having no migratory plans are almost identical. When compared to earlier studies, we see an increase in the number of young people preferring to live in large cities. In addition, almost one quarter express their preference for living abroad, majority of which opt for a Western European country. The fact that almost one fifth of all has plans and almost one fourth prefer to live abroad indicate the existence of two closely related but, nevertheless, separate dimensions of youth migratory thinking. While the preference for other counties may mean only an inclination, having plans on migrating abroad most certainly includes active search for such a possibility. In light of our findings it means that at least one fifth of Croatian youth not only dream of leaving the country but actually make plans how to make it a reality. Employed youth is far from being satisfied with their jobs. Every second confirms his or her disappointment. Approximately one fifth of both them and those that are still in the process of education desire jobs in the service or business sector; little less in number think of entering more creative and/or dynamic professions or professions related to education, health care and social services. This means that their professional aspirations are somehow higher that those of their parents, majority of whom have secondary school completed and are mainly employed as industrial, service and shop workers or clerks. Nevertheless, if their choices are compared to the structure of the employed force in Croatia and if we add to it a rapidly changing labour market in all transitional countries, their professional preferences seem rather realistic. This is probably why almost half of the young hold that their chances for getting a preferred job are high or very high. The data also confirm that their estimations are related to age and socio-professional status since pessimism increases with age (except for the university students) and is tightly linked to unemployment status. In any case, optimism prevails among the young and it, as well, may be linked to their strong motivation to succeed in life by relying on their own abilities despite unfavourable social and economic context in which they live. It is also possible, at least partly, that self-assurance of young people comes from positive educational experience. Over half of the young state they feel happy and satisfied when thinking of their schools or universities. However, it is not clear whether their satisfaction should be understood in terms of acquiring subject-matter knowledge and skills or in terms of developing certain personal qualities through participating in school life. Earlier studies on youth have proven that the young have complex relations towards education which are the outcomes of both institutional tasks and personal expectations. Moreover, our results document that feelings about school are correlated with sex and socio-professional status.Girls and university students, in general, are more satisfied with their education, while the unemployed are among the least satisfied. It is also possible that positive feelings about education also relate to school grades. Earlier studies have shown that female pupils receive somewhat better average scores than their male schoolmates, which may explain why girls have more positive feelings about school than boys. • On the other hand, it is clear that school is by no means a source of information about the events in the country and the world for young people since a great majority of them actually receive news through ordinary media (TV, radio, newspapers and magazines). Moreover, Internet has become an important source of information about the country and the world for approximately one fifth and over one fourth of them, respectively. This shift has to do with the fact that over two thirds of the young from our study are computer users and that more than half of them already have computer at home. It is, therefore, obvious that new information and communication technologies are becoming part and parcel of young people' s daily life what needs to be taken into account when policies and programmes of action for promoting their wellbeing are designed, especially in reference to underprivileged youth. Namely, our research confirms that the use of computer correlates with residence (urban environment), family background (parents with higher education and higher socio-economic status), age, and education factors (younger population and students). Nevertheless, young people are not enslaved by new information communication technologies. Most of them spend their free time associating with friends, engaging in sport activities, going to disco-clubs, watching TV or performing outdoor activities, while far less enjoy music, reading books or art exhibitions. In addition, many young people have no daily obligations, except in relation to school and spend their free time idling or sleeping. This means that the majority of youth either do nothing or engage almost solely in the so called passive and/or receptive activities for self-entertainment. Despite that fact, almost three fourths of them claim they are more or less satisfied with how they spend their free time what brings us to the conclusion that the main problem is not the quality of their free time activities but their lack of awareness that the quality itself is being at stake. However, it should be pointed out that their opinions are related to age and socio-professional status. Young people who belong to an upper age-cohort and who are unemployed exhibit far more dissatisfaction with their free time than the youngest. Overpronounced dissatisfaction among the unemployed seems to be an indicator of an overall discontent with one' s own life. For the unemployed, free time becomes a burden not only because they cannot perceive it in terms of an offduty activity but because they can not afford it financially. In reference to the use of psychoactive substances, it seems that tobacco smoking and alcohol consumption are the most widespread types of risk behaviour among the youth. Approximately one third of them smoke cigarettes or drink alcohol daily or weekly ; three fifths are non-smokers and one fifth never drink alcohol. Smoking increases with age and employment. Alcohol, on the other hand, is solely related to gender in a way that young women drink less than their male peers. Such trend may be the sign of a subtle male initiation rite de passage that has outlived its traditional context. Since the data on smoking are more favourable than those from earlier research it may be presumed that an anti-smoking media campaign, which has been going on rather aggressively throughout the country, has brought positive effect, whereas non-existence of similar anti-alcohol campaign may be the sign of a relatively high level of a social tolerance for alcohol consumption. As far as drug are concerned, Croatian youth is more inclined to the so-called 'soft' drugs. Over one third of the young have tried or used twice or more only marijuana ; hashish and ecstasy is mentioned by less than one tenth of them, whereas other 'hard' drugs have been only tried or are consumed by 1-3% of them. The consumption of marijuana is associated with a recognizable youth group, what confirms earlier studies. A group of highest risk is made of young people between 20 and 24, male, university students, the residents of Zagreb, Istria, Croatian Littoral and Dalmatia, and whose fathers have higher education level. A great majority of young people tend to see themselves in rather positive terms: they are self-assured, think they have a good number of personal qualities; believe in their capabilities when compared to other people and have no doubts that most people they know like them. This may be related to feeling of security they experience in the context of their immediate environment since a great majority of the young claim that they can almost always get warmth, care and support from their parents and support from their friends. On the other hand, only every second of them feel the same about their teachers. It seems that most Croatian families are characterised by an exercise of indirect and flexible control over their children in the course of their growing up. In over half of the cases parents or relatives hardly ever determine rules for their children' s behaviour although they do control the choice of their friends, as well as their evening outdoor activities. Moreover, young people claim that their parents are especially keen of their school progress since they almost regularly keep records on their children school situation. • When asked about the most serious problems of their generation, the majority of young people in Croatia mention socially unacceptable behaviour, such as drug abuse, alcohol consumption and violence, unemployment, low standard of living, the lack of life chances and mass migration of young experts abroad. Since unemployment was repeatedly displayed as the major problem of young generation in earlier studies, their present preoccupation with socially unacceptable behaviour may be related either to the sample structure (majority of them are students) or to a general social climate which is, due to predominance of media campaigns mainly geared against smoking and drug abuse (but not against alcohol consumption, except for safe driving), inducing an over-sensitisation to behavioural issues causing, on the other side, the lack of awareness of existentially important issues of young people that are of an utmost importance for their independence and self-satisfaction. Young people are inclined to attribute responsibility for solving these problems primarily to themselves, their parents and public authorities, i.e. firstly to those actors that function at the private level (personal and parents' responsibility), than to public sector (government, education system) and, finally, to the civil society (nongovernmental organizations, youth associations and religious institutions). This means that youth principally count on their personal strength and family support, as well as that they have explicit expectations of state institutions, whereas they think of receiving the assistance from the civil sector only exceptionally. Notwithstanding, since half of the young studied have failed to mention personal responsibility, it clearly demonstrates that both strong sense of self-responsibility and its avoidance stand side by side as two features of Croatian youth. Among the measures that Croatian youth see as the most efficient for solving their problems two are underlined: equal education and career opportunities, on the one hand, and strict punishment of drug dealers and restrictions on alcohol selling, on the other hand. Since the majority of youth consider socially unacceptable behaviour, including drug-addiction, to be the gravest problem of their generation, it is understandable that they see the way out in strict punishing of drug dealers, (rather than consumers), what is still inadequately determined by Croatian law. Other most frequently mentioned measure has to do with the youth quest for developing society of equal chances which is in line with their perception of unemployment as the second most frequently mentioned youth problem in Croatia. Although lesser in number, the young refer to their under-representation and require their participation in decision-making to be ensured at all levels. They also require better adapting of secondary and higher education to the needs of contemporary life, as well as better quality of education, in general; some speak in favour of establishing a ministry for youth affairs, developing national strategy for promoting youth well-being, setting up of funds for youth initiatives, better legal regulations of the places of youth entertainment, i.e., the issues majority of which have already been integrated into the recently adopted National Programme of Action for Youth that is seen as an initial step in developing a national youth policy. The values that the majority of young people hold personally important or very important are healthy environment, peace in the world, gender equality, and rights and freedoms of the individual. Second group of the most personally preferable values encompasses solidarity among people, social justice, economic security, respect for differences, rule of law, inalienability of property, civil society, free market, freedom of the media, protection of minorities, religion and democratic system. The bottom of the scale is occupied by social power, national sentiment, European integration, and high economic standard. The review of their preferences demonstrates a relatively respectable level of democratic potential of young people in Croatia. They are more oriented towards comfortable life based on key principles of democracy and civil society, which is in correspondence with earlier research that have documented the shift to a more individualistic value system, including youth' s preference for independence and their focus on self-realisation and material security. However, their relative devaluation of the importance of European integration may be, on the one hand, the sign of either their dissatisfaction with, or their criticism of the way new European order has been established, partly due to the fact that Croatia has been somehow unjustly left behind. On the other hand it may be the consequence of their perceiving the integration merely in terms of a political objective of which very little they experience in everyday life. This is not to say that they devaluate the importance of European integration for Croatia as such. It would be more accurate to say that Croatian young people are becoming more and more pragmatic in their social positioning of which many think not only in the context of Croatia but in the context of Europe and the world. Having in mind a long tradition of Croatian youth emigration to Europe and the fact that almost 20% of contemporary youth plan to leave the country for good (mostly for a European country), their relation toward European integration may mean that they see it only as an added value to an already established youth migratory pattern in Croatia. of young people about the determinants of upward social mobility in Croatia reflect their accurate perception of social anomalies that, if left unquestioned, threaten to deepen social inequalities and diminish democratic potential of the society. Namely, a great majority of the young see as important or highly important for social promotion in Croatia a combination of the following variables: adaptive behaviour, personal endeavour, knowledge and skills, and connections and acquaintances. University degree, money and wealth, and the obedience and submissiveness to the 'boss', are identified less but, nevertheless, reflect a combination of appropriate and inappropriate means of social promotion. Somehow more troublesome is the finding that one third to one half of the young consider belonging to certain nation or political party, as well as bribing and corruption as important determinants of one' s success in Croatia. These data present an index of youth's perception of Croatian society as the society of unequal chances since it, by allowing nondemocratic practice to play an important role in social promotion, actually discriminates against those who in this matter believe in, and rely on their own abilities and efforts. When compared to earlier studies, it is highly troublesome that almost the same factors of social promotion are estimated as important by both socialist and ' transitional' young people in Croatia. Overall examination of the above results may be seen as an indicator of a process of relative homogenisation of young people in today' s Croatia – certainly, within the issues here examined and at the present level of analysis. There is no doubt that young people here described have many characteristic in common, especially in reference to their marital status, family pattern, housing conditions, parent' s educational background, attitudes towards present and future life, professional and educational aspirations, desired accommodation, sources of information, satisfaction with free time, positive feelings about themselves, feeling of security in relation to their parents and friends, as well as in reference to their abuse of psychoactive substances. They also share their desire for autonomy and independence, and for the recognition by the society at large, as well as their dreams of a more just society in which life opportunities would match individual abilities and endeavour. When they differ, it is mostly due to their varied socio-professional status and age. Residential status, father' s educational background, gender, and regional background are less important. The tendencies that have been documented suggest that youth are divided primarily by their actual social status and stage of attained maturity, and only secondarily by socialization factors, such as social origin in a narrow and broad sense of the term, and a gender socialization patterns. However, further analysis of data should disclose youth dominating trends with more accuracy.

The Croatian government is undertaking a five-year plan to move people with intellectual and physical disabilities from confinement in two long-stay institutions, to supported housing within their communities.This paper examines a 17-year investment by the Mental Health Initiative of the Open Society Public Health Program to make these reforms possible. It reviews the development of civil society engagement, past organizational failures, changes in international law and political pressure, the roots of government partnership, and future challenges and opportunities.

Croatia is becoming the 28th member of the European Union on July1st, 2013. Croatia has gone a long way from a socialist republic to an independentcountry recognized as one of the economic tigers of the Western Balkans in thefirst decade of the 21st century.Croatia has been hit by the global crisis, which turned out to be a huge externalshock for the region of the Western Balkans. Although it does not enter theeconomy through the direct channels, as local banks have not been engaged intoxic assets trade, but indirect channels, like the decrease of FDI, which deepensforeign trade deficits, slow credit growth or decrease of remittance which lead toeconomic disturbances during the last phase of the European integration process.Small economies, like Croatia, are exposed much more to the effects of any disturbanceson the international scene. They are dependent on foreign trade and the inflow of FDI, while their demand and inflation rate are affected by the pace of changes in big economies.The article addresses the problem of economic development in the countrywhich needs to deal with a problem of the economic crisis infection and the EUintegration process. The article studies the economic situation in Croatia which is the consequence of a recovery plan undertaken by the Croatian government. ; Croatia is becoming the 28th member of the European Union on July1st, 2013. Croatia has gone a long way from a socialist republic to an independentcountry recognized as one of the economic tigers of the Western Balkans in thefirst decade of the 21st century.Croatia has been hit by the global crisis, which turned out to be a huge externalshock for the region of the Western Balkans. Although it does not enter theeconomy through the direct channels, as local banks have not been engaged intoxic assets trade, but indirect channels, like the decrease of FDI, which deepensforeign trade deficits, slow credit growth or decrease of remittance which lead toeconomic disturbances during the last phase of the European integration process.Small economies, like Croatia, are exposed much more to the effects of any disturbanceson the international scene. They are dependent on foreign trade and the inflow of FDI, while their demand and inflation rate are affected by the pace of changes in big economies.The article addresses the problem of economic development in the countrywhich needs to deal with a problem of the economic crisis infection and the EUintegration process. The article studies the economic situation in Croatia which is the consequence of a recovery plan undertaken by the Croatian government.

Croatia is becoming the 28th member of the European Union on July1st, 2013. Croatia has gone a long way from a socialist republic to an independentcountry recognized as one of the economic tigers of the Western Balkans in thefirst decade of the 21st century.Croatia has been hit by the global crisis, which turned out to be a huge externalshock for the region of the Western Balkans. Although it does not enter theeconomy through the direct channels, as local banks have not been engaged intoxic assets trade, but indirect channels, like the decrease of FDI, which deepensforeign trade deficits, slow credit growth or decrease of remittance which lead toeconomic disturbances during the last phase of the European integration process.Small economies, like Croatia, are exposed much more to the effects of any disturbanceson the international scene. They are dependent on foreign trade and the inflow of FDI, while their demand and inflation rate are affected by the pace of changes in big economies.The article addresses the problem of economic development in the countrywhich needs to deal with a problem of the economic crisis infection and the EUintegration process. The article studies the economic situation in Croatia which is the consequence of a recovery plan undertaken by the Croatian government. ; Croatia is becoming the 28th member of the European Union on July1st, 2013. Croatia has gone a long way from a socialist republic to an independentcountry recognized as one of the economic tigers of the Western Balkans in thefirst decade of the 21st century.Croatia has been hit by the global crisis, which turned out to be a huge externalshock for the region of the Western Balkans. Although it does not enter theeconomy through the direct channels, as local banks have not been engaged intoxic assets trade, but indirect channels, like the decrease of FDI, which deepensforeign trade deficits, slow credit growth or decrease of remittance which lead toeconomic disturbances during the last phase of the European integration process.Small economies, like Croatia, are exposed much more to the effects of any disturbanceson the international scene. They are dependent on foreign trade and the inflow of FDI, while their demand and inflation rate are affected by the pace of changes in big economies.The article addresses the problem of economic development in the countrywhich needs to deal with a problem of the economic crisis infection and the EUintegration process. The article studies the economic situation in Croatia which is the consequence of a recovery plan undertaken by the Croatian government.

The paper analyses economic inequality in Croatia in comparison with other transition economies of Central, East and Southeast Europe. It comprises a literature review and a descriptive analysis as well as an econometric modelling exercise. The main findings are the following Over the entire transition period, Croatia has had a rather low and remarkably stable level of income inequality. The decomposition analysis of the period 2000-2006 shows that, although the concentration of income from paid employment was rising, overall stability of income inequality was due to a reduction of the more unequally distributed income from self-employment as well as to improved targeting of public transfers in later years. By contrast, the redistributive effect of the system of public pensions is rather low and could be improved. The outcome of the econometric analysis suggests that Croatia should further aim for a high share of government expenditures and a low level of inflation, in order to achieve a reasonable redistribution of disposable income and a stable development of real income. At the same time Croatia should increase its share of exports of goods and services in GDP to raise employment in the more productive export industries. Efforts to further decrease the relatively high unemployment rate would yield positive distributional effects as well.

IN ENGLISH: The chapter describes the changes in educational policy in Croatia from 1990 to 2015 with a brief overview of the previous period and an analysis of policy instruments used in the last decade. In the analysed period, Croatian educational policy has undergone important changes although it was not a priority of key political actors. The analysis is focused on instruments used to achieve the educational policy goals. The goals are defined based on national public political documents, which have determined educational priorities in the analysed period and they are analysed within the context of all changes in national policies, changes in politics and the Europeanization of public policies. The chapter begins with the thesis that selecting instruments depends highly on ideas and interests of key actors. --- IN CROATIAN: Poglavlje opisuje promjene u obrazovnoj politici u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju od 1990. do 2015. godine. Pri tome se daje pregled prethodnog ciklusa i analiza policy instrumenata koji su korišteni. U tom periodu, hrvatska obrazovna politika je prošla kroz niz važnih promjena unatoč tome što nije bila prioritet glavnih političkih aktera. Analiza je usmjerena na korištene instumente kojima su se ostvarivali ciljevi obrazovne politike. Ciljevi su definirani na temelji nacionalnih dokumenata, a kojima su određeni obrazovni prioriteti. Analiza uzima u obzir kontekst policy promjena na nacionalnoj razini, političke promjene i europeizaciju javnih politika. Polazna pretpostavka poglavlja je da odabir policy instrumenata snažno ovisi o idejama i interesima glavnih aktera.

The paper investigate attitudes of respondents belonging to different confessional, religious, socio-demographic, socio-structural and socio-cultural strata within the dominant Catholic population towards " religious others" – members of other main branches of the same religion in Croatia (Catholic/Orthodox/Protestant), members of other religions (Islam, Judaism), members of " sects" or New Religious Movements, and non-religious people – through the use of Bogardus' social distance scale. The question about social distance towards different religious groups was included in the questionnaire of ISSP survey " The Role of Government" , conducted by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb in 2006 on a representative national sample (N=1200) of the Croatian adult population aged 18 years or more. The results showed the general social distance towards all religious others besides Catholics, and specifically the greater social distance toward religious communities which are new or which have not been present in this area for more than one century. Also, social distance is smaller towards non-religious than towards " the religious other" . Religiously affiliated respondents express greater social distance towards all religious groups and towards non-religious respondents than do those without religious affiliation. More religious respondents and religious practitioners express greater distance. Different socio- structural and socio-cultural characteristics of respondents also effects social distance, the predictor of greater distance being lower education, rural residential status and belonging to certain region (Lika and Banovina, Dalmatia).

Popular sovereignty in Croatia can be exercised either by representation, or by direct democracy, i.e. by direct popular involvement in decision making. Following initial overview of legal rules regulating exercise of direct democracy in Croatia, it will be demonstrated that almost complete absence of national referenda over the past eight years of Croatia's independence can be explained by specific political consensus among the President of the Republic, the Parliamentary majority and the Government. I will also present relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court on the point and try to answer to what extent probability of referenda in Croatia depends on institutional balance.

A maritime state, with its influence and policy by means of legal measures and regulations, can and must follow and urge business operations and development of the national port system, in a word, of each single port within that system. The development of the port system has to be marked by a clearly defined port policy that is a constituent part of the economic and traffic policy of the country. Port policy is a set of legal regulations by which the state shapes and guides the development of ports in compliance with assessed needs. The state's influence on business operations and development of ports in Croatia is at the very outset. The new maritime legislation (Maritime Code and Seaports Act) in Croatia attempts to overcome and rectify the flaws taken over from ex-Yugoslavia and endeavors to organize and direct business and development of the port system more successfully and in compliance with other developed European maritime states. The acts that are now in the process of legislating are the basis for the making of a long-standing, integral and justified port policy in Croatia.

In this paper legal prerequisites for vaccine licensure in Croatia are discussed. The Croatian legislation concerning vaccine licensing, marketing authorisation and utilization is reviewed. The procedures for including a vaccine into the Mandatory Childhood Vaccination Programme are also discussed with focus on Human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines. Non-obligatory vaccination recommendations are given when according to professional opinion; vaccination is beneficial for the vaccinee. There is little doubt that HPV vaccines should be recommended for preadolescent girls in Croatia. However, reaching a decision on its possible introduction into the Childhood Vaccination Programme will require careful consideration of the larger picture and a comparison of the cost-effectiveness of a mandatory vaccination against other competing public health priorities.

The Roma are one of the most recognisable, peculiar and vivid ethnic minorities in the Republic of Croatia. At the same time, they are also the most stigmatised and marginalised Croatian minority, whereas their marginalisation is multilayered and complex, affecting their civil, cultural, economic, social and political rights. The Roma have been present on the Croatian territory since the 14th century, but they have never been acknowledged the status of an autochthonous national minority by the Croatian Constitution. The goal of this paper is to give an overview of the most important features of the Romany identity in the Republic of Croatia as well as to point out at core issues of their poverty, discrimination and problems related to education, employment and housing. A special emphasis is put on the importance of preservation of the Romany traditional intangible heritage and inclusion of the Roma in the social and political life of the Croatian society. ; Peer reviewed

Croatia seems to be a fairly good example to illustrate the complexity and controversies encountered when dealing with the education of national ethnic minorities. National minority rights, including education, are far more complicated and sensitive projects in a transitional society - especially in countries immediately after a war or after severe interethnic conflicts (which sometimes escalated to "ethnic cleansing" as in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) - in comparison with well-settled, advanced democracies with elaborated human rights and with a "historical distance" towards previous wars and ethnic conflicts. In Croatia we can distinguish between "historical or autochtonous national minorities", some of which could be called "imperial", and the so-called "new minorities". Sooner or later we can expect the formation of immigrant minorities together with the rise of labour immigration. Special education for minorities is a thorny agenda, which on the one hand involves "real demands" (the European Charter) by vivid cultural communities with a developed collective identity and on the other, the readiness of a government to adopt these cultural (educational) demands as legitimate ones. The juridical-formal and public-political recognition of minorities and their rights to social and cultural equality is only the beginning and not the end in the process of comprehensive reconstruction of both a society and its educational system towards intercultural negotiations and multicultural perspectives. If minority education reduces itself to mechanically added special, minority related contents with no real interaction with the common majority education, it may only lead to further alienation of that minority from mainstream society and even to its stigmatisation. The social and cultural integration of a national minority into an open multicultural society depends not only on the willingness of a dominant ethnic group to recognise its equal cultural rights, but also depends on the political culture and readiness of a given minority to integrate into a culturally pluralistic society and accept the equality of others ("minority paradox"). As a final conclusion, the formally equal approach to different cultural communities may provoke new issues and jeopardise even a sincere attempt to promote the minority cause in education or in other fields. A fair and just education of national minorities in a society opening itself up to multiculturalist prospects can only be the result of a dynamic process of negotiations between a majority and a minority group (or groups) based on mutual recognition.