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AbstractIn his article "Carbon Emissions, Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, and Unintended Harms," Christopher J. Preston compares the culpability of carbon emitters versus that of geoengineers deploying stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI). This comparison relies on a parallel between carbon emitters and SAI deployers that requires both to be agents. However, both are not. While the harms of geoengineering will be caused by culpable agents acting intentionally, the harms connected to climate change emerge out of the uncoordinated actions of billions of people. Taken as a large group, carbon emitters cause harm but do not constitute an agent. Taken individually, carbon emitters are agents but do not cause the harms of climate change. As a result, the parallel collapses, and Preston's "surprising" conclusion is one that he is not entitled to reach.

A leader's culpability for involving his state in a conflict affects both his war termination calculus and his domestic audience's willingness to punish him if he loses. I define a culpable leader as any leader who either presides over the beginning of a war, or comes to power midwar and shares a political connection with a culpable predecessor. Using a data set created specifically for this study, I find that culpable leaders are more likely than nonculpable ones to achieve favorable war outcomes. I also find that domestic audiences will be willing to punish culpable leaders who lose, yet spare nonculpable leaders who do the same. Taken together, my findings underscore the need to appreciate more fully the role individual leaders play in bringing their states to war.

Depiction of Bertrande, the wife of Martin Guerre, by Natalie Zemon Davis in her famous bookThe Return of Martin Guerrehas been revolutionary in its attempt to recover the criminal agency of women in historical writing. Davis challenged the representation of women as "deceived" actors of history. Although the story of Martin Guerre has been retold many times, Bertrande has almost always been depicted as being fooled by Arnaud, the false husband; indeed the court that investigated the case decided to accept her testimony that she was "tricked" for more than three years. Despite being suspicious of adultery, the court excused her by considering "the weakness of her sex, easily deceived by the trickery and finesse of men," and thus mitigated female responsibility. Yet, Davis read the same documents from a different perspective and asserted the possibility that Bertrande might have been "acquiescent" rather than "deceived" and may even have been an accomplice of Arnaud by preferring him, both sexually and socially, to Martin Guerre, her real husband who had abandoned her. In the end, the accused has not been Bertrande, but Natalie Zemon Davis, by a male historian, Robert Finlay, for creating a "proto-feminist of peasant culture" out of Bertrande.

This book contributes to the debate over the culpability of the Trans-Atlantic Slave from various disciplinary perspectives. The general thesis that undergirds the book is that by knowing who was predisposed to benefit the most from the trade and why, prompting them to initiate it, appropriate culpability can be assigned.

Since the war in Ukraine has begun, Russia has used population transfers as one of its tactics of war with over 3.6 million Ukrainian citizens now in Russia. These are acts that both Ukrainian authorities and other governments including the United States have claimed are forced deportations. This pattern reflects a longer history—the Soviet Union frequently used similar population transfers as forms of collective punishment against potentially rebellious populations, and the Russian government used similar tactics in both Chechnya and Syria. But in this case, we have better evidence of these movements as they occur. Forced deportations and transfers are defined both as war crimes—under the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II and Article 8 of the Rome Statute—and as crimes against humanity—under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, as forced deportations constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity, there are a number of mechanisms by which individual Russian perpetrators of these acts can be held accountable. These include, with the Ukrainian government's acceptance of its jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court. But such accountability mechanisms also exist at the individual state level through universal jurisdiction and Magnitsky sanctions legislation.

This article aims to investigate the culpability of legal persons, both criminal and administrative and to reach this goal we had special consideration of compliance programmes adopted prior to the commission of the administrative infringements.