Suchergebnisse

Abstract The Moroccan mountains offer unique zones of biological and cultural diversity, yet most of their inhabitants suffer from poverty and vulnerability, and their ecosystems are highly vulnerable to natural hazards and environmental degradation. This research paper attempts to shed light on the role of actors in establishing a governance model that considers the peculiarities of development in mountainous regions. It further highlights the importance that governance has become in the process of evaluating territorial management as well as its role in managing development in the Moroccan mountain areas in general, while focusing on the Tichoukt massif in particular, as it is an integral part of the Moroccan mountain system. We therefore adopted a field study in which we worked on an inventory of the actors directly concerned with development at the massif level, whether at the local, provincial or regional level, defining their roles, goals and strategies, and understanding the structure of the relationships between them and then evaluate its implications on the reality of territorial governance in the field of study. Accordingly, the results of the field study analysis showed us that the mountain regions in general, and the Tichoukt massif in particular, lack basic actors capable of coordinating the interventions of the rest of the actors in the field of development, and that their positions do not correspond with the broad powers granted to them by the Constitution and the Charter of Administrative Decentralization. Keywords : territorial governance, actors, Tichoukt massif, strategies, territorial foresight. ملخص: تقدم الجبال المغربية مجاالت فريدة من التنوع االحيائي والثقافي، اال أن معظم سكانها يعانون من الفقر والهشاشة، كما أن النظم االيكولوجية بها معرضة بشكل كبير للمخاطر الطبيعية والتدهور البيئي. تحاول هذه الورقة البحثية تسليط الضوء على دور الفاعلين في ترسيخ نموذج حكامة يراعي خصوصيات التنمية بالمناطق الجبلية، نظرا الى األهمية التي أصبحت تحظى بها الحكامة في عملية تقويم التدبير الترابي، ودورها في تدبير ...

U tekstu se analiziraju prepreke i nove mogućnosti za sudioničko upravljanje u centrima za kulturu i ustanovama za obrazovanje odraslih u vrijeme epidemije COVID-19. Opisuje se važnost socijalne participacije i sudioničkog upravljanja u organizacijama za obrazovanje odraslih, važnost suradnje ustanova i udruga. Središnji dio analize bavi se provedbom koprodukcije tj. zajedničkog rada građana, udruga i ustanova u pripremi i provedbi programa. Ova analiza se temelji na podacima iz provedbe projekta u osam organizacija iz različitih dijelova Hrvatske u vrijeme epidemije COVID-19. ; The text analyzes barriers and new opportunities for participatory governance in cultural centers and adult education institutions during the COVID-19 epidemic. It describes the importance of social participation and participatory governance in adult education organizations, the importance of cooperation between institutions and associations. The central part of the analysis deals with the implementation of co-production, ie the joint work of citizens, associations and institutions in the preparation and implementation of the program. This analysis is based on data from the project implementation in eight organizations from different parts of Croatia at the time of the COVID epidemic 19.

The European entrepreneurial undertaking, in the form of an equipped & armed merchant ship ready to circumnavigate & conquer the globe, created the modern world with one side only: the globalized West. Contemporary global liberal interventionism & governmental entrepreneurship are segmented today into a dangerously simplified multitask global pyramid of governance through unidirectional cascades. For real globalization, this process has to be bidirectional at least: from the center to the periphery, but also from the periphery to the center. Otherwise, at the beginning of a new "centennial trend" & a "great cycle," there is the risk that the collapse of the liberal civilization of the 19th century could be repeated -- once again because of the weakness of the world-system peripheries. The question of how to strengthen the "anonymous" global economic, cultural, & political processes of the bidirectional kind is becoming the central global & strategic issue for today's politics & political science. It has turned out that this kind of state & its processes in the real global environment could be successfully analyzed & effectively made use of only with the complete unreduced methodical front of all the fields of political science together -- & more. As such, they could be practically surmounted only with a very complex political & economic action through a whole set of expertly managed public policies. From the historically based Croatian point of view, a possibility of integration into the world center was always in founding a world market "niche," & never in making even a mini-empire or in controlling a globalized or a mega-national net. Without a methodically global political science approach, also leaning on Central European & Mediterranean cultural & politological traditions, such Croatian interests will not be accomplished. 41 References. Adapted from the source document.

Social criticism has been a pervasive element in modern Arabic literature since its beginnings. This book is concerned with social criticism in blog narratives against the background of a long tradition of criticizing society through literary expression in the Egyptian national framework. It is also about ways in which the Arabic literary heritage, classical and contemporary, is put to work and recycled in Egyptian Arabic-language blogs. Readers will become aware that a number of the same societal and political problems that have been and still are treated in literature are brought up in Egyptian blogs. While social criticism will be shown to be a common thread in literary expression and blogging in Egypt, a central question is how bloggers use their cultural and literary heritage to advance their goals of changing social and political reality. The bloggers give voice to core problems with which an early blogging generation was and continues to be concerned. Some were discontented with the inability of the government to provide them with the democratic liberties they requested. Others emphasized the necessity to solve the urgent problems of poor governance, corruption and poverty. The book concludes that if the root problems are not addressed and the old order not removed, real change cannot take place. The question is what picture literature and social media including blogs will present to us henceforth: one of a society taking steps towards real change, or one reflecting the status quo with circumscribed individual liberties and lack of social reform

U radu se analiziraju 134 javne politike cjeloživotnog učenja (CU) u devet zemalja uključenih u projekt 'Javne politike koje podržavaju mlade u njihovom životnom putu - Komparativna analiza cjeloživotnog učenja i uključivanja u obrazovanje i rad u Europi' (YOUNG_ADULLLT) koji je razvijen u okviru EU okvirnog programa za istraživanje i inovacije HORIZON 2020. Analiza javnih politika cjeloživotnog učenja se temelji na tri teorijska koncepta – kulturna politička ekonomija, teorija životnog puta i upravljanje. Ciljevi analize se odnose na utvrđivanje procedura formuliranja i implementacije politika CU u pojedinim državama, analizu njihovih specifičnih ciljeva i stupanj koordinacije obrazovnih politika, politika socijalne zaštite i tržišta rada. Analiza pokazuje razlike među zemljama s obzirom na navedene ciljeve koje su posljedica različitih društvenih i ekonomskih okolnosti. Procedure formuliranja politika kreću se od centraliziranih do decentraliziranih. Ciljevi javnih politika cjeloživotnog učenja su trostruki – obrazovni, ekonomski i socijalni, pri čemu njihova zastupljenost varira od zemlje do zemlje. Razine i mehanizmi koordinacije cjeloživotnog učenja također nisu istovjetni te su prepoznate razlike među zemljama s obzirom na centralno upravljani lokalizam, laissez faire i demokratski lokalizam. ; The paper analyses 134 policies which address lifelong learning policies (LLL policies) in nine countries involved in the project Policies Supporting Young Adults in their Life Course: A Comparative Perspective of Lifelong Learning and Inclusion in Education and Work in Europe (YOUNG_ADULLLT, HORIZON 2020). The analysis is based on three theoretical concepts - cultural political economy, life course theory and governance. The objective of the analysis is to determine the ways in which the LLL policies for youth are formulated and implemented in educational, economic and social sectors. The analysis shows the differences between the countries with regard to the stated goals that are a result of different social and economic circumstances. Policy formulation policies range from centralized to decentralized. The objectives of policies are threefold - educational, economic and social, with their representation varying from country to country. The levels and mechanisms of lifelong learning coordination also show the differences between countries with regard to centrally managed localism, laissez faire and democratic localism.

U radu se razmatra potencijalni doprinos socijalnih inovacija jačanju socijalne kohezije i ublažavanju učinaka krize. U politikama i programima financiranja Europske unije socijalne inovacije prepoznaju se kao važan doprinos jačanju socijalne kohezije, koja slabi uslijed krize i povećane socijalne ranjivosti. Istovremeno, pokazuje se da su socijalne inovacije u hrvatskom kontekstu i dalje slabo poznat koncept priređivačima politika, stručnjacima i široj javnosti. Nalazi i zaključci rada temelje se na empirijskom istraživanju provedenom u okviru međunarodnog FP7 projekta WILCO – Welfare Innovations at Local Levels in Favour of Cohesion, unutar kojeg su studirani izabrani gradovi (u Hrvatskoj su to bili Zagreb i Varaždin); obilježja njihovih socijalnih sustava te su analizirani identificirani primjeri socijalnih inovacija. Lokalni socijalni sustavi gradova u istraživanju tek djelomično odražavaju karakteristike nacionalnih socijalnih režima, a otvorenost i podrška lokalnih vlasti ključna je za razvoj i održivost socijalnih inovacija. Većina istraživanih inovacija je u području usluga, iako se inovacije prepoznaju i u inovativnim instrumentima regulacije i socijalnih prava, novim oblicima vladavine te novim modalitetima rada i financiranja organizacija te one mogu utjecati na postupne promjene samih lokalnih socijalnih sustava. U hrvatskom kontekstu razlikujemo tri tipa socijalnih inovacija: (1) inovacije koje nastaju u javnom sektoru, uz podršku stručnjaka izvan sektora, (2) inovacije koje dolaze iz inozemstva, kao rezultat inozemnih financijskih programa te (3) inovacije koje dolaze iz civilnog društva, temeljem samoorganizacije građana. Dok se u primjerima nekih zapadnoeuropskih gradova javni sektor sa svojim profesionalnim kapacitetima prepoznaje kao važan proizvođač socijalnih inovacija, u Hrvatskoj prijašnja iskustva te istraživanja provedena u projektu sugeriraju da većina socijalnih inovacija dolazi iz civilnog društva, pri čemu je razina kulturnog i socijalnog kapitala važan preduvjet razvoja i uspjeha inovacija. ; This paper discusses a potential contribution of social innovations to strengthening social cohesion and mitigating the effects of the crisis. In EU funding policies and programs, social innovations are recognized as an important contribution to strengthening of social cohesion, which has weakened due to the crisis and increasing social vulnerability. At the same time, it is shown that social innovations in the Croatian context are still a concept poorly understood by policy creators, experts, and the general public. The findings and conclusions of the paper are based on the empirical research conducted within the international FP7 project WILCO - Welfare Innovations at Local Levels in Favour of Cohesion, which studied the selected towns (in Croatia Zagreb and Varaždin) and characteristics of their social systems, and which analyzed identified examples of social innovations. Local social systems of cities included in the research reflected the characteristics of national welfare regimes only partially, and the openness and support of local authorities is crucial for the development and sustainability of social innovations. Most of the studied innovations were in the field of services, although innovations were also recognized in innovative instruments of regulation and social rights, the new forms of governance and new modes of work and funding of organizations, and they can have an impact on the gradual changes of the local social systems. In the Croatian context, three types of social innovations can be distinguished: (1) innovations occurring in the public sector, with the support of experts from outside the industry, (2) innovations that come from abroad, as a result of foreign financial programs, and (3) innovations coming from civil society, based on the self-organization of citizens. While in the examples of some Western European cities the public sector with its professional capacity is recognized as an important producer of social innovations, in Croatia, past experiences and the research conducted within the project suggest that most social innovations come from civil society, where the level of cultural and social capital is an important prerequisite for the development and success of innovations.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.