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Recently, British Prime Minister Theresa May made a bold anti-cosmopolitan claim: 'If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what citizenship means'. Given that many have never found nationalism particularly appealing, some have been moved to become citizens of the world after hearing these lines. But how is one to become a cosmopolitan? The answer is found in the history of philosophy. Cosmopolitanism has taken many forms. There are moral, political, legal, economic and cultural cosmopolitanisms. A form that has not received much attention is therapeutic cosmopolitanism. The focus of this form is on how being a world-citizen entails certain health benefits. I argue that therapeutic cosmopolitanism is both the original and best way of being a world-citizen. To do so, I summarize the present taxonomy of cosmopolitanisms and show how therapeutic cosmopolitanism contrasts with these options. I use classical Cynicism as the primary example of therapeutic cosmopolitanism. Instead of the universalist humanism and supranational communitarianism that characterizes cosmopolitan options, Cynic cosmopolitanism employs extreme naturalism. I show how being a Cynic cosmopolitan is the preferable way of rejecting nationalists of all stripes.

The papers published in this issue of the EJPT discuss facets of the work of Isaiah Berlin from different perspectives and making use of varying intellectual approaches. At the same time, they focus attention on a few, central themes of Berlin's work: his complex relationship to liberalism and nationalism, his theories of liberty and value pluralism, and his perception and uses of the history of ideas. Consideration of the differences and overlap between these articles presents an occasion to take stock of Berlin's work as a whole; and a critical response to the interpretations and criticisms of Berlin presented here afford an opportunity to re-evaluate, criticize and defend central aspects of Berlin's intellectual position. This article goes beyond summary to present a critical, interpretive adjudication between the claims of Berlin's work, and the interpretations of that work presented in the other articles in this issue. Drawing on each of these, I present an interpretation of Berlin's contributions to thinking about the Enlightenment, nationalism and cultural pluralism, utopianism and political ethics, liberty, and value pluralism; I also consider the difficulties of interpreting Berlin's work, and applying his ideas today. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

The "new public management" (NPM) wave in public sector organizational change was founded on themes of disaggregation, competition, & incentivization. Although its effects are still working through in countries new to NPM, this wave has now largely stalled or been reversed in some key "leading-edge" countries. This ebbing chiefly reflects the cumulation of adverse indirect effects on citizens' capacities for solving social problems because NPM has radically increased institutional & policy complexity. The character of the post-NPM regime is currently being formed. We set out the case that a range of connected & information technology-centered changes will be critical for the current & next wave of change, & we focus on themes of reintegration, needs-based holism, & digitization changes. The overall movement incorporating these new shifts is toward "digital-era governance" (DEG), which involves reintegrating functions into the governmental sphere, adopting holistic & needs-oriented structures, & progressing digitalization of administrative processes. DEG offers a perhaps unique opportunity to create self-sustaining change, in a broad range of closely connected technological, organizational, cultural, & social effects. But there are alternative scenarios as to how far DEG will be recognized as a coherent phenomenon & implemented successfully. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

This essay solders together a historical case study of advertising on the China mainland in the early twentieth century with a series of generalizable appraisals and determinations to establish how the catachresis woman is evental. The event of women emerged historically in part because commercial advertising alleges that it did, and in part because at roughly the same time a subjective claim—"I am a woman"—began to be voiced. Although registered orthographically, woman 女性 is not simply a rhetorical category or a natural fact; it is not the effect of abyssal sex difference or an array of performatively accreted social subjects. It is a historical novelty. This essay universalizes a case rooted in Chinese- and Japanese-language archives and historical specificities, particularly the international advertising ephemera that presents a multiple (Badiou's language for a set or "context") or site where a historical event could have erupted and, in this case, did erupt. Ephemera are useful in historical analysis, as Walter Benjamin suggested a century ago, because historical events lie immanent in detritus as potential dialectical images, which the determined historian can extricate. Reading Badiou's philosophy creatively, the essay makes the case that women or woman is an emergent, historical, modern, and universal truth; direct critique of Badiou also drives home the point that philosophy (or "theory") is vulnerable to history and that historically, factually, actually, and in truth, women and feminism are foundations of modernity no matter how modernity is qualified.

This essay is Li Xiaojiang's response to Tani Barlow's "Socialist Modernization and the Market Feminism of Li Xiaojiang" (ch. 6 of Barlow's The Question of Women in Chinese Feminism). Barlow, in discussing Li Xiaojiang's work in the 1980s, wholly overlooked the key article "The Progress of Humanity and Women's Women's Liberation" (人类进步与妇女解放) published in Marxist Studies (马克思主义研究) in 1983, which Li claims was the first theoretical article on women to appear in a mainstream authoritative journal in mainland China. Li agrees with Barlow's characterization of one of her two ideological roots as Marxist humanism but says that her other root is not "psychodynamics" but Western feminism—though in her own work she has tried to keep some distance from it and refrains from using the word feminism (in Chinese or English) to describe the 1980s women's movement in China, preferring the term women's studies movement. Li rejects Barlow's characterization of her work in the 1980s as "market feminism" on the grounds that China was not then oriented to a market economy and that Li's theoretical attention at that time was on socialist revolution and Marxist theory about women's liberation. Li agrees with her critics' views that she is an essentialist feminist, for she holds that one is born a female and that the second-sex status is a necessary period in the historical evolution of humanity.

Metaphysical terms like science, matter, nature, and reality have always been in limbo in critical theory; scholars have deconstructed and problematized and critiqued them, yet they still will not go away. Debates over science's relationship to discourse and knowledge particularly revolve around the extent to which science's objects are "real" or, put more formally, to what extent objects of human inquiry exist outside their investigation. This essay critiques two important interlocutors in the debate—Butler and Latour—to argue that this is the wrong question to ask. Resisting the temptation to make the poststructuralist move of positing culture as the origin of nature, which would grant culture the primary status that nature has historically held, Kirby bypasses arguments over whether matter is out in the world or a product of language by expanding what counts as language. Rather than claim that nature in its prerepresentational form is impossible to experience, she argues that nature itself consists of representations, and not just human-made ones. This essay, and, in its own way, each essay in the special issue it responds to, shows how the binaries operating in science were never really binaries. Nature and culture, body and mind, and subject and object are not opposing terms that need to be brought together but always already related terms whose relatedness must be—and, throughout the issue of differences in which it appears, will be—unveiled.

While the nineteenth-century consolidation of the anthropological culture concept shifted ethnological interests away from the figure of the solitary "savage" to wider structures of communal governance, it nonetheless accommodated the eighteenth-century caricatures of instinctive and passionate "savages" by redeploying the terrain of the instinctive onto collective forms of social organization. At the same time, European instincts were believed to achieve greater independence from the material stuff of daily life, being increasingly figured as outside of either social or material influence. The split appears in Freud's analogy of "savage" sociality and the European psyche in Totem and Taboo as a hesitation about whether law and custom are external to the "savage" psyche or constituent parts of it. Freud's chief ethnological sources for Totem and Taboo—Lorimer Fison and A. W. Howitt's Kamilaroi and Kûrnai (1880) and Baldwin Spencer and Frank Gillen's Native Tribes of Central Australia (1899)—do not mention instinct, but their analyses of savage sociality nonetheless become the basis for Freud's early instinct theory. Freud sometimes presents himself as partial to the idea that instinct obviates institutional reinforcement when he needs to make the case that social structures are not transparent reflections of human wishes. This article argues that the ambivalence that appears so frequently in Freud's analysis of instinct highlights the fact that institutions cannot be thought solely to regulate the undesirable components of instinct.

Critical thought is most fruitful when it establishes a synergistic linkage between the Kantian tradition of epistemological critique and the Marxian tradition of social critique to question both established forms of thought and established forms of institutional life, thus putting us in a position to invent futures other than the one inscribed in the present order of things. Critical thought today is at once extremely strong and terribly weak. It is strong in that our capacities to understand society and history have never been so great (as indicated by the growing number of social scientists, the rising general level of education, and the influence of Foucault, Bourdieu, and feminism throughout the social and cultural disciplines). It is weak insofar as it remains enclosed within the academic microcosm and faces a symbolic Great Wall formed by neoliberal discourse as well as competition from a falsely progressive thought that invites us to submit to the prevailing forces of the the market under cover of celebrating the "subject," "identity," "multiculturalism," "diversity" and "globalization." Critical thought must tirelessly pose the question of the social costs and benefits of the policies of economic deregulation and social dismantling now presented as the road to prosperity and happiness under the aegis of "individual responsibility." It must return to its historical mission, which is to serve as a solvent of doxa so as to give ourselves a chance to think the world rather than being thought by it.

A critical evluation of the definition of peace in terms of predictable order, proffered by both social science & US cultural discourse. It is argued that cultures which value order above all else actually end up focusing on & increasing their sense of disorder. Defining peace solely in terms of order exacerbates this process, increasing peacelessness as well as injustice in many ways. Chaos theory & clinical psychology suggest an alternative view of peace as an interplay of order & disorder that transcends the opposition between them. Peace research & peace movements that represent this alternative definition are identified. Adapted from the source document.

This paper deals with aspects of social class within the modern welfare state of Norway. More specifically, it explores how universal family policy measures are understood and combined by parents in different social classes. Drawing on qualitative interviews with parents, we identified two distinctly different 'cultural models of care'. Parents more or less followed these models in their own care strategies, although some combined elements from each into hybrid strategies. The cultural models were clearly related to class: most middle-class parents combined the different welfare state measures into a 'tidy trajectory' of care, while most working-class parents created a 'sheltered space' for care. In the paper we discuss the significance of structural factors for these patterns of care by comparing our findings with similar research from Britain.