In 1865, there was the enactment of the laws of administrative unification for the Kingdom of Italy. On the occasion of the 150th anniversary, the Department of Legal Sciences of the University of Florence organized a study project on the transformations which over the last fifty years have affected the Italian Republic's administrative apparatus and activities. They analysed in its articulated local government and its EU membership. Over nearly two years, the researches have involved more than one hundred and fifty scholars from Italian universities. The results were presented on 15th and 16th October 2015 in Florence, the Italian capital city a hundred and fifty years before, which in 1965 had hosted the conference celebrating the 100th anniversary of the same administrative unification laws. The conducted studies are now published in definitive form and organized into eight volumes. Table of contents I. The organization of public administrations between national state and European integration, edited by Roberto Cavallo Perin, Aristide Police, Fabio Saitta II. Political and territorial cohesion, edited by Gabriella De Giorgi Cezzi, Pier Luigi Portaluri III. Legalization, edited by Barbara Marchetti, Mauro Renna IV. Technification, edited by Stefano Civitarese Matteucci, Luisa Torchia V. Public intervention in the economy, edited by Maurizio Cafagno, Francesco Manganaro VI. Unification and cultural pluralism, edited by Edoardo Chiti, Gianluca Gardini, Aldo Sandulli VII. Administrative justice as a service (between effectiveness and efficiency), edited by Gian Domenico Comporti VIII. Administrative citizenships, edited by Antonio Bartolini, Alessandra Pioggia
The reduction of more than a third of the number of members of parliamentary chambers, tounchanged electoral system, objectively leads to a significant reduction of thedegree of representativeness and pluralism of parliamentary bodies.The pluralist principle, although not expressly set out in a specific provisionconstitutional, in the light of a systematic logical reading, constitutes one of the principlesthe Constitution and is part of the so-called hard core of the Costitution, i.e. that set of legal assets that cannot be affectednot even by a constitutional law, because they contribute significantly to characterize our legal system in a democratic sense. The pluralist principle, and it pervades every part of our constitutional system in different forms and ways, from political pluralism, to social pluralism, to cultural pluralism, to cultural pluralism, to political pluralism.religious, to territorial. ; La riduzione di oltre un terzo del numero dei componenti le camere parlamentari, asistema elettorale invariato, comporta oggettivamente una riduzione significativa delgrado di rappresentatività e di pluralismo degli organi parlamentari. Il principio pluralista, anche se non espressamente enunciato in una specifica disposizione costituzionale, alla luce di una lettura logico sistematica, costituisce uno dei principifondamentali della Costituzione e rientra a pieno titolo nel c.d. nucleo duro dellaCostituzione, ovvero quell'insieme di beni giuridici che non possono essere intaccatineppure da una legge costituzionale, perché concorrono significativamente acaratterizzare in senso democratico il nostro ordinamento giuridico. Il principio pluralista,del resto, pervade ogni parte del nostro sistema costituzionale, manifestandosi in milleforme e modi diversi, dal pluralismo politico, a quello sociale, a quello culturale, a quelloreligioso, a quello territoriale.
Riconoscere che i concetti di laicità e secolarismo possiedono un'origine e uno sviluppo condizionato dalla cultura occidentale e dal cristianesimo significa prendere in considerazione l'eventualità di un ripensamento della distinzione tra ordine politico, religione e diritto nelle democrazie multiculturali e multireligiose. L'obiettivo di questo lavoro è mettere in discussione una concezione neutralista del secolarismo, alla cui base vi è il convincimento per cui l'esclusione dell'elemento religioso dalla sfera pubblica e normativa sono garanzia di eguaglianza in un contesto caratterizzato dal 'fatto del pluralismo'. Pertanto abbiamo analizzato il pensiero di due fra i più influenti filosofi politici, John Rawls e Jürgen Habermas, portavoci di una visione neutralista del secolarismo, e le critiche a essi rivolte da alcuni teorici del multiculturalismo – Bikhu Parekh e Tariq Modood –, che propongono, invece, l'abbandono della retorica della neutralità nella costruzione della sfera politica e normativa. Di conseguenza questi ultimi si rivolgono con maggiore apertura rispetto alle richieste provenienti dagli individui appartenenti a minoranze religiose e culturali, senza respingerle sulla base della loro natura culturale o religiosa. Al contrario, in particolare quando tali richieste di riconoscimento riguardano aree rilevanti della vita degli individui, come possono essere la famiglia, il matrimonio, le questioni ereditarie ecc., ossia aree in cui la natura culturalmente condizionata di alcune istituzioni è maggiormente visibile, viene presa qui in considerazione la possibilità che esse possano essere regolate e gestite in maniera differente. A tal proposito si è approfondita la proposta di far fronte a queste richieste attraverso l'adozione di sistemi di pluralismo normativo, con una particolare attenzione a un esperimento avviato in Gran Bretagna, che prevede per le comunità religiose la possibilità del risolvere le proprie controversie in materia di diritto di famiglia in tribunali arbitrali religiosi, che tuttavia operano sotto il controllo indiretto delle corti inglesi. La descrizione di questo caso è stata finalizzata a mettere in luce la necessità di ricercare nuovi strumenti coerenti con la visione del secolarismo che abbiamo cercato di proporre, ossia di una laicità che di fronte alle nuove istanze presenti nei contesti culturalmente e religiosamente plurali, piuttosto che arroccarsi dietro la convinzione che si possa garantire uguaglianza solo se si dà una sfera pubblica e normativa neutrale e che vi sia una soluzione razionale ai conflitti tra valori, tenta di accogliere la diversità nei suoi propri termini, andando alla ricerca di nuovi strumenti teorico-politici. Infatti, i canali di partecipazione attraverso i quali i sistemi democratici hanno cercato d'integrare la diversità non sembrano riuscire a far fronte alle richieste provenienti da individui che non si riconoscono a pieno titolo nella cultura della maggioranza. Ciò significa pensare a nuove strategie d'inclusione – di cui il pluralismo normativo può essere un esempio –, se si vogliono garantire proprio quei presupposti di valore che la democrazia promuove, ossia il pluralismo e l'eguale libertà di tutti i cittadini. ; If we recognize that the concept of secularism originates and develops from the influence of Western culture and Christianity, we must take into account the possibility to rethink the distinction between politics, religion and law in multicultural and multireligious democracies. The aim of this work is to question the neutralist conception of secularism, which is characterized by the belief that the exclusion of religious elements from public sphere and legislation to guarantee of equality in a context characterized by religious pluralism. At this aim, I analyze the thought of two of the most influential political philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, who represent the neutralist view of secularism, as well as the criticism addressed to them by multiculturalist theorists – Bhikhu Parekh and Tariq Modood –, who suggest giving up the abandon of the rhetoric of neutrality in the construction of the political sphere and regulations, to pay more attention to the demands coming from individuals belonging to religious and cultural minorities. Indeed, particularly when these issues involve significant areas where the culturally conditioned nature of some institutions is more visible – family, marriage, hereditary issues – the possibility that they can be regulated in a different way is also taken into account. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the proposal is given to adopt a system of legal pluralism, with a special attention to an experiment started in the UK, which provides religious communities the possibility to go to religious arbitration tribunals, operating under the indirect control of the English courts, related to family law. The description of this case aims at emphasizing the need to seek for new consistent means with the idea of secularism I have tried to suggest. Such a secularism is based upon the belief that only a neutral public sphere and legislation can guarantee equality, but tries to embrace diversity and to suggest new political theories. As matter of fact, the channels of participation through which democratic systems have tried to integrate diversity do not seem to be able to face the requests from individuals who do not fully identify into the majority culture, which means thinking about new strategies of inclusion – for example legal pluralism – so to ensure the very value assumptions promoted by democracy, that is to say pluralism and equal liberty. ; Dottorato di ricerca in Relazioni e processi interculturali (XXV ciclo)
In theory, republican orthodoxy does not acknowledge the political dignity of any intermediary body between free and equal individuals, stripped of all particularism, and the sovereign nation. This is why, right up to the present, the French public debate has been marked by an entrenched suspicion towards all forms of «communitarism», and by the proscription of the very concept of multicultural politics. But have the policies actually pursued by republican France been consistent with the proclaimed principles? Is it genuinely possible to claim that cultural identities have never been publicly «recognised»? This multidisciplinary investigation proposes to address the ambiguous relations between theory and practice in the Republican management of cultural pluralism
In theory, republican orthodoxy does not acknowledge the political dignity of any intermediary body between free and equal individuals, stripped of all particularism, and the sovereign nation. This is why, right up to the present, the French public debate has been marked by an entrenched suspicion towards all forms of «communitarism», and by the proscription of the very concept of multicultural politics. But have the policies actually pursued by republican France been consistent with the proclaimed principles? Is it genuinely possible to claim that cultural identities have never been publicly «recognised»? This multidisciplinary investigation proposes to address the ambiguous relations between theory and practice in the Republican management of cultural pluralism.
This work tries to afford some of the issues of the multiculturalism as a phenomenon that involve and challenge the Italian constitutional legal order. First of all, the existence of new cultural and linguistic minorities implies new needs of protection of diversity, since new minorities, composed by immigrants and second and third generations of immigrants, show different characteristics from the so called "national" or "historical" minorities existing on the territory of the State: it is required, on one hand, the development of new instruments of protection and valorization of their cultural diversity, but, on the other hand, new policies of integration. Thus, the first part of the work start from considering the protection of the so called "national" minorities, underling the link existing with the typology of the form of government in Italy, moving from the liberal State, to the authoritarian State and, finally, to the pluralist democracy, in order to achieve a better understanding of the system of protection of minority groups through article 6 of the Italian Constitution and through the principle of pluralism contained in article 2 of the Italian Constitution. The second part of the work tries to evaluate the possibility of an evolution in the interpretation of article 6 of our Constitution, which provides for a special protection of linguistic minorities. Until now, article 6 of the Constitution has constituted the constitutional grounds for a protection of the so-called "historical minorities" existing in the Country, while the new cultural and linguistic minorities have been excluded from the protection. Thus, the observations carried out start from identifying the constitutional grounds for a protection of the new linguistic minorities, underlining how it is possible to move from a literal interpretation to an extensive and evolving interpretation of article 6 of the Constitution. Then, taking into account the evolution both in jurisprudence and in literature, the proposal is to set aside the citizenship criterion as a condition to be entitled of the protection provided by article 6 of the Constitution in place of new criteria. A third part of the work tries to show how the safeguard of the cultural diversity of new minorities may be considered not only as an instrument of protection but also as a new and more inclusive constitutional value shared by all the political community, considering the Constitution not only as a legal instrument but also in its cultural and ontological nature as the expression of the values of a political community. Finally, the last part of the work is centered on the necessity of managing the phenomenon of multiculturalism, through a new "model" of integration which is able to fill the gaps shown by both the French model and the Britain model of integration, in order to afford the issue of the intercultural dialogue. In particular, the use of the intercultural dialogue may permit the coexistence of different cultures on the same territory, while maintaining the social cohesion of the society, the unity of the political community and guaranteeing the stability of the public order and it may suggest the possibility to move from the idea of a Nation that is culturally homogeneous to a dialogical Nation, where the cohesion of the political community is not based on cultural and linguistic homogeneity but on the mutual understanding of diversity, always within the limits of the respect of fundamental rights as protected in the Italian Constitution.
Il Montenegro ha condiviso con le altre ex repubbliche di Jugoslavia una lunga transizione istituzionale, avviata negli anni Novanta dello scorso secolo. L'ordinamento giuridico del piccolo Stato dei Balcani occidentali ha segnato una significativa trasformazione ispirata ai modelli socialdemocratici di riconoscimento e tutela delle libertà fondamentali e dello Stato di diritto. A tutt'oggi, tuttavia, il processo di traslazione verso la democrazia non sembra compiuto. Anche la legislazione sulla libertà religiosa (l'attesa e non ancora definita legge generale sulla libertà religiosa ed il numerus clausus di Comunità religiose munite di intesa con il governo) offre una prova evidente delle attuali difficoltà. Si tratta di segnali di una transizione in divenire che in questi ultimi anni ha perso smalto per motivi post-ideologici, di ordine culturale. Anche su tale settore di libertà giuridiche il legislatore di Podgorica dovrà intervenire con maggiore convinzione, in vista dell'ingresso del Montenegro, nel 2025, nell'Unione Europea. ; Montenegro shared with the other former republics of Yugoslavia a long institutional transition, initiated in the nineties of the last century. The legal order of the small State of the Western Balkans has marked a significant transformation, inspired by social-democratic models of recognition and protection of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. To this day, however, the process of shifting towards democracy does not seem to have been fulfilled. Even the legislation on religious freedom (the expectation and not yet defined general law on religious freedom and the numerus clausus of religious communities enjoying an agreement with the government) offers clear evidence of the current difficulties. These are signs of a transition in progress that in recent years has lost brilliance because of post-ideological, cultural reasons. Even on this area of legal freedom, Podgorica's legislator will have to intervene with greater conviction, considering the entry of Montenegro, in 2025, in the European Union. ; Derecho canónico
