Suchergebnisse

The first three volumes are edited by C.L. Tupper, the remaining volumes are by various Settlement officers and give the customary law by districts; the later volumes are printed at Lahore and have titles: Customary law of the Ludhiana district, Customary law of the Rawalpindi district [etc.] ; These laws are compiled by the Settlement officers of the Punjab, who summon together the leading men of the several tribes, and propound questions to them concerning tribal customs. The answers are recorded, with any instances given by them during the discussion and to this is added material from the court and revenue records. ; 1. A selection from the records of the Punjab Government -- 4. Sirsa, 1883 -- 5. Ludhiana, 1885 and Revised edition of 1911 -- 6. Rawalpindi, 1887 and Revised edition of 1910 -- 7. Moga, Zira and Ferozepore, 1890 and Revised edition of 1915 -- 8a. Karnal, Tahsil Kaithal and Parganah Indri, 1892 -- 8b. Karnal, Panipat Tahsil and Karnal Purgana, 1910 -- 9. Gujrat, 1892 and Revised edition of 1922 -- 10. Amballa, 1893, and Revised edition of 1921 -- 11. Amritsar, 1893 and Revised edition of 1914 -- 12. Gurdaspur, 1893 and Revised edition of 1913 -- 13. Lahore, 1894 and Revised edition of 1916 -- 14. Sialkot, 1895 and Revised edition of 1917 -- 16. Dera Ghazi Khan, 1898 and Revised edition of 1922 -- 17. Peshawar, 1899 -- 18. Multan, 1901 and Revised edition of 1924 -- 19. Jhelum, 1901 -- 20. Muzaffargarh, 1903 -- 21. Mianwali, 1908 -- 23. Rohtak, 1911 -- 24. Attock, 1911 and Revised edition of 1931 -- 25. Hissar, 1913 -- 26. Gujranwala, Revised edition, 1914 -- 27. Hoshiarpur, 1914 -- 29. Jullundur, 1918 -- [30] Montgomery, 1925. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The author is a Don at the School of Law, University of Nairobi Kenya and a development consultant with various NGOs and other international bodies in Eastern Africa region and Italy. He is a researcher and writer of articles and texts on matters concerning law and culture. Dr. Onyango is an expert in modern legal science with wide knowledge of law ranging from comparative legal system, international public law, ethics, philosophy, theology, sociology, mass media and social realities today. He is currently teaching Social Foundations of Law, Customary Law, International Public Law and International Relations at the University of Nairobi and he is a part-time lecturer at St. Paul�s University. Among his publication are Cultural Gap and Economic Crisis in Africa and, Dholuo Grammar for Beginners.

This contribution deals with the question of whether a judgment from a mainstream court dealing with customary law can be regarded as authority and thus as a recording of a customary rule or rules. When a mainstream court develops customary law to promote constitutional values or strikes customary law down for want of constitutionality, it creates new rules which are written down but which can easily be changed when society brings it to court and convinces the court that the rule needs to be changed. It is my contention that case law is a binding source of law, including customary law, which must be followed until such time that it is either absorbed into legislation or amended by a subsequent decision in terms of the principle of stare decisis. It gives us some measure of assurance as to the law to be followed. The high number of customary law disputes taken to a court of law is confirmation that traditional communities are embracing the power of the courts to settle their disputes. The judgments of these courts inevitably become the origins of customary rules that they develop and can thus be regarded as piecemeal recording of (living) customary law.

This contribution deals with the question of whether a judgment from a mainstream court dealing with customary law can be regarded as authority and thus as a recording of a customary rule or rules. When a mainstream court develops customary law to promote constitutional values or strikes customary law down for want of constitutionality, it creates new rules which are written down but which can easily be changed when society brings it to court and convinces the court that the rule needs to be changed. It is my contention that case law is a binding source of law, including customary law, which must be followed until such time that it is either absorbed into legislation or amended by a subsequent decision in terms of the principle of stare decisis. It gives us some measure of assurance as to the law to be followed. The high number of customary law disputes taken to a court of law is confirmation that traditional communities are embracing the power of the courts to settle their disputes. The judgments of these courts inevitably become the origins of customary rules that they develop and can thus be regarded as piecemeal recording of (living) customary law.

This article explores the expression of State sovereignty through customary norms in a regulatory space dominated by investment treaties. It argues that, because most of the actionable concepts expressing sovereignty in international law are general (not specific to a "branch") andcustomary, misunderstanding the role of customary law in investment regulation amounts to confining sovereignty to a few narrow carve-outs and exceptions in investment treaties. However, customary concepts operate autonomously and in parallel to treaties, unless specifically excluded by the latter. The lex specialis principle does not necessarily command the exclusion in toto of relevant customary rules. The article discusses the work of the Institut de Droit International in this regard and then analyses the investment case law relating to the application of the police powers doctrine, necessity, countermeasures and transnational public policy. It shows that failure to address specifically the articulation of treaty and customary norms even in the event the former apply as lex specialis is subtly eroding, without clear legal grounds,the customary expression of sovereignty in foreign investment disputes.

In The Philosophy of Customary Law, James Bernard Murphy brings greater theoretical clarity to the often murky topic of custom by showing that custom must be analyzed into two more logically basic concepts: convention and habit. With a clearer understanding of custom, one can better grasp the many roles that custom plays in a legal system. In this book James Bernard Murphy explores the nature and significance of custom and customary law, and how conventions relate to habits in the four classic theories of Aristotle, Francisco Suarez, Jeremy Bentham, and James C. Carter.