Suchergebnisse

Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- 1 Information Sharing in Military and Security Operations -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Information Sharing with Whom? -- Why Is Information Sharing Among Partners Beneficial, Even Though It May Be Hard to Do? -- Acting like an Oyster: Why is Information Sharing Among Partners Problematic? -- The Dynamics of Non-sharing and Non-receiving -- Conclusions and Organization of this Volume -- References -- 2 Information Fusion: Intelligence Centers and Intelligence Analysis -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Defining Information Fusion -- Origins of the Concept -- Civilian Policing and Security -- Civilian Fusion Centers -- Criticisms of Civilian Fusion Centers -- Models of Information Fusion -- The Joint Directors of Laboratories (JDL) Process Model -- Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop -- C-OODA -- Military Information Fusion Centers -- The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre -- The U.S. Joint Analysis Center (JAC) -- Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) -- Air Force Joint Battlespace Info-Sphere -- Criticism of U.S. Military's Fusion Centers -- Conclusion -- References -- 3 Oh, Didn't Anyone Tell You? The Importance of Intra-Organizational Information Sharing -- Abstract -- Organizational Justice and the Role of Informational Justice -- Informational Justice -- This Study -- Procedure -- Sample -- Measures -- Descriptive Results -- Descriptive Analyses of Demographic Variables -- Correlational Analyses -- Mediational Analyses -- Discussion -- References -- 4 Information Sharing in Contemporary Operations: The Strength of SOF Ties -- Abstract -- Introduction -- Organizational Effectiveness in Multinational HQs -- Special Forces and Conventional Forces in Operations -- Case Study: SOF HQs in Kabul -- Main Barriers to Information Sharing -- Conclusion: A Delicate Chemistry -- References

"Digital forensics is the science of collecting the evidence that can be used in a court of law to prosecute the individuals who engage in electronic crime"--Provided by publisher

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Entering the Cyber Commons -- Problem -- Research Question -- Interdependence and Power -- Method Development -- Cyber Application and Case Studies -- Summary -- 2. Interdependence -- Why Use Interdependence Theory? -- Interdependent Characteristics of the Virtual State -- Defining Interdependent Cyberspace -- Cyber Operations -- Summary -- 3. Power -- Types of Power -- Power Application -- Power through Economic Cyber Influences -- Summary -- 4. Method Development -- Method Types -- Describing the Data Sources -- Categorizing Cyber Events -- Case Study Guideline -- Summary -- 5. Cyber Applications -- Application in Practice -- Deciphering the Data -- Evaluating the First Four Hypotheses -- Summary -- 6. Case Study Analysis -- Deciphering Events through Narrative Linkages -- Japanese Government Case: Economic Espionage -- Ukrainian Power Grid Case: Economic Cyberattack -- Codan Case: Intellectual Property Theft -- Evaluating the Economic Hypotheses -- Summary -- 7. Framing Future Channels -- Linking Hypotheses to the Research Question -- Future Applications -- Final Thoughts -- Appendix -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About Mark T. Peters II

In 2011, Nasser Al-Awlaki, a terrorist on the US 'kill list' in Yemen, was targeted by the CIA. A week later, a military strike killed his son. The following year, the US Ambassador to Pakistan resigned, undermined by CIA-conducted drone strikes of which he had no knowledge or control. The demands of the new, borderless 'gray area' conflict have cast civilians and military into unaccustomed roles with inadequate legal underpinning. As the Department of Homeland Security defends against cyber threats and civilian contractors work in paramilitary roles abroad, the legal boundaries of war demand to be outlined. In this book, former Under Secretary of the Air Force Antonia Chayes examines these new 'gray areas' in counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism and cyber warfare. Her innovative solutions for role definition and transparency will establish new guidelines in a rapidly evolving military-legal environment

Code Red Worm; Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI); Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT); Conficker Worm; Cray, Seymour; Cryptography; Cyber Attack; Cyber Crime; Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA); Cyber Defense; Cyber-Defense Exercise; Cyber Deterrence; Cyber-Equivalence Doctrine; Cyber Escalation; Cyber Espionage; Cyber Ethics; Cyber Sabotage; Cyber Security; Cyberspace Policy Review (2009); Cyber Terrorism; Cyber War; Cyber Warriors; Cyber Weapon; D; Dark Web; Deep Web; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

For nearly seventy years, NATO has been used as a forum for its Allies to consult, co-operate, and act on the decisions taken collectively for the benefit of their security and defence. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, the Alliance has taken a number of steps in recent years to bolster its cyber defences, recognizing that cyber defence forms a part of NATO's core task of collective defence. This article will shed light on NATO's approach to cultivating co-operation on cyber defence – among Allies but also with a broad partnership network of countries, international organizations, industry and academia. Specific initiatives that are being pursued by the Allies to support NATO's broader deterrence and defence, enhance national cyber resilience, and collaborate with partners in a spirit of co-operative security will be explored. In the end, these activities contribute to ensuring thatNATOcontinues to adapt and remain fit for purpose as a platform for consultation and action on collective security in the digital age.

"This book explores problems which incorporate every aspect of contemporary quantitative applications of operations research methods in military. It address and feature original research on the innovative applications of techniques and methodologies on defense and military related problems and relevant theoretical frameworks and the latest empirical research findings in the area"--

This article addresses the rise in state-sponsored cyber attacks over the past three decades and proposes a new ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations. Since 1982, nation states have embarked in a fierce race to develop both clandestine and covert offensive cyber capabilities. Their intended targets range from foreign militaries and terrorist organizations to civilian populations and the critical infrastructures that they rely upon. Advancements in cyber security have, however, contributed to the discovery and attribution of offensive cyber operations, such as state-sponsored ransomware attacks, where state-built cyber capabilities have been used to attack governments, industries, academia and citizens of adversary nations. The financial and psychological costs of these ransomware attacks are today a threat to any state's national security. This article draws from academic research, the cyber military doctrines of four countries—a total of eight models from the Netherlands, Sweden, the U.S., and the U.K.—and the authors' operational experience to propose a new ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations. This ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations and the associated Cyberspace Operations Canvas are needed today in order to increase the resilience of national critical infrastructures against attacks from state-developed tools. We use the WannaCry-case to illustrate how the implementation of the ambidextrous framework for offensive cyberspace operations would result in increased awareness and understanding of the prospective cyber threats, their intended target(s), the likelihood of cascading effects and the options available by nation states to minimize them.