Suchergebnisse

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which consists of military forces from more than 40 NATO and non-NATO countries, is now officially history. In combination with the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the international intervention in Afghanistan has been one of the most lengthy operations in modern times. Such overwhelming effort requires reflection and evaluation. What have we learned from being part of this intervention? In this focus article I will go into one of the most important and demanding elements of this intervention - the civil-military space. The civil-military interaction played a significant role and received much attention, theoretical and practical. The question was about how various actors can contribute to a successful, holistic effort. I should say something about the term 'civil-military coordination' which focuses on the relationship between different actors, and then look into the Norwegian approach to civil-military relations. I would argue that the Norwegian approach was based on important principles, but could appear as immature and inflexible. I justify my claim by lifting some challenges and contradictions that have emerged, either because of - or despite - the introduction of the model. The newly appointed Afghan committee will give us considerable insight and several lessons and will be useful in future policies and practices. Already, however, two things for sure; firstly, that we will be asked to contribute in future military operations without being able to predict what these will contain (we have other words prepare us for many different contingencies). Secondly, under virtually all military operations be civilians present, with greater or lesser degree of contact between them. This civil-military dynamics often understood within the concept of civil-military cooperation (Rietje & Bollen 2008; Hoogensen Gjorv 2014 Hoogensen Gjorv & Gjorv 2014). Adapted from the source document.

This comparative article reveals how the general focus of Canadian and Russian threat perceptions in the Arctic have shifted from a Cold War fixation on hard defence to accommodate soft security issues over the last three decades. Both countries now pay greater attention to threats and challenges stemming from climate change, security, and safety risks associated with resource development and increasingly accessible sea routes. Although concern about military conflict arising from Arctic disputes continues to frame some media discussions in both countries, most strategic analysts and academics have moved away from this line of argument. Instead, military functions now include assertion of Canadian and Russian sovereignty over their respective internal waters, as well as protection of resources in their exclusive economic zones and on and in extended continental shelves; protection of economic interests in the North, including mineral and bio-resources; prevention of potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and state infrastructure; and dual-use functions, such as search and rescue operations, surveillance of air and maritime spaces, support to safe navigation, and mitigation of natural and human-made catastrophes.
The authors argue that analysts should parse two forms of military modernization in the Arctic: one of capability development related to the global strategic balance, where the Arctic serves as a bastion or a thoroughfare; and a second intended to address emerging non-traditional security challenges. They contend that these modernization programs do not inherently upset the Arctic military balance and need not provoke a regional arms race.

The advantages that some military establishments have enjoyed in the remote Arctic region are diminishing. The military secrets of the Arctic Ocean are being progressively uncloaked, as civilian polar research expands into areas previously known only to a few. This study examines the security ramifications of broadened international research into what has been the most inhospitable and exclusive operational area on Earth. Firstly, the study argues that successful military operations in the Arctic depend on extended knowledge about area-specific issues related to e.g. the upper atmosphere and magnetosphere, weather, sea ice, ocean structure and dynamics, seafloor bathymetry and sediments, as well as reliable target detection systems. Secondly, it finds that a number of nations, both Arctic and non-Arctic, have stepped up their polar research in recent years. Secrets once held by a few are now accessible to many through international cooperation, data-sharing and open-access publishing. Finally, the study concludes that knowledge proliferation is likely to level the Arctic battlefield. Lending terms from Mica Endsley's three-level Situation Awareness model, polar research will result in increasingly shared perceptions about the Arctic operational environment, contribute to a more uniform comprehension of the elements, and even enable new actors to project a future state of the Arctic environment.

The article contributes insights into the rise of the Russian empire based on Mongolian and Byzantine imperial traditions in contrasts to empires based on Roman imperial traditions. The history and traditions of the Mongolian and Byzantine empires are briefly discussed, and it is argued that the Russian empire was primarily based on Byzantine traditions where religion was a central principle for territorial expansion and the imposition of laws by a central power was the primary political practice. A history of the rise and fall of the Russian empire is included. It is argued that although the Napoleon wars were a military triumph for Russia, but also marked the beginning of the fall of the Russian tsarist empire due to a lack of central control of military operations and alliances. The author also gives attention to that the Russian empire has only been analyzed according to imperial theories upon being dissolved, but also that the concept is relevant as it has returned in present-day Russian political debate. This article is one in a series of articles on the topic of empires. References. E. Sundby

What does it mean for a military operation when a gender perspective based on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 should be integrated in the daily work? The question is interesting if one considers that such 'gender integration' has to take place on every level of this male-dominated institution. This article study of the gender-integration process in the 2008 Nordic Battlegroup and connects the analysis of the process with ongoing national and international developments. In interpreting the content of the resolution in practical assignments and capacity building it is found that ambiguous interpretations at the highest levels have resulted in difficult decisions and conflict at the lower levels. Moreover, gender integration is caught up in discussions related to professional identity. To some extent the approach to connect resolution 1325 with 'operational effectiveness' is resulting in decreasing resistance. Adapted from the source document.

The Arctic is saturated with nuclear facilities bringing both benefits for regional economic and social development and risks of nuclear and radiological accidents and concerns about radioactive wastes. There is every reason to expect the Arctic will remain a nuclearized region during the foreseeable future. This makes it important to direct attention to issues of nuclear safety and security in the region. We identify several clusters of these issues in the Arctic, including the challenges of potential nuclear accidents, the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the cleanup of radiological contaminants, and concerns about nuclear security. An analysis of international conventions and voluntary codes of conduct shows that they are applicable to Arctic nuclear safety and security, but only in general terms. This suggests a need for an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear and radiological safety, emergency preparedness and response, and cleanup of radiological contaminants. The outbreak of military hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted normal procedures for addressing issues of common concern in the Arctic. But the need for co-operation regarding matters like nuclear safety and security will not go away. Assuming it is possible to devise "necessary modalities" for restarting the work of the Arctic Council following the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear safety and security could be developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, which already has taken an interest in nuclear safety through the activities of its Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Once such an agreement is in place, it will become important to consider the infrastructure needed to ensure that its provisions are implemented effectively.