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A recent essay from Israeli writer Gadi Taub in Tablet makes clear that Israel's war in Gaza is not its last. Israel is going "to shed its defensive strategy and go on the offensive." That means taking out Hezbollah and then taking on "a multifaceted struggle against Iran over its drive for regional hegemony and its nuclear weapons program."Taub, whose hawkish views in many ways reflect the vital center of Israel opinion, sees the Biden administration as following a longstanding Democratic policy of appeasing Iran. In sharp contrast to Henry Kissinger, whose 1970s diplomacy he lauds, Taub finds Secretary of State Antony Blinken's policy to be a disaster. "By empowering the Iranians, Blinken's policy will inevitably also further the penetration of the region by Iran's patrons, the Russians and the Chinese, at America's expense. Kissinger's policy was focused on pushing America's great power rivals out. American policy today is inviting them in."The Dream Palace of the IsraelisThe most extraordinary feature of Taub's essay is its unreal portrait of the regional forces arrayed for and against Israel. Iran, Taub writes, "is at war with the old American regional alliance system — which includes Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But Secretary Blinken and President Biden are appeasing the new radicals, not containing them."In this imaginary tableau, shared by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel is in an unspoken but deep alliance with the Sunni Arab states, who want to see Hamas crushed and Iran and its proxies relentlessly attacked. What these rulers say in public, so the story goes, is miles apart from what they say in private. In public, of course, Arab leaders are breathing fire about Israel's mad amplification of the Dahiya Doctrine in Gaza. In private, these Arab leaders are reportedly telling U.S. and Israeli insiders (but seemingly no one else) that they heartily approve Israeli's operations. This Israeli view of Arab leaders is delusional. Yes, Arab leaders have big issues with Hamas. But they also think, as do their people, that Israel's extreme violence in Gaza may open the gates of hell, as the 2003 Iraq War once did. They don't think it's possible to pulverize Hamas into oblivion, because new defiant leaders will inevitably emerge. Israel, in their view, is not solving anything, but rather magnifying insecurity in the region. The (feeble) attempt by Blinken to put restraints on Israel's conduct of the war in Gaza is said by Taub to invite Russia and China into the region, but in fact it is Israel's policy that does so. That policy pushes Iran and America's traditional Arab coalition into one another's arms, making them realize that they have congruent interests in opposing Israeli plans. These interests, in turn, are likewise simpatico with those of Russia and China right now. Taub believes that Israel's coming offensives would break the new relations between the Saudis and the Sino-Russian bloc. No, these relations would be strengthened. This Islamic consensus — which joins Arabs, Iranians, and Turks and is supported by Russia and China — would be given further impetus if Israeli ambitions in the West Bank are fully realized. Another Nakba in Gaza and in the West Bank is anathema to America's Arab friends. Yet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of the Palestinian Authority just as harshly as Hamas or Hezbollah. He has rejected U.S. proposals to bring the PA into Gaza after the war. Netanyahu maintains within his coalition powerful ministers (National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich) who have big plans for the West Bank and Temple Mount. In this regard there appears to be a fourth security front in the West Bank and Jerusalem, distinct from Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran. Washington as Enabler and RestrainerTaub hangs his essay on a comparison between Henry Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy in the 1970s and Antony Blinken's policy today. Kissinger, Taub relates, taught a masterclass in diplomacy. Arab leaders, Kissinger saw, "would understand that only the U.S. could deliver Israeli concessions, and that the price–peace with Israel and breaking with the Soviet orbit–would be worth it. It worked."Fast forward to today. If the United States cannot or will not deliver Israeli concessions, surely its leverage with the Arab states is sharply diminished. Israel is totally dependent on U.S. arms for the conduct of its current and projected operations. "The Israelis are playing with house money," as one U.S. official puts it. As of December 1, transfers loaded on to U.S. cargo planes included 15,000 bombs and 57,000 artillery shells. More is on the way. The Biden administration has lots of leverage over Israel. They are just unwilling to use it. The Biden administration has rightly warned Israel against a big offensive operation in Lebanon. Hezbollah is in a use-it-or-lose-it situation with respect to its offensive systems, with Hezbollah reportedly having 100,000 to 150,000 missiles and rockets, far superior to Hamas's force. The evacuation after October 7 of some 80,000 Israelis from communities bordering Lebanon is undoubtedly an unacceptable outcome for Israel, but Israel cannot seek to eliminate Hezbollah without incurring grave risks to its own population. It would be far better for Israelis to reoccupy the northern towns under the auspices of the mutual deterrence that prevailed before October 7, rather than to launch a big war against Hezbollah. However, the Israelis clearly think otherwise. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has promised a military campaign to drive Hezbollah beyond the Litani River unless Hezbollah heeds Israel's ultimatum to evacuate the border region. The horrifying risk from such an escalation is that Israel would turn Beirut and southern Lebanon into Gaza. If Taub's views are a reliable guide, the Israelis have totally given up on Biden and the Democrats. The putative "appeasement" of Iran is not "an offhand mistake of the Democratic Party" but "a premeditated strategy designed to strengthen Iran at the expense of America's traditional allies." At a time when Arab Americans and their allies are livid with Biden and Blinken, it is curious to find Taub and the Israelis joining in the execration. The former group hates B&B for giving Israel the greenest of green lights, the other for the bright red lights (stop with the civilian killing, don't invade Lebanon) that Taub discerns. The administration's position is unenviable. On one side is the geopolitical disaster that follows from a blank check to Israel, on the other the domestic perils of having a gigantic fight with Netanyahu and the whole Israeli nation. In this acute battle between the national interest and personal political survival, will President Biden do a John Adams and choose country over party? I do not have an answer to this question. One thing is crystal clear. Supporting Israel means supporting a grand design that calls for a war on all fronts, financed and enabled by the United States. The Israelis seem to have no consciousness of the fact that previous uses of force in Lebanon and Palestine didn't solve their security problem. Instead, they believe that more destruction, on a Dresden-like scale, will do this time around what it has not done in the past. Given Israel's lonely existence in a sea of Muslims, this belief seems irrational to me. Israel cannot get rid of its security problem or its enemies by the massive use of force. Escalation imperils Israelis as much as it imperils their neighbors. But the Israelis hold to their belief in force with theological conviction, and the belief should be taken with the utmost seriousness. Thus far, this irresistible force has not encountered an immovable object.

Climate stress will become more intense and frequent throughout CENTCOM's area of operations. It may be called upon less to fight wars and more to airdrop humanitarian supplies or evacuate people from disaster zones. It should also plan to contribute to stability operations in the region.

Australia's 2023 cybersecurity strategy makes clear that most of the things we need to do to protect ourselves in cyberspace are essentially defensive. The strategy is usefully organised according to six 'shields'. But sometimes we ...

It's U.S. defense policy to make sure women play a meaningful role in matters of war, peace, and security. This includes embedding women's perspectives in decisionmaking. Real-world examples show the benefits of applying a gender lens to military planning and operations.

 This week, I went to Winnipeg in the coldest temps of the year thus far to observe one of the new CDSN research efforts: understanding the dynamics of Canadian domestic emergency operations in response to natural events.  Paraphrasing Emdad Haque, one of our co-directors,  nature will create extreme conditions, but whether they are disastrous is up to people and government.  Emdad, Nira Agrawal, and Kawser Ahmed brought together a sharp group of folks, including the army's liaison to Manitoba, the ADM for Emergency Management in Manitoba (a survivor of my big IR class at McG), researches from the universities in the area, and more (see here for details).  What did I learn?Emergencies are rare for any individual but they are increasingly common collectively.  Climate change is already fostering more and more floods, fires, and other extreme events.  So, this is not just a thing that happens from time to time but is an every day thing now.The notion of the CAF as a last responder needs to die.  Yes, the military wants to be called on only in the most extreme emergencies when no one else can do what they can do.  But there are plenty of incentives for folks to ask for help and for the CAF to be unable to say no.That most of this stuff ends being led by the most local folks--that the feds don't take over but are there to supplement.  Which means the military is following orders, not ordering people around.As always, prevention is the least expensive route but often there are not political incentives.  It seems to me that the real opportunity to make changes to manage/mitigate is as the cycle goes from response to the emergency to recovery--that building back better is a thing.  Rebuild out of harm's way, away from the flood plains, for example.As always, the Indigenous people are put into awful positions by the past and by the present.  Limited infrastructure means they need assistance, but then they are seen as objects, those to be rescued, rather than agents with their own expertise and preferences.  Evacuations need to be rethought--they are very disruptive physically, economically, culturally, mentally.Federalism in Canada continues to suck mightily.  Some provinces understand that they need to build back better, so the Winnipeg floods didn't recur with the same level of damage.  Others understand that they can save money by doing less preparation and then call the feds in when help is needed.There is a lot more work, coordination, planning, preparation going on in this area in between emergencies, that many bad storms and other events do get mitigated.  But again, it is going to get much harder as storms and other conditions get more intense.I was very pleased to see the CDSN idea work out here--that we had engaged people in different parts of government and society, there was a real exchange of information, the students were super engaged, and it is the start of a more comparative analytical conversation.  I also learned that Winnipeg is cold, full of friendly folks, and one can lose one's mittens in a cab and then get them back when one happens to take the same cab back to the airport.So glad I could hang with Andrea Charron, who has done so much for the CDSN

The Israel Defense Forces withdrew the 98th division and the 7th armored brigade from Khan Younis after four months of battles in the city. Israel's Defense Minister said "the withdrawal of troops from Khan Younis was carried out once Hamas ceased to exist as a military framework in the city." The shift in forces is being watched closely across the region as Israel continues to say it will enter the southern Gaza city of Rafah in order to defeat Hamas.
The post IDF ends operations in Khan Younis as Gaza war reaches six months first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

BY ANISH KOKA On March 25th, 1971, the Pakistani army launched Operation Searchlight, a military campaign to brutally suppress a Bengali nationalist movement. The roots of the genocide lie in the partingContinue reading...

Yesterday, the New York Times published a guest essay by Craig Singleton, a fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, entitled "China's Military is Going Global." Singleton argues that Beijing is well on its way to building a globe-spanning network of "strategic strong points along China's major trade, energy, and resource routes" that pose a dire military threat to the United States. Allegedly using the structure of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative of commercial infrastructure projects, Beijing's supposedly new "under the radar" strategy is seen as directly challenging Washington's ability to carry out critical overseas military missions, including the defense of Taiwan.In response to this expanding threat, Singleton calls for Washington to devise a strategy designed to "pre-emptively" neutralize China's moves, including "incentives or punishments" directed at host governments.It is surprising that the New York Times saw fit to publish such an essay, since it is replete with distortions, exaggerations, and speculations. There is no question that China's overseas military-related activities merits close examination, especially when they take place in sensitive areas. But such an examination requires a careful parsing of actual facts, with clear distinctions made between proposed plans, actual undertakings, commercial versus military (and non-military security) purposes, and the likely military benefits for China that might ensue from a particular location or operation. Instead of observing such requirements, Singleton plays fast and loose with the evidence, subtly caveating his statements with weasel words like "might," "may," "could," "suggests," "suspected," etc. Nonetheless, almost every conceivable possible, current, or emerging overseas Chinese commercial, scientific, or security "presence" is labeled as part of a deliberate, coordinated, military-centered strategy to "reshape the global military landscape" in Beijing's favor and hence to threaten the U.S. In reality, China has thus far established only one actual, operating overseas military base, on the horn of Africa, in Djibouti, and is probably establishing a naval facility in Cambodia. But there are real limits to how far China can go in duplicating such places. As Isaac Kardon of the Carnegie Endowment has pointed out, China has no formal military alliances (beyond the dubious case of North Korea) and is unlikely to acquire any in the foreseeable future, a fact that imposes major constraints on its ability to establish serious military bases. Few if any countries wish to commit to housing full-fledged, sizeable military facilities that could project Chinese military power across their region and, in the process, invite an American response. Moreover, many of the actual security-related facilities that Singleton employs as evidence for his argument serve functions other than militarily threatening the United States, such as anti-piracy missions, UN peace-keeping rotations, non-combatant evacuation operations in an emergency, or the protection of nearby investments. And their ability to evolve beyond such functions is likely to remain highly limited. Most recipient states want Chinese commerce and investment above all else. Indeed, many of the supposed new Chinese bases or proto bases identified by Singleton consist primarily of a commercial or civilian scientific presence, some with only a vague potential for military use. A few existing commercial facilities (such as in the UAE) might acquire limited military functions, but in many cases this remains unclear. One can argue that such commercial locations do serve a kind of strategic purpose, but as part of Beijing's efforts to become a major commercial and scientific/technological power, not to directly threaten U.S. global military dominance. In addition, even if a clearer military function were to emerge in many of China's overseas facilities, it is far from clear that it would in most cases provide Beijing with the kind of daunting strategic benefit that Singleton alleges. For example, some analysts of the facility in Cambodia have argued that it will provide few new operational advantages for the PLA. In truth, Singleton's argument is an updated and expanded version of the so-called "string of pearls" idea that appeared many years ago. Originating with an American corporation, the concept sought to link together some of China's overseas activities in Southeast Asia and along the Indian Ocean to the Middle East to form a grand Chinese strategic move to dominate the region militarily and politically. As with the present version, the reality fell far short, usually for similar reasons.Finally, it is troubling that Singleton recommends that Washington should adopt both incentives and coercive means to preemptively neutralize China's allegedly nefarious overseas activities. If applied to most of the existing examples he provides of these activities, such an effort could easily backfire, as target countries interpret Washington's behavior as an attempt to undermine what they regard as legitimate commercial and scientific transactions with China.China's expanding overseas commercial, scientific, and security presence requires close, careful examination, no question. Unfortunately, this essay does not offer such analysis. Indeed, by publishing it, the New York Times has more likely provoked an even greater level of threat inflation than already exists in Washington and elsewhere.

Despite the largest Israeli military operation in the West Bank since the Second Intifada, the state of the West Bank remains in question.
The post Analysis: Post Jenin Operation, Questions Linger About the State of the West Bank first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

 Yesterday, I participated at a roundtable consultation with the Social Sciences Research Review Board* [SSRRB], which is DND/CAF's equivalent of a research ethics board.  The meeting was partly to brief us (some profs researching the military, some research ethics board folks) and partly to get our feedback on how things are going and about potential reforms.*  The SSRB process is essentially run out of the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis.  And that was cool to learn since DGMPRA is a partner of the CDSN, with one of its staff, Irina Goldenberg, serving as one of our Co-Directors.  I would say that this institution, like research ethics boards, are necessary evils for researchers, but they are not evil.  They can be inconvenient, but as one REB participant said, they create necessary friction.  Social science has a history of doing harm to its research subjects--with the most infamous ones being the Milgram experiments and the Stanford Prison experiments.  What is it about psychologists that cause them to be the exemplars for this stuff?  I don't know, but I do know that Carleton has separate REBs for psych versus other social sciences since the former needs more vigilance than the latter.Part of the challenge of REBs and especially SSRRB is that we hear the horror stories, but do not have a good sense of how much they slow researchers down, how much of that is due to the researchers and how much of that is due to the review process.  I can give you one example that is most trivial that slowed my latest one down: the Carleton REB required me to change my various documents (the consent form I give to my research subjects, for example) to update the new Carleton logo.  Which is, to be clear, utter bullshit since an old logo or a new one has no implications for whether I would be creating risk for the research subjects if they consented to be a research subject (to agree to be interviewed).  But the change did not take me long.  Anyhow, SSRRB does not have a website!  So, their ability to convey info is not great, so we can borrow from a organization (and CDSN partner) that interacts with SSRRB quite often: CIMVHR! CIMVHR is the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research, and while much of their work is on health stuff, which goes to a different board, their members do a lot of social science stuff (more on that below).  So, the CIMVHR website provides much more help for SSRRB than, well, SSRRB does right now:We encourage all applicants to review the Social Science Research Review Board (SSRRB) requirements before applying; For SSRRB inquiries contact: ssrrb-cerss@forces.gc.caSo, our first recommendation was for them to get a website!Anyhow, they explained the process, and it was most relevant as I just had a student face serious challenges.  To get SSRRB approval, one needs an internal sponsor within the CAF or DND.  What is most confusing about this is that it needs to be an L1 organization--which means the Army or the Navy or the Air Force or a command like CANSOF or CJOC.  Does that mean that it needs to be approved by THE L1?  The commander of the Navy, the chief of the army and so forth?  Um, depends on what you are asking?  If you are asking to survey a specific unit, one can perhaps work with someone at the LCol level rather than having the big boss sign off.  The SSRRB folks said that they could help folks find a sponsor, which my student didn't experience.Why a sponsor and then why are other approvals needed?  The SSRRB folks said this was mostly to prevent survey fatigue and researchers getting in the way of operations, etc.  I did ask about whether this could serve as a veto in the research process since there is language in the documents (from Treasury Board) about the research being in the interests of the organization.  The SSRRB folks insisted this didn't happen, but it is hard to tell if that is the case.  The big thing in play is that the Arbour Report had a recommendation (#46) specifically focused on this stuff.  Specifically, why should academics have to go through their university REBs and then do it again with SSRB?  They are working on three three options:Allow for concurrent review with academics so that folks don't have to wait and if they get feedback from one system, they can then revise what is in the other.Have SSRRB accept or waive the ethics stuff in their process if a researcher can provide them with a REB certificate from their home institution, and just work on the stuff that is DND/CAF-centric--security/operational issues, whether the research has already been done (lots of internal research that we don't have easy access to), or whether it gets in the way of operations.Collaborative agreements whereby a university's REB and SSRRB agree perhaps to SSRRB essentially be one-stop shopping--that if one gets SSRRB approval, then the home university accepts that as a legit REB approval.  The idea here for any reform is to make it easier/simpler/quicker for academics.  Grad students and junior faculty do not have a lot of time to go through multiple processes.  So, this is a work in progress, but it does look like things will get easier although perhaps not easy.  Getting a sponsor is not so easy and getting commanders to approve of research in their area of responsibility is tricky as well.  But eliminating duplicative REB processes would be a big improvement.I mentioned social science above--one of the things that drives me crazy works in a positive way here: a narrow definition of what counts as social science.  In the minds of the SSRRB folks, as far as I can tell, there is a tendency to consider surveys as social science and may be focus group stuff, but not other stuff, which means that other stuff (which really is social science) does not fall into their domain.  So, one can do elite interviews (the stuff I do) since they are "consultations".  One can also do program eval, which don't count as research if worded correctly.  So, either one's REB or SSRRB can help frame a project so that going through SSRRB's approval process is not necessary.  On the other hand, having that stamp of approval is handy for getting commanders to allow pesky academics to have access to subordinates.So, the big punchlines are: SSRRB may not be as much a gate keeper as folks think, and if they are gate keepers, they are willing to change due to the Arbour report to make things better.  Oh, and there are ways to dodge them.  I still worry about the parts of their procedures that give senior folks in the CAF the ability to veto research, but the practical reality is that one can't do a variety of research projects on the military if  the commander is hostile, whether or not there is a procedure that gives them a veto.One last thing: DGMPRA have done a lot of studies on personnel issues, so if one is working on that, it is best to approach them and see if a related project may have produced data--they are willing to share data.  Tis what the collaborative agreements are for.   

On Friday, the Texas representative will introduce a resolution rebuking recent pushes to conduct military operations against Mexican cartels without Mexico's consent or congressional authorization.

The 35-year-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed enclave wedged between the two countries, appears to have been settled in Azerbaijan's favor as President Ilham Aliyev raised the country's flag over the region's former de facto capital. While officials in Azerbaijan celebrated a political victory after conducting an "anti-terrorist operation" on September 19 against Karabakh Armenian military units, more than 100,000 Armenians have since been forced to leave their homes for the neighboring Republic of Armenia. Baku's actions and threats thus far should be reason enough for Washington to end the military assistance it has provided Azerbaijan over previous decades. In fact, it should have ended assistance years ago.During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Washington committed to prohibiting aid to Azerbaijan through Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act. However, following Azerbaijan's pledge to cooperate with President George W. Bush's global war on terrorism following the attacks on 9/11, Congress approved a process to waive Section 907 in 2002; this has occurred each year since. From 2002 to 2020, the Departments of State and Defense (DOD) reported providing about $164 million for security assistance to the government of Azerbaijan.All waivers of Section 907 should have ended in 2020 as Azerbaijan initiated the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Military equipment, potentially sent by Washington, is being used by Azerbaijan to satiate its territorial aspirations, not the intended purpose of supporting U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Azerbaijan also explicitly violated the condition of the waiver requiring that Baku "will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia."Secretary of State Antony Blinken has reportedly stated that the U.S. State Department will not renew a long-standing waiver for military assistance. Secretary Blinken's statement was likely the result of lawmakers who have pushed for ending this military assistance, such as Senators Gary Peters (D-Mich.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), and others who have sponsored the Armenian Protection Act of 2023. This bill would effectively repeal the Section 907 waiver. Adopting such a bill would be a positive development, as Azerbaijan considers further aggression against Armenia's internationally recognized territory. Domestic rhetoric by Aliyev is most important in understanding the potential of Azerbaijani foreign policy ambitions. President Aliyev has previously threatened to use force to establish a "corridor" through southern Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan with the Autonomous Nakhchivan Republic. "The Zangezur Corridor is a historical necessity," Aliyev said in January 2023, "It will happen whether Armenia wants it or not." Azerbaijan and Turkey are particularly interested in linking this route with the already expansive "Middle Corridor" to directly connect the two countries rather than the current path through Georgia. Days after the offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh, Aliyev held talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Nakhchivan regarding the Zangezur Corridor, hinting at creating a land bridge between their two countries through Armenia. If Azerbaijan (and, by extension, Turkey) established a link by force across Armenia's territory, it would clearly violate Armenian sovereignty and territorial integrity, the exact tenets that Brussels and Washington have sought to defend in Ukraine and uphold through the so-called rules-based order. For Armenia, such a development would deprive it of a land border with Iran, one of its key regional allies and trading partners.As such, Armenia is vehemently opposed to the idea of a corridor through its territory that is not under its direct jurisdiction. Article 9 of the 2020 ceasefire statement includes a provision committing Armenia to "guarantee the security" of transportation connections between Azerbaijan's mainland and Nakhchivan. However, both sides have accused each other of violating this agreement. Additionally, the stipulation that "control over transport communication is carried out by the bodies of the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia" appears unlikely as Moscow did not do much of anything to stop clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2022 or Azerbaijan's offensive in September 2023. As a result, Armenians have lost significant trust in Moscow's ability to provide security to Armenia despite being a mutual security partner in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).Iran also has qualms with the prospect of Azerbaijan and Turkey occupying Armenian territory and creating the Zangezur Corridor by force. Tehran has said that it opposes "geopolitical" changes in the South Caucasus. Specifically, Iran is deeply concerned about Israeli influence in Azerbaijan. Baku received high-tech drones and other weapons from Israel, which after Russia, was the second-largest arms supplier to Azerbaijan from 2011 to 2020. On top of military hardware, Tehran worries that Azerbaijan, over time, has become a hub for Israeli intelligence and surveillance. Due to Israel's military and intelligence cooperation with Azerbaijan, Iran sees this as Israel expanding its presence in the South Caucasus. On the surface, Russia may appear indifferent to the creation of a Zangezur Corridor, as Russia does not share Iran's threat perceptions of Israel. This may be shortsighted. If Azerbaijan and Turkey take the Zangezur Corridor through military means, it could spiral into a larger-scale war between Tehran and Ankara. Despite the limited interests of the United States in the South Caucasus, facilitating cooperation with Baku and Yerevan to peacefully coordinate trade routes could serve to avoid a future war on Europe's periphery.While stopping American military support will not necessarily inhibit Azerbaijan's current aggression from occurring — Israel and Turkey provide most of its military hardware — it will remove American complicity.Refusing to provide another waiver to Section 907 is the right thing to do, as Azerbaijan's use of military force clearly does not serve U.S. interests since it has led to a humanitarian crisis affecting over 100,000 Armenian civilians and could spark a middle-power conflict on the periphery of Europe. Baku will inevitably push back on this decision, but it will serve the United States well to resist external pressure and abide by consistent and fair rules and laws.

In defiance of international norms and rules, U.S. officials are laying claim to the large oceanic area in the central Pacific Ocean that is home to the compact states.Now that they are renewing the economic provisions of the compacts of free association with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia, U.S. officials are insisting that the compacts provide the United States with exclusive control over an area of the central Pacific Ocean that is comparable in size to the United States."We control essentially the northern half of the Pacific between Hawaii and Philippines," U.S. special envoy Joseph Yun told Congress in July.For decades, the United States has overseen compacts of free association with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Under the compacts, the United States provides the three countries with economic assistance while it maintains powerful military controls over the islands and their waters.One of these military controls, "the defense veto," enables the United States to prevent the compact states from forging international agreements that could impede U.S. military priorities. Consequently, the compact states have never joined the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear free zone in the region.Another U.S. military control is "the right of strategic denial" by which U.S. officials assert that they can prevent other countries from accessing the compact states' lands, waters, and airspace."The compacts do give us full defense authority and responsibility in those countries and provide our ability to strategically deny third country military access," U.S. diplomat Jane Bocklage told Congress earlier this year.Although the compacts include language that permits the United States to foreclose access to the islands by third-party military forces, U.S. officials have broadly interpreted this language to mean that they can exclude third parties from the compact states' exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which extend up to 200 miles around each island's coastlines.At a congressional hearing in July, Senator John Barrasso (R-WY) asserted that strategic denial authority "allows us to deny access to any potential adversary in an area of the Pacific comparable in size to the continental United States." An associate presented a map that portrayed the EEZs as one contiguous area under U.S. control. "It's nearly as large as the continental United States," Barrasso remarked.Defense Department official Siddharth Mohandas agreed with the senator's interpretation. He claimed that the United States maintains unfettered and exclusive access to the area. "We have the ability to deny foreign militaries access and the ability to operate in the exclusive economic zones of the Freely Associated States," Mohandas said, referring to the compact states.This interpretation of strategic denial is inconsistent with international law. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, all countries have the rights of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zones of other countries, as stipulated by Articles 58 and 87.Most countries, including the compact states, are parties to the convention. The United States has never ratified the convention, but high-level U.S. officials have expressed their support for it."Although not yet a party to the treaty, the U.S. nevertheless observes the UN LOSC as reflective of customary international law and practice," the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration explains, referring to the Convention on the Law of the Sea.When U.S. officials say that they have a right to exclude third-party actors from the compact states' exclusive economic zones, they are making claims that are inconsistent with the UN Convention. There is no legal basis for the United States to prevent ships from other countries from peacefully traversing the compact states' exclusive economic zones.More than two decades ago, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) acknowledged in a major report that strategic denial does not extend to the compact states' exclusive economic zones. According to the GAO report, strategic denial is limited to the 12-mile territorial waters that surround each island. Even within these smaller zones, the GAO noted, military vessels from other countries maintain the right of "innocent passage.""Statements by policymakers that indicate the United States has a right to deny military access to the islands and a vast area of the Pacific Ocean—a widely cited U.S. interest—overstate the breadth of this right, which only covers the individual islands and their 12-mile territorial waters," the GAO explained.A map included in the GAO report shows that strategic denial applies to small isolated areas rather than the much larger expanse of the Pacific Ocean that is often claimed by U.S. officials. A key implication of the GAO's map is that the United States cannot legally exclude third parties from the vast oceanic area that surrounds the compact states.In fact, U.S. officials have long taken the position that exclusive economic zones must remain open to navigation. Across the world, they have promoted "freedom of navigation," which they have presented as the freedom of ships to sail the world's oceans and waterways wherever the law allows, including in the exclusive economic zones of other countries.When U.S. officials have sent warships through some of the world's most contested waterways, such as the South and East China Seas, they have said that they are defending "freedom of navigation." The presence of U.S. military forces has often created tensions, possibly even violating Article 88 of the U.N. Convention, which requires ships to have peaceful purposes, but U.S. officials have always insisted that these operations are consistent with international law."We're committed to ensuring that every country can fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows," Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in a speech in June. "Every country, large and small, must remain free to conduct lawful maritime activities."The U.S. mass media has often sided with the U.S. government's position on freedom of navigation, especially as it concerns U.S. military operations in the exclusive economic zones of rival countries. In a July 2023 report about North Korean criticisms of U.S. military activities in North Korea's exclusive economic zone, The New York Times indicated that North Korea has no legal basis for excluding U.S. military forces from the area."A country can claim the right to exploit marine resources in its so-called exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from its 12 nautical-mile territorial waters," The New York Times reported. "But it does not hold sovereignty over the zone's surface and the airspace above it."When countries such as China and North Korea claim that they have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their exclusive economic zones, U.S. officials always disagree, insisting that these areas must remain open to freedom of navigation, particularly for U.S. warships.Regarding coastal states such as China and North Korea, the U.S. position is that they "do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs," according to a report by the Congressional Research Service. "The United States will continue to operate its military ships in the EEZs of other countries."By claiming to have a right of strategic denial over the compact states' exclusive economic zones, however, U.S. officials are taking a position that is inconsistent with international law and their own practices in many parts of the world, including the Indo-Pacific. If they were to use force to prevent a third party from accessing the vast expanse of waters around the compact states, then they would be violating the law and the very principles that they apply to other countries.In short, U.S. officials have no legal basis for their claims to control the vast oceanic area that is home to the compact states, just as the GAO confirmed in its landmark report more than two decades ago.This article has been republished with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.

Twenty-one years ago, the U.S. and its allies invaded Iraq in the erroneous belief that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction and was allied with al-Qaida, the terror group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. created an occupation authority, but failed to restore order and helped spawn the insurgency that bedeviled it by dismissing the entire Iraqi military and the most experienced civil servants. Coalition troops fought a losing battle, regained their footing with the 2007 troop surge, and finally departed in 2011. U.S. troops returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State and they remain there to this day, though ISIS was largely eliminated by 2019.In January 2020, Iraq's parliament voted on a nonbinding measure to remove the U.S. troops from Iraq, but the Americans remain at the request of the Iraqi government. However, in response to the parliament's 2020 vote, Iraq and the International Coalition changed the mission of the troops from a combat mission to one of advisory and training.Iraq's prime minister, Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani, will meet U.S. President Joe Biden on April 15, primarily to discuss the U.S. troop presence. Though the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission is reviewing the troop presence issue, will the U.S. side stall fearing it may have to agree to a smaller presence and constrained operations? Possibly, so Sudani may want a public commitment from Biden to force the march to a constructive, timely decision.Aside from the troops issue, Sudani wants to strengthen Baghdad's ties with Washington, which he considers Iraq's top bilateral relationship, and to add an economic dimension to Iraq's ties with America.When Americans think of Iraq in economic terms it's all about the oil, but in November 2023 ExxonMobil, America's biggest oil company, exited Iraq with nothing to show for a decade-long effort. The departure will lower the expectation of other U.S. companies, but Sudani wants to revitalize economic ties, and he will be accompanied by many of the country's top businessmen.U.S.-Iraq trade has room for growth. In 2022, the U.S. exported $897 million in goods, the top product being automobiles. Iraq, in turn, exported $10.3 billion in goods, most of it crude oil.A key economic objective of Iraq is the $17 billion Development Road, an overland road and rail link from the Persian Gulf to Europe via Turkey, that will host free-trade zones along its length.Biden and Sudani should consider the shape of the future U.S.-Iraq relationship, which has to now been governed by military considerations, and has become the best example of The Meddler's Trap, "a situation of self-entanglement, whereby a leader inadvertently creates a problem through military intervention, feels they can solve it, and values solving the new problem more because of the initial intervention. …A military intervention causes a feeling of ownership of the foreign territory, triggering the endowment effect." Iraq is the only real democracy in the Arab world, and many young Iraqis want a separation of religion and state, something that should resonate with Americans and, Iraqis hope, cause the U.S. to deal with Iraq as Iraq, not a platform for operations against Syria and Iran, or to support Washington's Kurdish clients.Washington damaged itself in Iraq by killing Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January 2020. Baghdad had moved the PMF, once a militia, into the government in 2016 (no doubt with American encouragement), so the killing of Muhandis, then a government official, increased popular support the PMF.What are some clouds on the horizon for the U.S. and Iraq?Corruption. Pervasive corruption in Iraq has slowed economic development and subjected Iraqi citizens to ineffective governance. The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International ranked Iraq 154 of 180, a slight improvement from 2022 when it ranked 157 of 180.Iraq was previously described by TI as: "Among the worst countries on corruption and governance indicators, with corruption risks exacerbated by lack of experience in the public administration, weak capacity to absorb the influx of aid money, sectarian issues and lack of political will for anti-corruption efforts."Sudani has not ignored corruption, calling it one of the country's greatest challenges and "no less serious than the threat of terrorism."Elizabeth Tsurkov. Tsurkov is a Russian-Israeli academic who was kidnapped in 2023 by Kata'ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-influenced Iraqi militia. Tsurkov, a doctoral student at Princeton University in the U.S., entered Iraq with her Russian passport and did not disclose that she was an Israeli citizen and Israeli Defense Forces veteran. (A 2022 Iraqi law criminalized any relations with Israel.)Tsurkov's family wants the Biden administration to designate Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism for failing to secure her release. Sudani's office announced an investigation into the matter and the issue may arise when Sudani meets Biden, though the best outcome for Iraq and the U.S. is a Russia-brokered deal between Israel and Iran.If Biden designates Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism that will irreparably damage the relationship and open the door for China.China. The U.S. is Iraq's top relationship, but not its only relationship. China will respond to the ostracism of Baghdad by extending invitations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, the latter of which can fund infrastructure projects through the New Development Bank. PetroChina replaced ExxonMobil in West Qurna 1, one of Iraq's biggest oil fields, and is ideally positioned for further expansion. And Iraq was the "leading beneficiary" of China's Belt and Road Initiative investment in 2021.Sudani has said Iraq should not be a cockpit of conflict for the U.S, and Iran, but when Iran is concerned it, in Washington, is always 1979. Though Sudani has many challenges to face, Biden has more: he must reorient his government away from its colonial mentality in West Asia, recognize that Baghdad must reach a modus vivendi with Tehran that may not be to Washington's pleasure, and not smooth the way for Beijing's greater penetration of West Asia.

This year's defense policy bill is a bit of a mixed bag for critics of American military adventurism. The compromise version of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) — which passed the House and Senate this week — added more than $40 billion to the Biden administration's funding request, resulting in an eye-popping $886 billion top-line.The final bill left out a bipartisan, Senate-passed amendment to expand compensation for people affected by U.S. nuclear testing, which caused a range of cancers and radiation-related diseases among Americans living downwind of explosive tests, as RS reported on last week.But one measure could make a big difference for activists hoping to hold the Department of Defense accountable for killing civilians in far-off war zones. The amendment, first introduced by Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), would force the Pentagon to tell Congress why it denied any requests for compensation from civilians harmed or killed by American troops abroad."When U.S.-provided weapons or military action results in civilian harm, the Department of Defense has an obligation to investigate what happened and make amends to families who lost their loved ones," Warren told RS. "I'm concerned the Department of Defense is not fully meeting these obligations, so I'm changing the law to provide transparency and accountability."A 2020 law set up a $3 million annual fund for payments to victims, but the process for actually securing compensation has been shrouded in mystery. As Warren noted in a 2022 letter, the Pentagon only made one payment in all of 2021 "despite the large number of cases that DoD has confirmed as credible," not to mention the cases of civilian harm identified by journalists and researchers but denied by the military.When the U.S. has made payouts, they've only gone to people in Iraq or Afghanistan despite credible reports of civilian harm from U.S. strikes in Syria, Somalia, and other War on Terror hotspots. The payments are considered "ex gratia," meaning that they are not mandatory and can be given at the discretion of military officers on the ground.Even high-profile cases often fall through the cracks. Take the infamous 2021 strike in Kabul that killed 10 Afghan civilians, most of whom were children, despite initial reports that the attack had targeted ISIS fighters.In an uncommon move, DoD apologized for the strike and "made a public commitment to condolence payments and pledged to help survivors relocate," according to Alice Speri of the Intercept. The family did get to relocate to the U.S., but as of this May, they have still not received the compensation they were promised. In fact, a volunteer resorted to a GoFundMe fundraiser to help the survivors make ends meet. When Speri asked the Pentagon to explain what had gone wrong, officials declined to comment, "citing the family's privacy."In another case, the U.S. badly wounded a man in a 2018 strike on a car in Yemen, leaving him permanently disabled and killing four other passengers. Despite evidence that none of the victims were military targets — and a letter from multiple members of Congress calling for an investigation into the incident — the Pentagon has never even looked into the attack.The new measure "helps ensure that the ex gratia payments are being made as they should and that people who have been harmed in U.S. military operations are able to receive the amends payments they deserve," said John Ramming Chappell of the Center for Civilians in Conflict.Another Warren-backed amendment that made it into the final NDAA could also have a positive impact on civilians abroad, according to Chappell. The measure will require the Pentagon to brief Congress on its implementation of a series of recommendations from a 2022 Government Accountability Office report on issues with "end-use monitoring" (EUM) of U.S. weapons.The report tells a stark story. According to the GAO, Guatemalan officials had used American jeeps multiple times between 2018 and 2021 to intimidate international NGOs and even U.S. embassy staff. Remarkably, neither the State Department nor the Pentagon had "policies governing how to record allegations of misuse in their internal tracking documents," leaving U.S. officials unaware of Guatemala's systematic misuse of American military equipment.The amendment will force DoD to brief Congress on how it has implemented the report's recommendations, which include creating a tracking system for allegations of misuse. If implemented, these suggestions would be an important step for improving EUM efforts, which currently "don't actually monitor how U.S. weapons and equipment are used," Chappell told RS."Efforts to create processes to track and respond to the misuse of U.S.-origin weapons and equipment are absolutely vital to ensure accountability for misuse," he said.While the term "misuse" gives officials significant room for interpretation, the recommended changes to EUM would likely force the U.S. to examine whether Israel has violated the terms of U.S. arms sales in its bombing of Gaza, which even President Biden has at times called "indiscriminate."Officials would also likely have to report on whether U.S. rifles went to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, as Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir promised in October.The U.S. already has much of the information necessary to open such inquiries, according to Politico, which reported yesterday that State Department officials have asked government lawyers to determine whether the U.S. faces "potential international law exposure as a result of approving" arms sales to Israel despite growing evidence of misuse.