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Strategic A2/AD in Cyberspace focuses on exclusion from cyberspace, or the ability of a state to be cut off entirely from cyberspace. Strategic anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations are common in other domains, but, before now, they have not been examined for their relevance to cyberspace. This book examines how strategic A2/AD operations can cut off states from cyberspace through attacks at either the physical or logic layers of cyberspace. The result of strategic cyber A2/AD operations could be catastrophic for modern economies, governments, military forces, and societies, yet there has been surprisingly little study of these threats to states' access to cyberspace. This book examines the implications of strategic cyber A2/AD operations for deterrence strategy and proposes a new view of how exclusion from cyberspace can be used as a coercive tool in diplomacy

Over the last century, the domains of air, space, and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting domains of land and sea. While the doctrine for land operations is relatively mature, the doctrine for space and cyberspace continue to evolve, often in an unstructured manner. This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to U.S. Army and joint warfighting. It concentrates on the central question: How are U.S. military operations in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being integrated with operations in the traditional domain of land? This inquiry is divided into three major sections: • Existing Doctrine: This section presents an overview of the current state of joint and U.S. Army doctrinal development for each of the domains of land, space, and cyberspace. • Operations in Multiple Domains: This section examines the concept of cross-domain synergy and its ability to enhance globally integrated operations. • Future Operations: This section explores probable future operating environments as well as the resulting implications for U.S. Army and joint force development. It includes recommendations for policymakers and senior leaders regarding the future development and integration of space and cyberspace doctrine. Anticipated future trends favor the decreased emphasis on traditional large-scale land operations and increased frequency and intensity of conflict in space and cyberspace, perhaps even where these newer domains may become preeminent for a given operation. The joint staff's pursuit of achieving cross-domain synergy in planning and operations offers a credible method to face some of the challenges of the future joint force, but this will likely remain an evolutionary vice revolutionary endeavor. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1399/thumbnail.jpg

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From the outset, the emergent national and transnational networks of automated, inter‐connected information systems were expected to create beneficial communities. Unfortunately, unpleasant contingencies more like those of turbulent urban environments have emerged in the undesired challenges to individual and group security from these spreading global and critical networks. The 'netted' nations of the West are acting more like global neighbouring cities in their increasingly similar social burdens and competition for resources seeping across real and virtual borders. At the same time, with the rise of both wider global networks and highly‐Webbed military technology, the global military community is developing new, broader notions of the contingencies for which they must be prepared. In this process, on‐going since the Gulf War of 1991, millions of defense research and acquisition budget dollars have been, and continue to be, aimed at solutions for these newly perceived broadening responsibilities.The surprising result is a growing intersection between the capabilities being sought and developed in the most modern of militaries, the services of the US, and the emerging needs of the wider civilian community in meeting new contingencies. This article discusses this growing intersection in meeting internet‐borne societal threats or in applying internet‐enabled responses to intentional or unintentional social disruptions. While these trends are largely seen, today, in the US military and society, they portend similar possible developments around the globe. Not only is the US currently defining the dominant notions of a 'modern' military, it is also the incubator nation for global notions of a computerized society

The first 7 years of U.S. Cyber Command operations are paved with milestones that mark the steady operationalization of modern cyberspace as the newest domain of military conflict as well as a realm of international power. The creation of the Cyber Mission Force and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber are significant steps toward improving the timeliness and effectiveness of cyberspace operations that directly support combatant commands and the whole-of-government responses to cyberspace threats. It focuses on the central question: "What is the context in which different military services approach cyberspace component operations internally as well as with the Department of Defense?" ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1381/thumbnail.jpg

News Stories Archive ; Understanding the role of cyberspace in military operations is not limited to just the cyber experts and practitioners, especially in this modern era of Great Power Competition. With this in mind, the. Read More

Abstract
The growing importance of cyberspace to modern society, and its increasing use as an arena for dispute, is becoming a national security concern for governments and armed forces globally. The special characteristics of cyberspace, such as its asymmetric nature, the lack of attribution, the low cost of entry, the legal ambiguity, and its role as an efficient medium for protest, crime, espionage and military aggression, makes it an attractive domain for nation-states as well as non-state actors in cyber conflict.
This paper studies the various non-state actors who coexist in cyberspace, examines their motives and incitements, and analyzes how and when their objectives coincide with those of nation-states. Literature suggests that many nations are currently pursuing cyberwarfare capabilities, oftentimes by leveraging criminal organizations and irregular forces. Employment of such non-state actors as hacktivists, patriot hackers, and cybermilitia in state-on-state cyberspace operations has also proved to be a usable model for conducting cyberattacks. The paper concludes that cyberspace is emerging as a new tool for state power that will likely reshape future warfare. However, due to the lack of concrete cyberwarfare experience, and the limited encounters of legitimate cyberattacks, it is hard to precisely assess future effects, risks and potentials.

Cyberspace operations have become pervasive in the United States, and they enable many aspects of modern life for the average citizen, such as entertainment, communication, education, transportation, banking, and voting. The continuing development of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve component cyberspace units can leverage the capabilities and experience of industry and academia to help protect critical information infrastructure and enhance national security. What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force? ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1383/thumbnail.jpg