Fandom, kultura partycypacyjna i niekończąca się popularność Disneya. Refleksje z D23 Expo 2019 (23‒25 sierpnia 2019)
In: The Polish journal of the arts and culture, Heft 14 (2/2021), S. 187-197
ISSN: 2450-6249
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In: The Polish journal of the arts and culture, Heft 14 (2/2021), S. 187-197
ISSN: 2450-6249
Printed by S. Gusnell. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; BANC; N7425.D23 1800: Imperfect copy: p. v-vi omitted in numbering ; BANC; N7425.D23 1800: Bound with: Dallaway, James. Anecdotes of the arts in England
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German politicians frequently emphasize the importance of Mittelstand firms for the economy, thereby particularly referring to their enormous engagement in training apprentices. However, there is yet almost no empirical evidence on the question whether Mittelstand firms are in fact excessively active in training apprentices. We study whether the relative importance of owner-managed small and medium sized enterprises has an effect on firms' apprenticeship activity on the county level.
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This paper investigates the causal effect of the quality of property rights on the price of collateralized consumer loans. Identification stems from exogenous variation in the improvement of property rights in Vietnam following recent accelerations of the land titling program as well as political change in provincial leaderships. We exploit a unique data set which comprises the complete loan data of one of the largest private Vietnamese banks, regional level information on the quality of property rights and legal institutions as well as an exact measure of bank competition derived from the complete relevant georeferenced bank data of Vietnam. Our findings clearly indicate that more secure property rights reduce the cost of credit, and these results are very robust to the inclusion of competition in our regression model. Owing to an institutional peculiarity of the Vietnamese banking practice, we support our findings with a falsification exer-cise on employer-insured loans.
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International offset certificates have systematically traded at a lower price than European Union Allowances (EUAs), although they are perfect substitutes. Firms therefore had a strong incentive to use the cheaper certificates up to the maximum quantity fixed by the regulator. This study highlights that a considerable number of firms did not use their offset credit entitlement and by doing so seemingly forwent profits, which supports the idea that significant transaction costs exist in carbon permit trade. While most of the literature on emission trading evaluates the efficiency of regulation in a frictionless world, firms in reality face managerial costs of compliance with regulation. This study examines the use of international offset credits within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for carbon dioxide, in order to assess the relevance of such managerial and information-related transaction costs. This study further establishes a model of firm decision under fixed entry costs and estimates the size of transaction costs rationalizing firm behavior using both standard parametric and semi-parametric binary quantile regression methods. These costs appear to be sizable and make active optimization of compliance unprofitable for many small emitters. It appears that a large portion of these transaction costs stems from participation in the EU ETS in general, rather than additional participation in the offset trade.
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This paper studies the effect of trade facilitation on vertical firm structure using plant-level data from Switzerland. Based on the Business Census and the Input-Output table, we first calculate a binary measure of vertical integration for all plants registered in Switzerland. We then estimate the effect of a Mutual Recognition Agreement with the European Union on the plants' probability of being vertically integrated. Adopting a difference-in-differences approach, we find that this policy change reduced the treated plants' probability of being vertically integrated by about 10 percent. Our results are consistent with recent work in international trade theory.
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In: Europa-Archiv, Band 44, S. 1-4
Deals with plans for Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe announced Dec. 7, 1988. Includes text (in German) of M. Gorbachev's Dec. 7, 1988, speech before the UN General Assembly (p. D23-D37).
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 1, S. 265-294
ISSN: 1944-7981
Thinking about contingencies, designing covenants, and seeing through their implications is costly. Parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete. The paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design. (JEL D23, D82, D86, L22)
Angesichts der teilweise prekären Finanzlage deutscher Kommunen gelten freiwillige Kooperationen im Kommunalbereich als mögliche Alternative, z. B. zu politisch heiklen Gebietsreformen, um Kostenersparnisse zu realisieren. Die Ergebnisse einer Effizienzstudie des IWH (in Kooperation mit der Universität Kassel) zeigen am Beispiel der hessischen kommunalen Abwasserentsorgung allerdings, dass sich nicht jede Form der kommunalen Zusammenarbeit bzw. Arbeitsteilung günstig auf die Effizienz der Leistungserstellung auswirken muss. Insbesondere die verbreitete Teilzweckverbandslösung schneidet hier eher ungünstig ab. Weitere Ergebnisse zeigen neben einem erheblichen Effizienzsteigerungspotenzial auch eine weitgehende Ausschöpfung von Größenvorteilen. Daneben bestätigt sich außerdem der erhebliche Einfluss demographischer und siedlungsstruktureller Faktoren für die effiziente Abwassersammlung und -behandlung.
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Despite a recent expansion in housing finance, Brazil still faces a severe housing shortage, especially among lower-income people, and it is important to examine the development, limitations and prospects of the country`s housing finance market. This paper investigates the recent evolution of that market in Brazil, focusing on whether the current expansion in mortgage lending is the result of institutional and economic improvements favoring economic stability and compliance with contractual obligations or is merely an effect of the higher level of housing loans imposed by the government on financial institutions. Different explanations are found for private and public institutions.
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This book is a study of the multinational corporation from the transaction cost perspective. The firm is a system of administrative relationships based on a nexus of contracts and the strong interdependence of specific assets. The firm substitutes the market mechanism when, in view of resource allocation and the existing transaction costs, it is a more costly instrument than the entrepreneur with his coordinating role. Using the theory advanced by Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson we investigate some key features of the multinational corporation. We analyze the role of technology for the emergence of multinationals. This emergence is predetermined by scientific discoveries and technological innovations which shorten the geographic distances among economic resources in the world and allow cutting on organizational costs within the firm. The multinational firm is a complex hierarchical structure dispersed in many countries and aimed at replacing the international market in the allocation of global resources. The firm performs this task at less cost than the market. The more costly the different regional or national markets in which multinational firms operate, the greater the advantage of the bureaucracy, the more centralized the company and the lower the autonomy of the subsidiaries. Some further findings are that there are specific risks for multinationals in their operations in the global market since there are various market failures present. Firms overcome those by internal organization, horizontal and vertical integration. Through intrafirm trade and transfer prices companies manage to capture externalities becoming thus a cheaper instrument of resource allocation than the market. The international division of labor transforms into intrafirm division, market pricing turns into transfer prices and the technological transfer turns into intrafirm exchange of technological knowledge and innovations. Multinational firms are faced with transactional and behavioral opportunism in Eastern Europe, both from employees and contractual partners in market dealings. Multinationals have difficulty finding skillful management with western education and experience in the tradition and practices of the market economy. This hinders the role of management in substituting the market mechanism. Additional sources of risk and instability for multinational corporations in the region of Eastern Europe are the underdeveloped capital market, macroeconomic instability, consistent corruption and crime, political risks, lack of property right enforcement, etc.
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From the point of view of Durkheim, institutions are ways of acting, feeling and thinking, expressing any social act. Institutions have stringent action on the individual, have its own existence, independent of individual manifestations, which are distinctive for a given group, being accepted by all members. Types of social institutions are economic institutions, educational, political, cultural and family. Within institutions, communication is an inherent phenomenon.For Katz and Kahn "communication is a social process of great relevance to the functioning of each group, organization or society," the very essence of the social system or organization. The organizational structure provides stability for human communication and facilitates administrative tasks. (Rogers Everett M. and Agarwala-Rogers Rekha, 1976, p. 6). Therefore, an effective institutional communication adds value to any institution.
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Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners' capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate those that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). A one-standarddeviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72 per cent increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality simultaneously controlled for in our empirical models of FDI inflows. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement. We show in the context of a simple model with endogenous expropriation that, when there is a binding threat of expropriation, foreign investors can become unresponsive to differences in other dimensions of institutions and political risk, and may even reduce optimal investment as these institutions improve.
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The paper suggests a partial solution to the disjunction between the institutional environment and the institutions of governance by considering the budget constraint. This approach is put in the perspective of the comparative analysis of economic organizations as discrete structural alternatives. The budget constraint presents a whole range of alternative values that are distinct by different transaction costs that organizations meet. Following different values of budget constraint, bounded rationality and opportunism are allocated to alternative uses and asset specificity takes different forms. This approach requires that the discriminating alignment solution considers the prevailing value of the budget constraint, which opens the need for a comparative perspective on efficacious organizational governance. A second level of governance is corporate governance. The debate over corporate governance is centered around decision-making power and the existence of quasi-rents that organizations produce. Given different values of the budget constraint, the definition of what are efficacious systems of decision-making power and appropriation of quasi-rents are distinct in the shareholder value and the stakeholder interest paradigms.
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The paper reconsiders the theory of fiscal federalism in a framework inspired by property-rights theory. We set up a two-period model where on a first stage a region in a federation can expend value-enhancing investments into a public project. The project can be implemented on a second stage, and causes spilovers on other regions. Under centralized as well as decentralized governance, negotiations on the federal level facilitate the realization of the efficient policy. Still, non-contractibility of investments causes the overall outcomes to differ across regimes. If the region with access to the public project bears the entire implementation costs of its policies, underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity (centralized governance) is superior when spillovers are weak (strong). Conversely, if linear cost-sharing arrangements are feasible, decentralized authority often leads to a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority (with majority or unanimity rule) does not.
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