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Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR.

The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (NDDRP) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was implemented over a period of seven years (2004- 2011) with the World Bank's support and funding. The NDDRP had three objectives: 1) disarmament of all combatants willing to be granted a status of demobilized person; 2) demobilization of all ex-combatants who met the conditions for a return to civilian life through a downsizing process of armed forces or groups; and 3) reintegrate the demobilized in the social and economic practices of the community of their choice with opportunities and conditions similar to those of other members of the community. To achieve these objectives, the DRC government initially established a National Commission of Demobilization and Reinsertion (CONADER, 2003), then established the NDDRP (2004), and finally created a new NDDRP Implementation Unit (IU-NDDRP, 2007). NDDRP was divided into three distinct phases, each capitalizing on the gains as well as the mistakes of the past. Economic reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants represented four out of five demobilized as recorded by the program. At the program's conclusion, the implementing partners decided to support the creation, legalization, and strengthening of demobilized persons' economic associations. This model of economic and social reintegration developed by the NDDRP can serve as a model framework for future rehabilitation and reintegration processes in DRC as well as in other countries. Finally, as the results were not as high as expected in regard to the number of women as well as wounded and disabled veterans demobilized, the NDDRP can be lauded for successfully reaching and reintegrating a highly significant number of Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFG) through special projects executed by different implementing partners.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a set of activities that forms part of the strategies for peacebuilding after civil war. DDR has become the standard way of addressing security threats in immediate post-conflict situations. However, DDR is designed to promote national security, rather than human or community security. This creates severe obstacles for success, if success is seen in terms of overall security promotion rather than defined merely by the number of arms collected and people demobilized. The reason is that if security at the community level is not improved, then people will be unable to abandon armed violence as a way of protection and of making a living. Disarmament in such a situation will probably be only temporary. Thus, it is a necessity for DDR to aim at community security. However, when community security becomes the aim, then this opens up questions about whether DDR is the most appropriate strategy. At best, it can be part of a more wide-ranging strategy, which in addition to top-down DDR programs also involves community-based activities. Altogether, such a holistic security promotion strategy should endeavor to make people and communities better able to protect themselves and to create a living that does not depend on war and violence. In other words, it should aim at making guns redundant 'Community-based' and 'Second-generation' DDR initiatives lend inspiration for such a wider security promotion approach. What they show is that the optimal approach is very context-specific. An analysis of the conflict, of local security mechanisms, and of the needs and capacities of communities, therefore, has to be the first step, despite the fact that this takes valuable time. Adapted from the source document.

This article introduces the special issue on DDR and 'Armed Non-Statutory Actors' (ANSAs) which we prefer to the less precise label of Armed Non-State Actors. The understanding that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs are essential in helping to prevent the recurrence of war in post-conflict situations is at the heart of current peacebuilding practice and the academic literature on peacekeeping and stabilization. But the changing strategic context of DDR programs and in particular the proliferation of ANSAs presents new challenges, the responses to which have been characterized as 'second generation' DDR. The changing context poses new questions and forces us to rethink assumptions and templates of DDR as the concept is blurred and expanded. The question is if it makes sense to hold on to the concept or whether the assumptions associated with it will get in the way of rethinking templates for violence reduction in the future.

The economic or political economy of conflicts and civil wars in Africa is an expanding field with an increase in research and literature especially in the last few decades. However, less attention has been devoted to the role of political economy in peacebuilding operations/interventions. This dissertation examines the extent to which political economy, specifically its elements in terms of interests, incentives, and institutions shapes the conceptualization, design and implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and the prospects for sustainable peace. The Niger Delta Amnesty (NDA) is used as an empirical case study.:CHAPTER ONE GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 Introduction 1.1 State of the art 1.1.1 The political economy of peacebuilding 1.1.2 Institutions in rentier states 1.1.3 Resource curse discourse and interests 1.1.4 Wealth distribution and incentives 1.2 Research question 1.3 Problem statement 1.4 Overview of research methodology 1.4.1 Structural framework of the political economy approach 1.4.1.1 Neoliberalism Approach 1.4.1.2 Neopatrimonialism approach 1.4.2 Comment on sources 1.4.2.1 Research design 1.4.2.2 Research method 1.4.2.3 Data generation method 1.4.2.4 Method of data analysis 1.5 Challenges in the field 1.6 The structure of the dissertation CHAPTER TWO HISTORICIZING OIL CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA REGION 2 Introduction 2.1 Analyzing the Origins and dynamics of the Niger Delta Conflict 2.1.1 The Geography and People of the Niger Delta 2.1.2 Pre-colonial Niger Delta and the Emergence of European Trade in Nigeria (1444 – 1850) 2.1.3 Colonial Considerations: Increasing Agitations, Palm oil Production and the Discovery of Oil (1851 – 1960) 2.1.4 Independent and Post Independent Nigeria and the Foundations of the Oil Conflict (1960 – Present) 2.1.5 Militant Movements in the Niger Delta in the Recent Past (1990s – Present) 2.2 Nigerian Political Economy, State Policy Response and the Nature of the Nigerian State 2.2.1 A Survey of the Nigerian Political Economy 2.2.2 State-centric Responses to the Niger Delta Oil Conflict (1960 – 2009) 2.2.2.1 Positive "Carrot" Approach 2.2.2.2 Coercive "Stick" Approach 2.2.3 An Explanation of the Nature and character of the Nigerian State 2.3 Conclusion CHAPTER THREE THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE AND NON-STATE INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA 3 Introduction 3.1 Furthering Institutional Scholarship and Debates 3.1.1 The Mainstream Debate 3.1.2 The Critical School 3.2 State-to-State Institutional Interaction 3.2.1 Institutions as "Rules of the Game" 3.2.2 Differential Power Distribution 3.2.3 Formal Institutional Bargaining 3.3 Non-state Driven Institutional Interlinkage 3.3.1 Institutions as socially shared rules/traditional systems 3.4 State and Non-state Institutional Exchange 3.4.1 Institutional Bricolage 3.4.2 Institutional Credibility 3.5 State, Non-state and International Collaboration 3.5.1 Complexities of NDA and DDR Institutions 3.5.2 Complementarity of NDA and DDR Institutions 3.5.3 Limited Access Order in NDA and DDR Institutions 3.6 Implications of Statutory, Non-Statutory and International Institutions to NDA and DDR 3.6.1 Lack of Coordination 3.6.2 Exacerbation of Conflict 3.6.3 Weak Hybridized Institutions 3.7 Conclusion CHAPTER FOUR CONCEPTUALISING INTERESTS AND INCENTIVES IN THE FRAMING OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY AND DDR PROGRAM 4 Introduction 4.1 Mapping Actor Network Analysis in the Niger Delta Conflict 4.1.1 The Nigerian Government 4.1.2 Oil Communities 4.1.3 Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) 4.2 Contested Interests: Actors, Encounters and Entanglements in the Niger Delta 4.2.1 Powerful Versus Powerless Encounters 4.2.2 Elitists Entanglements 4.2.3 Intra and Inter Community Contestations 4.2.4 MNOCs and Niger Delta Communities' Confrontations 4.3 Conclusion CHAPTER FIVE A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NIGER DELTA AMNESTY, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 5 Introduction 5.1 Amnesty: A Peacebuilding Practice 5.2 The NDA and DDR Program and the Politics of conceptualization 5.3 NDA and DDR Program and the Art of Negotiation 5.4 NDA and DDR: The Practice of Planning 5.5 The Implementation Process of the Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Program 5.5.1 The Disarmament Phase 5.5.2 The Demobilisation Phase 5.5.3 The Reintegration Phase 5.6 Niger Delta Amnesty and DDR Process: A Shift from a Neoliberal Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) Principles to a Neopatrimonial DDR Practice 5.6.1 From a people centered approach to a patron-client driven approach 5.6.2 From a flexible, transparent and accountable doctrine to a non-transparent and unaccountable DDR process 5.6.3 Nationally Owned 5.6.4 From an Integrated IDDRS Norm to a non-integrated approach 5.6.5 From a well-planned IDDRS to a haphazard DDR 5.7 Conclusion CHAPTER SIX GENERAL CONCLUSION 6 Introduction 6.1 Main Research Questions and Empirical Findings 6.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contribution 6.3 Potential Concerns for Future Research BIBLIOGRAPHY

In an attempt to facilitate transition from conflict to peace, Disengagement, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) initiatives are key in fostering national dialogue and reconciliation. While much literature exists on the disengagement component of the process, very few scholars have documented in detail the screening phase and its challenges. Indeed, the screening phase is critical to ensure the success of a DDRR program, especially in contexts dominated by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). This publication examines how the Government of Niger (GoN) implements the screening process for disengaged combatants associated with Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa (BH/ISIS-WA). Thanks to the screening process, this article also explores the linkages between BH/ISIS-WA surrenders and judicial actors, as an opportunity to collect information on arrested associates in an environment with weak state presence characterized by heightened insecurity. The Government of Niger has made progress in the treatment of defectors by updating its legal framework, through the creation of a National Program on disengaged combatants and the set-up of an action plan to seek international support. The GoN is therefore trying to align itself based on respect for the International humanitarian laws and United Nations resolutions, in order to promote the human rights of both BH/ISIS-WA repentants and the communities into which they integrate. Additionally, the GoN strives to integrate lessons learnt from other Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) across the African continent, in particular the case of Somalia. The overall process is managed by the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) but includes several other governmental agencies as well. In some instances, parts of the DDR implementation chain benefit from the support of international partners. The author of this article was in charge of providing technical assistance to the Government of Niger in developing a national strategy for disengaged persons associated with BH/ISIS-WA. He also assisted state actors to implement program components, such as the screening phase and the legal framework.

Several years ago a devastating civil war that raged in Sri Lanka for 3 decades between the state army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), finally ended. One of the immediate issues that the country had to face in the aftermath of the war was dealing with the remnants of the LTTE combatants. For that purpose, the state launched the program of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). The program appeared to be unique in many ways, different from the DDR programs initiated and conducted by the UN in other countries recovering from civil war. One of such features distinctive for Sri Lanka, was that DDR was launched in the absence of the ceasefire or peace agreement between belligerents, in the condition of a total victory of the state army. What has attracted the attention of the international community, was the full monopoly on the development and execution of the program by the government of Sri Lanka, with the UN left outside. In this research project I look into how DDR in Sri Lanka is different from the conventional vision on DDR. I bring up a question on whether the Sri Lankan DDR is simply a tool for maintaining the political influence, or it challenges the very understanding of the concept. To analyse the data collected during the fieldwork in Sri Lanka, I employ theories on statehood, human security and peacebuilding.

A key component of peace process and post-conflict reconstruction is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. I argue that DDR programs imply multiple transitions: from the combatants who lay down their weapons, to the governments that seek and end to armed conflict, to the communities that receive - or reject - these demobilized fighters. At each level, these transitions imply a complex equation between the demands of peace and the clamor for justice. However, traditional approaches to DDR have focused on military and security objectives, which have resulted in these programs being developed in relative isolation from the field of transitional justice and its concerns with historical clarification, justice, reparations, and reconciliation. Drawing upon my research with former combatants in Columbia, I argue that successful reintegration not only requires fusing the processes and goals of DDR programs with transitional justice measures, but that both DDR and transitional justice require a gendered analysis that includes an examination of the salient links between weapons, masculinities, and violence. Constructing certain forms of masculinity is not incidental to militarism: rather, it is essential to maintenance. What might it mean to 'add gender' to DDR and transitional justice processes if one defined gender to include men and masculinities, thus making these forms of identity visible and a focus of research and intervention? I explore how one might 'add gender' to the DDR program in Columbia as one step toward successful reintegration, peace-building and sustainable social change. (Human Rights Quarterly)

Although it is common for armed groups to splinter (or "fragment") during contexts of multi-party civil war, current guidance on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not address the challenges that arise when recalcitrant fighters, unwilling to report to DDR, break ranks and form new armed groups. This Practice Note addresses this issue, drawing lessons from the multi-party context of the DRC and from the experiences of former members of three armed groups: the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), and the DRC national army (FARDC). While the findings indicate that the fragmentation of armed groups may encourage desertion and subsequent participation in DDR, they also show that active armed groups may monitor DDR programs and track those who demobilize. Remobilization may follow, either as active armed groups target ex-combatants for forced re-recruitment or as ex-combatants remobilize in armed groups of their own choice. Given these dynamics, practitioners in settings of partial peace may find it useful to consider non-traditional methods of DDR such as the use of mobile patrols and mobile disarmament units. The temporary relocation of ex-combatants to safe areas free from armed groups, or to protected transitional assistance camps, may also help to minimize remobilization during the reintegration phase.