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Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.

Predmet je ovoga rada razvoj zakonodavstva nadležnoga za regulativu lijekova u Banskoj Hrvatskoj u razdoblju Austro-Ugarske i na istom području kasnije, između dva svjetska rata, u okviru nove države (Kraljevstvo/Kraljevina SHS, odnosno Kraljevina Jugoslavija). Na početku vremenskoga razdoblja samo su ljekarne po propisima farmakopeje izrađivale službene lijekove. Na kraju promatranoga razdoblja to je područje imalo farmaceutsku industriju, sposobnu pratiti dosege svjetske farmaceutske industrije. Rad je napravljen s namjerom prikazati kako je zakonodavstvo pratilo novosti u farmaciji i farmaceutskoj industriji te kako je također proaktivno uvodilo i činilo obvezatnim nova praćenja svojstava lijekova. ; The variety of human diseases and necessity for curing them resulted in the appearance of medicines and medical treatments. Traditional or people's medicines had been applied in the old times. Rulers realized over time the importance of getting medicines and medical treatments codified. Pharmacies, being in charge for the production of medicines, existed from 13th century. The Habsburg Monarchy proclaimed the General Sanitary Order (Das Generalsanitätsnormativum) in 1770, codifying that physicians should visit pharmacies and control their work once a year. The pharmaceutical industry has taken over medicines production in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century in Western Europe and North America, and new methods of medicines production has been occurring ever since.The Banal Croatia, which included today's Croatia without Međimurje, Baranja (Baranya), Istria and Dalmatia, had been relatively independent in the health policies in the period from 1869 to 1918, and passed the Law on Pharmacies in 1894. The Law stipulated the control of pharmacies rather than the control over the pharmaceutical industry. The traditional approach prevailed in healing of many different health issues at the times when modern medicines had not yet been developed. Pharmacists were barred from knowing the properties of medicines made by manufacturers, since manufacturers have kept ingredients and recipes of their sources of income secret. State was the only one privy to all of the properties of a medicine and such a medicine was usually known as "a secret remedy". The Banal Croatia witnessed the birth of a large-scale manufacturing of secret remedies by companies held by Adolphe Thierry de Chateauvieux and Eugen Viktor Feller.The interwar period saw the proliferation of the Croatian pharmaceutical industry. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in which the area of the Banal Croatia had been extended to Međimurje and Baranja, established the control of medicines made by the growing pharmaceutical industry. At first, the manufacturers were responsible for their products. In 1925 a state surveillance and control of medicines production and sale was established. It meant that the state had accepted the responsibility for the quality of medicines thereby making the state quality-proof assignments put on package inserts of medicines, as well as making the state registries and other documents regarding the medicines control. The Control of Biologics Act of 1930 made it clear that biological medicines are more important and that they treated efficiently the larger scope of health issues than chemical medicines had. The regulation related to the state control of medicines from the same year had been the biggest achievement of the interwar medicines state control. The regulation of medicines became an overall state affair, with the state comptrollers actively involved in the control of each and every batch of medicines. Banovina Hrvatska, which had included the former Banal Croatia, created the state institutes for production as well as control of medicines aimed at the centralization and co-ordination of production and control of medicines. The assessment of the properties of medicines improved as well, from the control of harmlessness to the controls of purity and potency. The control of efficiency was introduced later. The development of the production and regulation of medicines in the territory of Banal Croatia in the timeframe selected for this article moved in line with the development that occurred in the Western Europe and North America. When the Second World War broke out modern medicines regulation was already in existence.

Povijest nastanka i djelovanja građanskih udruga u Lici može se pratiti još od 1835. godine kada je osnovana Narodna čitaonica u Senju. Ipak, tek su krajem 19. stoljeća stvoreni svi preduvjeti za brojnije osnivanje svih vrsta građanskih udruga u Lici te je od tada njihov broj u stalnom povećanju. Iako je nesumnjivo da su razne vrste udruga u Lici svojim djelovanjem pozitivno djelovale na ličko društvo, taj fenomen društvene mikro-povijesti nije bio predmet sveobuhvatnog proučavanja. Ovaj doktorski rad kronološki prati stvaranje prvih građanskih udruga (društava, zaklada, štedionica, klubova i podružnica) u Lici u vrijeme Vojne krajine, njihovo naglo povećanje u vrijeme Ličko-krbavske županije i promjene koje su ih zahvatile u vrijeme Kraljevine Jugoslavije te završava početkom Drugoga svjetskog rata kada su građanske udruge u Lici naglo nestale s povijesne pozornice. U radu je prikazano političko, gospodarsko i kulturno stanje u Lici koje je uvelike utjecalo na brzinu i kvalitetu nastanka novih udruga. Također su obrađene i građanske udruge izvan prostora Like jer je njihova kulturna i ekonomska interakcija bila važan element u razvoju ove regije. Stoga je cilj ovog doktorskog rada po prvi put u našoj historiografiji dati, ne samo sumarni prikaz građanskih udruga, već i razloge, uzroke te posljedice njihovog postojanja na prostoru Like i Senja, a sve u svrhu boljega razumijevanja kompleksnih i nedovoljno razjašnjenih povijesnih procesa u hrvatskoj povijesnoj regiji Lici. ; The beginings of organizations set up in Lika region reaches far into the past, in the time of medieval brotherhoods; however, the first civil organizations in Lika did not arise until the Military Border systems have been abolished and until the break through of the modernization processes that originated in the Civic Croatia. The city of Senj had partially different but also earlier organizations' development. The first known civic organization on the area that has been the subject of this doctoral dissertation was The National Library in the city of Senj, founded in 1835. Withal, this civil organization is the first one in Croatia. In Lika region, the first civil organizations were not founded until the abrogation of the Military Border which, at the same time, has been the starting point for the progression of one of the most important forms of modernization. In the first part of this scientific work, social stratification and differentiation in the everyday life of Lika's residents has been depicted, whereas the usage of an argumented research approach has served to explain complex political, military, economic and other mutual influences between Lika's peasants-soldiers and the authorities that have dominated during that time. Multiple conflicts, unsafe and economically marginalized area, unsettled property laws and so called 'cooperative phenomena' are just a part of the numerous reasons why Lika region has entered Croatian and Habsbourg Monarchy's cultural and social processes relatively late. An emphasis is on the development of education, literacy and culture as basic determinants of future development of the civil organizations. Second major group of the research questions deals with an emersion of the organizations on the Croatian and European area, as a result of new global political processes. This part of the disertation tries to answer the question 'which were the reasons for the organizations' establishment in the first place', so as 'to what extent the organizations have influenced the residents of Wienna, Zagreb and other cities of the Habsbourg Monarchy'? Special emphasis is put on the law regulations, that is, so called 'Imperial Decree' which has helped the organizations to establish and work. Also, this group of the research questions discusses the inherited differences that existed in an administration, mentality and the development itself between the former Military Border and the Civic Croatia. Comparative research has provided an evidence that the development of a new district – Lika-Krbava county – when compared to the other districts, has been minor. Also, the questions that have been the matter of this scientific work were 'which kind of the organizations were there in the first place, 'what is the nature of the organizations' and 'which is the real level on which these organizations have fulfilled their purposes and goals'. This kind of analysis is very important in order to understand Lika's history from the beginning of the 20th century; in this period economic and cultural life of the Lika's residents is highly inflenced by a new regime of the Kingdom of SHS and, later on, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This group of questions especially makes an exception of the city of Senj, as a kind of border exception, but also explains which political and economic circumstances and perplexities resulted in prosperity and stagnation of the city beneath the Nehaj Fortress. The third group of the research questions, using the archive sources of the civil organizations' rules, gives an overview of more than one hundred and fifty civil organizations according to the territorial regions (districts) that existed during the Lika-Krbava county and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This section reveals the purposes, goals and the activities of administrative councils and assemblies of all major civic organizations (associations, clubs, affiliates, commities, foundations) found in the districts that existed during that time – Brinje, Donji Lapac, Gračac, Gospić, Korenica, Otočac, Perušić, Udbina and the cities Senj and Karlobag. In spite of major illiteracy, political and national antagonism and the fact that Lika was at the periphery in the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, until the beginning of the World War I, a great number of the organizations has been established in Lika region. When talking about this in the first place, we must mention some proffesional societies, libraries, 'falcon' organizations, music organizations and economic organizations, although there were also some historical occurences such as the first theatrical group in Otočac, or one of the oldest tennis clubs in Croatia, the one in Gospić. Thereby, in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, Lika is the region of the numerous changes, but even more is the region of the extreme contradictions. In the same (research) way, the attention has been dedicated to history of Lika's organizations outside Lika's area. Throughout this group of questions not all civic organizations outside Lika have been elaborated, only those whose members actively participated in the development of the possibilities for the future economic prosperity of Lika region. Therefore, this part of the paper tries to show the connection between Lika region and the other parts of the countries that existed during that time, where the descendants of Lika's residents have lived. This scientific work tries to answer the questions of the real connection of Lika's people outside Lika with the real problems which were perceived by them in a different way than by those who remained living in the homeland. The Society of Lika's people in Zagreb was Lika's major emigrant organization which intensively helped its agile members and offered a solution for a hard life in Lika region. The Society for the preservation of the Plitvice Lakes was one of the best known organizations in Croatia, however, its class and narcissistic behaviour could not have been accepted by most of Lika's residents. In spite of individual interests of a great number of members of Lika's civic organizations, what does remain is a constatation that the organizations, especially those whose members were peasants, have obtained a huge success when it comes to development of cooperatives, crafts, agriculture, but also education and culture. Also, what is notecable is the fact that efficiency of the numerous affiliates of federate economic organizations has increased, what leads to the conclusion that the overall progress in Lika was connected with the political and economic centres outside Lika. A key influence onto the organizations' development in Lika was the one by certain individuals such as Buda Budisavljević, Ivan Devčić, Dragutin Trstenjak, Ante Cividini, Ivan Krajač, Ivan Gojtan, Ante Lončarić, so as many other culturaly and publicly known people. In that way, this doctoral thesis has scientificaly confirmed an actual similarity of the associations and organizations in Lika with those in the rest of Croatia, but also that these similarities were, in fact, quite limited. Civic organizations are an important factor in every community, so as, of course, for Lika's identity which is historically saturated in turbulent ways. This work tries to make a contribution not just to better understanding of the civic organizations in Lika, but to contribute to understand the overall environment, that is, the atmosphere in Lika region. This gives new knowledge regarding micro-historical elements of one culture that has been a carrier of social, cultural, political and economic development of the region between the Kapela mountains in the north and South Velebit and the river Zrmanja stream in the south. This doctoral thesis is the first scientific contribution to better understanding of the civic organizations and their importance in the region under consideration. Although this thesis, through the depiction of work of the civic organizations in Lika, has tried to give an answer regarding broader social, political, economic, cultural and religious life of Lika and Senj's residents in the period of turbulent and modernisation processes, some questions remain only partially answerable. If we take into consideration the broadness, possibilities and influence of the organizations, this observation is logical, too. Also, here we can talk about a vast area which makes a closed whole only in certain segments. That is the reason why this overview of the work of the civic organizations in Lika asks for further research attention, especially when it comes to the analysis of economic changes which have occurred in Lika during the second part of the 19th and the first part of the 20th century. In order to accomplish this, besides the archival research, a potential researcher must pay attention to the statistical analysis. Moreover, this scientific work gives just a model of how to evaluate certain types of the civic organizations and how to compare them with the organizations similar to them. Although this doctoral thesis had to be done within a canonical time frame, it will be praiseworthy if we compare the civic organizations in Lika which exist today to those which have existed during the period of Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Of course, this kind of research calls for plenty of time, as well as considerable material assets, hence it can be done sometime in the future. Despite the fact that the tragic events during the World War II lead to the abolition of the civic organizations outside Lika region, the constitution of the Republic of Croatia has created the conditions for the reestablishment of the organizations. Nowadays, more than twenty organizations outside Lika work very actively and responsibly in order to interconnect Lika's emigrants and their descendants with their homeland, from where their ancestors arrived more than one hundred and fifty years ago.

Na Veliki petak 1494, 28. ožujka, u Sikstinskoj kapeli, pred papom Aleksandrom VI. (Borgiom) i članovima papinskog dvora rapski arhiđakon Martin Nimira održao je – dakako, na latinskom – propovijed o Muci; njezinu je pisanu verziju u travnju iste godine u Rimu tiskao Eucharius Silber. Propovijedati pred papom za vrijeme mise značajan je društveni uspjeh; objaviti održanu propovijed dodatno ističe njezinu važnost; pa ipak, Nimirin su život i djelo do danas u povijesti hrvatske i novolatinske književnosti neistraženi. Donijet ću ovdje osnovne podatke o Nimiri, društvenom kontekstu njegove propovijedi, o strukturi tog djela i njegovim kurijalno-humanističkim obilježjima te recepciji (knjižicu je posjedovao Marko Marulić, a 1522. nekoliko je Nimirinih stranica u svoje djelo uvrstio Giovanni Mercurio da Vipera). ; On Good Friday 1494, Martin Nimira, archdeacon of Rab and scion of a wellregarded Rab family, delivered a sermon on the Passion to Pope Alexander VI and members of the papal curia. After April 3 that same year the sermon was printed in Rome by Eucharius Silber. Nimira built his career in the Papal States of Italy as a client of the cardinal of Siena Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini (1439–1503); some years earlier, in March 1487, Nimira had already preached before the Roman cardinals, on the feast of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the Dominican church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva. Nimira's known writings and activities (a poetic prayer for the health of the cardinal Todeschini Piccolomini Hecatosticum carmen ad Christum optimum maximum pro cardinalis Senensis salute, perhaps in 1488; his copyediting of the Politics of Aristotle translated by Leonardo Bruni and commented on by Thomas Aquinas and Ludovico Valenza, 1492) suggest Nimira was a curial humanist, dependent on the patronage of the Roman court and its cardinals. Nimira's sermon on the Passion, in the printed edition dedicated to the cardinal Bernardin López de Carvajal (d. 1523), bishop of Cartagena, Spain, displays Nimira's learning, his command of theological, philosophical and lyrical registers of expression, as well as oratorical elegance and a readiness to adopt Cicero's rhetorical models (sentences from speeches Against Verres 2, 5, For Publius Quinctius and For Aulus Cluentius, as well as the famous fragment of Gaius Gracchus reported by Cicero in On the Orator). The sermon has an introduction, two main parts, and a short closing prayer for God's mercy, especially to the Pope. The first part is philosophical (in Nimira's words, stemming from ingenium), the second part lyrical (arising from pietas). The philosophical part considers the necessity of Christ's Passion and death, touching also on the suffering of the good and the success of the evil in this world, while the lyrical part shows how Christ suffered and died. There is a prosopopoeia of the Virgin Mary, and the piercing of Christ's body is seen as the culmination of his suffering. The Jews (including Judas Iscariot) are presented as the main enemies, their faith as utterly wrong and depraved (confirmation is presented in a collage of biblical quotes), and the piercing of Christ's body is seen as their most terrible crime. The extremely strong antisemitic tone of Nimira's sermon might have been set partly by the tradition of the liturgical Improperia as part of the observance of the Passion, partly by the rhetorical need to contrast blame (of the Jews) and praise (of Christ), but possibly also by the antisemitic leanings in the circle of Nimira's acquaintances: these must have included Antonio Lollio, the secretary of the cardinal Todeschini Piccolomini, who had already in 1486 composed another highly antisemitic sermon before the Pope, and the Dominican Paolo Moneglia from Genova, who as the magister Sacri palatii chose Nimira as the preacher for the Good Friday of 1494; in April of the same year Moneglia was appointed inquisitor of the March of Genoa, which was under strain because of the influx of large numbers of Sephardic Jews and Marranos expelled from Spain and Sicily (later, in Rome in 1498, Moneglia led a spectacular auto da fé of several hundred Marranos in front of St. Peter's Basilica). The success of Nimira's sermon can be inferred from the privileges granted to his family by the cardinal Todeschini Piccolomini later in 1494, from the relatively large number of printed copies of Nimira's small book that survive today (32 in public libraries), from the record of Nimira's preaching in the diaries of Johannes Burchard, papal Master of Ceremonies, and from those who read Nimira's sermon during the Renaissance: we know that a copy of the sermon was owned by Marko Marulić, and that Giovanni Mercurio da Vipera (bishop of Bagnoregio 1523–1527) quoted extensively from the philosophical part of the sermon in his Contra a recto divini cultus itinere aberrantes (Rome 1522). We present an edition of Nimira's sermon following a digital facsimile of a copy in Bavarian State Library. In the edition, the abbreviations are expanded, orthographic variants of ae, u and i are removed, the punctuation is modernized, the spelling and capitalization standardized. Nimira's explicit and implicit textual sources are identified wherever possible.

Djelatna uloga Međunarodnoga odbora Crvenoga križa (MOCK) do izražaja dolazi u ratnim okolnostima u provođenju aktivnosti utemeljenih na međunarodnom ratnom pravu da bi se osigurala pomoć za sve ratne stradalnike. U osiguravanju uvjeta rada tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata MOCK je pokušao uspostaviti službene odnose sa svim zaraćenim državama, odnosno svim vojnim snagama bez obzira na to je li im bio priznat status zaraćene strane. Stoga su u radu prikazani i napori koje je MOCK uložio u pokušaje da pripadnici Narodnooslobodilačke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije steknu službeni položaj zaraćene strane, odnosno službeni status ratnih zarobljenika, te da se na njih dosljedno primijene odredbe međunarodnoga ratnog prava. Usprkos prethodnim kontaktima MOCK je tek nakon imenovanja stalnoga predstavnika u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj (1943.) započeo opsežne aktivnosti u korist pripadnika partizanskoga pokreta Jugoslavije, od kojih su najvažnije bile praktična primjena odredaba međunarodnoga ratnog prava na zarobljene pripadnike partizanskih jedinica te osiguravanje raznih oblika pomoći. S istom je nakanom predstavnik MOCK-a uspostavio kontakt i s Vrhovnim štabom Narodnooslobodilačke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije, a suradnja je olakšana tek nakon potpisivanja sporazuma Tito-Šubašić, što je rezultiralo uspostavom službenih odnosa krajem 1944. godine. Na temelju izvornoga arhivskoga gradiva, objavljenih izvora i literature autor pokazuje i neke aspekte suradnje do završetka rata te u neposrednom poraću. ; The active role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) comes to the fore in wartime circumstances, in carrying out activities based on international war law (the Geneva and Hague Conventions) regarding providing assistance to all war victims. In securing working conditions during World War II, the ICRC attempted to establish official relations with all belligerent parties regardless of whether they were or were not recognised as belligerent parties. Therefore, the author presents part of the ICRC efforts made in the process of recognising the international war law-regulated status of belligerent party to members of the People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, i.e. the status of prisoners of war. Despite some earlier contacts, after the designation of a permanent representative to the Independent State of Croatia (1943), the ICRC launched extensive activities in favour of members of the Yugoslav Partisan movement, the most important of which was the practical application of the international law of war. Permanent representative Schmidlin constantly intervened in the ministries and the prime minister of the Independent State of Croatia through the Central Office of the Croatian Red Cross and as well through prominent figures in the political and social life of the State. However, although the Partisans de facto achieved the position of a belligerent party in their relations with the German military forces, this status was strongly opposed by the ISC authorities. Due to the change in the British attitude towards the Yugoslav Partisans, in the summer of 1943 the ICRC leadership ordered its permanent representative in Zagreb to establish contact with members of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia as soon as possible. Very soon, Schmidlin contacted the Supreme Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army and Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia. In late November 1943, shortly after the beginning of the Allied Conference in Tehran, the ICRC leadership also received an Allied recommendation on the same subject. The existence of the Yugoslav Committee of the Red Cross in London, which had legitimacy and was the only recognised Yugoslav national Red Cross society, was a major problem in establishing relations between the ICRC and the Yugoslav Partisans. The ICRC leadership remained committed to not recognising the new societies created during the war. After the signing of the Tito-Šubašić agreement in mid-June 1944, the ICRC leadership changed its position, and representatives of the Yugoslav government and Marshal Tito sent several letters to the ICRC Permanent Delegation in London in late September and early October 1944. In those letters, they informed the ICRC leadership of the establishment of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Red Cross on the island of Vis. At the same time, the Royal Yugoslav Red Cross Society in London was dissolved. All of this resulted in the unification of the national organisation of the Red Cross in Yugoslavia, which led to the establishment of official relations between the ICRC and Yugoslav Partisans at the end of 1944. Based on original archival sources and literature, the author points to some aspects of cooperation until the end of World War II and in the early post-war period. One of the main aspects of the ICRC's work during this period was the practical application of the provisions of the international law of war to prisoners of war in Yugoslavia. Tito himself made the same promises, though the Yugoslav Ministry of Social Policy made this conditional: they would be applied only if it was proven that captured members of the Partisan movement had been treated in the same way during the war. The treatment of prisoners of war in Yugoslavia could only be speculated about, and the authorities immediately refused to allow foreign diplomatic or ICRC representatives to gain insight into the treatment of prisoners of war. It is clear that the ICRC faced the same problems in its relations with the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia and the German Reich during the war and the Yugoslav authorities at the end of the war and in the immediate post-war period.

Namjera ovoga priloga je prikazati kako i zašto su tekle promjene u vlastima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) u Banja Luci tijekom 1941. i 1942., a dijelom i 1943. godine. Time mislim na različite osobe koje su kao dužnosnici NDH u Banja Luci obnašale vlast. Na promjene kod tih dužnosnika utjecao je odnos vlasti NDH, odnosno ustaškog pokreta prema bosanskohercegovačkim muslimanima, koje su oni smatrali sastavnim dijelom hrvatske nacije. Također je na te promjene utjecala i politika NDH prema srpskom stanovništvu, odnosno državni teror koji je NDH, nakon proglašenja, pokrenula prema njemu, a zatim ustanak tog stanovništva protiv NDH, što je njezine vlasti prisiljavalo na promjene prethodnih postupaka. ; The article presents the personal changes within the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) in the town of Banja Luka in north-western Bosnia. After the Axis attack on Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the proclamation of NDH ruled by Ustasha movement, whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into its territory. Banja Luka was an important centre in north-western Bosnia. The majority of population in that part of Bosnia was made up of Orthodox Serbs, while the rest were Catholic Croats and Moslems. Immediately after the establishment of NDH authority in Banja Luka the main role was played by Viktor Gutić, a pre-war lawyer. Gutić became the head of the ruling Ustasha movement in Banja Luka and north-western Bosnia, but he was also the head of the civilian administration. New Ustasha regime immediately began with policies directed against the Serbs, ranging from abolishment of their national and religious identity to forced resettlements of certain parts of Serbs to Serbia. The new regime also committed mass killings of parts of Serb population. As a strongman in Banja Luka, Gutić distinguished himself in implementation of such policies. But in July of 1941 mass uprising of Serbs broke out in north-western Bosnia and it soon brought NDH authorities in a difficult situation. The uprising would gradually develop into two mutually opposed movements, the Partisans led by Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the royalist Chetnik movement. With the challenge put by mass uprising of Serbs, NDH authorities gradually realized that the arbitrary violence against Serbs, that went even beyond the official anti-Serb measures, backfired. Therefore, NDH introduced certain measures aimed at de-escalation of violence and peaceful efforts to dissuade Serbs from rebellion. This was best seen in the activities of the Committee for the examination and establishment of public safety and order that was established in Banja Luka in late 1941. The committee was headed by Croatian air-force colonel Ivan Mrak and its duty, among others, was to investigate and punish those who committed atrocities against the Serb population, while simultaneously calling Serbs who have rebelled to return to their homes, guaranteeing them safety. In August of 1941 Viktor Gutić was recalled from his duty in Banja Luka. He formally became a high official in the Ministry of internal affairs, but in fact he was stripped of real authority and removed from Banja Luka. Position of Moslem community in Banja Luka and north-western Bosnia was also of great importance. According to the Ustasha ideology, Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina were integral and equal part of the Croatian nation. Therefore, for Ante Pavelić, as head of NDH and Ustasha movement, it was of crucial importance to gain the support of the Moslems. Before the proclamation of NDH the Ustasha movement had a certain number of Moslem supporters. But after Ustasha came to power, Pavelić realized that he needs the support of those Moslem politicians who headed former Yugoslav Moslem Organization, the strongest political party of the Moslem community in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the period of Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For these reasons Džafer Kulenović, distinguished representative of the Yugoslav Moslem Organization, became the vice-president of Government of NDH. Contrary to such general policy, Viktor Gutić, while he was in power in Banja Luka, led sectarian policies that caused the discontent of the Moslem community. But Moslem representatives from Banja Luka, counting on Moslem members of the NDH government, could influence the decision making in Zagreb and were able to counter Gutić's policies. Although Gutić was removed from Banja Luka he still had supporters there, among others in the hierarchy of the Catholic church. Therefore, conflict between Gutić's group and the Moslems continued. Ultimately in summer of 1942. Ante Pavelić appointed Dragan Hadrović as a head of Great County of Sana-Luka in Banja Luka. Hadrović was a Catholic, but with the obvious support of Pavelić and Moslem members of NDH government he began leading a pro-Moslem policy, entering into a conflict with Gutić and his supporters. In a wider sense Hadrović was leading a policy of moderation, opposed to the various excesses of certain other institutions of NDH and representatives of the Ustasha movement. With such policies Hadrović soon gathered enemies within the NDH structures and was also in conflict with the Catholic bishop in Banja Luka, Jozo Garić. Finally, in July of 1943 Hadrović was assassinated by a bomb planted in a postal parcel. It was never officially established who assassinated him, but all sources suggest that the bomb was planted by certain elements within the Ustasha movement who opposed Hadrović's policies. The article follows these events through all important changes and developments within the NDH administration in Banja Luka. Ultimately it can be concluded that NDH regime itself was heterogeneous, with various splits within its ranks. These splits occurred between Catholic and Moslems as well as between those who, according to the changing circumstances, opted and called for more moderate policies, while other remained sectarian and prone to uncompromising and/or violent solutions.

U sklopu istraživanja urbane jezgre Trogira autorica donosi rezultate zaštitnih arheoloških iskapanja te analizu povijesnih izvora i arhivske grade vezane za gradske zidine 15. stoljeća. Posebice se razmatra gradnja gradskog kaštela te ojačavanje sjeverne kortine renesansnim cilindričnim kulama u skladu sa suvremenim traktatima o fortifikacijama. ; La città di Traù (Trogir) è definita nei suoi confini naturali dall'isola sulla quale, nel lungo corso storico di duemila anni della città murata, le fortificazioni si svilupparono ad anello. Sul limitato spazio dell'isoletta si alternarono diversi sistemi fortificatori e le rispettive strategie belliche previste dal mare e dalla terraferma. Alla fine del XIV sec. si costruì, sul lato sud della città, una nuova cinta muraria che con i suoi merli raggiungeva in altezza le torri romaniche. l n tutta la parte sud della città, per una lunghezza di ca. 95 m, si sono interamente conservate le mura cittadine con il cammino di ronda nel convento di S. Nicola . Già verso la fine del XIII secolo era iniziata la costruzione di un lungo tratto di mura dove sorgeva una palizzata tra la città antica e il borgo, e per tutto il secolo successivo si fortificò il borgo con la cui addizione Traù raddoppiava la sua superficie urbana. Anche borgo era munito di torri, tra cui si segnalano la Torre grande alle catene e la Torre delle Polveri detta Oprah, termine noto nel lessico fortificatorio croato del tardo medioevo. I sondaggi archeologici hanno confermato l'andamento del tratto murario, lungo ca. 140 m, tra il centro storico e il borgo, dove una volta si trovava il fossato difensivo, rafforzato da una palizzata, del quale è rimasta memoria nel termine Obrov (scavo) . Come la vicina Spalato, Traù non si arrese volontariamente alla Repubblica di Venezia e questo portò nel 1419 ad un lungo blocco marittimo. La città non era sufficientemente preparata per un attaco dal mare non avendo mai rafforzato la debole parte inferiore delle cortine medioevali e nemmeno le torri quadrate che accompagnavano le mura a intervalli regolari . La flotta veneziana al comando di Pietro Loredan attaccò la città a cannonate colpendo il campanile della cattedrale, il convento di S. Nicola, il palazzo comunale e molti altri edifici. Come nelle altre città dalmate, Zara, Spalato e Sebenico, il nuovo governo intervenne con urgenza con lavori di restauro e costruzione di castelli che sono quasi sempre collocati perifericamente rispetto alla città, assicurando cosi la possibilità di difesa autonoma nel caso di rivolte. Il luogo di costruzione del castello fu scelto in un punto chiave del porto cittadino, accanto all'antica Torre grande alle catene, che era ideale per osservare l'accesso occidentale allo stretto marino tra Traù e l'isola di Čiovo e l'accesso a Spalato protetto dal golfo chiuso di Kaštela. Venezia inviò per questo da Bergamo a Zara e a Traù l'ingegnere militare Pincino affinchè adattasse e consolidasse le fortificazioni esistenti secondo le nuove esigenze difensive . I lavori furono affidati al maestro Marin Radojev che secondo alcune fonti avrebbe anche disegnato il castello. Il castello cittadino, più tardi noto con il nome di Camerlengo, ha pianta trapezoidale con una monumentale torre poligonale a sudovest, e torri quadrate minori agli angoli. Esternamente al castello v'era il cammino di guardia con il muro di sostegno, e verso la città si scavò un fosso artificiale di ca. 20 m di larghezza che fu riempito dal mare. Sulla torre grande sono collocati gli stemmi di Pietro Loredan , del capitano generale del Golfo, del conquistatore di Traù, il doge Francesco Foscari ( 1423-1457), e del conte traurino Maddalena Contarini (1430-1432), mentre sulle torri angolari del lato est sono collocati gli stemmi del conte traurino Jacopo Barbariga (1426-1429). L'accesso principale al castello era dalla città alla quale era collegato da un ponte su dieci piloni che passava sopra il canale difensivo. L'ingresso al porto era difeso da una bertesca su mensole a cui si accedeva dal cammino di guardia del castello, mentre la porta settentrionale era chiusa da una saracinesca di ferro. Dopo la fortificazione del castello cittadino e la costruzione della cinta muraria intorno al borgo cessò la funzione difensiva del tratto di mura eretto sul luogo della palizzata d'un tempo, tra la parte vecchia della città e il borgo, ed esso fu così demolito. Sul lato sud della città Traù mantenne il sistema difensivo tardomedioevale che era costituito dalla cortina con le torri, per poi adottare sul lato nord, alle prime incursioni dei Turchi dalla terraferma, un nuovo sistema difensivo con torri cilindriche e mezzalune. La caduta di Costantinopoli nel 1453 e, un decennio dopo, la rovina del regno di Bosnia furono chiari segnali di pericolo per le città dalmate. Alla fine degli anni 60' iniziarono le irruzioni turche in Dalmazia e il pericolo per la campagna di Spalato e Traù. Uno dei primi interventi fu la costruzione di una torre angolare cilindrica a nord-ovest della città, sembra per ordine del conte Lodovico Lando nel 1470. anche se dal la parte della terraferma si trovava lo stemma del conte Antonio de Canal (1496-1498), durante il governo del quale la torre fu verosimilmente ultimata. Nella parte conica del basamento vi è un locale con cupola con una sola feritoia per il cannone, mentre nella parte cilindrica al pianterreno vi sono cinque casematte con aperture rotonde all'esterno. Sulla terrazza che conclude l'edificio, in origine coperto da tetto, v'era la banchina con parapetti su mensole. La torre di S. Marco presenta somiglianze con il corpo centrale della torre Minceta a Ragusa (Dubrovnik), ma limitata dalla posizione e dalla poca profondità del canale non potè essere dotata di un moderno antemurale. Sul lato opposto della città, a nord-est, la facciata della cattedrale era esposta agli attacchi bellici e la difesa fu assicurata dalla costruzione di una torre semicircolare detta Malipiero dal conte cittadino Troilo Malipiero ( 1477- 1480). Essa fu completamente demolita nel secolo scorso durante i lavori di sistemazione della strada che passa esternamente alla città, e ne è rimasta testimonianza solo sulle rappresentazioni grafiche di Traù. Nella seconda metà del Quattrocento non vi furono grandi interventi sistematici alle mura, si risolsero invece, a causa della minaccia turca, solo alcuni punti deboli della difesa. La modellazione primo rinascimentale di torri più basse di forma semicircolare e circolare con basamento a piano inclinato, e la sostituzione dell'alto muro verticale della cortina con muri più bassi dotati di scarpa, indicano la diffusione di teorie fortificatorie moderne.

U studiji se, nasuprot uvriježenim mišljenjima, dokazuje da su blokovi sjevernog dijela Dioklecijanove palače bili izvorno projektirani i izvedeni za potrebe gineceja kojemu se u Notitia Dignitatum spominje nadstojnik (Procurator gynaecii lovensis Dalmatiae -Aspalato). Opskrbljivao ga je akvedukt kapaciteta 1500 1/sec. = 129.600 m3 na dan. Problem obilnog ispiranja riješen je odgovarajucim kanalizacijskim sistemom koji je postojao samo duž ulica sjevernog dijela Palače u kojem su se nalazili pogoni carskih tkaonica. Tehnologija je (uz sustav bazena arheološki uočenih u prizemlju Papalićeve palače) ukljucivala sumporavanje, za što su bili na raspolaganju brojni izvori sumporne vode uz samu Palaču. Čitava građevina savršeno se uklapa u dugački niz tetrarhijskih javnih radova. Bila bi to izvorna, osnovna funkcija građevine u koju se Dioklecijan povukao nakon što je 305. g. bio prisiljen na abdikaciju. ; In scholarly literature, the term "city" was first mentioned by Lj. Karaman, talking of the beginnings of medieval Split in Diocletian's Palace, and then by Andre Grabar in his Martyrium (I: 232-233).2 Noel Duval, in a series of studies he wrote, asks whether Diocletian's residence should be classified as palatium, villa, castrum, urban settlement or some special type of architecture, considering that in comparison with genuine imperial palaces like those in Constantinople, Antioch, Philippopolis and Ravenna, it was wanting a number of "attributes": proposed the term "chateau".3 -5 The term was thoroughly investigated by Slobodan Čurčić, discussing late antique palatine architecture, showing convincingly that the urban character of these residences was undoubted (of Antioch , Nicomedia, Salona, Constantinople, Split) - although the miniature municipal quarters in them had an only slightly more than symbolic significance.6 Diocletian's building in Split really does not have the external look of a Roman imperial villa. In Split, in particular with respect to the two architectural masses in the northern part of the building, we note, its innate anti-landscape character, both the internal and the external disposition of the architectural elements, which is almost inorganically formalised. Not even in the narrow residential area, within which the halls are interconnected only via the "cryptoportico" having no direct contacts with the surrounding landscape, we do not find any of the characteristics that in the nature of things we would expect in a residence in which, it was always considered, the emperor intended to while away his final years. The Split edifice is really primarily an example of fortification. But here too we can be surprised. The sentry patrol corridor should be on the top of the walls and should be protected with a parapet, while here it is on the first floor, perforated with hardly defensible apertures (3 x 2m). The building was clearly primarily motivated by the desire to impress the surroundings, with its emphatic delineation of military presence and power. The Golden and Silver Gates and the great apertures of the sentry corridor on the three sides of the walls onto the mainland must have been walled up before the Byzantine-Gothic wars of the 530s.7 But it would seem that we can understand its form - so very particular that it evades the usual, in some sense fossilized, terminology – only through some new reading of the original meaning and purpose of the building itself. In author's opinion, this is proffered by a very simple question. The aqueduct that brought water into the palace from the source of the river Jadro was, in the design and execution of the imperial architects, undoubtedly related to the construction of his final dwelling place. Although it is a rare specimen of a Roman monument of this kind that is still being used today (reconstructed in 1878), in the literature and in research it has been almost entirely neglected, and has certainly never been interpreted in the original context. The aqueduct provided 1500 l/ sec. (129.600 m3 a day), which in terms of our standards would be enough for a population of 173,000. 8,9 The sheer amount of water inevitably leads to the question of what it was meant for, because it far exceeded the needs of the relatively modest bath complexes in the Palace. The answer might be hidden in an almost neglected item of information from Notitia Dignitatum OC XI 48 (ed. 0 . Seeck, 150) where there is a mention of the Procurator genaecii Iovensis Dalmatiae - Aspalato- warden of the imperial weaving shop for the production of woollen clothing for the army that worked in Split, under the title of Jupiter. So far it has always been thought, on the rare occasions when this fact has been mentioned at all (and then only by-the-bye) that this gynaeceum was only after Diocletian's death "inscribed" into the Palace, which was for the whole of the 5th century a kind of pensiopolis of dethroned emperors or pretenders to the throne. It has been considered that the northern part of the Palace was reserved for the Imperial Guard, for stables and the like. 10,11 Notitia Dignitatum, a long list of all the senior offices in the Empire, civilian and military, is certainly of a composite character. The basic text was created probably in about 408 (in partibus Occidentis changes were recorded up to 420), but it conceals a lot of information about the periods before the revision of the basic copy, mirroring the order that Diocletian had brought into the state, which certainly relates to the Split gynaeceum, which alone of the 14 such complexes located in the most important cities of the empire bears the characteristic predicate Iovense: it must in itself constitute a terminus post quem non to do with the origin of the factory of military uniforms of wool in the building in Split. 12,13,15 Although the gynaecea were never mentioned in the context of Diocletian's reforms, it is generally accepted that they were created at the time of the first Tetrarchy. The concentration of the labour force, the range of specialised jobs, the degree of organisation and their connection with urban centres makes them, in the judgement of historians, the closest to the modern industrial factory. State factories (fabricae) were set up in the late Empire to eliminate or at least to alleviate the difficulties concerning the supply of the state and the army with certain products. It was necessary to clothe the approximately half a million soldiers that Diocletian 's army reforms had raised, as well as no small number of clerks. Archaeology, however, has never made any direct contribution to the understanding of their internal organisation, except in the case of the otherwise well documented gynaeceum in Carthage, which lay in the heart of the city, on the edge of the celebrated Circular Harbour. 16,17 The state operated, through the comes sacrarum largitionum, a number of weaving mills, both for woolen and linen fabrics, and dyeworks 18 The Split gynaeceum should have probably been in some kind of complementary relationship with the gynaeceum moved to Salona, perhaps for security reasons, from Bassiana (Donji Petrovci, Pannonia Inferior) also noted by Notitia Dignitatum, XI, 46 (Procurator gynaecii Bassanensis Pannoniae Secundae translati Salonis). In Salona, thus, there was a large cloth dyeworks (In Not. dign. the Procurator bafii Salonitani Dalmatiae was also mentioned) and weaving mill. At Five Bridges in Salona artisan workshops were actually found, probably a dyer's workshop, and fulling mills for cloth and the dyeing of cloth. Also to be seen is the reservoir from which the water to drive the mills ran, and a building for the habitation of the workers. 19 In one inscription in Salona, a magister conquilarius is mentioned (CIL III 2115 + 8572), clearly the head of the state workshops in which purple was extracted from shellfish, perhaps for the gynaeceum in Aspalathos. 22 Another inscription found in Salona mentions a certain Hilarus, who was the purpurarius, dyer of red garments or, perhaps, negotiator artis purpurae. 23 That the Salona baffeum and the Split gynaeceum were mentioned only in the Notitia Dignitatum, says that their production was a strictly channelled state monopoly, and that the products from them did not make their way to the general market as other goods did. The army was supplied directly, without the agency of merchants. Although not all the technological details of the gynaeceum, the fullonica and the baffeum have been revealed, we can conjure up in the northern half of the Palace an image of the whole system of pools in which the fabrics were washed, softened and finished by being trampled on with bare feet in a solution of potash , fuller's earth, human and animal urine. Here then there was a very large demand for water.28 Garments were rubbed with chalk, and fumigated with sulphur. It is particularly important to remember that the technology included, among other things, sulphur treatment (sulfure sulfire ), for which there were the many springs of sulphurous water alongside the Palace itself, which were used for the washing and bleaching of cloth right up to the first half of the 20th century, by St Francis church on the Shore.29 The problem of copious rinsing was solved by the extraordinarily handled sewage system that existed only along the the cardo and decumanus and the perimeter streets of the northern part of the Palace , in which the mentioned plant was located. Among other things, the extreme western part of the sewer under the decumanus, at the exit from the Palace, has been explored. It passed under the western gate (Porta ferrea), and moved in a gentle arc towards the south-west, finishing some forty metres further in a stone portal (below the kitchen of today's Hotel Central). Thence in an open channel all this water flowed into the bay of the sea, in the immediate vicinity of the grandest corner of the Palace.30 The monumental cross-section of this sewage system corresponds perfectly to the cross-section of the aqueduct. We should underscore the fact that the sewage system was located only along the streets of the northern part of the Palace, while we might expect it to be primarily in the residential southern part, which also shows that it was constructed for the purpose of the production inside the gynaeceum. Unfortunately, there are practically no archaeological records of the small finds from investigations of the northern part of the Split building. But, during excavations of the crossing place of the cardo and decumanus (in order to establish the original level of the street and the Peristyle) M. Suić in 1974 did observe, "a very thick layer of fine sediment of a markedly red colour of non-organic origin", which had been deposited in the cloaca, and which had retained its intensity for centuries. This must prove the existence of fullonica, which must have been located within the gynaeceum.31, 32, 55, 56 Gynaeciarii, like other craftsmen, were associated into corporations or collegia, but were not able to leave their work, being nexu sanguinis ad divinas largitiones perlinenles, which makes the construction of the northern part of the Palace, in which they lived alongside their workshops even more logical. 36 - 4 0 Their patron saint in 5th c. might have been, as I have already speculated, St Martin - patron of soldiers and weavers -to whom the little church in the sentries' walk over the Golden Gate, walled-in very early on, was dedicated. 41 All this also suggests that Christianity was alive in the Palace from day one. Along with the bishop and the praetorians, the weavers were probably that industrial revolutionary guard of the time. It is not at all surprising that a martyr like St. Anastasius - a fullo, the co-patron of Split, should have come precisely from the milieu of the fullers, probably working in the baffeum in Salona. In Split, Diocletian's gynaeceum was probably reliant upon a manufacture that already existed, one linked with the sulphurous water and perhaps on the broom, genisla acanlhoclada, from which a colouring agent for dying the cloth was obtained, and according to which, it is believed, Aspalathos actually obtained its name.43 There was raw material in Dalmatia within reach. Immediately following the Second World War there were about one million sheep in the central hinterland of the Adriatic coast. Delm or Dalm in Old Illyrian means shepherd, herder, flock, and hence Delminium means the place of pasture, and delme- dalme still today in Albanian means sheep.44 - 49 Evidence of the organised weaving industry in Roman Dalmatia can be seen in the form of the weaving industry around Split, which all the way through the Middle Ages and until quite recently was different from that in the other regions. 51 The Gynaeceum iovense might have been special precisely in the fact that this was not a remodelled and expanded production area already in existence, the expropriation of some extant minor complexes (as is assumed to have happened in Carthage), but a green field project, an exemplarily constructed industrial unit. And for this reason, of all such establishments, it was the only one to have such a flowery dedication and name. At the end one should also draw attention to an almost neglected reference concerning the palace, that is, the first description of it, uttered by the most authoritative mouth of all. In the Oralio ad Sanclorum coelum which he delivered in Antioch in 325, Emperor Constantine said that the colossal pile of the palace was a "loathed dwelling" in which the Emperor Diocletian shut himself up after this abdication: "After the massacre in the persecutions, after he had condemned himself by depriving himself of power, as a man of no utility, acknowledging the damage he had done with his imprudence, he remained hidden in his really contemptible dwelling place". 61 This surprising statement of Constantine might be an allusion to the fact that Diocletian had to spend his last days in a building that in spite of all the sumptuousness of its centre and the residential quarters looking onto the sea- must also have had the features of a military factory, to which the form of the castrum must have been in all respects much more suitable than to a charming imperial residence. The whole of the building fits perfectly in with the long series of tetrarchic public works. It is important to stress the autonomy of the cardo and the decumanus (12 metres broad) with their own lastricatus and their own porticatus, independent of the blocks that they hid. I would even say that the form of the castrum is more logical for a gynaeceum than it is for a palace. What should be actually highlighted is the surprising pragmatism, as well as the great social focus of the lllyrian emperors, who really did want to renew the "fervent patriotism and iron duty in the evil days" (Syme). Probus in Egypt worked on an important improvement of the navigation of the Nile; temples, bridges, porticoes, palaces, all were put up by the army. Galerius himself was a devotee of public works, and undertook an operation worth of a monarch, says Gibbon, diverting the excess of water from Lake Pelso (Balaton) to the Danube, at the border with Noricum. He had the endless woods all around cleared, and gave the whole reclaimed area between the Drava and the Danube to his Panonian subjects to be cultivated, naming it Valeria after his wife. 65, 66 Most of the buildings that Diocletian put up were of a utilitarian purpose, such as mints and the factories that Lactantius mentions, or border forts, roads and bridges. Dozens of extant inscriptions tell us of the dedications of new and restored temples, aqueducts, nymphea and public buildings - "vetustatu con lapsum" or "Ionge incuria neglectum"- dilapidated from age and long neglect. 67 According to Lactantius's writing, Diocletian had an infinitam cupiditatem aedificandi, an infinite desire to build. 68 Today we are apt to count mostly the imperial palaces in connection with this statement, and to forget the whole framework of comprehensive public works that were undertaken during the first tetrarchy. Twenty years of relaxation from civil wars and barbarian invasions, and the gradual suppression of local unrest, led to the renovation of the prosperity in cities all round the Empire, hence the major number of public dedications, the revival of overall construction activity. The Tetrarchan New Deal - with Diocletian as the Roosevelt of the ancient world - is often understood in a formalist way, as a series of legislative and political attempts to halt inflation, overlooking exploits like Galerius's round Balaton, or this one in Split. The construction of the Split Palace, then, no kind of imperial Xanadu, as it is often held to be, justified its investment. More than that: its existence enabled antiquity in Dalmatia, even after the 7th century catastrophe, not to be extinguished with a sudden death, but over long centuries to be merged into the modern age, remaining until this day a lesson in and criterion for every creative architectural operation into the tissue of the city, which developed organically within the precise, almost dry geometry of the Emperor's palace-cumfactory. * The article was published in English, in: Das Imperium zwischen Zentralisierung und Regionalisierung: Palaste- Regionen- Volker (ed. A. Demand, A. Goltz und H. Schlange-Schoningen), Berlin - New York 2004: 141-162.

Migracijski val od 2014. do 2016. u kojem je velik broj djece i majki iz država Sjevernog trokuta na putu prema krajnjem odredištu SAD-u bio u tranzitu Meksikom okarakteriziran je krizom. Kriza je podrazumijevala postojanje prijetnje koja opravdava provođenje izvanrednih mjera. Teza rada je da pod utjecajem SAD-a Meksiko migrante u tranzitu smatra prijetnjom sigurnosti građanima Meksika, a ne ugroženim pripadnicima istoga kulturnoga kruga koje treba zaštititi. Stoga se prema njima ne odnosi u skladu s ciljem ljudske sigurnosti, već primjenjuje silu. Rad predstavlja studiju slučaja. U prvom odjeljku dani su prikaz vrsta migracija i poimanje migracija u kontekstu ljudske i građanske sigurnosti, dok su u drugom analizirani potisni i privlačni faktori migracija iz država Sjevernog trokuta. U trećem odjeljku prikazana je politika tranzitne države Meksika prema ilegalnim migrantima. U radu je izložen sud o migracijskoj politici Meksika prema migrantima u tranzitu. Zaključeno je da je iz perspektive ljudske sigurnosti politika bila »loša« jer je bila diskriminirajuća i u neskladu s kulturno-političkim kontekstom te moralnim i zakonskim normama. No gledano iz perspektive nacionalne sigurnosti politika je bila »dobra« jer je bila ostvariva, postigla je rezultate uz prihvatljiv trošak ljudi i sredstva i njome su obranjeni državni interesi Meksika – dobri odnosi sa SAD-om. ; This article will attempt to answer two questions; first, in what way did the Government of Mexico attempt to resolve the influx of a large number of migrants, children and family members, from the Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras) who were transiting Mexico on their way to the United States in the 2014–2016 period? Second, why have migrants continued to arrive even after the adoption of the Mexican Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) of 2014, which was supposed to resolve the migration crisis and put an end to arrests and deportation? At the same time, the article will try to assess, according to Haines (2013), whether the Mexican post-2014 migration policy has been "good" (in line with the political and cultural context, achievable and effective with acceptable costs of staff and resources), or "bad" (discriminatory and incompatible with existing moral and legal norms). The thesis of the article is that under the influence of the United States, Mexico is treating migrants in transit as a security threat, rather than as members of the same cultural circle who require protection. So, instead of helping them, Mexico uses coercion to suppress them. While traditional threats are endangering the survival of the state, new threats to the state are also endangering individuals. The article consists of an introduction, three sections and a conclusion. The first section will provide an explanation of the relationship between migration and security (traditional national security and human security). The second section analyses the pull-and-push factors of migration from the Northern Triangle countries. This is followed by Mexico's transit policy towards illegal migrants, which is discussed in the third section. Case study research was used as a methodological strategy. The migration wave in the 2014–2016 period, consisting of many children and mothers from the Northern Triangle states transiting through Mexico on their way to the United States, was characterised as a crisis. A crisis implies the existence of a threat justifying the imposition of extraordinary measures. The issue of migrants in transit through Mexico was no novelty. Since the late 1980s, under the pressure of the United States, Mexico has been deporting migrants in transit back to their countries of origin. As Mexico has increasingly associated with the United States, there has emerged a growing need for greater compliance with "American requirements" and for the understanding of "American fears" of illegal migrants. After 11 September 2001, the fear became almost paranoid. Mexican presidents Fox, Calderon, and Nieto brought about and implemented a restrictive migration policy in line with the US policy, according to which migrants posed a threat to national security. Although repeatedly emphasising its intention to protect the migrants in transit, Mexico militarised and securitised its migration policy. This was particularly apparent after the 2014 Frontera Sur programme, which applied the same methods – arrest, deportation and denial of asylum – to the vulnerable population of women and children who largely satisfied the criteria for refugee status recognition. The PFS emphasised the intent to protect migrants, to better manage border crossings and to create security and prosperity zones in the south of the country. However, after two years of the programme's implementation it can be concluded that none of the objectives above have been achieved. Indeed, migrants in transit are additionally exposed to strife, suffering, and violations of their fundamental human rights, both by criminal organisations and the forces of law and order. Therefore, their transit has become much more uncertain than it was before. At the same time, human rights are violated by the state of Mexico itself, which denies migrants the right to asylum or recognition of humanitarian visas. The border in the south of the country has not become more secure. That PFS complies with US interests is apparent from the fact that the United States is its main source of funding, since it has managed to link the combat against drugs and migrants in transit via the Merida Initiative. The question is why have migrants continued to arrive despite everything mentioned above? It was their hope that somehow, they would reach the USA or, in the worst case, remain in Mexico. The most elementary human right, the right to life, is endangered in the countries of the Northern Triangle. In addition to personal insecurity, there are other human security threats in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador forcing the citizens to flee and emigrate from political, economic, environmental, and health and food insecurity. With everything being said, it is not easy to evaluate the Mexican migration policy. From a perspective of human security, it was "bad" because it was discriminatory and incompatible with the cultural and political context, as well as with moral and legal norms. Evaluated from a national security perspective, it was "good" because it was achievable, it has yielded results with an acceptable cost of staff and resources and has achieved state interests – good relations with the United States. At the same time, it is one of the tools Mexico can use in the future if Trump should decide against Mexican interests (significant taxing of Mexican products or deporting the many Mexican citizens illegally residing in the United States). Since Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador belong to the same cultural (historical, religious and linguistic circle), it was presumed that Mexico would pursue a policy that favours migrants and their protection; however, that did not happen. The authors agree with Kimball (2007: 140) that in the long run, Mexico will not be able to simultaneously advocate and implement both the pro- and anti-immigrant policy. The problem of the migrant wave, mostly consisting of mothers and children from the Northern Triangle countries, who were in transit through Mexico during 2014–2016, was attempted to be resolved via securitisation rather than care about their security. Castles de Haas and Miller (2014: 5) state that in the case of Mexico, there is a proliferation of migration transition, since it is turning from an emigration into an immigration country. To be more specific, with Trump coming to power, Mexico is increasingly not just a transit country, but also an ultimate destination country. Trump's immigration policy regarding immigrants from Central America suffers from deep historical amnesia related to the role of the USA in the Central American conflict of the 1980s, which has significantly destabilised the region. Moreover, Trump denounces and demonises as dangerous criminals the families, women and children, who have fled from violence contributed to by the USA (Portillo Villeda and Miklos, 2017: 53–54). This is one of the reasons the number of arrested migrants from Central America on the southern border of the United States has significantly decreased, but the number of asylum seekers in Mexico has increased threefold. There is a hope that new Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador would perceive vulnerable Northern Triangle migrants more as a threat to human rather than national security.

U članku se objavljuje nalaz capsellae reliquiarum iz oltara crkve sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Kaštel Gomilici. Potvrđuje se Farlatijev navod o posveti crkve (podignute nad ostacima ranokršćanske bazilike) koju je izvršio splitski nadbiskup Abšalon 1160. godine. Autor razmatra pitanje njenih titulara iznoseći pretpostavku da je izbor moći pohranjenih u relikvijaru bio svojevrsni politički ulog rečenog nadbiskupa (ugarskog podrijetla) osobito radi činjenice da su u capselli i moći ugarskog sv. Stjepana Kralja, a da su Marija, te sv. Kuzma i Damjan suzaštitnici splitske katedrale. U članku se analiziraju tipološke odlike gomiličkog oltara u odnosu na poziciju sepulchruma, pa ga se uspoređuje s istovremenim u regiji. Autor izvodi široki ekskurs o pojavi kulta sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Splitu, i na teme "svetačke topografije" unutar Dioklecijanove palače na razmeđu kasne antike i ranog srednjeg vijeka. Kaštelanska crkvica, posvećena relikvijama iz splitske katedrale, interpretira se kao svojevrsni relei gradske političke moći u ageru. ; U članku se objavljuje nalaz capsellae reliquiarum iz oltara crkve sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Kaštel Gomilici. Potvrđuje se Farlatijev navod o posveti crkve (podignute nad ostacima ranokršćanske bazilike) koju je izvršio splitski nadbiskup Abšalon 1160. godine. Autor razmatra pitanje njenih titulara iznoseći pretpostavku da je izbor moći pohranjenih u relikvijaru bio svojevrsni politički ulog rečenog nadbiskupa (ugarskog podrijetla) osobito radi činjenice da su u capselli i moći ugarskog sv. Stjepana Kralja, a da su Marija, te sv. Kuzma i Damjan suzaštitnici splitske katedrale. U članku se analiziraju tipološke odlike gomiličkog oltara u odnosu na poziciju sepulchruma, pa ga se uspoređuje s istovremenim u regiji. Autor izvodi široki ekskurs o pojavi kulta sv. Kuzme i Damjana u Splitu, i na teme •svetačke topografije• unutar Dioklecijanove palače na razmeđu kasne antike i ranog srednjeg vijeka. Kaštelanska crkvica, posvećena relikvijama iz splitske katedrale, interpretira se kao svojevrsni relei gradske političke moći u ageru. Recentemente in una piccola cripta sullo stipite dell'altare della chiesa romanica dei Santi Cosma e Damiano a Kaštel Gomilica è stata scoperta una cassettina di piombo (7 x 4 x 3 cm), del cui contenuto e scopo parla l'iscrizione finemente intagliata, in caratteri carolini minuscoli del XII secolo: HIC SVNT RELIQUIIE SCE MARIE VIRIGINIS SCCS MA/RTIRV COSME l ET DAMIANI l ET SCI STEFA/NI REGIS Il ritrovamento è confermato da una fonte di Farlati che riferisce come la chiesa di S. Cosma e Damiano fosse stata consacrata dall'arcivescovo spalatino Absalon nell'anno 1160, e come la sua costruzione fosse stata iniziata dalle monache del convento di S. Benedetto con il permesso del loro predecessore Gaudio (1138-1158). La chiesetta stessa fu innalzata sui resti di una basilica tardoantica, ma gli scavi archeologici hanno dimostrato che nella vita di questa località vi è una chiara discontinuità. Sarà per questo probabile che vi sia stata una ripresa in epoca romanica. Rimane, dunque, inspiegato se già la basilica paleocristiana di Gomilica fosse intitolata ai santi Cosma e Damiano. Considerato che l'articolo mette in luce come le reliquie custodite nella capsella appena scoperta, fossero state prescelte in base ad un certo programma chiave dell'arcivescovo Absalon (è fondamentale l'indicazione: reliquie di santo Stefano Re), l'autore illustra innanzitutto la tradizione del culto di S. Cosma e Damiano all'interno del palazzo di Diocleziano a Spalato. Cvito Fisković ha tormulato di recente l'attraente ipotesi che il culto di S. Cosma e Damiano potesse essere una particolare derivazione - traduzione del culto di Esculapio nel palazzo tardoantico dell'imperatore Diocleziano, che dedicò a tale divinità, secondo la testimonianza di Torna Arcidiacono, il tempietto che sorgeva di fronte al suo mausoleo. Sullo sviluppo del culto cristiano nel Palazzo, oggi si può veramente dire qualcosa di più. L'autore avanza l'ipotesi che le chiesette di S. Teodoro e S. Martino risalgano al tardoantico. Entrambi i titolari hanno carattere specificamente militare. A Spalato il primo è collegato alla guardia bizantina che difendeva la Porta Ferrea del palazzo di Diocleziano. Il secondo, S. Martino - protettore dei soldati, dei sarti e dei tessitori - la chiesetta del quale a Spalato si trova sopra la Porta Aurea, potrebbe essere collegato all'esistenza documentata (proprio nella parte settentrionale del Palazzo) di una bottega per la produzione di tessuti di cui si ricorda il Procurator gynaecii Jovensis Dalmatiae Asphalatho. I gynaecarii erano per lo più condannati - con status di lavoratori. Generalmente parlando, soldati, lapicidi, porporai, tessitori - gli abitanti del Palazzo nei suoi primi secoli - erano il ceto ideale per accogliere il mistero cristiano. L'autore, dunque, pensa che a Spalato come altrove i gynaecarii erano riuniti in una corporazione di cui S. Martino poteva essere il protettore più conveniente. Oltre che dalla diffusione generale del culto di entrambi i santi ricordati in epoca tardoantica, l'ipotesi è convalidata da una notevole concentrazione di spolia paleocristiani presso entrambe le chiesette. L'autore in questo excursus va ancora oltre. Nella letteratura è stato più volte citato il bizzarro racconto di Amiano Marcellino, su come nell'anno 356 una donna denunciasse suo marito Danus e su come fosse stato condannato a morte, per delitto di Jaesa maiestatis avendo rubato la tenda rossa dal sarcofago dell'imperatore nel suo mausoleo. La storia è utilizzata solitamente per provare che Diocleziano fece costruire il tempio ottagonale, che più tardi sarebbe diventato la cattedrale di Spalato, come suo sepolcro e che vi era effettivamente stato seppellito. Non è mai stata, stranamente, posta la questione del motivo per cui Danus rubo il drappo cremisi dalla tomba di Diocleziano, pur essendo evidente che non poteva trattarsi di un furto motivato da interessi venali con la stoffa imperiale color cremisi, non si potevano cucire abiti da portare in pubblico. Si tratto molto probabilmente di un cosciente atto di profanazione, di un intervento di vendetta cristiana sul sarcofago dell'imperatore che per le sue posizioni contrarie al cristianesimo sarebbe rimasto profondamente impresso nella memoria dei secoli successivi come il più efferato persecutore dei cristiani. Lo scritto di Marcellino potrebbe essere proprio la significativa dimostrazione dell'inizio del regolamento dei conti del cristianesimo con le reliquie del paganesimo all'interno del Palazzo. L'autore, continuando, richiama l'attenzione sul fatto che il piccolo concilium sanctorum dei protettori di Spalato con Maria alla testa (la cattedrale è intitolata alla Assunzione di Maria) era costituito da due coppie: accanto a S. Domnio e Anastasio, S. Cosma e Damiano. Nelle analisi delle origini e delle funzioni,:P.ei culti dei santi nell'eta tardoantica è stato fatto notare come molte communità paleocristiane sottolineavano volentieri il fatto di avere nef loro centri più santi, e di scegliere spesso come protettori coppie di santi (Gervasio e Protasio a Milano, Pietro e Paolo a Roma, Felice e Fortunato ad Aquileia . . ). Peter Brown fa rilevare come tale scelta fosse cosciente: "la festività di due santi era la celebrazione della concordia all'interno di una città in potenza profondamente disunita ." L'autore ha trovato un'interessante suggerimento per tale interpretazione nell'analisi del rapporto insolitamente complesso tra S. Grisogono e S. Anastasia a Zara. Nella ricchissima scelta di reliquie che gli poterono essere offerte al principio del IX secolo, quando giunse a Costantinopoli come mediatore tra Carlo Magno e l'imperatore Nicoforo, il vescovo di Zara Donato, scelse certamente con molta attenzione le reliquie di S. Anastasia, in quanto il" suo pari", tutto considerato, doveva già trovarsi a Zara. L'autore ritienne che Donato non ebbe in mente tanto l'unione dopo la morte di Grisogono e Anastasia, quanto una specie di neutralizzazione dell'influenza "ideologica" che avevano in città le reliquie di S. Grisogono, giunte da Aquileia. In verità, le reliquie del santo scomparvero e più tardi furono nuovamente scoperte con un singolare miracolo. Ma qui siamo già di fronte ad un classico topos agiografico - il nuovo ritrovamento del corpo di un santo. Tutto questo excursus serve all'autore per formulare le seguenti osservazioni: se i santi Cosmia e Damiano, come titolari della chiesetta di Gomilica, sono eventualmente anche più antichi della sua consacrazione nel 1160, le reliquie nella capsella ritrovata sono sicuramen te, come le reliquie della Santa Vergine Maria, giunte dalla cattedrale di Spalato - al tempo dell'arcivescovo Absalon che arrivò a Spalato dall'Ungheria, e se ne allontanò con il riaffermarsi del potere bizantino sulla città. Le reliquie di S. Stefano, re d'Ungheria, si possono ritenere, con certezza, come parte del particolare ruolo politico affidato all'arcivescovo, uno dei tanti nella linea filo-ungherese che nel corso del XII secolo stette a capo della cattedrale spalatina. La costruzione della chiesetta a Kaštel Gomilica alla metà del XII secolo e lu sua consacrazione nel 1160, non si svolse, sicuramente, nel vuoto! Faceva parte della nuova politica integrale della chiesa, di un'epoca di consolidamento politico-sociale dei rapporti tra la città e lo spazio retrostante, il tempo che preparò il rinnovamento della maggior parte delle nostre cattedrali, e in cui il numero dei luoghi di culto cristiani nella campagna intorno alle città adriatiche aumentò di colpo. L'autore dà un breve guadro delle tappe più significative che dimostrano quanto il tour de force della città e delle sue chiese riuscì a penetrare nel territorio circostante. Esso fu ricoperto da una rete di chiesette nuove o rinnovate. Tramite la diffusione di particelle di santi trasportate in simili recipienti e cassettine in miniatura, si conquistavano e consacravano nuovi spazi. La chiesa negli spazi extra-urbani diventa un ripetitore del potere cittadino. L' "archeologia devozionale" rinnovava le relazioni con l'epoca eroica del primo cristianesimo. Il topos del ritrovamento e del rinnovamento di una delle località cristiane già consacrate, coincideva a suo modo con il topos del ritrovamento del santo protettore perso. Era questo indubbiamente anche il modo p iù breve di riconnotare uno spazio. Dopo l'interpretazione dell'iscrizione sulla capsella, l'autore, infine analizza le caratteristiche tipologiche dell'altare della chiesa di Kaštel Gomilica.

Čitanjem poznatih i dosad nepoznatih arhivskih dokumenata otkriva se logičniji slijed događaja na gradilištu trogirske kapele, a podcrtava se uloga Koriolana Ćipika u njenom projektiranju. Analizom Duknovićevog kipa sv. lvana (kojeg autor datira oko 1482. godine i identificira kao Alviza, Koriolanova sina, izabranog od trogirskog Velikog vijeća za biskupa) unutar majstorovog opusa uvodi se logičan intermezzo - s ne bas kratkim boravkom u rodnom Trogiru početkom 80-ih godina - bez kojega bi inače teško bilo objasniti izvanredna ostvarenja koja je izradio za Ćipika na njegovoj palači i u kapeli bl. Ivana, kao i na palači Andrije Cege. ; Con l'identificazione ipotetica di un ritratto che si cela sotto le vesti della statua di San Giovanni Evangelista nella cappella del beato Giovanni Ursini nella cattedrale di Traù - si cercha di rafforzare il ruolo che poté avere nell'intero progetto l'umanista traurino Coriolano Cippico. I contemporanei lo chiamavano il Grande ( 1425-inizi 1493). È l'autore dell'opera latina Petri Mocenici imperatoris gestorum libri III (Venezia 1477), più nota sotto il titolo De Bello Asiatico, nella quale descrisse le operazioni militari veneziane ( 1470-74) contro i Turchi È importante sottolineare che Coriolano ricoprì un ruolo attivo nei cantieri e nella sistemazione dell'interno della cattedrale per ben quattro decenni e sempre quando i lavori riprendevano. Proprio in rapporto alla Cappella del beato Giovanni Ursini, dirò che Coriolano vi lavorò in qualità di "operario" per un intero anno ( 1466-67) prima del Contratto ricordato per la sua costruzione, nel quale egli figurava come procuratore di Niccolò Fiorentino. La costruzione della cappella si svolse a più riprese per un periodo inusualmente lungo: i lavori iniziarono, in verità, appena dopo il ritorno di Coriolano dalla guerra, nel1475. Dal libro dei conti risulta operario nel 1482 quando, finalmente, ebbe inizio la decorazione della cappella con le statue. La cappella fu ultimata nella parte architettonica solo nel 1488, al tempo in cui era nuovamente operario Coriolano. Considerato il suo ruolo guida nelle controversie con i vescovi traurini Torlon e Marcello, suo successore, proprio intorno alle competenze dell'opera (questioni che, per es., nel 1490, dovettero risolvere il legato papale e lo stesso doge), non vi è dubbio alcuno che Coriolano sorvegliò di persona i lavori fino al termine della sua vita. Si deve notare che tra l'arrivo di Marcello nel 1489 (prima di questa data furono svolti lavori importanti - in assenza del vescovo precedente che si era trattenuto a Roma per cinque anni) e la morte di Coriolano nel 1493, non sono documentati nuovi lavori né nuove statue nella cappella. L'importante svolta iconografica che si verificò all'interno della cappella, quando il precedente Cristo del Fiorentino fu sostituito con uno nuovo, e quando la composizione dietro l'altare ottenne un nuovo significato ic01iologico, segue i lavori successivi alla morte di Coriolano nel 1493. I Cippico potevano avere anche un motivo particolare per legarsi alla cappella: Giovanni Ursini, vescovo traurino nell'XI-XII sec. era giunto a Traù da Roma, e i Cippi co esaltavano le loro origini romane più insistentemente di quanto fosse di moda allora, nella Dalmazia umanistica. E importante avvertire che gli architetti e gli scultori di tutti i principali progetti comunali del tempo di Coriolano lavorarono ai palazzi Cippico- per primo l'Alessi dopo la metà degli anni 50, poi il Fiorentino negli anni 70, e Ivan Duknović negli anni 80. A Traù Coriolano, evidentemente secondo un programma definito, riuscì a occupare tutto il lato ovest della piazza principale della città con i suoi due palazzi - di fronte al palazzo comunale, alla cattedrale e agli altri edifici pubblici, provvedendoli di numerosi stemmi della sua famiglia, con chiare pretese principesche. I figli di Coriolano erano ugualmente stimati come umanisti. Nella parte sita della scala situata nel cortile del "Palazzo Cippico Piccolo" a Traù, realizzato da Niccolò Fiorentino probabilmente alla metà degli anni '70, si trova il rilievo di un poeta incoronato che i critici hanno interpretato finora come il ritratto del re Mattia Corvino, oppure di un amico di Coriolano, il noto storico Marc'Antonio Coccio, detto Sabellico. Il rilievo, secondo autore, rappresenta Alvise, il figlio di Coriolano. Alvise Cippico, nato il 17 settembre 1456, già nel 1470 si recò a Padova per intraprendere gli studi di teologia e diritto, nonché letteratura. In chiusura delle Commoediae di Terenzio (Venezia 1473), curate dal suo professore Rafael Regio, Alvise- allora sedicenne- pubblicò una poesia in latino di dieci versi, dedicata ai lettori dell'opera. Da Padova, dove conseguì il dottorato in utroque iure, in occasione della guerra di Venezia con Ferrara inviò, il 12. XII. 1482, un panegirico di 257 esametri al doge Giovanni Mocenigo, o più propriamente al senato veneziano (Aloysii Cipici iurisconsulti et poetae panegyricus in Senatum Venetiarum). Giovanni era il fratello di Pietro Mocenigo sotto il quale Coriolano aveva combattuto. Si tratta di una poesia di argomento storico, di un'esaltazione mitologica della missione storica di Venezia. Nello stesso anno (1482) Alvise era a Roma. Lo videro con il fratello Giovanni nel circolo di Pomponio Leto. Ottenne alcuni benefici da Innocenza VIII; è qualificato come "familiaris nostris". Nel 1488 divenne vescovo di Famagosta su Cipro. Fu nominato segretario "ab epistolis" di papa Alessandro VI, Rodrigo Borgia. Nel 1500 gli furono negati il vescovato e le rendite, ma alla fine del 1503, il suo nuovo protettore Giulio della Rovere, Papa Giulio II, lo nominò arcivescovo di Zara. Lo celebrò Giovanni Aurelio Augurello. Morì il 2.III.1504 mentre era ancora arcivescovo di Zara. Fu seppellito in San Pietro. Quest'identificazione del rilievo di Palazzo Cippico, è sostenuta dal ritratto della stessa persona che è 'camuffata' sotto la toga della statua di San Giovanni Evangelista, realizzata per la cappella traurina da lvan Duknović. Considerato che la statua è lavorata anche nella parte posteriore si ritiene che originariamente non fosse stata pensata per la nicchia in cui si trova oggi, ma per un altare. Si fa inoltre notare che il Fiorentino, già nel 1482, aveva collocato nella cappella del beato Giovanni Ursini il suo San Giovanni. Nello stesso tempo Coriolano si adoperava per assicurare la cattedra vescovile traurina al figlio Alvise e, suppongo poté ordinare un ritratto identificatorio di questo tipo. Il Gran Consiglio traurino, in verità, prescelse Alvise Cippico come vescovo il 27. XI. 1483, ma la Signoria non confermò questa scelta né la sottopose alla curia. Nonostante tutti i meriti del padre nei confronti dello stato e la fedeltà dichiarata dal figlio (nell'enfatico panegirico al Senato del 1482), la Signoria sicuramente valutò le ambizioni di Coriolano come troppo pretenziose. In epoca rinascimentale, inoltre, Venezia si atteneva al principio che i vescovi e i conti delle città dalmate fossero prescelti fuori dalla Dalmazia. È interessante che il papa più tardi nominò Alvise vescovo di Famagosta a Cipro, dove suo padre quindici anni prima aveva svolto una nota missione diplomatica; Marcello, invece, vescovo locale fu trasferito a Traù, dove si scontrò subito con il Gran Consiglio e gli "operari", rappresentati proprio da Coriolano. L'ipotesi, dunque, sarebbe che in un primo momento il San Giovanni di Duknovié, con il volto di Alvise, proprio per questa identificazione non poté essere accettato, soprattutto non in presenza del vescovo Torlon (†1483) ancora vivo e con il quale Coriolano come procuratore degli interessi comunali in relazione alla cattedrale era in rapporti tesi, e che per questo motivo fosse stato ordinato ex novo al Fiorentino. All'ipotesi presentata si può obiettare che la statua di Duknović è lavorata anche dalla parte posteriore. Allo stesso modo, tuttavia, sono lavorate anche altre statue dello stesso maestro che erano originariamente previste per essere collocate nelle nicchie, come il putto-reggifiaccola che aveva realizzato sempre per Coriolano. Inoltre, al centro della schiena in questo caso non si sarebbe trovato il foro per assicurare ed elevare la statua, che vediamo nel San Giovanni Evangelista. Terminus ante quem per la statua di Duknović è da ritenere il 1489 quando è documentata la realizzazione del San Filippo del Fiorentino, il cui modello, come ha notato Štefanac, è proprio il San Giovanni di Duknović che gli stava di fronte. San Tommaso apostolo del Duknović se osserviamo il sistema dei drappeggi- è ugualmente confrontabile con il San Giovanni. Anche se fosse stato creato per una collocazione esterna alla cappella- alle cui nicchie del resto si adatta meglio delle sculture del Fiorentino- entrò per tempo nella cappella, in ogni caso prima del notevole rifacimento in epoca barocca che vide proprio nel San Giovanni del Duknović la statua più pregevole di tutto l'insieme, e l'attribuì ad Alessandro Vittoria di cui furono innalzate quattro statue accanto alla piramide del campanile, nel XVII secolo. Possiamo però ricordarci che il tipo fisionomico aquilino è uno dei tipi più famosi di ritratto eroico. Già la teoria fisionomica antica e medievale riteneva che l'aspetto di ogni animale fosse determinato dalla sua natura. Di conseguenza: una persona dal naso schiacciato e carnoso simile al leone dovrebbe essere generosa, virile, forte, ma anche incline all 'ira- come il leone; l'aquila, invece, nell'arte profana rinascimentale è portatrice di una varietà di significati simbolici -con associazioni alla regalità, all'acutezza visiva, all'elevatezza del pensiero. È allo stesso tempo attributo della speranza, della virtù e del ringiovanimento. L'identificazione di Alvise Cippico dal naso aquilino con San Giovanni poté stabilirsi proprio attraverso l'aquila attributo dell'Evangelista. Nel caso traurino, oltre a tutta la pretenziosità del ritratto che oggi ravvisiamo, Cippico voleva rappresentare il figlio nell'atto di ossequiosa imitazione delle virtù del santo (imitatio exempli virtutis). Con questo contributo (pubblicato in altra versione negli Atti del Convegno Internazionale: Michefozzo, scultore e architetto (1396-1472), a cura di G. Moroli , Firenze 1998: 287-296) si apre l'interrogativo se il San Giovanni di Duknović fosse destinato proprio ad essere il primo nella cappella. All 'interno dell 'opus del Duknović s'introduce un logico intermezzo con il soggiorno nella nativa Traù ai primi degli anni '80, senza il quale sarebbe difficile spiegare le eccezionali creazioni realizzate per il Palazzo Cippico. Soprattutto, leggendo i documenti noti e quelli finora non noti dell'archivio della cattedrale traurina si scopre la logica successione degli avvenimenti nel cantiere della cappella di Traù, e si pone in rilievo il ruolo di Coriolano Cippico sia nella sua progettazione, sia all'interno del circolo umanistico traurino della seconda metà del XV secolo.

Pri analizi dvaju suprotstavljenih narativa povezanih s temom uspostave vojske Europske unije (EU) u europskom medijskom i političkom prostoru u ovome radu upotrebljava se teorija sekrutizacije te se temeljem analize diskursa i javnog mnijenja dokazuje da suprotstavljeni narativi ispunjavaju uvjete da ih prema definiciji Kopenhagenske škole svedemo pod pojam sekuritizacije. Prema autorima Kopenhagenske škole, sekuritizacija je govorni čin kojim provoditelj sekuritizacije do tada nepolitizirani odnosno politizirani predmet debate prikazuje kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju prema referentnom objektu koja zahtijeva hitne mjere. Prvi narativ koji rad analizira je neizvjesna sigurnosna situacija u Europi i oko nje koja bi mogla prerasti u egzistencijalnu prijetnju društvu Europske unije i europskom identitetu zbog nepostojanja vojske Unije. Drugi, tome oprečni narativ pak interpretira uspostavu vojske Europske unije kao egzistencijalnu prijetnju NATO savezu i suverenitetu država članica Unije. Rad postavlja pitanje je li sekuritizacija upotrebljiva poluga u nastojanju provođenja odnosno blokiranja čvršće intergracije EU na području obrane. Analizom diskursa glavnih aktera, provoditelja sekuritizacije i sigurnosnih strategija EU, Velike Britanije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država te analizom prihvaćanja narativa od strane publike, rad zaključuje da su ti oba narativa činovi sekuritizacije. Prvi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane europskih federalista na čelu s predsjednikom Europske komisije Jean-Claudeom Junckerom, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštiti postavlja društvo EU i europski identitet. Egzistencijalna prijetnja referentnim objektima dolazi od ruske politike, ali i neizvjesne sigurnosne situacije u neposrednom susjedstvu EU-a. Ovaj narativ kao rješenje nameće uspostavu vojske EU-a. Drugi narativ, sekuritiziran od strane euroskeptika, NATO saveza te političkih elita Velike Britanije, SAD-a i Rusije, kao referentne objekte koji se pod hitno moraju zaštititi postavlja suverenitet država članica EU i opstanak NATO saveza koji se nalaze u egzistencijalnoj prijetnji od strane uspostave vojske Europske unije, čija bi uspostava oduzela nacionalne vojske tj. suverenitet država članica u području obrane, a postojanje NATO saveza učinilo izlišnim ; The thesis proves that around the establishment of the European Union army, we can infer two opposing narratives in European Union's media and political space and that both meet the conditions to be called a securitization. The first narrative (positive securitization) that the thesis analyses argues that the precarious the security situation in and around Europe could become an existential threat to the society of European Union (EU) and European identity because of the paucity of the EU army. The second narrative (negative securitization) that the thesis analyses interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the sovereignty of EU member states. Securitization is defined through the Theory of Securitisation by the scientists belonging to Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde) as a speech act by which an actor (securitizing actor) presents a specific issue, until then only politicised in the political or public space, as an existential threat to the referent object that requires extraordinary measures. For a speech act to be an act of securitization and not just an attempt of securitisation, public (or a target group) needs to accept the speech as such. Thus, the Theory of Securitization affirms that the chosen narratives are acts of securitizations through discourse analysis and public opinion analysis. Elements of securitization are before mentioned securitization actor, referent object and public, as well as functional actors, which indirectly affect security decisions by lobbing or directing the securitization actors, and context, as a speech act cannot be an independent factor in the securitization process but is dependent on historical, political, societal, economic, geographic, and other variables. The principal difference between Theory of Securitisation and the mainstream security theories: Traditional Security Studies (TSS) and Critical Security Studies (CSS), is that Theory of Securitization is not concerned if the issue that a speech act wants to present as a security issue, really is a security issue, but how a speech act presents the issue as a security issue. Unlike the Theory of Securitisation, TSS is a realistic security theory that examines is the issue a real security threat while CSS is a constructive security theory that examines the reality of security threat. Both, TSS and CSS, analyze already present security threat, while Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat. Positive securitisation, the precarious security situation in and around Europe that could become an existential threat to the society of the EU because of the paucity of the EU army, is securitised by European federalists headed by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and HR/VP Federica Mogherini. Referent objects that are in urgent need of protection are the EU society and the European identity (values and principles) that are in the existential threat of Russia and uncertain security situation in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. As a solution for the existential threat, securitising actors impose the establishment of the EU army. Functional actors of positive securitisation are stakeholders in the European defence industry who have a purely economic reason for the backing of positive securitisation, and European elite which advocates the federalisation of the European Union. The prime public, core target group, for the positive securitisation should be the Heads of 28 EU member states who make decisions concerning Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). As the decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous, and some member states, mostly United Kingdom (UK), steadily use the instrument of veto to block further development of the CSDP, the thesis assumes that the securitising actors of positive securitisation decided to expand the target group for their securitisation onto European Union society as a whole. Reasons behind the expansion of the target public, which thus makes the whole society of the European Union a the public is a pressure onto the Heads of EU member states since the citizens of the EU have a very favourable opinion about the further development of the CSDP and mostly positive opinion regarding the establishment of the EU army. Negative securitisation, which interprets the establishment of the EU army as an existential a threat to the NATO and the sovereignty of EU member states, is a complex form of securitisation. Instead of one securitising actor or one group of securitising actors with the same motive (European federalist with Juncker as champion in positive securitisation), negative securitisation is securitised by several securitising actors without the leading champion with sometimes the same and sometimes different motives: Eurosceptics, NATO, decision-makers in the United Kingdom, the United States (US) and Russia. Furthermore, negative securitisation accumulates the referent objects that are in urgent need of protection: the sovereignty of the EU member states and the survival of the NATO alliance. The only element of the negative securitisation that is unambiguous is the existential threat from the establishment of the EU army whose establishment would take away the national armies, i.e. the sovereignty of the EU member states and made the NATO alliance vulnerable. Hence, for the sake of simplicity of understanding the elements of negative securitisation and their synergy, the thesis uses the Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) for the proper consideration of the patterns of the security connections. Using discourse analysis of the speech acts and official documents the thesis shows how the decision-makers in the US (regardless of their political affiliation) securitise the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to NATO and future of Atlantic security cooperation. Same is evident with the NATO as a securitising actor. The decision-makers in the UK (mostly conservatives) securitise the establishment of the EU army and further development of CSDP as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states. Russia too securitises the establishment of the EU army as an existential threat to the national sovereignty of EU member states but does the deed backstage financially supporting nationalist and Eurosceptic EU parties and via cyber-attacks and disinformation campaign. Functional actors of negative securitisation are stakeholders in the non-EU defence industry and other industries which prosper due to unstable global security situation, private military organisations, non-independent think thanks, etc. The public for the negative securitisation is the Eurosceptic part of the EU society, but the core target group are the citizens of the UK. Securitising actors of the negative securitisation narrowed the public of their securitisation for the same reason why the securitising actors of the positive securitisation broaden theirs – decisions concerning CSDP must be unanimous. Consequently, the securitising actors of the negative securitisation to be successful in their securitisation need to persuade only citizens of the UK that their narrative is correct. As already mentioned, the Theory of Securitisation analyses the creation of the security threat, so very important for the understanding of the results of discourse analysis is the context behind the construction of the securitisation. In the case of the securitisations analysed in the thesis, the contexts of both narratives have foundations in the conflict between neorealist and neoliberal doctrines in foreign politics, different security strategies of the countries, and change in a global security system, as well as historical, political, societal, economic, geographic and other variables. No EU member state can be a superpower on its own in today's world. This notion and aim to hinder the possibility of another armed conflict in Europe prompted the creation of the Union. After more than 60 years of enlargement and integration, the EU is an economic superpower. Nevertheless, to protect its economic superiority as well as to impose its doctrine in foreign politics and expand its multilateral security strategy, the EU needs to be and defence union. This idea is not a new one but exists and was attempted to be implemented from the beginning of the EU existence. The securitising actors of the positive securitisation believe that with the establishment of the EU army, the EU can keep the US hegemony in the global security system and the Russian renewal of bloc-system aspirations under control. Some securitising actors of the positive securitisation also believe that the further integration of the EU is necessary to prevent the disintegration. Above all, is the strong desire of the EU elite for the federation of the EU. Expectedly, not least because of the postulate of the security dilemma, the US and Russia are afraid of the military-strong EU which could change the current global security system, while the UK believes that with the strengthening of the EU its military and political strength will wane or disappear. As the UK is the EU member state and its citizens are the most Eurosceptic the public in the EU, both and the US and Russia focused most of their securitisation's efforts toward the UK's citizens. The US also uses the UK as a tool of disruption in the EU – it's right to veto decisions about the further development of CSDP, integration of the EU in the defence field and the establishment of the EU army. The thesis hypothesises that the two opposed narratives that the thesis considers to be securitisations have generated the status quo in the development of CSDP. Through the discourse analysis of speech acts and the official documents of securitising actors of both narratives as well as analysis of the acceptance of narratives by the audience (public opinion analysis), the thesis positively answers the research question: Is the securitisation theory usable the instrument in the effort to implement/block more effective EU integration?