Suchergebnisse

Part of a dispute some 66 million years in the making, Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC considered for the first time whether dinosaur fossils—specifically a one-of-a-kind specimen containing entombed "dueling dinosaurs"—qualified as "minerals" for the purposes of a property transaction under Montana law. Finding no consistent statutory or dictionary definition for "mineral," the Ninth Circuit relied on a test previously utilized by the Montana Supreme Court to hold that the dinosaur fossils constituted minerals due to their rare and exceptional qualities and were therefore part of the property's mineral estate. The decision was promptly nullified, however, as the Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and the Montana legislature passed a measure declaring dinosaur fossils part of the surface estate under state law.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabiltiy Act, commonly known as CERCLA, facilitates cleanup of hazardous waste sites and those contaminated by other harmful substances by empowering the Environmental Protection Agency to identify responsible parties and require them to undertake or fund remediation. Because pollution sometimes occurrs over long periods of time by multiple parties, CERCLA also enables polluters to seek financial contribution from other contaminators of a particular site. The Ninth Circuit clarified the particuar circumstances under which contribution actions may arise in Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., holding non-CERCLA settlements may give rise to CERCLA contribution actions, and corrective measures imposed under different environmental statutes may qualify as response actions required for a responsible party to seek contribution from another. In addition, the court clarified what constitutes resolved liability in such situations, another prerequisite for contribution actions. That final determination led it to vacate a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Richfield based on an erroneous conclusion that Asarco, in seeking financial contribution from Atlantic Fichfield for remediating a CERCLA site both had contaminated, exceeded the applicable statute of limitations. The case was thus remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Osage Nation, as owner of the beneficial interest in its mineral estate, issues federally-approved leases to persons and entities who wish to conduct mineral development on its lands. After an energy-development company, Osage Wind, leased privately-owned surface lands within Tribal reservation boundaries and began to excavate minerals for purposes of constructing a wind farm, the United States brought suit on the Tribe's behalf. In the ensuing litigation, the Osage Nation insisted that Osage Wind should have obtained a mineral lease from the Tribe before beginning its work. In its decision, the Tenth Circuit applied one of the Indian law canons of construction and concluded that the digging, crushing, and sorting of minerals by Osage Wind amounted to "mineral development" under the definition of "mining," and therefore required a mineral lease issued by the Osage Mineral Council.

In Tidyman's Management Services, Inc. v. Davis, (Tidyman's) the Montana Supreme Court neglected to address the underlying issue: whether an insurer's duty to defend is revocable. Although the Court did not directly address revocability, the holding requires an insurer to provide defense after it acknowledges a duty to defend even if the insurer knows of information that undisputedly negates coverage. Therefore, the Court indirectly held the duty to defend is irrevocable. The holding is consistent with legislative intent.

State territory — Acquisition of — Conquest and annexation — Annexation of Austria by Germany — Effect of Austrian State Treaty, 1955 — Status of Austria after termination of German control and prior to entry into force of State Treaty — Nature of nullity of German annexation.Jurisdiction — Territorial — Exemptions from — Foreign armed forces — Belligerent occupation — Jurisdiction of military tribunals of Occupant — Members of armed forces of occupant — Immunity from local law.646Belligerent occupation — Judicial functions of occupant — Members of armed forces of Occupying Power — Crimes committed by — Local law and courts — Immunity from.