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A hidden issue is whether the more de‐escalatory behavior of cooperatively‐motivated compared to competitively‐motivated conflict parties is the result of less concern for one's own goals, more concern for the other's goals, or both. A scenario study and a simulation experiment among undergraduate students confirmed the hypothesis that the difference in other‐concern is the critical explanator. The stronger other‐concern of cooperatively‐motivated compared to competitively motivated parties fostered more accommodating, more problem solving, more compromising, and less forcing, resulting in more de‐escalation or less escalation.

Presents evidence that the more deescalatory behavior of cooperative (vs competitive) conflict is a result of more concern for the other's goals. The findings of both a scenario study in which 72 college students in the Netherlands projected themselves into a conflict with another student & a simulation experiment in which 84 Dutch undergraduates participated in dyadic conflicts show that the stronger other-concern of cooperatively motivated conflict yields higher levels of accommodation, problem solving, & compromise & lower levels of forcing than seen in competitively motivated conflicts. These findings are a departure from conflict management models that are based on participants' levels of concern for their own goals. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 60 References. Adapted from the source document.

Analyzing social conflicts -- Underlying conditions for social conflicts -- The emergence of conflicts -- Alternative conflict strategies -- Adopting conflict strategies -- Escalation of conflicts -- De-escalation of conflicts -- Mediation in conflicts -- Settling conflicts -- Conflict outcomes and consequences -- Synthesis, specifications, and challenges

Civil conflicts undergo cycles of escalation. Beginning with riots, purges, and other violent acts of aggression, they escalate further and often culminate in outright civil war. This paper studies the effects of foreign aid on the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. We make three major contributions. First, we combine data on civil wars with data on low level conflicts in a new ordinal measure that captures the two-sided nature of conflict. Second, we study the effect of development aid on escalation and de-escalation. This allows us to give a rich description of how conflicts evolve dynamically, and to highlight the different roles played by bilateral aid in these transitions. We stress that low level conflicts matter since they are a violent expression of discontent over the distribution of rents (including aid) or of repression by the state. Third, we employ a new instrumental variable, which we then use to predict bilateral aid of DAC donor countries to 125 recipient countries over the period of 1975 to 2010. This solves the endogeneity concerns which have so far plagued the aid-conflict relationship. Our results show that the effect of foreign aid on the various transition probabilities is heterogeneous and sometimes very large. For example, receiving bilateral aid raises the chances of escalating from peace to small conflict, and from small conflict to armed conflict, but does not affect the transition from peace to civil war. Our main findings are robust to different estimation methods, controls and measures of conflict or foreign aid.

"Conflict Escalation" published on by Oxford University Press.

Dynamics of Violence: Processes of Escalation and De‐ Escalation in Violent Group Conflicts. Sociologus, Special Publication 1. Georg Elvert. Stephen Feuchtwang. and Dieter Neubert. eds. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1999 290 pp.