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Since 2004, the government of Turkey has undertaken a number of "decentralisation" reforms. A number of laws have been passed that give increased autonomy and resources to regional and local authorities and aim to reorganise the division of tasks and the relationships between these authorities and the central government. These reforms represent substantial change, since there had previously been practically no intermediate level between the central government and the citizens, and the decision-making centres in Ankara constituted serious bottlenecks that were regularly circumvented. The reform process raises a number of questions. What rationales led to the implementation of these reforms? Did the reforms result from the opening of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union, in 2005, or were domestic political processes also a factor? What real changes did these reforms introduce? What impact have they had on adjustments in the levels of government and the connections among them, and, more generally, on the Turkish political scene?

Since 2004, the government of Turkey has undertaken a number of "decentralisation" reforms. A number of laws have been passed that give increased autonomy and resources to regional and local authorities and aim to reorganise the division of tasks and the relationships between these authorities and the central government. These reforms represent substantial change, since there had previously been practically no intermediate level between the central government and the citizens, and the decision-making centres in Ankara constituted serious bottlenecks that were regularly circumvented. The reform process raises a number of questions. What rationales led to the implementation of these reforms? Did the reforms result from the opening of negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union, in 2005, or were domestic political processes also a factor? What real changes did these reforms introduce? What impact have they had on adjustments in the levels of government and the connections among them, and, more generally, on the Turkish political scene?

Decentralisation as a concept is attracting a lot of interest, not least with the rise of decentralised and distributed techno-social systems like Bitcoin, and distributed ledgers more generally. In this paper, we first define decentralisation as it is implemented for technical architectures and then discuss the technical, social, political and economic ideas that drive the development of decentralised, and in particular, distributed systems. We argue that technical efforts towards decentralisation tend to go hand-in-hand with ambitions for rearranging power dynamics. We caution, however, against simplistic understandings of power in relation to the decentralisation-centralisation spectrum, and argue that in practice, decentralisation might very well be served by and produce centralising effects. The paper then goes on to discuss the critical literature that highlights some of the common assumptions and critiques made about decentralisation and the pros and cons of a decentralised approach. Finally, we propose some of the missing parts to current debates about decentralisation, and argue for a more nuanced and grounded approach to the centralisation/decentralisation dichotomy.

The rapidly evolving blockchain technology space has put decentralisation back into the focus of the design of techno-social systems, and the role of decentralised technological infrastructures in achieving particular social, economic, or political goals. In this entry we address how blockchains and distributed ledgers think about decentralisation.

This article aims to examine what Indonesia has achieved in the last decades of decentralisation. In other words, has decentralisation brought about what its prominent advocators yearned for? How do "decentralisers"-- supporters and prominent advocators of local autonomy - play their roles in re-actualising or reinventing their local identities? How has local identity emerged within the state's territory? Empirically, most new splitting regions (pemekaran) (both province and district) are formed through mobilisation of etnhnic and religious sentiments. Specifically, ethnic politics continue to contribute to the development of the West Sulawesi. Decentralisation, at the changing political landscape, has been seen as a new opportunity and arena for local elites to compete against others to control the local governments.

[Victor von Andrian-Werburg] ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Austr. 113

Fact Sheets on Decentralisation in Africa provide clear and accessible materials to assist policymakers, practitioners, students and the public at large to better understand the various concepts and mechanisms associated with decentralisation. They focus primarily on local government and unpack the 'toolbox' of instruments and concepts that make up the broader framework for decentralisation. These concepts are often difficult, multifaceted and located in complex theory. The aim of the Fact Sheets is to present them in such a way that they can be understood by a wide range of audiences, and which identifies, explains and distinguishes key concepts relevant to the African context.

There is a popular belief among decentralists that if local governments have the power to generate and spend revenue, without relying on central government funding, their expenditure will be pro-poor and will improve the lives of local people. Such views have influenced recent calls for greater decentralisation in developing countries in general and Africa in particular. However, evidence from Ghana casts some doubts on this view. A brief comparison of the expenditure and revenue patterns of the poorest and richest local governments there suggests that local governments are not inherently pro-poor and that locally generated funds might be used in ways that do not reflect the needs of the locality as a whole. Thus the fiscal devolution view of decentralisation appears to be out of kilter with reality. To discuss this issue, the three sections in this paper summarise the assumptions and perceived benefits of decentralisation, describe decentralisation in Ghana, and analyse the revenue and expenditure patterns of the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority and the Kasena Nankana District Assembly.

Europeanization can be regarded as a process that finds expression in the gradual redefinition of state sovereignty and the development of supranational common institutions (e.g. Agreement of Schengen, Court of Justice, Euro currency). In parallel, territorial subsidiarity seeks to provide for a greater sub-state say in areas of social policy-making often linked to cultural or identity considerations. This paper deals with welfare development in the European social model in contemporary times. While a paradigm shift in macro-economic policies has allowed for monetary centralisation and a growing matching of EU internal 'open' markets, the quest for the decentralization of welfare programmes has also aimed at meeting demands for policy innovation and a more effective management. Allegedly, welfare provision by sub-state diversity may affect collective solidarity and redistribution. The emergence of new social risks and the role played by the mesogovernments in welfare reform in Europe are also subject to analysis and discussion in this chapter. ; Peer reviewed

This paper offers a commentary on what decentralisation has come to mean in India, based on recent research conducted in Kerala, one of the southern states. In particular, the paper discusses the tensions between 'regionalism' and 'localism'. It begins with a brief outline of how decentralisation is conceived within the broad literature. This is followed by a case study, where the shifts in forms of decentralisation adopted by the Kerala state government are examined. The paper concludes with key findings that underpin an understanding of decentralisation within the Indian context.

In 2001, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation programme throughout the country. The new programme aimed at countering citizens' social, economic and political marginalisation which was widely viewed as constituting one of the principal drivers of the horrific genocide in 1994 in which almost one million Rwandans were brutally massacred. This research aims at analysing the extent to which Rwanda's decentralisation process is meeting these aims. Employing a framework which differentiates between procedural participation (electoral participation); substantive participation (ongoing active participation in local decision making); and participation as cost-sharing (ongoing participation through financial contributions and voluntary labour), four main findings are discussed. First, although there is much talk among officials and commentators about bottom-up planning processes emanating from local village meetings (formerly ubudehe and now umuganda), and while such an ethos underpins the original Decentralisation Policy formulated in 2001, the accompanying legislation is somewhat scant in its references to such a form of participation as well as to mechanisms whereby this might take place. Instead, a focus on community mobilisation in participation as cost-sharing is more apparent. Second, a shift in emphasis within the decentralisation programme over time is evident. The current national strategy of fast-track economic development as a route out of poverty has been superimposed on the original goal of reconciliation and community building with an attendant emphasis on results over process. This is evident in the 2013 revisions to the Decentralisation Policy as well as in the shift, during the second phase, from political decentralisation toward administrative decentralisation evidenced in the introduction of public management frameworks such as the imihigo and the emphasis on the administrative capacity of local leaders. It is also evident in the demise of the local planning ...

There has been a trend towards decentralisation throughout the world with the heated discussions about its advantages, mainly from the last five decades. Perceived advantages of decentralisation are ranging from better public service delivery to public involvement in the governance process to mobilisation of revenue resources. Most of the countries throughout the world are strengthening their local governments as priority is given on their development policy framework. India is also become a highly decentralised country after the passage of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts. Decentralisation in India can be seen in three different aspects- political, administrative and fiscal, but still needs to do more to meet all its objectives. Even after empowering the local governments with taxing powers, however, it is still lagging behind in terms of fiscal decentralisation. This paper is an attempt to highlight some challenges to fiscal decentralisation to Panchayats in India.

This paper presents a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction, a fixed public budget must be financed with a wage tax and a head-tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralisation equilibria. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. Inefficiency may be higher under utilitarian governments or majoritarian ones. If local governments are utilitarian, the more productive jurisdiction is better off at the first best than with tax competition, while the other is worst off. If they are majoritarian, both jurisdictions will under some conditions prefer the tax decentralisation to the first best.

This paper presents a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction, a fixed public budget must be financed with a wage tax and a head-tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralisation equilibria. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. Inefficiency may be higher under utilitarian governments or majoritarian ones. If local governments are utilitarian, the more productive jurisdiction is better off at the first best than with tax competition, while the other is worst off. If they are majoritarian, both jurisdictions will under some conditions prefer the tax decentralisation to the first best.

Existing explanations of individual preferences for decentralisation and secession focus on collective identity, economic considerations and party politics. This paper contributes to this literature by showing that preferences for fiscal and political decentralisation are also driven by concern about the quality of government in the face of corruption. It makes two claims. Firstly, information on national-level corruption decreases satisfaction with national politicians, and subsequently increases preferences for decentralisation and secession. Secondly, information on regional-level corruption pushes citizens of highly corrupt regions to prefer national retrenchment and unitary states. The effects of this political compensation mechanism crosscut national identities and involve regions that are not ethnically or economically different from the core. We test our argument using a survey experiment in Spain and confirm its cross-national generalisability with data from the European Values Study.