Suchergebnisse

U radu se opisuje i komentira The Local Government Reform Project (2000–2007) u Hrvatskoj, navode njegove temeljne premise te sistematizira rad na Projektu. Radilo se na četiri reformska pravca – jačanje decentralizacijske politike, prijenos znanja i vještina radi jačanja odgovornosti, oblikovanje institucija te suradnja s medijima obavještavanje lokalnih samoupravnih jedinica i građana. Jačanje decentralizacijske politike nastojalo se provesti, na primjer, iniciranjem obuhvatne decentralizacijske reforme, radom na promjenama i poboljšanjima zakonodavstva, jačanjem uloge Udruge gradova te izgradnjom mreže za zagovaranje decentralizacije. Prijenos znanja i vještina nastojao se provesti usavršavanjem lokalnih službenika, poboljšanjem metoda upravljanja lokalnom imovinom i financijama, usavršavanjem postupaka i prakse javne nabave i investicija, izradom kompjutorskog programa za upravljanje lokalnim financijama, nastojanjem oko primjene mjera e-upravljanja u lokalnoj samoupravi, itd. Izgradnja institucija bila je usmjerena prema Udruzi gradova, Akademiji lokalne demokracije, obrazovnim inicijativama širom zemlje te jačanju suradnje lokalnih samoupravnih jedinica. Pristup je bio participativan, odozdo-prema-gore, praktičan i podupirući. ; The Local Government Reform Project (2000–2007) in Croatia is described and commented. Main premises are noticed and work within the Project systematised. There were four reform directions – policy reform with a focus on decentralization, knowledge and skill transfer to increase accountability, institution building, and, finally, media outreach and local government and citizen information. Measures for reaching policy reform were, for example, introduction of a comprehensive decentralization reform, improvement of respective legislation, strengthening the role of the Association of Cities and building advocacy network. Knowledge and skills transfer was attempted by building capacity of local government professionals, working on asset and internal financial management, procurement and investment procedures and practices, creating new software with regard to financial management, promoting e-government measures, etc. Institution building was concentrated on the Association of Cities, the Local Democracy Academy, education initiatives throughout the country, and localgovernment cooperation. The overall approach was participative, bottom-up, practical, and supportive.

Pojam "centralizacije" počeo se koristiti u Francuskoj krajem 18. stoljeća kada je nakon revolucije stvorena nova struktura vlade. Pojam "decentralizacije" u upotrebu je ušao početkom 19. stoljeća. Ideje slobode i decentralizacije provodili su tijekom 19. i 20. stoljeća protudrţavni politički aktivisti koji su sebe nazivali "anarhistima", "libertarijancima", pa čak i decentralistima. Tocqueville, jedan od zagovornika decentralizacije je istaknuo da decentralizacija ima ne samo administrativnu vrijednost već i graĎansku dimenziju, jer povećava mogućnosti za graĎane da se zainteresiraju za javne poslove. I od akumulacije tih lokalnih, aktivnih, pronicljivih sloboda, raĎa se najučinkovitija protuteţa središnjoj vladi, čak i ako bi bila podrţavana od neosobne, kolektivne volje. Veliki broj zemalja u razvoju i tranzicijskih zemalja započeo je neki oblik programa decentralizacije. Taj je trend povezan sa sve većim zanimanjem za ulogu civilnog društva i privatnog sektora kao partnera vladama u traţenju novih načina pruţanja usluga. Decentralizacija upravljanja i jačanje kapaciteta lokalne uprave dijelom je i funkcija širih društvenih trendova, što uključuje, na primjer, općenito rastuće nepovjerenje u vladu, propast nekih od najcentraliziranijih reţima na svijetu (npr. Sovjetskog Saveza) i novonastale separatističke zahtjeve koji se rutinski pojavljuju u pojedinim dijelovima svijeta. Pokret prema lokalnoj odgovornosti i većoj kontroli nad nečijom sudbinom nije, meĎutim, rezultat samo negativnog stava prema središnjoj vladi. Umjesto toga, ovaj razvoj dogaĎaja uglavnom je potaknut snaţnom ţeljom za većim sudjelovanjem graĎana i organizacije privatnog sektora u funkciji upravljanja. ; The term "centralization" began to be used in France in the late 18th century when, after the revolution, a new government structure was created. The term "decentralization" came into use in the early 19th century. The ideas of freedom and decentralization were implemented during the 19th and 20th centuries by anti-state political activists who called themselves "anarchists," "libertarians," and even decentralizers. Tocqueville, one of the proponents of decentralization, pointed out that decentralization has not only an administrative value but also a civic dimension, as it increases opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs. And from the accumulation of these local, active, insightful freedoms, the most effective counterbalance to central government is born, even if it were supported by an impersonal, collective will. A large number of developing and transition countries have embarked on some form of decentralization program. This trend is linked to the growing interest in the role of civil society and the private sector as partners to governments in seeking new ways of providing services. Decentralization of governance and strengthening the capacity of local government is partly a function of broader social trends, which include, for example, growing distrust of government, the collapse of some of the world's most centralized regimes (eg the Soviet Union) and emerging separatist demands that routinely emerge in some parts of the world. The movement towards local responsibility and greater control over one's destiny is not, however, the result of only a negative attitude towards the central government. Instead, this development is largely driven by a strong desire for greater citizen participation and private sector organization in the governance function.

Pojam "centralizacije" počeo se koristiti u Francuskoj krajem 18. stoljeća kada je nakon revolucije stvorena nova struktura vlade. Pojam "decentralizacije" u upotrebu je ušao početkom 19. stoljeća. Ideje slobode i decentralizacije provodili su tijekom 19. i 20. stoljeća protudrţavni politički aktivisti koji su sebe nazivali "anarhistima", "libertarijancima", pa čak i decentralistima. Tocqueville, jedan od zagovornika decentralizacije je istaknuo da decentralizacija ima ne samo administrativnu vrijednost već i graĎansku dimenziju, jer povećava mogućnosti za graĎane da se zainteresiraju za javne poslove. I od akumulacije tih lokalnih, aktivnih, pronicljivih sloboda, raĎa se najučinkovitija protuteţa središnjoj vladi, čak i ako bi bila podrţavana od neosobne, kolektivne volje. Veliki broj zemalja u razvoju i tranzicijskih zemalja započeo je neki oblik programa decentralizacije. Taj je trend povezan sa sve većim zanimanjem za ulogu civilnog društva i privatnog sektora kao partnera vladama u traţenju novih načina pruţanja usluga. Decentralizacija upravljanja i jačanje kapaciteta lokalne uprave dijelom je i funkcija širih društvenih trendova, što uključuje, na primjer, općenito rastuće nepovjerenje u vladu, propast nekih od najcentraliziranijih reţima na svijetu (npr. Sovjetskog Saveza) i novonastale separatističke zahtjeve koji se rutinski pojavljuju u pojedinim dijelovima svijeta. Pokret prema lokalnoj odgovornosti i većoj kontroli nad nečijom sudbinom nije, meĎutim, rezultat samo negativnog stava prema središnjoj vladi. Umjesto toga, ovaj razvoj dogaĎaja uglavnom je potaknut snaţnom ţeljom za većim sudjelovanjem graĎana i organizacije privatnog sektora u funkciji upravljanja. ; The term "centralization" began to be used in France in the late 18th century when, after the revolution, a new government structure was created. The term "decentralization" came into use in the early 19th century. The ideas of freedom and decentralization were implemented during the 19th and 20th centuries by anti-state political activists ...

Ukidanjem ureda državne uprave u siječnju 2020., poslovi koje su obavljali uredi kao prvostupanjska tijela državne uprave povjereni su na obavljanje županijama u njihov preneseni djelokrug čime je model dekoncentriranog obavljanja poslova državne uprave u Hrvatskoj zamijenjen modelom upravne decentralizacije. U radu se stoga prikazuju obilježja prenesenog djelokruga kao modela organizacije obavljanja poslova državne uprave u teritorijalnim jedinicama te upravne decentralizacije čiji je preneseni djelokrug institucijski rezultat. Pregled znanstvene literature o prenesenom djelokrugu i efektima provođenja upravne decentralizacije dopunjen je komparativnim prikazom efekata primjene prenesenog djelokruga u češkoj i njemačkoj lokalnoj samoupravi. Na temelju teorijskih razmatranja i komparativnih iskustava, raspravlja se o mogućim učincima primjene prenesenog djelokruga u hrvatskim županijama na njihov institucionalni razvoj i obavljanje prenesenih poslova. ; After the abolition of the county administrative offices in January 2020, the tasks performed by the county administrative offices as first-instance state administration bodies were delegated to the counties, as the second level self-government units in Croatia. By this organizational change, the model of deconcentrated performance of state administration tasks was replaced by the model of administrative decentralization. In this context, the paper presents the features of the delegated scope of competence as an organizational performance model of state administration tasks in territorial units and administrative decentralization with a delegated scope of competence as an institutional result. The review of the scholarly literature on the delegated scope of competence and the effects of administrative decentralization is supported by a comparative review of the delegated scope of competence in the Czech and German local self-government. Based on theoretical considerations and comparative practices, the paper discusses the possible effects of the application of the delegated scope of competence in Croatian counties on their institutional development and performance of the delegated tasks.

After the abolition of the county administrative offices in January 2020, the tasks performed by the county administrative offices as first-instance state administration bodies were delegated to the counties, as the second level self-government units in Croatia. By this organizational change, the model of deconcentrated performance of state administration tasks was replaced by the model of administrative decentralization. In this context, the paper presents the features of the delegated scope of competence as an organizational performance model of state administration tasks in territorial units and administrative decentralization with a delegated scope of competence as an institutional result. The review of the scholarly literature on the delegated scope of competence and the effects of administrative decentralization is supported by a comparative review of the delegated scope of competence in the Czech and German local self-government. Based on theoretical considerations and comparative practices, the paper discusses the possible effects of the application of the delegated scope of competence in Croatian counties on their institutional development and performance of the delegated tasks. ; Ukidanjem ureda državne uprave u siječnju 2020., poslovi koje su obavljali uredi kao prvostupanjska tijela državne uprave povjereni su na obavljanje županijama u njihov preneseni djelokrug čime je model dekoncentriranog obavljanja poslova državne uprave u Hrvatskoj zamijenjen modelom upravne decentralizacije. U radu se stoga prikazuju obilježja prenesenog djelokruga kao modela organizacije obavljanja poslova državne uprave u teritorijalnim jedinicama te upravne decentralizacije čiji je preneseni djelokrug institucijski rezultat. Pregled znanstvene literature o prenesenom djelokrugu i efektima provođenja upravne decentralizacije dopunjen je komparativnim prikazom efekata primjene prenesenog djelokruga u češkoj i njemačkoj lokalnoj samoupravi. Na temelju teorijskih razmatranja i komparativnih iskustava, raspravlja se o mogućim učincima primjene prenesenog djelokruga u hrvatskim županijama na njihov institucionalni razvoj i obavljanje prenesenih poslova.

Visoke i rastuće regionalne ekonomske nejednakosti u Hrvatskoj uz »parcijalnu decentralizaciju« sustava socijalne skrbi rezultirale su porastom socijalnih nejednakosti među hrvatskim građanima. Spomenuti procesi rezultirali su situacijom da se jedno od temeljnih načela socijalne države i socijalne politike kao što je načelo jednakosti sve više narušava. Navedeno ima za posljedicu da razina ostvarenja socijalnih prava građana u Hrvatskoj u sve većoj mjeri ovise o mjestu stanovanja i socioekonomskom statusu. Navedena tvrdnja je središnja hipoteza rada koja je eksplicirana analizom dostupnosti institucionalne skrbi za starije osobe po županijama u Hrvatskoj i lokalnih socijalnih programa izabrane četiri jedinice lokalne samouprave. Provedena analiza pokazala je značajnu razinu međužupanijskih nejednakosti u dostupnosti institucionalne skrbi za starije te isto tako analizom izdvajanja i strukture lokalnih socijalnih programa demonstrirala da je stupanj ostvarenja socijalnih prava građana Hrvatske u značajnoj mjeri neujednačen i ovisan o mjestu stanovanja i socioekonomskom statusu. Uzroci za navedenu situaciju nalaze se u neuspješnim politikama ujednačavanja regionalnog razvoja i parcijalno provedenoj decentralizaciji sustava socijalne skrbi. Zaključno poglavlje donosi određene preporuke za nositelje ekonomske i socijalne politike kojima bi se demonstrirane i rastuće socijalne nejednakosti hrvatskih građana potencijalno ublažile. ; High and increasing regional economic inequality with 'partial decentralization' of social welfare system in Croatia resulted in an increase of social inequality among Croatian citizens. The aforementioned processes resulted in a situation in which one of fundamental principles of social welfare and social policy, such as the principle of equality, is being seriously impaired. The result of that is that the realization of social rights of citizens in Croatia is increasingly dependent on the place of residence and socio-economic status. This claim is a central hypothesis of the paper which was demonstrated by analyzing the availability of institutional care for the elderly by county in Croatia and an analysis of local social programs of four selected units of local self-government. The analysis demonstrated a significant level of inter-county disparities in the availability of institutional care for the elderly and the analysis of local social programs has shown that the degree of realization of social rights of Croatian citizens is largely uneven and dependent on the place of residence and socio-economic status. The causes for that situation had come from the unsuccessful policies of harmonization of regional development and partial decentralization of the social welfare system. The final chapter provides specific recommendations for economic and social policy makers with potential positive effects which would decrease social inequality of Croatian citizens in the future.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.